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Abstract
In this thesis, I aim to investigate and challenge cisgenderism— the ideology that 
delegitimises people’s own designations of their genders and bodies. In Chapter 1 ,1 
discuss the epistemological concerns that informed my decision to apply a bricolage 
approach, explain how I applied bricolage techniques in my research, and introduce 
the cisgenderism framework. In Chapter 2 ,1 conduct a bibliometric analysis to 
identify the four most widely cited empirical papers in the field of sexist language 
research in English. I then discursively analyse these four empirical papers for the 
cisgenderist assumptions that can lead to misgendering and explore the implications 
of this misgendering. In Chapter 3 ,1 shift my disciplinary focus from feminist 
research to psychology with a quantitative content analysis of pathologising and 
misgendering forms of cisgenderism in psychological literature on children’s genders 
and gender-associated expression from 1999-2008. In Chapter 4 ,1 conduct two 
experiments that that use Trader’s (1954) diagram of infant genital ‘virilisation’ to 
explore whether framing effects in ostensibly ‘neutral’ and ‘value-free’ medical 
communication about infant genitals can affect laypeople’s decisions to recommend 
or reject ‘normalising’ infant genital surgery. In Chapter 5 ,1 conduct two studies of 
people’s self-reported experiences of being misgendered and misgendering others. I 
explore whether perceptions of the adverse effects of misgendering differ between 
targets and sources of misgendering, between people who report being perceived as 
‘trans’ and people who report that they are not, and between people who report 
having matching and mismatched identity documents. I complement the quantitative 
empirical findings with an analysis of qualitative participant narratives of having 
been misgendered and having misgendered others. Chapter 6 concludes this thesis 
with a restatement of the aims of this research, a synthesis of how the six bricolage 
techniques I employed contributed to my findings in Chapters 2-5, and a discussion 
of how these findings can inform interventions to reduce cisgenderism.
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Chapter 1
Crafting A Bricolage Approach
[1.1] Aims of this research
In this thesis, I investigate and challenge cisgenderism, the delegitimisation of 
people’s own designations of their genders and bodies, in a variety of contexts. I 
have three main aims: First, I aim to develop and refine a new psychological 
framework for thinking about and studying forms of gender and body 
delegitimisation. By applying this new framework—the cisgenderism framework—I 
aim to address some of the limitations of previous research frameworks such as 
transphobia, genderism, and anti-trans prejudice that will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Second, using the cisgenderism framework, I aim to present research about 
forms of gender and body delegitimisation that have been overlooked or addressed 
only obliquely in previous psychological research, such as misgendering (Chapters 2, 
3 and 5) and extra-linguistic forms of communicating cisgenderist ideology, such as 
those occurring through medical diagrams (Chapter 4). Third, I aim to inform 
effective strategies for challenging forms of cisgenderism (Chapters 2-6).
[1.2] Researching psychologies of gender/sex: Epistemological considerations
When considering how to approach the study of cisgenderism, I first evaluated the 
relevance of existing research using the concept of epistemology. The concept of 
epistemology has been used to describe the study of the sources, structures, historical 
and sociopolitical contexts, and limitations that affect the production and 
dissemination of disciplinary knowledge (e.g., Riger, 2002; Foucault, 1966/1994). A 
key assumption of epistemological enquiry—research motivated by or concerned 
with epistemology—is that facts are not politically and theoretically neutral ‘truths’ 
that are merely uncovered in the pursuit of knowledge. Epistemological enquiry is 
often motivated by the recognition that knowledge production—an important aim of 
psychological research—can both reflect and enact ideology. In the context of his 
argument for a ‘rhetorical psychology’, social psychologist Michael Billig describes 
ideology as ‘the common sense of a community’ that ‘is said to maintain the social 
relations of power’ (Billig, 1991, p. 7). Consequently, researchers who approach 
their topic with an awareness of epistemology, as actualised through the conduct of 
epistemological enquiry, can call attention to ideology in the form of taken-for- 
granted assumptions and societal practices. An important aspect of Billig’s 
description is the recognition that ideological processes can justify, validate.
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undermine, or silence particular societal structures, practices, experiences, and social 
relations of power (e.g., Foucault, 1980, 1981). In light of this recognition, I begin 
my research of delegitimisations of people’s genders and bodies by considering 
epistemological debates regarding the scientific study o f ‘gender’.
It has been longstanding and normative practice in the field of psychology to 
promote the use of operational definitions when researching constructs (e.g.. Boring, 
1945). Experimental psychologist Edwin Boring, who is credited with being one of 
the first to study the history of psychology as a psychological research exercise (e.g., 
O’Donnell, 2002), advocated the use of operational definitions to unify scientific 
thinking and resolve controversy. According to Boring (1945), the aim of science is: 
...the simplification of our knowledge of nature under a set of broad 
generalizations, and the simplification is greatest when laws are stated in a 
single language... Scientific controversy... occurs usually in connection with 
the interpretation of the data, arising on the occasion of the validation of 
concepts or because of the ambiguity of meaning of conceptual entities. 
Positivistic procedures force such concepts and entities back to their 
observational bases and thus out of the realm of disagreement (p. 243).
In this vision of psychological research. Boring characterised complexity, 
multilinearity and controversy as problematic elements that undermine scientific 
enquiry. Boring’s above-referenced statement that the positivistic procedures for 
which he advocates ‘force such concepts and entities... out of the realm of 
disagreement’ can be interpreted as his recommendation for the use of force to 
subjugate complexity, multilinearity, and controversy. This application of force 
promotes silences about dissenting narratives and refusal to recognise discussion of 
these silences as science. Thus the process through which scientific knowledge is 
unified in so doing relegates absences and omissions to the status of mere 
observation, as beyond the limits of scientific enquiry. This issue will be revisited in 
more detail later in this chapter, when I discuss bricolage techniques.
That Boring did not provide an operational definition of ‘gender’, ‘sex’, or 
‘woman’ in his work (e.g.. Boring, 1951) speaks to the equally longstanding practice 
in psychology of treating gender as a universally intelligible and meaningful concept
18
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that requires no explanation (see also Winston, 2002, for a critique of Boring’s 
uncritical and antisemitic use of ‘race’ when describing his Jewish students).
Boring’s assumptions about ‘gender’ and ‘sex’ also functioned to obscure 
discriminatory practices against women psychologists after World War II. For 
example. Boring’s collaborations with feminist psychologist Alice Bryan (e.g., Bryan 
& Boring, 1944; Bryan & Boring, 1946; Bryan & Boring, 1947) were motivated in 
large part by Boring’s attempt to convince Bryan that ‘the woman problem’ (i.e., 
women’s under-representation in positions of scientific leadership in psychology) 
was the result of differences between women and men rather than the result of 
discrimination against women. Boring’s claim that women did not experience 
discrimination in professional psychology was undermined by documentation of his 
previous discriminatory practices, such as barring women from entry to laboratories 
without a man to chaperone and other behaviours that restricted the professional 
practice of women psychologists (see Capshew & Laszlo, 1986 for further 
discussion). This practice of overlooking possible disagreement over the definition of 
‘gender’ by omitting its operational definition, even among researchers who advocate 
the use of such definitions, continues to characterise psychological research. Even 
psychological texts that aim to critique biological essentialism and reductionist views 
of gender typically fail to define gender and treat the category of gender itself as 
unproblematic (e.g., Hyde, 2005; Parlee, 1996; Unger, 2001).
Boring’s (1945) above-referenced claim that the use of operational definitions 
can remove ‘the ambiguity of meaning of conceptual entities’, and thus remove 
dissent, was his attempt to praise this removal of dissent as a beneficial result of 
‘positivistic procedures’ (ibid., p. 243). Although Boring was promoting such 
procedures, his statement is a reminder that scientific techniques, such as the use of 
operational definitions, can have the unfortunate political consequence of 
suppressing critiques of ideology in science. Yet the omission of such operational 
definitions for gender-related concepts can enact a similar erasure of dissenting 
views in psychological research, when this omission leads psychologists to assume 
that the constructs of gender and sex have a singular meaning and context for all 
people. I argue that the absence of operational definitions for gender in psychology 
functions to silence disagreement and to obscure ambiguity and multiplicity of
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meanings. This absence of operational definitions for gender in psychology 
simplifies psychological understandings of ‘nature under a broad set of 
generalisations’ in similar fashion to the aims described by Boring (1945), when he 
promotes the use of such definitions. In the absence of visible discursive explanations, 
it is these largely invisible and largely unchallenged generalisations that define 
operationally the construct of ‘gender’ in psychology. I will illustrate how the 
absence of such operational definitions can facilitate the erasure of dissent and 
ambiguity using the example of psychological research on the relation between 
gender and pink-blue colour preferences.
American studies researcher Jo Paoletti, whose background in studying the 
history of clothing and fashion informed Pink and blue: Telling the boys from the 
girls in America (Paoletti, 2012), examined two distinct historical claims about the 
relation between pink-blue colour preferences and gender. The first claim is that 
pink-blue gender coding was reversed in decades prior to the 1950s, and the second 
is that pink-blue gender coding was inconsistent until the 1950s. Paoletti provided 
compelling evidence for both hypotheses, although the evidence appears to align 
more closely with the inconsistency hypothesis. As part of the diverse forms of 
evidence discussed in this text, Paoletti reproduced a chart of colour preferences for 
infants’ clothing in major United States cities in 1927 (ibid.,Table 5.1, p. 91). This 
chart, based on a Time magazine article published in 1927, documented that there 
was a greater preference for pink in boys’ infant clothing and blue in girls’ infant 
clothing in some locations. Paoletti notes that pink was the traditional colour for boys 
in Belgium, that blue was still considered a suitable colour for girls in Switzerland, 
and that pink remained a normative colour for boys in Korea through the 1980s (see 
also Frassanito & Pettorini, 2008). Paoletti provides numerous other sources of 
historical documentation to support her claims.
Paoletti’s finding that pink and blue are not universally linked to girls/women 
and boys/men, respectively, is consistent with evidence from other researchers (e.g., 
Choungourian, 1968; Taylor, Clifford, & Frankin, 2013). Despite compelling 
empirical evidence to the contrary, psychological researchers have continued to 
search for possible biological origins of ‘sex’ differences in preferences for pink or
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blue. In their investigation into biologically based ‘sex’ differences in colour 
preference, Hurlbert and Ling (2007) note that ‘...there is no conclusive evidence for 
the existence of sex differences in color preference. This fact is perhaps surprising, 
given the prevalence and longevity of the notion that little girls differ from boys in 
preferring ‘pink’...’ (p. R623). Downplaying the importance of their key finding that 
‘both males and females share a natural preference for ‘bluish’ contrasts’ (p. R624, 
emphasis added), Hurlbert and Ling describe their active search for evidence of 
biological sex differences. They then theorise regarding possible evolutionary 
reasons for their finding of a very small effect to indicate that women in their sample 
displayed a slight preference for the colour pink. By selecting an interpretation of 
their findings that assumes the presence of ‘biological sex differences’, Hurlbert and 
Ling obscure their important finding that women and men in the UK displayed 
pronounced gender differences in colour preferences graphed on a mean hue 
preference curve, whereas women and men in China did not. This finding suggests 
that gender differences in colour preferences are culture-specific rather than the 
result of biological or evolutionary factors. In their discussion, Hurlbert and Ling 
reproduce and promote an uncritical history of women as berry-gatherers, despite 
evidence of women’s past and ongoing roles as hunters and the limitations of the 
woman the gatherer/man the hunter hypothesis (see Fedigan, 1986).
As psychologist Cordelia Fine observed, ‘... so thoroughly have these 
preferences become ingrained that psychologists and journalists now speculate on the 
genetic and evolutionary origins of gendered color preferences that are little more 
than 50 years old’ (Fine, 2010, p. 208). For example, the possibility of a pink-blue 
reversal has been dismissed as ‘scientific urban legend’ (del Giudice, 2012, p.
1321)—as not science—at least in part because it challenges the attempt by some 
psychological researchers to simplify ‘our understanding of nature’ (Boring, 1945). 
This scientific silence enacts an ethnocentric erasure of contemporary societal 
contexts in which wearing pink is considered normative and desirable for men, from 
the Sapeur fashions of Brazzaville in the Congo (Tamagni, 2009) to the High Street 
shops of contemporary London. In this case, both the absence of operational 
definitions for gender and sex and the consequent lack of epistemological debate 
function to perpetuate silence about these scientific silences.
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In response to their recognition of the lack of neutrality in science, feminist 
researchers have adopted three distinct analytical approaches: feminist empiricism, in 
which researchers seek to reduce sexist errors in experimental research while 
retaining existing methods that aspire to uncover ‘truth’; standpoint epistemology, in 
which researchers reject the scientific norms that form empiricist methodology and 
focus instead on conducting analysis from a woman’s perspective and viewpoint; and 
feminist postmodernism, in which science is seen as a process of constructing reality 
rather than uncovering it (Harding, 1986; Riger, 2002). In the postmodernist 
approach, research findings are seen as strategic representations of reality mediated 
through linguistic categories that privilege particular societal structures and ways of 
understanding the world.
In her discussion of feminist responses to epistemological debates in scientific 
research, feminist psychologist Stephanie Riger (2002) observed that ‘although the 
strategies intended as a feminist method overcome some of the objections to 
traditional social science, they raise as many problems as they solve’ (p. 36).
Feminist empiricism is based on the assumption that value-free research can be 
achieved by adherence to rigourous scientific techniques. Critics of this approach 
note that scientific research is never ‘neutral’: researchers’ values influence 
hypothesis testing and the framing of research questions well before an experiment 
has commenced (Harding, 1986; Messing, 1983). Although Fine (2010) critiques 
biological essentialism about colour preferences, her above-referenced description of 
colour preference stereotypes as being ‘so thoroughly’ ingrained demonstrates an 
uncritical acceptance of one aspect of sociological essentialism about colour 
preferences. This acceptance may demonstrate the difficulty of active dissent within 
science about gender and sex. Fine’s critique of gender ideology did not address the 
processes by which gender and sex are defined, nor did Fine discuss how societal 
practices are legitimated or invalidated by these definitions.
Standpoint epistemology rejects the purported neutrality of scientific 
methodology in an effort to challenge disciplinary approaches that privilege men’s 
accounts of ‘reality’ over women’s. This challenge is based on the recognition that 
such disciplinary approaches typically enact androcentric generalisations about all
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people based on findings solely from ‘men’ participants. Although this critical shift 
in focus allows researchers to call attention to androcentric norms and to challenge 
the exclusion of some women’s voices in scientific debates, this approach is limited 
by the treatment of categories such as ‘gender’, ‘woman’, ‘man’, ‘female’ and ‘male’ 
as unproblematic and stable classifications. The focus in standpoint epistemology on 
treating people’s own ‘voices’ as authoritative statements of marginalised group 
experience is often described as identity politics, a term used to describe efforts to 
reflect a ‘minority’ group’s own interests and understandings that may differ from 
those of the dominant group (Sampson, 1993). Although the identity politics that 
underpin standpoint epistemology have been employed by some feminists to 
challenge forms of gender discrimination, identity politics may also reinforce the 
societal exclusion of people who experience gender-related marginalisation, such as 
when ‘trans women’ are viewed as not speaking from an ‘authentic’ women’s voice 
or perspective.
In contrast, a feminist postmodernist approach deconstructs demographic 
categories and places language at the centre of critical enquiry. Researchers who 
employ this approach query ostensibly neutral meaning and universality of concepts 
such as ‘truth’, ‘knowledge’ and ‘science’ to examine and undermine the ideologies 
and societal hierarchies that are reflected in, and produced by, particular ways of 
defining and invoking these constructs. Researchers who use this approach often 
focus solely or primarily on the analysis of discourse. Researchers have defined 
discourse in a variety of ways. Some researchers have at some points during their 
careers used the term discourse to describe only the linguistic components of 
ideology (e.g., ‘all forms of spoken interaction, formal and informal, and written 
texts of all kinds’. Potter & Wetherell, 1987, p. 7), whereas other researchers use this 
term more broadly to describe systems of meaning that can be represented in images, 
symbols, gestures, silences and other forms of communication (Parker, 1990; 
Patterson, 2000).
Postmodernist feminist approaches to studying gender often involve 
deconstruction and critique of widely accepted ‘truths’. Postmodernist feminist 
strategies of deconstruction and critique can challenge discriminatory gender
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ideology effectively. Yet the emphasis in a postmodernist feminist approach on the 
ideological components of language may obscure how ideology can be produced, 
communicated, and maintained through extra-linguistic forms of discourse. As 
psychologist Ian Parker (1990) noted, discourses can be found beyond linguistics and 
text. Parker explained the relation between discourses and text by noting that 
discourses are rendered visible and therefore accessible to critique when placed in 
verbal or written form. Aspects of human communication that include silences, 
gestures, visual representations such as dress and hair, schematic diagrams, and 
graphs have been more extensively represented in the field of semiotics (e.g., Eco, 
1976/1979) than in discourse analysis.
Feminist sociologist Oyèrônké Oyëwùmi has challenged the claims of some 
feminist postmodernist scholars that their approach to gender is ‘social 
constructionisf. In The invention o f  women: Making an Aftican sense o f Western 
gender discourses, Oyëwùmi (1997) critiqued as ethnocentric the widespread 
assumptions in ‘social constructionisf approaches to gender research that the 
existence of gender categories is a universal fact that has been manifested across all 
time periods and societies; that gender is a universally salient organising principle of 
human societies and thus a valid field of study regardless of social context; that the 
category ‘woman’ is universally regarded to have uniform and essential social 
properties; that women are subordinate across all societies; that women are a 
universally subordinate gender; and that the category ‘woman’ ‘is precultural, fixed 
in historical time and cultural space in antithesis to another fixed category -  “man”’ 
(ibid., p. xxi; see Amadiume, 1997 for relevant discussion). Oyëwùmi observed that 
‘by writing about any society through a gendered perspective, scholars necessarily 
write gender into that society’ (ibid., p. xv). Oyëwùmi’s assertion that ‘the process of 
making gender visible is also a process of creating gender’ (ibid., p. xv) may appear 
consistent with a feminist postmodernist approach to knowledge production. 
However, she also critiques the biological determinism of ‘Western’ or ‘colonial’ 
feminisms and discusses how the ‘bio-logic’ of gender forms an integral part of 
‘social constructionisf theorising. Accordingly, I use the term ‘gender/sex’ to 
acknowledge the biologically deterministic elements embedded in nominally ‘social 
constructionisf theories of gender (see ‘sex/gender identity’ in Carrera, DePalma, &
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Lameiras, 2012). However, note that I reverse the order that Carrera et al. use, in 
order to highlight and challenge the primacy of biological ‘sex’ classifications in 
psychological ideologies about how ‘gender’ is imposed and read.
Perhaps ironically, Oyëwùmi’s (1997) argument about the inappropriateness of 
‘gender’ as a social category in precolonial Yorubaland has in turn been the subject 
of critique by feminist scholar Bibi Bakare-Yusuf, who contends that Oyëwùmi’s 
critique of colonial feminisms overlooks the extra-linguistic manifestations of gender 
categories and gender hierarchies in pre-colonial Yoruban societies (Bakare-Yusuf, 
2003). This debate regarding whether ‘gender’ is a valid category to apply to 
Yoruban and other African societies makes an important contribution to feminist 
scholarship by challenging the assumption of gender as a universal fact that can be 
studied across all contexts, and by problematising research that assumes all societies 
share common norms and beliefs about gender/sex.
Based on my exploration of these three feminist research approaches—feminist 
empiricism, standpoint epistemology, and feminist postmodernism— I concluded 
that no singular approach that excluded the other two approaches would enable me to 
achieve the aims of my research. The lack of existing psychological research on 
cisgenderism meant that I could not rely solely on previously validated measurement 
tools or quantitative methods, as is typically the case in feminist empiricism. I did 
not want to reject quantitative empirical tools in my investigations of gender/sex 
delegitimisation. I also did not want to select a particular identity through which to 
position my research ‘voice’, as is often the case in standpoint epistemology. I 
wanted to use quantitative methods strategically to expose and challenge 
cisgenderism, without being restricted to a method that would exclude data in the 
form of narratives and images. Consequently, I needed to select a research approach 
that would allow me to capitalise on unexpected situations and methods that might 
inform my development of the cisgenderism framework. I also wanted a method that 
would integrate the multilinear and complex lived experiences that I had while 
developing the cisgenderism framework, rather than one that would re-enact 
Boring’s (1945) policy of relegating these insights to silence or rejecting such 
potential sources of data outright as ‘not science’.
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Given the lack of prior thinking in psychology about forms of gender and body 
delegitimisation from a cisgenderism framework, I also needed a research approach 
that would facilitate rather than inhibit my engagement with fundamental questions 
such as those posed by Oyëwùmi (1997) regarding the stability and universality of 
the category ‘gender’. Although qualitative research methods are widely accepted 
and often preferred in gender studies, I was hesitant to reject entirely the empirical 
research approaches such as experimental methods with established disciplinary 
authority, given their potential to aid me in representing and challenging 
cisgenderism among a wider audience.
The use of psychological experiments to challenge existing constructions of 
social ‘reality’ and imagine the world can be characterised as both scientific and 
political. For example, social psychologists Russell Spears and Heather Smith 
challenged the construction of experiments as ‘scientific’ and apolitical. They argued 
that psychological experiments are inherently political exercises due to their 
representation of situations that are ambiguous and open to multiple interpretations; 
their representation of and control over ‘subjects’, whose individual and collective 
identities are often overlooked by researchers; and their function as ‘paradigms of 
power’ that construct particular social relations between researchers and participants 
(Spears & Smith, 2001). Although this representation of experiments may appear to 
be a critique of experimental method in psychology in general, Spears and Smith 
(2001) contend that it is precisely the political character of experimental practice that 
can make experiments a valuable resource and an informative paradigm for research 
that explores people’s social lives. They construct psychological experiments as both 
politically charged and politically useful ways of doing science. Based on these 
needs and informed by the aforementioned epistemological concerns, I chose to 
apply a bricolage approach to my research.
[1.3] Crafting a bricolage approach
Bricolage is more of a meta-method than a single method, and as such can be 
difficult to define. Rsearcher and artist Ainslie Yardley explained the bricoleur’s role 
as that of ‘a maker of patchwork, a weaver of stories, an assembler of montage’ 
(Yardley, 2008, para. 12). This explanation is consistent with the key assumption in
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the bricolage approach to research, as stated by critical pedagogy researchers Joe 
Kincheloe and Kathleen Berry (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004), that ‘theory is not an 
explanation of the world- it is more an explanation of our relation to the world’ (p. 2). 
This recognition that theoretical frameworks construct views of social relations 
rather than uncovering social ‘truths’ is a core concept of bricolage. Kincheloe and 
Berry define a bricolage approach as distinguished not only by the application of 
diverse research methods, but by theoretical commitments, epistemological critiques, 
and methodological strategies in that can advance rigour and complexity.
Multilinearity is a key component of bricolage. Whereas Parker (1990) 
identified coherence as an essential criterion of discourse, a bricolage approach 
strives for multilinearity and complexity rather than coherence (see Potter, Wetherell, 
Gill, & Edwards, 1990 and Sawyer, 2002 for further discussion). The following 
account of two contrasting concepts of ‘rigour’ demonstrates the potential benefits of 
multilinearity. Some feminist authors have critiqued the concept of ‘rigour’ (e.g., 
Harding, 1986; Keller, 1985). Harding (1986) noted that ‘clearly, more scientifically 
rigorous and objective inquiry has produced the evidence supporting specific charges 
of androcentrism—but that same inquiry suggests that this kind of rigor and 
objectivity is androcentric! ’ (p. 110). In other words, a method that researchers can 
use to illuminate and challenge androcentrism effectively may itself contain and 
reinforce androcentric assumptions that undermine researchers’ aims.
Acknowledging similar limitations of previous definitions, Kincheloe and 
Berry (2004) redefined the concept of ‘rigour’ in the process of knowledge 
production from an uncritical allegiance to positivist research instruments to a deeper 
understanding of ‘the complex socially and politically constructed nature of the 
research act’ (p. 36). Using the example of ‘intelligence’ tests, they discuss how the 
privileging of certain cultural views of human merit in psychometric testing can 
serve to redefine highly intelligent students as ‘unintelligent’, and thereby limit their 
future potential to be recognised as producers of worthwhile ideas. Thus by 
recognising the limitations and potential of constructs such as ‘intelligence’,
Kincheloe and Berry (2004) enhanced rigour and promoted social justice.
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By linking ‘rigour’ with androcentric ideology (e.g., Harding, 1986; Keller, 
1985), some feminist researchers have raised important concerns about the 
discriminatory gender ideology involved in everyday methodological aspects of 
‘doing science’. Yet there are other epistemological possibilities for concepts of 
rigour such as that found in some traditional Jewish texts. Despite the mistaken belief 
among those who seek to adapt it as a magical system outside of Jewish religious 
contexts that Kabbalah is distinct from Judaism, Kabbalah has been considered a 
major area of Jewish thought by a wide spectrum of Jewish theological scholars 
(Telushkin, 1991). Whereas halacha (Jewish law) is focused on the principles and 
applications of physical laws based on Torah commandments. Kabbalah as a field 
focuses on the metaphysical explanations and insights that explain these same 
physical laws from the Torah (ibid.). Sfirah (pi. sfirot) in Kabbalistic Jewish 
teachings is the Hebrew term for the attributes or manifestations of G!d that 
simultaneously create the physical world and reflect Divine elements in that world 
(Afilalo, 2005). The sfirah of gvurah, or rigour (Afrlalo, 2005, p. 286), is typically 
considered a ‘feminine’ quality associated with the left side of the ancient 
metaphysical concept of the Tree of Life. This classification of rigour as feminine is 
mentioned several times in Afilalo’s (2005) text on the Kabbalah. When discussing 
‘the feminine aspect -  rigor’ (ibid., p. 62) with regard to the sfirot, Afilalo explained 
that some partsufim (configurations of multiple sfirot that act collaboratively) ‘are 
masculine and bestow kindness, others are feminine and bestow rigor‘ (ibid,, p. 62). 
This traditional association of rigour with the ‘feminine’ does not constitute mere 
‘subversion’ or ‘transgression’ of anglocentric gender norms—nor can it be deemed 
a ‘queering’ of normative feminist renderings of rigour. This competing 
understanding of rigor as ‘feminine’ in Jewish intellectual tradition is also more than 
an ‘effect to be explained’ or an outlier to be contrasted with a predominant and 
secularised academic norm. Rather, it constitutes a distinct and contrasting paradigm 
of rigour that can challenge, enhance and inform academic feminist approaches to the 
conceptualisation of rigour.
The potential utility of these contrasting notions of rigour highlights the 
affordances of ‘developing the theme that the world is more complex than we 
thought’ (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 45). Indeed, as Kincheloe and Berry observed.
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‘bricoleurs familiar with complexity can no longer accept a unidimensional view of 
the world’ (ibid, p. 45). A bricolage approach achieves ‘rigour’ by actively seeking 
and embracing multilinearity, and achieves complexity by incorporating multiple and 
temporally shifting meanings into scientific analysis. This way of conceptualising 
complexity entails the integration of diverse sources, such as those offered by 
feminist critiques of scientific epistemology and the kabbalistic exigesis compiled by 
Afilalo (2005). Using a bricolage approach allows researchers to acknowledge both 
understandings of ‘rigour’, without privileging one at the expense of another.
Multilinearity is not unique to bricolage methodology. In some systems of 
learning that developed centuries before the modem era, such as traditional systems 
of Talmudic study, multilinearity is well established as a normative and traditional 
mode of study. The Talmud consists of two parts: the Mishnah, the Oral Torah that 
Jewish historical sources trace as having been given over at Sinai along with the 
Written Torah, or Chumash (the five books of Moses), and codified in the Gemara, a 
multilinear chronicle of debates and discussions of each line of Mishnah by a total of 
over a thousand different rabbis from different centuries whose arguments might 
otherwise be separated across hundreds of years (Telushkin, 1997). A typical page of 
Talmud contains a central passage of Mishnah and Responsa from early sages, 
surrounded by multiple commentaries, questions, interpretations, and disagreements 
authored by later generations of rabbis about the meanings and implications of these 
passages. This multilinear approach to learning through challenge and dissent is a 
fundamental aspect of Jewish chinuch (system of learning) that can be characterised 
as a bricolage. Talmudic scholarship involves a stmctured method of mles for 
arriving at decisions in disputes by rabbinic commentators, a scientific method that 
can facilitate an alternative epistemology to androcentric and monolinear notions of 
‘truth’. Indeed, Talmudic scholar and historian of religion Daniel Boyarin (1991) has 
cautioned that interpretations of the Talmud as androcentric can reinforce 
androcentrism by obscuring the presence of conflicting Talmudic accounts and forms 
of resistance against negative portrayals and exclusions of women.
In contrast to Boring’s (1945) construction of scientific aspirations for unity 
and simplicity, the Talmudic Jewish tradition embraces and celebrates multilinearity.
29
Chapter 1
Crafting A Bricolage Approach
The Talmudic maxim ‘élu va Élu divréy elokim chayim’ (lit. ‘Both are the words of 
the Living G!d’) is a core principle of Torah study: ‘In all the debate and 
disagreement in the Talmud—about how to keep the laws, about what the Torah is 
saying—there is in practice no right and wrong’ (Glinert, 1992, p. 70). This tradition 
of learning treats multilinearity as a fundamental aspect of knowledge, and the 
recognition that in Talmudic debates and disagreements there is ‘in practice no right 
and wrong’ (ibid., p. 69) is illustrated by the following statement from an anecdote 
attributed to Rabbi Yisroel of Rizhyn: ‘Yes, the Torah is at root one Torah. And yes, 
in the physical world, shivimpanim la-torah (the Torah shows us seventy faces)’ 
(ibid., p. 70). In Talmudic chinuch, the classic Talmudic term kdshe describes 
challenging questions students ask their teachers about any topic or text. These 
critical questions that challenge authority and tradition constitute normative practice 
in Talmudic learning systems (ibid., p. 107). A commitment to multilinearity in the 
form of diverse sources of knowledge production is reflected in the traditional saying, 
‘Ézehu chacham? Ha-loméd mi-kol adâm. Who is wise? Someone who leams from 
everyone’ (ibid., p. 75-76). Glinert explains that notions of wisdom ‘cannot live apart 
from the community. Wisdom is with the people’ (ibid., p. 76).
Whereas Boring (1945) constructed complexity and contradiction as 
antithetical to science, Kincheloe and Berry (2004) advocate the use of a ‘literacy of 
complexity’ (p. 25) in bricolage. This literacy of complexity involves recognising 
and addressing the complexity of everyday life by explicating and implicating orders 
of reality and questioning universalism. This literacy of complexity also involves 
acknowledging polysemy (i.e., the multiple meanings of words and concepts across 
contexts), the living processes in which cultural processes and institutions are 
situated, intersections between contexts, multiple epistemologies, and intertextuality.
Bricolage methodology involves a commitment to complexity through 
exploration of how tacit discursive rules and practices shape knowledge production; 
recognition that all knowledge production involves interpretation and that research 
findings—like all representations and narratives—contain a fictive dimension; 
awareness that all research methods contain temporally and culturally specific 
assumptions; and examination of the complex relationship(s) between power and
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knowledge. These aspects of bricolage share some similarities with the feminist 
postmodernist approach. As Kincheloe and Berry note, ‘discourse cannot be removed 
from power relations and the struggle to create particular meanings and legitimate 
specific voices’ (p. 7). They cite Foucault’s notion of power as ‘a censor that 
excludes, blocks, and represses’ while also being ‘a great producer, creating 
knowledge and legitimate ways of seeing’ (p. 29). As Kincheloe and Berry note, 
‘bricoleurs watch carefully as power operates to privilege the data coming from 
particular academic or political economic locales’ (p. 7). Yet bricolage moves 
beyond the emphasis in postmodernist feminist approaches on deconstructing and 
critiquing discourses manifested through language and texts to address extra- 
linguistic forms of knowledge production. Crucially, a bricolage approach need 
neither automatically reject nor uncritically accept the value of empirical or 
quantitative research methods, such as experiments. Instead, experimental 
approaches can be applied strategically to study how ideology functions in everyday 
contexts (e.g., Spears & Smith, 2001).
In many conceptual and practical aspects, a bricolage approach challenges 
some dominant assumptions about the ‘correct’ way to conduct quality research and 
the labelling as inappropriate or unscientific of research acts that deviate from that 
script. The charge of being ‘unscientific’ is often used in psychological research to 
privilege status quo interpretations and to dismiss research that challenges popular 
assumptions as being merely ‘political’ (Spears & Smith, 2001). Bricolage 
methodology differs from the logical positivist methodological tradition that typifies 
scientists who aspire to singularity and objectivity in pursuit of ‘truth’ (e.g. Boring, 
1945). Yet bricolage also differs from ostensibly ‘critical’ anti-positivist research 
traditions that can produce new normativities in the process of challenging existing 
norms (see Riger, 2002). Instead, the bricoleur seeks to shed light on multiple 
concurrent narratives and lines of enquiry for the purpose of informing questions 
about how some ideologies and forms of knowledge production are privileged over 
others and exploring the additional questions that result from such enquiry.
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[1.4] My application of bricolage techniques
Bricolage can be characterised as a meta-method in the sense that it is a method 
about how to do methodology and a form of critical epistemology that informs the 
selection of research methods and the aims of interpretation (Yardley, 2008). A 
bricolage approach to research methodology acknowledges that research methods are 
actively constructed by researchers based on available tools. I describe my approach 
as a bricolage approach rather than the bricolage approach, because the theoretical 
commitments of this meta-method orient away from uncritical adherence to 
checklists and predetermined instructions, even those devised by bricoleurs 
themselves. Thus bricoleurs seek to avoid any passive acceptance of methodological 
guidelines and checklists developed in contexts that do not share the researcher’s 
strategic needs in a particular research situation (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004).
Kincheloe and Berry (p. 15) describe a synergistic relation between ‘the hermeneutic 
search for understanding and the critical concern with social change for social justice’ 
in bricolage research, thus challenging the notion that these two epistemological 
orientations must be mutually exclusive or in conflict.
My methodological choices were based not only on considerations of how to fit 
theory with method, but also with strategic concerns regarding the methods that 
would most effectively aid me in unmasking and challenging cisgenderism in 
particular domains. When crafting my bricolage approach, I selected six techniques 
of bricolage methodology that fit my research aims: ‘rigour in the absence’; tracing 
and exposing the hidden and diffuse social relations of power; reflexive empiricism; 
treating research as an active process of strategic decision-making toward social 
justice aims; ‘moving to the margins’; and the Point of Entry Text (POET) technique 
of approaching complexity through multiple and simultaneously transparent layers of 
written work and human experience. I will briefly discuss each of these six 
intersecting aspects of bricolage and explain how I applied these techniques to my 
research.
[1.4,1] Rigour in the absence
The methodological tool of rigour in the absence is used by the bricoleur ‘to imagine 
things that never were; to see the world as it could be; to develop alternatives to
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oppressive existing conditions; to discern what is lacking in a way that promotes the 
will to act; to understand that there is far more to the world than what we can see' 
(Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 20). In the sense that rigour in the absence can be used 
to create contexts that explore taken-for-granted ways of understanding social 
categories, it can be a useful technique for researchers who wish to apply the 
aforementioned critical, strategic approach to experimental design suggested by 
Spears and Smith (2001). Rigour in the absence is similar to the approach taken in 
the formulation of modem aggadot (singular: aggadah), or stories constmcted, often 
by Talmudic scholars, to explore conceptual themes and implications of biblical texts. 
Some aggadot use complex metaphors and provide details of narratives that are only 
mentioned briefly in the written Torah. Rigour in the absence has been a particularly 
vital tool for me given the lack of existing research on cisgenderism at the start of my 
research. Applying the technique of ‘rigour in the absence’ became a key strategy of 
my research situation in the context of methodological decision-making and meaning 
making.
In my analysis of cisgenderism in sexist language research, I identified the 
gender-associated exclusions that are supported by the limited focus on masculine 
generic language in this research (Chapter 2). Through this application of ‘rigour in 
the absence’, my analysis was designed to motivate feminist researchers to adopt 
non-cisgenderist research methods. In response to the oppressive existing ways of 
thinking about and talking about young people’s genders and bodies, I envisioned 
and subsequently constmcted a research landspace in which the delegitimisation of 
young people’s own genders and gender-associated expression was the object of 
scmtiny. By focusing my attention on what was wrong with psychological research, I 
shifted the emphasis away from existing debates that focus on what is wrong with 
these young people (Chapter 3). Similarly, by altering Trader’s (1954) diagram to 
construct new visual representations of infant genitals that are independent from the 
textual meanings mapped onto these images in the field of paediatric endocrinology,
I provided the opportunity for my participants to produce novel ways of ordering and 
classifying human genitals (Chapter 4).
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[1.4.2] Tracing and exposing the hidden and diffuse social relations o f ‘power ^
In Power: A radical view, sociologist and political theorist Steven Lukes (1974) 
critiqued the notion of power as something that is seen. Lukes proposed that a three- 
dimensional understanding of power would examine decision-making processes, the 
setting of agendas for decision-making, the covert and overt workings of power, and 
the concerns of those who were marginalised or excluded from decision-making 
processes. Attorney, educator and self-identified trans activist Dean Spade (2011) 
discussed the interactional and structural aspects of power involved in such a three- 
dimensional perspective. Spade critiqued the ‘perpetrator/victim’ and ‘disciplinary 
norm’ ways of conceptualising power for giving insufficient attention to how power 
functions in everyday life. As Spade noted, ‘disciplinary gender norms have received 
far more attention in trans scholarship and activism than population-level 
interventions’ (ibid., p. 123). A focus on population-level interventions may facilitate 
analysis of ‘the use of gender as an administrative category by institutions of all 
kinds’ (ibid., p. 123), thus inviting critiques such as those by Oyëwùmi (1997). 
However, the process of examining ‘population-level’ interventions may reify the 
administrative gender categories that the examiner seeks to critique.
A bricolage approach recognises how the workings of power can shape how 
texts are constructed and interpreted. As Joe Kincheloe explained:
the difficult aspect of tracing the impact of power involves the silent and 
invisible ways that power operates via structures, narratives, and meta­
narratives to constrain our understandings of the world. In this context, such 
understandings typically legitimate particular socio-political interests while 
delegitimating others’ (Kincheloe, 2004, p. 98).
This hidden aspect of power as constraining our understandings of the world through 
meta-narratives applies to commonly accepted historiography of ‘power’ as a 
relational concept that transcends simplistic notions of ‘haves and have nots’. Thus a 
feminist epistemology that uses identity politics as a strategy to challenge existing 
power hierarchies is constrained by a view of the world that reinforces rather than 
challenges administrative category gender/sex categories.
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In my research, I articulate this understanding of power by constructing both 
disciplinary norms and population-based classifications and interventions as focal 
points of analysis. My analysis of sexist language research (Chapter 2) examined the 
everyday consequences of how researchers construct administrative gender/sex 
categories. My study of people’s decisions to recommend or reject surgical 
interventions that ‘normalise’ intersex babies’ genitals (Chapter 4) explored contrasts 
between medical meta-narratives of normalisation and laypeople’s decision-making 
processes.
[1.4.3] Reflexive empiricism
Traditional approaches to data analysis invoke the principle that researchers should 
determine the specific analytical tests they will use during a discrete research design 
phase before data are available (e.g.. Field & Hole, 2006). In contrast, a bricolage 
approach involves recognising and valuing that data may be surprising and may lead 
to new insights that shape subsequent analytical choices. This approach prioritises 
researcher flexibility in using tests that best suit the nature of the data that are being 
collected. In a traditional empirical view, this notion of ‘fit’ would focus mainly on 
checking quantitative data for conformity to assumptions of ‘normality’, such as 
obtaining z-scores for skewness and kurtosis, and checking for homogeneity of 
variance. Such evaluation would be performed primarily for the purpose of 
determining whether to run parametric or non-parametric statistical tests on the data. 
In addition to these methodological considerations, a bricolage approach prioritises a 
reflexive empiricism that involves a multilinear, holistic evaluation of data to 
determine which tests best fit the findings. This means being flexible and responsive 
to unexpected results and unanticipated data sources. Thus a bricolage method rejects 
categorically the widespread practice of ‘excluding outliers’ in an effort to 
manufacture a cohesive, linear narrative.
During the debriefing for one of my experiments on people’s judgments about 
intersex babies’ genitals (Chapter 4), two of my participants spontaneously disclosed 
unsolicited personal experiences with the normalising medical interventions 
mentioned in the experiment. One participant shared his experience of being 
normalised surgically (Appendix N). Another participant shared her experience as a
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researcher who had participated in a clinical study of children with intersex bodies 
(Appendix M). Instead of excluding these experiences from consideration or 
attempting to shape the two accounts into a coherent, singular message, I gave these 
participants an opportunity to send me a written email with their experiences 
described in their own words.
This reflexive approach means that I was able to question my original plan for 
each study and reconsider my approach in light of new and unexpected information. 
Yet some of my colleagues appeared to take a contrasting approach to empirical 
research. During my research experiences, numerous colleagues expressed the 
calculated inscrutability of empirical research methods. One recognised statistical 
expert was kind enough to explain the messy process involved in a new kind of 
analysis I was attempting to teach myself. His generosity in imparting the tricks of 
the trade was accompanied by a cautionary proviso not to discuss aspects of 
quantitative research that deviate from the ‘correct’ methodological ideology. He 
explained that it was somewhat of an ‘open secret’ that even experienced researchers 
play around with data and typically only record the analyses that yield what they 
believe will be meaningful to colleagues and journal peer reviewers. ‘We do those 
things in the privacy of our bedrooms’, he said, ‘then we figure out which tests work 
best and report only those that are correct’. In contrast, the technique of reflexive 
empiricism in a bricolage approach encourages the researcher to function like ‘the 
painter who stands back between brushstrokes, looks at the canvas, and only after 
this contemplation, decides what to do next’ (Turkle & Papert, 1990).
My own research aims demanded greater transparency about the active 
decisions I made to shape research findings, particularly as my task of challenging 
cisgenderism often required me to deviate from established ‘correct’ methodology in 
which aspects of cisgenderism were embedded and through which cisgenderism is 
often perpetuated (e.g., the assumptions that gender is always synonymous with sex, 
that gender is a dichotomous/binary variable, and that gender is universally singular). 
As my research developed, my interpretations of previous data became more multi­
layered. I found myself revisiting previous analyses and noting aspects about which 
my thinking had shifted or that I could identify as open for critique. Using the
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previously discussed Talmudic technique of asking challenging questions or raising 
critical issues alongside existing texts, I enhanced my bricolage by providing 
reflective boxes in which I discussed my methodological decisions (Chapters 3 and
4).
[1.4.4] Research as strategic decision-making toward social justice aims 
Bricolage moves beyond the acknowledgement of research as a subjective process 
that inscribes or perpetuates particular views of the world (e.g., Spears & Smith, 
2001). The bricoleur makes the explicit commitment to select interpretations that 
destabilise oppressive social relations, and to actively call attention to cultural and 
social sources that have been marginalised and minoritised within dominant 
disciplinary discourses. Taking a bricolage approach involves the application of 
social justice principles when selecting research interpretations, instead of treating 
such interpretations as value-free, objective conclusions. When choosing how to 
interpret my research findings, I applied six of the eleven principles of selection 
employed in the bricolage approach described by Kincheloe (2004, pp. 100-102): For 
each study, I wanted an interpretation that would grant me access to new possibilities 
of meaning and new ways of thinking; that would benefit marginalised people in 
their struggles for respect and inclusion; that would recognise how differently 
gender/sex can function in a variety of cultural and historical contexts; that indicated 
an awareness of how gender/sex and cisgenderism are constructed and maintained; 
that considered perspectives from multiple individuals who had diverse social 
experiences and backgrounds; and that could re-conceptualise the world for the 
purpose of transforming it.
In addition to making methodological choices about how to conduct my 
research and interpret my findings, I also made epistemological decisions regarding 
how to challenge disciplinary authority. My decision to prioritise texts from 
marginalised perspectives meant that I did not uncritically accept or view as relevant 
the claims of widely cited scholars from European, United Kingdom and United 
States academic contexts. The decision to shift my frame of reference and to redefine 
disciplinary authority was based on my experience of how the invocation of these 
high-status scholars detracted from the time available to engage with perspectives
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from institutionally marginalised authors. Work by canonical authors is not immune 
to oppressive misuse, and citing such authors does not automatically mean one has 
engaged in dismantling the diffuse structures of power these scholars have attempted 
to render more accessible to critical enquiry. For example, social psychologist Derek 
Hook (2001) has critiqued two main approaches to discourse analysis (Parker, 1992; 
Potter & Wetherell, 1987) for mis-applying Foucault’s notion of ‘discourse’. Hook 
(2001) asserts that the supposedly ‘Foucauldian’ discursive analytic method does not 
actually exist. Thus I have engaged with this canon only where doing so served the 
strategic epistemological aims and social justice principles of each analytical piece in 
my bricolage.
[L4.5] Moving to the margins
Pre-colonial, post-colonial, acolonial, and cross-cultural sources of knowledge 
production and ways of knowing are increasingly influential and informative in 
bricolage research approaches (e.g., Richardson, 2013). By ‘moving to the margins’, 
the bricoleur shifts Asian, African and First Nation societal norms and intellectual 
scholarship from the margins of academic discourse to a place of legitimacy. In 
acknowledgement that most accounts of gender in psychology stem from a particular 
geographic and cultural paradigm, I treat these minority world societies 
typically called ‘Western’ or ‘developed’) psychologies as the ‘effects to be 
explained’. I reframe the margins of minority world psychology by treating majority 
world (i.e., societies typically called ‘third world’, which represent a statistical 
majority of the world human population) sources of knowledge production as the 
norms against which minority world theories are evaluated. In so doing, I remove the 
a priori privileging of minority world psychologies. This strategic use of critical 
regionalities (Johnson, Jackson, & Herdt, 2000) can enable researchers to critique 
‘both the various ways in which an area of the world is imagined as being separate 
and distinct and... the flows of people, goods, and ideas through which a particular 
region or world area is made’ (p. 372).
In my research, I treat the distinction between ‘minority world’ and ‘majority 
world’ regions as a theoretically and politically useful fiction, rather than seeking 
internal coherence. This majority world includes a number of indigenous societies
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that are situated within geopolitical borders claimed by minority world states. This 
critical regionality restores the designation of ‘majority’ to the approximately 83% of 
the human population (Alam, 2007,2008) that is located in heterogeneous societies 
across Asia, Africa, Central and South America, Eastern Europe, and Oceania. This 
critical regionality can serve as a useful frame for moving these societies from 
marginality to priority, when evaluating grand theories of gender espoused by 
minority world psychologists. This binary challenges existing regional fictions that 
characterise majority world societies as not being ‘developed’ according to 
measurements that prioritise minority world values, as being ‘third’ even when they 
emerged prior to European societies, or as being ‘southern’ from the standpoint of 
particular geographic locations. For example, when discussing cisgenderism in 
research about children’s genders (Chapter 3), I critique minority world gender/sex 
ideology using a frame of reference based in majority world societies. Yet I 
acknowledge this strategic use of a regional binary as a temporally bound act with 
limited long-term utility. As a temporary measure, this critical regionality may serve 
a similar aim to the ‘ cisgender/transgender’ binary that has been used to mark the 
previously unmarked category of ‘cisgender’ or ‘non-trans’, and in so doing has 
rendered the privileges and exclusions of administrative gender/sex categories more 
visible and accessible to critique. When exploring the effects of self-reported 
experiences of being misgendered and misgendering others in everyday life (Chapter 
5), I moved to the margins by treating people’s own designations of their genders and 
bodies as valid and by operationally defining the delegitimisation of these self­
designations as the ‘effect to be explained’ in my research design..
[1.4.6] Point o f  Entiy Text (POET) technique
A bricolage approach seeks to recognise and expose ‘the various structures that 
covertly shape our own and other scholars’ research narratives’, accentuating the 
relation between ‘a researcher’s ways of seeing and the social location of his or her 
personal history’ (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 2). I began my postgraduate research 
journey with the desire to expand the scope of the academic lens on ‘trans people’ to 
include a greater diversity of ‘voices’ and experiences through phenomenological 
enquiry. Through the bricolage process of reflexive investigation described above, 
my research experiences clarified that it was not the scope of the lens but the lens
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itself that shaped the production and interpretation of knowledge in delegitimising 
ways that I would come to term ‘cisgenderism’. Even the metaphor of a ‘lens’ at 
times threatened to constrain my enquiry to the visible and seen as much as my 
previous notion of ‘voices’ had privileged discourse over silences and 
communication over the conspicuous absences to which the bricolage technique of 
rigour in the absence would repeatedly call my attention.
The Point of Entry Text (POET) technique of bricolage (Berry, 2004) offers an 
alternative to the limitations of the ‘lens’ metaphor, envisioning multiple overhead 
transparencies that overlay each other and inform each subsequent layer of 
complexity produced through critical enquiry. In the POET technique, personal 
conversations and experiences can initiate research enquiry. This transparent 
integration of personal experiences to inform research is a key component that 
differentiates bricolage from some other research approaches that define personal 
experiences as ‘biases’ against a fictional ‘objective’ or ‘unbiased’ perspective. 
Kincheloe and Berry (2004) describe how one student’s POET emerged based on a 
conversation about height discrimination, while another student’s POET was based 
on a personal journey to World War II reunions for veterans in Europe.
[1.4.7] A utobiographical POE Ts
In a bricolage approach, personal experience is viewed neither as a problematic 
deviation from ‘value-free’ and ‘objective’ science, as in Boring’s (1945) logical 
positivist epistemology, nor as a standpoint that grants the privilege of automatic 
insider wisdom and authority to speak on behalf of the marginalised groups to which 
one claims membership. Personal experience contributes to the bricolage as a kind of 
‘informed intuition’ that ‘sorts out the leads and dead ends’ (Kincheloe & Berry, 
2004, p. 118). The bricoleur neither categorically rejects nor uncritically accepts 
personal experience as authoritative, but instead treats personal experience as one of 
many valid points of entry into a particular issue, problem, or question (ibid.).
The POET that commences a research process in a bricolage approach often 
begins with an autobiographical account of how a bricoleur became interested in a 
particular topic. This autobiographical account typically involves feedback looping
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through multiple, ongoing layers of complexity. The POET expands to consider 
multiple critical social-theoretical discourses, diverse research genres and analytical 
tools, cultural and social positionalities, and ways to contest disciplinary and 
interdisciplinary departmentalisations of knowledge. The POET often involves 
interrogating ‘Western grand narratives’ (ibid., p. 117), incorporating diverse 
contexts of human activity, and identifying the various levels of engagement of 
diverse sources. Kincheloe and Berry (2004) describe levels of engagement feedback 
looping as focused on identifying ‘the activities, strategies, needs, procedures, 
communication, setbacks, intuitive moments... that move you from the level of 
attraction to your topic to that of passion and maybe a bit of insight’ (p. 141). Thus 
the POET facilitates the integrative process of navigating emotional responses 
without the masculinist dichotomy that positions ‘rational science’ in opposition to 
feeling and intuition. The POET technique explores levels of privilege and 
oppression, genealogy of discourses, signs, and concepts; bricoleurs can use this 
technique to build links between methodology, theory, interpretation, political 
context, and narrative.
When determining how to theorise about and research cisgenderism, I first 
considered the main contributing influences to how I approached my topic and the 
potential benefits and challenges these influences might present. Three main 
influences that guided the selection of my research approach were the Talmudic 
system of learning, my lived experience with the Chinese concept o f guân.xî, and my 
gender and body experiences as a man who was not raised as a boy. This included 
my experience of having been hormonally ‘normalised’ in childhood by medical 
professionals who warned that I would not otherwise experience ‘normal female 
puberty’.
My prior training in Talmudic chinuch informed my research methodology 
well before my (re-)discovery of multilinearity, complexity, questions that challenge 
authorities and traditions, and the use of diverse sources of knowledge production 
that recent academic scholars have associated with bricolage. A bricolage approach 
appealed to me partly because I wanted to value multilinearity, complexity and 
dissent as beneficial components of learning that had been integral to my Talmudic
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studies. Although Talmudic scholarship continues to be practiced in religious 
learning environments around the world, this learning tradition is often excluded 
from secular academic environments. Billig (1996) explained that ‘under the glare of 
enlightenment, the rabbinic traditions of learning seemed to have no part to play in 
‘proper’ learning...’ (p. 13). However, Billig noted the value of such traditions, 
reminding readers that ‘those ancient voices belong to a rich tradition, which values 
argumentation and which has developed dialectical skills as sharp as, if not sharper 
than, those of any modem philosopher’ (ibid., p. 13). Billig recognised that 
argumentation about accepted ‘truths’ can be integral to the learning process. My 
participation in Talmudic learning environments motivated me to question 
uncontested ways of constmcting knowledge in academic environments, such as the 
‘transgender’/ ’cisgender’ binary on which discrimination-based concepts such as 
transphobia depend.
My understanding of power as a relational concept predated my exposure to 
minority world academic discourses. Learning to build ‘good guan.xi’, to avoid ‘bad 
guan.xi’, and to use my guan.xi strategically all areas of in social relations formed a 
central part of my everyday life during part of my childhood in the Zhông.shân area 
of southern China in Guangdong Province. The relational concept of power known as 
guan.xi, for which no suitably complex English translation exists, has been a central 
tenet of Conftician social thought for centuries. Guan.xi is a major area of enquiry in 
Chinese psychology (Hwang, 2012). The explicit linguistic acknowledgement in 
Mandarin Chinese of guan.xi at work in everyday life renders visible the social 
relations through which power operates. Thus my cultural experience of guan.xi 
motivated my efforts to interrogate these social relations in my research.
Kincheloe and Berry (2004) have described power as hiding ‘in the taken-for- 
granted, the ostensibly banal dimensions of the lived world... that shape how and 
what we see’ (p. 98). I experienced the phenomenon of power hiding in the 
ostensibly banal repeatedly in my research situation. As someone who might easily 
be dismissed as ‘an angry activist’ by those who share Boring’s (1945) view of 
dissent as unscientific, my supervisor advised me to substantiate my theoretical 
claims through research and not to rely solely on a discourse of ‘personal experience
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as expertise’. As a man who had personally experienced both non-consensual 
medical normalisation and subsequent gender affirmation, I had also helped many 
other seekers of gender affirmation in my capacity as founding director of a relevant 
charity. Based on the insights that these direct personal experiences gave me into 
cisgenderism, it was important for me to challenge the privileging of some people’s 
experiences as forms of expertise, particularly when ‘experience as expertise’ 
discourses are routinely employed by mental health professionals to describe their 
interactions with ‘trans people’. Such interactions often occur in hierarchical clinical 
settings where claims o f ‘experience as expertise’ are typically denied to laypeople.
My personal experiences of non-consensual ‘normalisation’ and gender 
affirmation became highly relevant and even essential at multiple points during my 
research process. For example, when seeking participants for an online study of 
people’s experiences of being misgendered, some of the sites where I posted my 
recruitment text were trans-only and intersex-only Facebook groups. These groups 
are not accessible to even the most well-intentioned ‘ally’. While research 
recruitment efforts with people who experience cisgenderism typically occur at 
public ‘trans community’ conferences and events, these events are seldom attended 
by the many people who would be classified as ‘trans’ by others and who are unable 
or unwilling to identify publicly with such events.
The complexity of a bricolage approach was necessary to study cisgenderism 
in a field where even seemingly ‘neutral’ research structures and devices functioned 
simultaneously to perpetuate and mask cisgenderist ideology. My frequent 
involvement with activist and social change activities to challenge cisgenderism 
throughout my PhD process provided vital information for my research and 
contributed significantly to the ‘informed intuition’ (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 
118) I needed to navigate the nascent framework of cisgenderism. The more 
cisgenderism I uncovered and experienced during my research situation, the greater 
my need for the empowerment and personal healing I experienced from these social 
change activities. At times, my activism sustained my PhD research in ways that 
complemented the camaraderie of my supportive supervisor and my colleagues.
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Through a bricolage approach, I have developed a multilinear research 
consciousness that allowed me to experience the research process through multiple 
frameworks simultaneously: I am a man who has navigated cisgenderism during his 
own gender affirmation process and who continues to experience cisgenderism in my 
everyday life. I am a man who has experienced medical ‘normalisation’ about which 
I was insufficiently informed and to which I did not give informed consent. I am a 
former founding director of a charity that assisted hundreds of people in navigating 
cisgenderism in their everyday lives. I am a poly cultural person with cross-cultural 
childhood experiences of how gender/sex norms in one society can often contradict 
those in another. I am also a researcher who recognises that more than personal or 
professional experience is required to expose the processes through which some 
people’s understandings of their genders and bodies are systematically delegitimised, 
while those of others are uncritically manufactured and maintained.
Along my research journey, I overlaid a new transparency to add to my 
perceptual frameworks, that of the cisgenderism framework. An initial part of my 
research process involved retreading lived territory from my past experiences to 
integrate into my research situation an understanding of cisgenderist phenomena that 
had been heretofore excluded from psychological maps. Yet I found that the territory 
was not static terrain populated with stable objects waiting to be named and claimed. 
Instead, the territory shifted with each glance, my research gaze transforming a ‘trans 
person’ into a ‘person with a non-assigned gender’, then into a ‘person with a self­
designated gender’ and finally into a ‘person who has been misgendered’.
In the process of applying bricolage techniques to reflexively evaluate my 
research, I questioned previously stable concepts in psychology and experienced the 
transformation of these tools of enquiry into examples of ‘the invisible artefacts of 
power and culture’ (Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 2) through which cisgenderism is 
produced and maintained. Kincheloe and Berry define the complexity of such plural 
consciousness as an important aspect of bricolage methodology, as it is through this 
process that ‘assertions that knowledge is permanent and universal are undermined 
and the stability of meaning is subverted’ (ibid., p. 12). Thus the plural consciousness 
with which I approached my research situation led me to shift both how I approached
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my research and how I described my own gender and body throughout my research 
experience.
[1.5] Transphobia, genderism, and anti-trans prejudice
When I began my PhD research, the topic of cisgenderism was entirely absent from 
psychological literature, and aspects of this delegitimising ideology had been 
addressed mainly in an identity politics framework by a handful of activist scholars 
outside of formal psychological research contexts (e.g., Namaste, 2000; Serano,
2007). Essentialist categories of ‘transsexual’ and ‘cissexual’ people were central to 
these anti-discrimination efforts. Where previous research was focused primarily on 
studying ‘transsexuals’ (sic) as the ‘effect to be explained’ (e.g., Devor, 1993; Green 
& Young, 2001), Namaste (2000) and Serano (2007) were influential to the 
subsequent shift towards a focus on interrogating the hostile treatment of such people. 
Since Namaste’s (2000) analysis, prejudice and discrimination researchers have 
discussed ‘transphobia’ (Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Nagoshi et al., 2008; Sugano, 
Nemoto, & Operario, 2006; Winter, Webster, & Cheung, 2008; ‘genderism’ (Browne, 
2004; Hill & Willoughby, 2005), and ‘anti-trans prejudice’ or ‘prejudice against trans 
people’ (Tee & Hegarty, 2006).
Social psychologist Darryl Hill’s (2002) psychological study of ‘trans people’s’ 
experiences outlined one of the first frameworks for researching these forms of 
hostile treatment. Hill recommended the use of three constructs- transphobia, 
genderism and gender-bashing—to conceptualise hatred against trans persons. 
Borrowing from clinical psychologist and activist George Weinberg’s (1972) concept 
of homophobia. Hill (2002) theorised ‘transphobia’ as fear or disgust related to 
encountering a ‘trans person’. Although Hill noted that the use of the ‘-phobia‘suffix 
does not imply that transphobia is a disorder, he used this suffix to describe fear and 
hatred that he classified as irrational. Hill applied the term ‘gender-bashing’ to 
describe violence that results from this fear and hatred.
Research in the transphobia paradigm reconceptualised the ‘transsexual 
problem’ as one of discrimination and prejudice against ‘trans people’. This new 
framework was applied by a variety of researchers interested in the mistreatment of
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‘trans people’. Hill and Willoughby (2005) developed a transphobia scale that 
predicted parents’ reactions to ‘gender non-conforming’ children (see also Martin, 
1990). Transphobia researchers found that some measures of transphobia and 
homophobia are correlated (Nagoshi et al., 2008), and that exposure to transphobia 
can negatively impact safer sex practices (Sugano et al., 2006) and traumatise targets 
(Mizock & Lewis, 2008). These findings informed the development of interventions 
to reduce discrimination and to rectify the harm caused by hostile treatment.
In ‘transphobia’ research, violence and discrimination towards people whose 
assigned gender differs from their gender self-designation are typically attributed to 
negative attitudes towards people with ‘transgender identity’, and this literature relies 
heavily on essentialised administrative gender/sex categories. For example, concepts 
such as ‘the transgender community’ (emphasis added), ‘transgender people’, 
‘transgenders’, ‘transgenderists’, ‘transsexuals’, or ‘transpeople’ are often invoked in 
this literature (e.g.. Hill & Willoughby, 2005; Mizock & Lewis, 2008; Tee & 
Hegarty, 2006; Winters, 2008).
Hill (2002) compared genderism to heterosexism, whereas human 
geographies lecturer and activist Kath Browne (2004) used the term ‘genderism’ to 
describe ‘the hostile readings of gender ambiguous bodies’ (p. 332, emphasis added). 
Browne’s analysis examined how genderism functions when people whose 
gender/sex identity is delegitimised encounter ‘dichotomously sexed’ sites such as 
public toilets. Like Hill’s (2002) framework, which was based on his engagement 
with ‘trans community’ networks, Browne’s (2004) use o f ‘genderism’ was a 
strategic attempt to challenge discrimination against people who ‘do not conform to 
the binary categories of man/woman, male/female’ (p. 332). The concepts of 
transphobia and genderism were applied strategically by Hill (2002) and Browne 
(2004) to accomplish social justice aims, yet several aspects of these approaches 
limit their strategic utility.
The ‘transphobia’ and ‘genderism’ concepts fail to challenge six key 
assumptions that contribute to forms of gender and body delegitimisation. The first is 
the notion that is implicit in the terms ‘trans’ and ‘gender variant’, that people whose
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gender assignments differ from their gender self-designations lie across from or vary 
from ‘normative’ human development. Second, the transphobia and genderism 
frameworks fail to challenge the assumption that ‘trans people’ and ‘cis people’ 
constitute distinct classes of individuals. Third, the transphobia and genderism 
frameworks presume that ‘trans people’ do not fit within ‘the gender binary’ 
(emphasis added), even when such people identify their own genders and bodies 
within this binary. Fourth, these frameworks treat gender and body delegitimisations 
as inherently hostile and thus do not adequately address forms of delegitimisation 
that may not involve fear, hostility, revulsion or individual negativity. Fifth, these 
frameworks address the problem of societal delegitimisation of people’s genders and 
bodies in terms of the need to recognise gender/sex categories beyond woman/man 
and female/male binaries (e.g., Browne, 2004; Hill, 2002). This approach promotes 
an uncritical acceptance of essentialised identity categories that rely on the 
‘cisgender’ vs. ‘transgender’ gender binary, whilst simultaneously problematising the 
woman/man and female/male gender/sex binaries. The construction of ‘trans people’ 
as inherently non-binary may lead researchers to overlook the many people whose 
own descriptions of their bodies and genders fit within a woman/man or male/female 
gender/sex binary, and whose experiences of delegitimisation occur not solely as a 
result of such binaries but primarily due to other people’s failure to treat their own 
binary designations of their bodies and genders as legitimate. Another unfortunate 
consequence of this construction is the unintentional ‘othering’ that can result from 
the use of gender/sex binaries (e.g., ‘ambiguous’ versus ‘normal’ bodies, ‘trans 
people’ versus ‘cisgender people’, etc.). Sixth, transphobia and genderism both 
exclude intersex people’s experiences of gender and body delegitimisation from 
consideration. In much ‘gender’ research, the body is taken as self-explanatory. 
Constructs such as ‘biological sex’ are employed to produce and reinforce the 
primacy of the body as a material fact rather than as a concept that is as much 
politically and socially constituted as ‘gender’.
These shortcomings exemplify the ways that ‘prejudice’ and ‘discrimination’ 
constructs can emphasise individual attitudes and divert attention away from 
systemic problems (Billig, 1991; Fernando, 2009; Kitzinger, 1987). For these reasons, 
many lesbian, bisexual and gay researchers have abandoned the term ‘homophobia’
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in favour of such concepts as ‘heteronormativity’ (Warner, 1993), ‘heterosexism’ 
(Herek, 1990) and ‘sexual prejudice’ (Herek, 2000). I argue that a similar shift is 
needed to properly engage with the societal systems that people whose own 
designations of their genders and bodies are delegitimised must navigate. I use the 
term cisgenderism to name this ideology.
[1.6] The cisgenderism framework
Early scholarly uses of the term ‘cisgenderism’ described an essentialist gender 
binary. People whose gender self-designations were considered ‘trans’ or literally 
‘across from’ the gender typically associated with their assigned sex category (e.g., 
‘transgenderism’, ‘transgender’ or ‘transsexual’ people) were constructed as 
fundamentally distinct from people whose gender self-designations were considered 
‘cis’ or literally ‘on the same side as’ their assigned sex category (e.g., 
‘cisgenderism’, ‘cisgender’, or ‘cissexual’ (e.g., Edelman, 2009; Serano, 2007). My 
use of the term cisgenderism differs from this earlier usage. I use the term 
cisgenderism to describe the ideology that delegitimises people’s own designations 
of their genders and bodies.
I use the term cisgenderism for three reasons. First, unlike ‘transphobia’, 
cisgenderism describes an ideology, rather than an individual attitude. This ideology 
is systemic, multi-level and reflected in authoritative cultural discourses. Second, 
whereas ‘transphobia’ and ‘genderism’ purport to contrast treatment of different 
types o f  people, cisgenderism problematises the categorical distinction itself between 
classes of people as either ‘transgender’ or ‘cisgender’ (or as ‘gender variant’ vs. 
unmarked) (see also Miller, Taylor, & Buck, 1991). The cisgenderism framework 
shifts the focus of analysis from purported essential distinctions between such classes 
of people (i.e., ‘transgender’ vs. ‘cisgender’) to critical evaluation of how such 
distinctions can function to delegitimise people’s self-designations. Through my 
cisgenderism studies framework, I critique the notion implicit in the tenns ‘trans’ and 
‘gender variant’ that such people lie ‘across from’ or ‘vary from’ normative human 
development. The cisgenderism studies approach facilitates my rejection of the 
assumption that ‘trans people’ and ‘cis people’ constitute distinct classes of 
individuals.with essentially distinct natures.
48
Chapter 1
Crafting A Bricolage Approach
Disagreement with other people’s determinations about one’s own gender does 
not make one a fundamentally different type of being. This essentialist language can 
divert attention away from systemic problems by marking gender independent people 
as the ‘effect to be explained’. Such language also obscures the main difference 
between gender independent people and any other people: not any essential 
properties of such people, but the delegitimisation of their own designations of their 
genders and bodies by external actors. In order to avoid using similarly essentialist 
language, I use the terms gender self-designation to describe people’s own 
designations of their genders and gender independent (cf. Rainbow Health Ontario, 
2012) as an adjective to describe people whose genders are independent of, or 
different from, the genders typically associated with their externally assigned ‘sex’ 
classification. These terms are intended as experiential descriptors rather than 
identity labels, in recognition that such people do not fit neatly as a homogeneous 
social group. For example, many gender independent people identify simply as 
women, men, or a non-binary gender such as genderqueer and do not necessarily 
identify as ‘trans’ or consider themselves part of a ‘trans community’. By applying 
these descriptive alternatives to the imposition of ‘umbrella’ terms or identity labels 
on people who may identify in vastly different ways, I seek to avoid reifying 
essentialist notions about ‘the trans person’ as a fundamentally distinct class of 
being.
My thinking is informed by research that shows that such categorical 
distinctions can themselves be components of prejudicial ideologies in areas such 
‘race’, gender, and sexual orientation (Haslam & Levy, 2006; Keller, 2005; Martin & 
Parker, 1995; Prentice & Miller, 2007; Williams & Eberhardt, 2008). I consider 
cisgenderism to be a form of ‘othering’ that takes people categorised as ‘transgender’ 
as ‘the effect to be explained’, consistent with theorising about ‘race’ and ethnicity 
(DuBois, 1903/2005), ‘sex’ (de Beauvoir, 1949/1974), ‘gender’ (Roughgarden, 
2004), ‘disability’ and ‘special needs’ (Allen, 1999), ‘humanity’ (Bradshaw, 2009; 
Marcu & Chryssochoou, 2005), sexuality (Warner, 1993) and their intersections 
(Burman, Gowrisunkur, & Sangha, 1998; Purdie-Vaughns & Eibach, 2008). Thus, 
cisgenderism may be reflected in psychological research that assumes cisgenderism 
to be healthy or ideal, just as heterosexist ideology is evident when researchers
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‘conceptualiz[e] human experience in strictly heterosexual term s.. .  consequently 
ignoring, invalidating, or derogating homosexual behaviors and sexual orientation’ 
(Herek, Kimmel, Amaro, & Melton, 1991, p. 958) or sexist ideology is evident when 
researchers consider only boys in their model for human development (e.g., Freud, 
1923/1960). Third, cisgenderism provides a clearer frame than either ‘transphobia’ or 
‘genderism’ for evaluating the role of language in science in the dissemination of 
prejudicial ideology, following similar work in the field of sexist language (e.g., 
Bichler, 1991; Hyde, 1984; Martyna, 1980).
Fourth, although Namaste (2000) and Serano (2007) have used the concept of 
‘cissexism’ to discuss ideology that delegitimises ‘trans people’, a crucial difference 
between cissexism and cisgenderism is that cissexism is based on sexism, which 
recognises women as women and discriminates against women on the basis of their 
status as women. In contrast, cisgenderism is a distinct phenomenon from ‘cissexism’ 
(Serano, 2007) (i.e., sexism against people who are perceived as ‘trans’ by others). 
Rather, cisgenderism involves a refusal to recognise people’s own genders as 
legitimate. Unlike cissexism, cisgenderism is not as easy to conflate linguistically 
with sexism or to presume as merely another form of sexism enacted by one type of 
person (a ‘cis’ person) on another (a ‘trans’ person). As discriminatory ideology 
directed against women, sexism works by imposing oppressive elements on a group 
of people recognised as women and not by refusing to recognise someone’s status as 
a woman. Using the cisgenderism framework, I aim to contribute to evidence-based 
understanding of cisgenderism in psychology, medicine, and everyday life; to 
increase awareness of how cisgenderism can affect research, policy, and practice; 
and to inform future efforts to reduce cisgenderism in medical, psychological, legal, 
and social arenas.
People’s own designations of their genders and bodies can be de-legitimised 
during everyday interactions with societal systems in a variety of ways: Their 
genders and bodies may be pathologised by being classified as disordered (e.g., 
‘gender identity disorder’, ‘gender dysphoria’, ‘disorders of sex development’); they 
may be misgendered by being addressed or described using language that de­
legitimises their own designation of their gender (e.g., when a man with an intersex
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status is automatically described using non-binary gender language; when a woman 
who was designated ‘male’ at birth by doctors is called ‘Sir’ or described as ‘he’; 
when a person who identifies as genderqueer is automatically described as a woman 
and mother), or by being treated in a way that excludes them from recognition as 
members of the gender/sex they self-designate (e.g., when the speaker who says 
‘thanks to the men here’ makes eye contact with all of the men present except for the 
man who was designated ‘female’ at birth) . They may be de-gendered by being 
addressed or described using ‘neutral’ or objectifying biological language that does 
not recognise their gender self-designation (e.g., when a man who was designated 
‘female’ on government-issued identity documents is called ‘they’ or ‘the person’ in 
a situation where others are being described as ‘she’ or ‘he’, a woman who was 
designated ‘male’ is described as ‘a male-to-female transsexual’ where other women 
are simply called ‘women’, or a genderqueer person is called a ‘natal female’ where 
other people are described simply as women or men, without reference to their 
presumed biological attributes). Note that it would not constitute de-gendering to 
treat someone as neutral if that is consistent with how they identify. A person may 
also be de-gendered by being treated as non-gendered when they have a clear gender 
self-designation (e.g., at a party, when a woman who was assigned as ‘male’ asks for 
the location of the toilets, she is directed to the ‘unisex’ toilets, whereas other women 
present are shown to ‘female’ toilets).
They may be marginalised as effects to be explained or marked categories (e.g., 
when people whose own genders are not listed on their identity documents or 
medical records are described as gender ‘variant’; when researchers ask ‘what causes 
people to be intersex?’). They may be essentialised as being a distinct class of person 
(e.g., when all people whose own gender and body self-designations have been 
delegitimised by others are uncritically labelled as ‘intersex’, ‘transgender’, 
‘transsexual’, ‘trans people’, or as members of ‘the intersex community’ or ‘the trans 
community’). They may also be socially excluded from consideration in everyday 
experience (e.g., when airplane security policies treat discrepancies between people’s 
gender self-designations and the gender markers in their passports as automatic red 
flags for terrorism, based on the assumption that people’s gender designations are 
reflected in their Government-issued identity documents; when published
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descriptions of ‘researchers’ and ‘trans people’ assume these categories are mutually 
exclusive and thus fail to consider the possibility that some researchers have 
experienced gender affirmation or having their gender designations delegitimised by 
others). The present research initiates a new psychological field that explores these 
various forms of delegitimisation.
[1.7] Thesis structure and overview of the present research
This thesis comprises studies that move from the study of disciplinary forms of 
cisgenderism (Chapters 2-4) to the study of self-reported misgendering in everyday 
life (Chapter 5), and from the use of textual analyses through bibliometrics, 
quantitative content analysis and discursive analysis (Chapters 2 and 3) to the use of 
experimental methodology (Chapters 4-5). Each chapter commences using the 
bricolage Point of Entry Text (POET) technique. The POET describes the personal 
experiences, conversations and/or texts that served as entry points into each piece of 
research in my bricolage. Next, I provide a review of key concepts or publications 
that contextualise the particular piece of research. I begin with a bibliometric analysis 
of the four most widely cited English language papers in the field of sexist language 
research (Chapter 2), applying the technique of rigour in the absence to imagine how 
cisgenderist assumptions in this research could lead to practical barriers for people 
whose genders and bodies are delegitimised. I use the moving to the margins 
technique to critique these four papers from the cisgenderism framework, in which 
assumptions about the legitimacy of externally imposed, administrative gender/sex 
categories are challenged. I follow this study with a quantitative content analysis of 
psychological literature on children’s genders and gender-associated expression 
(Chapter 3). By creating and empirically validating my own measures for 
pathologising and misgendering forms of cisgenderism, which have not previously 
been operationalised, I demonstrate rigour in the absence. In several sections of the 
analysis, I engage in reflexive empiricism by critiquing my approach in reflective 
text boxes. In the discussion section, I trace and expose the hidden and diffuse social 
relations of power that produce and maintain cisgenderism in psychology. Next, I use 
rigour in the absence to imagine alternatives to the most widely used medical 
diagram of infant genitals (Chapter 4). Using experimental methodology, I move to 
the margins and conduct two experiments in which the current medical norm is
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constructed as an experimental condition rather than a control. In this study, I explore 
how verbal instructions, textual descriptions and the ordering of images in the 
schematic diagrams can influence people’s decisions in ostensibly ‘neutral’ and 
‘value-free’ medical communication about young people’s genitals. I then conduct 
two studies of people’s self-reported experiences of being misgendered and 
misgendering others (Chapter 5) and explore whether perspective as a target or 
source gender delegitimisation affects people’s perceptions of the effects of 
misgendering. Finally, I conclude this thesis with a discussion of my findings in 
Chapters 2-5 and provide recommendations for reducing cisgenderism based on my 
research findings (Chapter 6).
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Misgendering in English Language Contexts: Applying Non-Cisgenderist
Methods to Feminist Research
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[2.1] Introduction
This chapter focuses on an analysis of sexist language research. Language is a 
common medium through which components of cisgenderist ideology can be 
communicated and produced. When seeking sources to guide my own use of 
language in my research and my development of a new framework for understanding 
gender and body delegitimisations, I began by juxtaposing three POETs to present a 
complex and multilinear perspective on sexist language research. The first was the 
American Psychology Association Publication Manual (2010) section on reducing 
bias regarding gender (pp. 73-74), which has historically been viewed by many 
psychological researchers as a definitive style guide (Madigan, Johnson, & Linton, 
1995). As Madigan, Johnson and Linton (1995, p. 428) have observed, APA style ‘is 
not just a collection of arbitrary stylistic conventions but also encapsulates the core 
values and epistemology of the discipline’. The Manual states:
Sexist bias can occur when pronouns are used carelessly, as when the 
masculine pronoun he is used to refer to both sexes or when the masculine or 
feminine pronoun is used exclusively to define roles by sex (e.g., “the nurse...she”). 
The use of man as a generic noun or as an ending for an occupational title (e.g., 
policeman instead of police officer) can be ambiguous and may imply incorrectly 
that all persons in the group are male. Be clear about whether you mean one sex or 
both sexes. (American Psychological Association [APA], 2010, p. 73).
These instructions codify an essentialist gender/sex binary in which ambiguity 
is treated as as a problematic and invalid gender option. The conflation of ‘man’ with 
‘male’ and ‘masculine’ in the text constructs the normative person as someone whose 
physical characteristics align in a particular way with their own designation of their 
gender. Thus an authoritative professional guide on how to reduce some overt forms 
of gender bias in language effectively mandated some forms of gender 
delegitimisation that are likely to be less obvious to readers with less awareness of 
who is excluded from such descriptions.
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The second POET that facilitated my entiy into this research was a quotation 
from a ‘trans activist’ button cited in trans activist and scholar Vivane Namaste’s 
(2000) Invisible lives: The erasure o f transsexual and transgendered people:
Your theories are covered in our blood—Trans activist button, Toronto, mid- 
1990s. (Namaste, 2000, p. 27).
This quotation inspired me to consider the destructive effects that psychological 
theories about people’s genders and bodies can have on the actual lives of people 
who are targets of cisgenderism. Based on this consideration, I followed my 
discursive analysis of cisgenderist assumptions in sexist language research by 
exploring the practical consequences of these assumptions in the context of people’s 
everyday lives.
My third POET was an incident that occurred in one of my university courses 
while I was an undergraduate student. When I first read the university catalogue, I 
was excited to see a course titled ‘Women’s bodies, women’s lives’. I enrolled at the 
first opportunity, and arrived at the first class with unbridled enthusiasm. However, I 
quickly discovered that the lead lecturer had a particular approach to the topic that 
acknowledged some women’s bodies and lives and excluded other women’s bodies 
and lives.
One of my close friends in the course, M., was a transfer student from a 
historically Black university in the Southeastern United States. M. identified as Black, 
Puerto Rican and white due to her polycultural background. She and I were among 
the only polycultural students in the course. She identified as a bisexual woman. 
During a lecture on intersecting oppressions and patriarchal hierarchies early in the 
course, the lead lecturer drew a table with two parallel columns on the chalkboard.
She wrote binary pairs of social categories in each row: white, black; gay, straight; 
rich, poor; female, male.
As each of the first three pairs was added to the chalkboard, M. raised her hand 
to inform the lecturer that this binary construction had excluded her. She was not 
solely white or Black, she informed the lecturer. Another student pointed out that 
Asian and First Nation peoples were also excluded by the lecturer’s binary approach.
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When M. asserted that she felt erased as a bisexual person, the lecturer stated that 
bisexual people did not actually exist and were simply ‘fence-sitters’ who should 
decide whether they were ‘really’ gay or straight. At this point, almost half of the 
students in the class rose unceremoniously from their seats in the large lecture theatre, 
collected their belongings, and stampeded towards the exit.
As the third binary pair was added to the chalkboard, M. protested yet again.
She was solidly middle class, neither ‘rich’ nor ‘poor’ by conventional standards in 
this geographical region. After objecting several times, we then reached the final 
binary: female, male. At this point, M. and I objected in unison for distinct reasons: I 
objected to the assumption that ‘female’ and ‘male’ were natural categories given my 
experience of having been forcibly normalised to conform to one of these two 
recognised categories. M. objected to the characterisation of ‘female’ and ‘male’ 
bodies as essentially distinct, as she had some physical characteristics that were more 
closely associated with ‘male’ bodies.
We raised our hands expectantly, and our eyes locked in a moment of solidarity. 
We knew we both wished that our classmates had actually read the course 
assignments, instead of leaving us with the ethical obligation we felt to challenge the 
lecturer’s problematic views in the absence of any other dissenting voices. The 
lecturer raised the inside of her palm and thrust it flat towards us. ‘We in the feminist 
movement,’ she intoned. ‘We have a rule known as the three penny rule.’ M. and I 
glanced quickly at each other, puzzled by our unfamiliarity with this rule after years 
of active involvement in feminist organisations. ‘We believe in equality, so each 
person gets three pennies. You can speak once for each of the three pennies.’ Here 
the lecturer paused for dramatic effect, before concluding sharply, ‘and I do believe 
you two have used up your three pennies.’
This experience with the use of ostensibly liberating ideology to silence and 
marginalise others has remained salient in my memory. Whenever I engage in or 
analyse research that has social justice aims, I evaluate its functions and effects as 
distinct from its stated intent. Based on this ‘three penny rule’ principle, I consider 
how concepts that appear to promote ‘equality’ can in some contexts function to
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undermine it. In the current analysis, I considered whether sexist language research 
functioned to challenge some forms of gender ideology whilst reinforcing others.
In the recent American Psychological Association (APA) Guidelines for Non- 
Sexist Language (APA, 1977) that appeared in APA’s (2010) Publication Manual, 
the American Psychological Association cautioned authors against generic masculine 
language, such as using ‘he’ and ‘man’ to refer to people in general rather than 
specifically to men. APA’s (2010) acknowledgement above that generic masculine 
language ‘may imply incorrectly that all persons in the group are male’ attests to 
institutional concern in the field of psychology about the effects of misgendering on 
women. Similarly, APA guidelines (2010, p. 74) elsewhere advise authors to ‘refer to 
a transgender person using words (proper nouns, pronouns, etc.) appropriate to the 
person’s gender identity or gender expression, regardless of birth sex’ (sic) and to 
‘use the pronouns he, him, or his in reference to a female-to-male transgender 
person’.
These prescriptions seem beneficial. Several theorists have argued that 
misgendering negatively affects gender independent people (e.g., Serano, 2007; 
Winters, 2008). This claim is supported by research that documents negative 
consequences of misgendering in medical and mental health settings (e.g., Craig, 
2005; Dewey, 2008) and by the recent empirical finding that masculine generic 
language is a form of social exclusion that has detrimental effects on women (Stout 
& Dasgupta, 2011). However, almost all of the psychological research on 
misgendering concerns the misgendering of women through the use of masculine 
generics. In this analysis, I critically review key papers in this tradition that continue 
to influence both current research and current policies on inclusive language. My 
analysis suggests that feminist research on sexist language might benefit from 
consideration of research on misgendering by getting past the assumptions that the 
effects of generic language solely affect women, that the group ‘women’ has clear 
and distinct boundaries, and that researchers can determine people’s genders 
accurately and reliably in situations where those people cannot be asked to determine 
their genders for themselves. My analysis also identifies areas of shared relevance 
between feminist approaches to psychology and the emerging field of cisgenderism
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studies, which provides a new theoretical approach to people who experience gender 
and body delegitimisation (e.g., people who are often described as ‘transgender’ or as 
‘intersex’ in English-speaking contexts).
[2.1.1] A brief history o f contrasting feminist approaches to * trans ^  activism 
From the 1850s to the 1950s, gender independent people in the United States 
experienced increasing regulation and segregation in daily life (Stryker, 2008, pp. 
31-59). As early as the 1960s, gender independent people began to engage in 
community organising and to form enduring organisations in response to these 
restrictions (Stryker, 2008, pp. 59-89). By the 1970s, these communities were 
increasingly visible and organised in the United States (Stryker, 2008, pp. 78-89). A 
1971 article published in the Trans Liberation Newsletter (reprinted in Stryker, 2008, 
pp. 96-97) notes the existence of at least seven existing ‘trans liberation’ groups 
located in Los Angeles, Milwaukee, New York, and San Francisco. Other 
organisations that provided community support and advocacy included the Beaumont 
Society, founded in the UK in 1966 (The Beaumont Society, 2011), and the Seahorse 
Club (which later split into separately named state branches), founded in Australia in 
1971 (Seahorse Society of New South Wales [NSW], n.d.).
Some feminist authors in the 1970s were already aware of both the existence of 
people whose gender assignments did not match their self-designations and the 
ongoing collective efforts for ‘trans liberation’ (Namaste, 2009; Serano, 2007; 
Stiyker, 2008). These scholars often commented on the bodies, lives, and 
experiences of such people and responded to emerging ‘trans liberation’ movements 
(Namaste, 2009; Serano, 2007; Stryker, 2008). Some past feminist scholarship was 
explicitly hostile or discriminatory, refusing to acknowledge women who were 
assigned as ‘male’ as authentic women. These hostile responses included repeatedly 
misgendering these women as ‘males’ or ‘she-males’ and repeatedly misgendering 
men who were assigned as ‘female’ as ‘confused lesbians’ (e.g., Raymond, 1979), 
even when these men identified as gay or bisexual men whose attractions and 
partnerships were with other men. Some prominent feminists treated women who 
had been assigned as ‘male’ as enemies of feminism (e.g., Daly, 1978; Morgan,
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1978; Raymond, 1979), and several actively campaigned against equal rights for 
gender independent people (Stryker, 2008, pp. 101-113).
Other 1970s-1980s feminist scholars critiqued academic theories that excluded 
gender independent people (e.g., Kessler & McKenna, 1978) and expressed support 
for those who had been targeted by cisgenderist attacks (e.g., Haraway, 1985; see 
also Stryker, 2008, pp. 108-109). Feinbloom, Fleming, Kijewski, and Schulter’s 
(1976) article used interview data from women who had been assigned as ‘male’ and 
who were active participants in lesbian feminist activism to provide support for these 
women’s inclusion in feminist circles. While few people of ‘trans’ experience with 
known gender histories were recognised as scholars during these decades, some 
‘trans’ activists were already challenging inaccurate or discriminatory portrayals of 
their lives in academic and clinical literature (Parlee, 1996; Stryker, 2008). Sandy 
Stone’s 1987 essay The Empire Strikes Back (Stone, 1992), which was sub-titled 
ironically as a ‘post-transsexual manifesto’, was written in response to Raymond’s 
(1979) book.
In recent decades, the hostility that often characterised the relation between 
feminist theories and gender independent people during the 1970s stands alongside a 
newer tradition of beneficial collaborations between feminists and people of ‘trans’ 
experience. The increasing visibility of gender independent people who identify as 
feminists has led to greater recognition of the overlap between what were once 
considered discrete and opposing political movements. This historic 
acknowledgement has facilitated the emergence of new ‘transfeminisms’ (e.g., Scott- 
Dixon, 2006; Enke, 2012; Serano, 2007).
In contrast to the active enmity or support with which some feminist scholars 
discussed gender independent people from the 1970s through 1980s, some 1970s- 
early 1990s feminist research that did not specifically intend to address gender 
independent people perpetuated their erasure by relying on cisgenderist assumptions. 
Stout and Dasgupta’s (2011) research explored how even subtle cultural practices 
that do not have hostile intent and that do not personally ostracise individuals can 
systematically overlook entire social groups. Stout and Dasgupta documented the
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detrimental effects this exclusion can have on individuals. My cisgenderism 
framework integrates feminist concerns about generic masculine language such as 
using ‘he’ and ‘man’ to refer to all people with the broader problem of misgendering, 
constructing the world (i.e., through language or behaviour) in a way that designates 
a person as a member of a gender category with which they do not identify.
[2.1.2] A brief and partial history o f debates on sexist language in English
I approach the topic of sexist language with the assumption that gender category 
ascriptions in language use have political history. Contrary to prior and 
contemporary claims like those of MacKinnon (1973) that masculine generics are 
merely a matter of grammatical convention and ‘tradition’, use of generic masculine 
language in English emerged for complex ideological reasons that are well 
documented. Historical linguistic research shows evidence of the use of a singular 
generic ‘they’ in English co-existing alongside ‘she’, ‘he’, and ‘he or she’ as early as 
Old English (Bodine, 1975; Curzan, 2003). The first grammar text to label the 
singular ‘they’ as incorrect was Lindley Murray’s (1795) English Grammar. Several 
decades later, an 1850 Act of Parliament replaced the generic use of ‘he or she’ with 
‘he’ in all formal British legal documents, transforming Murray’s prescriptivist 
vision into formal regulation (Bodine, 1975). Widespread acceptance and usage of 
the generic singular ‘they’ continued into contemporary English (Bodine, 1975; 
Curzan, 2003) and remains more commonly used than ‘he’ to denote a person whose 
gender is unknown (Baranowski, 2002). Ironically, those who dismiss feminist 
efforts to promote non-sexist language as ‘revisionism’ of ‘traditional’ language use 
are themselves engaging in revisionist history of language use and the invention of 
tradition.
The 1850 Act of Parliament had the stated aim of making legislative 
documents more concise (Bodine, 1975). More recent defenders of prescriptive 
masculine generic language have also used such rationalist motives. Martyna (1980) 
described how popular media ridiculed non-sexist language as ‘linguistic lunacy’ and 
claimed that feminism ‘assaults the English language’ (Van Home, 1976; as cited in 
Martyna, 1980), thus ignoring the historical plurality and diversity of English 
linguistic traditions. Concerns on behalf of gender independent women were rarely
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articulated in early debates about sexist language. Indeed, Van Home’s (1976) 
attribution of violence to feminists seeking equal respect is similar to feminist Janice 
Raymond’s (1979) claim that all gender independent women who wish to be 
recognised linguistically as women ‘rape women’s bodies by reducing the real 
female form to an artefact, and appropriating this body for themselves’ (p. 104). 
Morgan (1978, p. 181) also employed ‘the “transsexual rapist” trope’ (Stryker, 2008, 
p. 105) to justify her intentional misgendering of gender independent women.
Feminist psychological research on the effects of sexist language in English 
was first conducted in the 1970s, alongside the emergence of the aforementioned 
‘trans liberation’ movements and diverse feminist responses to these movements 
(Namaste, 2000; Namaste, 2009; Stryker, 2008). This field of enquiry substantiated 
regional feminist challenges to sexist language and catalysed public discourses 
surrounding it (e.g., Martyna, 1978, 1980). This formative research aimed to clarify 
the impact of sexist language on thought and behaviour, to explore the effectiveness 
of alternatives to sexist language, and to document the negative societal and 
interpersonal impact of sexist language. The literature included both cognitive 
psychological studies showing the effects of language on the imagination of social 
categories (e.g., Hyde, 1984) and commentary on the use of generics in scientific 
writing, such as the first book-length guide to non-sexist language in English (Miller 
& Swift, 1981).
Given a historical context in which the voices and concerns of gender 
independent people (including activists working outside of academia) were routinely 
dismissed by psychological science (Parlee, 1996), it is not surprising that feminist 
researchers in the field of sexist language gave incomplete acknowledgement to the 
range of people who experience misgendering. Similarly, it is not surprising that 
feminist researchers publishing during this period rarely appeared to consider the 
distinction between using masculine generics to apply to women and more 
widespread practices of misgendering. Yet both practices emphasise the problematic 
nature of designating people’s gender based on assumptions rather than by actual 
verification with the person concerned. First published in 1988, Margrit Eichler’s 
(1991) guide to non-sexist research methods described ‘sexism’ as comprising
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multiple ‘problems’ that often overlap, rather than a discrete, homogeneous concern. 
Accordingly, in this analysis, I examine key papers that continue to inform the 
literature on sexist language for the extent to which they acknowledge multiple 
aspects of misgendering.
[2.13] Bibliometric overview o f sexist language research in English 
I used bibliometric analysis to determine which articles to examine. I conducted this 
analysis using Web of Science, an interdisciplinary database that indexes over 12,000 
journals in the sciences, social sciences, arts and humanities from 1900 to the present. 
A Web of Science search on June 29, 2011, for all English language journal articles 
on the topics of “sexist language”, “gender biased language”, “gender bias in 
language”, “sex biased language”, “sex bias in language”, or “linguistic sexism” 
returned 65 results, excluding commentaries, errata, and reviews. The two subject 
areas in which these articles most commonly appeared were women’s studies {n = 24, 
36.92%), and social psychology (« = 23, 35.38%), including articles that were cross­
listed in women’s studies and social psychology (« = 16, 24.62%). All of the articles 
referenced as developmental psychology (« = 17, 26.15%) were cross-listed with 
women’s studies. Only two other fields included more than three articles: educational 
research {n = 7, 10.77%) and communication {n = 5, 7.69%). Only five journals 
published two or more articles each on sexist language; Sex Roles (« = 16, 24.62%); 
Psychology of Women Quarterly {n = 5, 7.70%), Journal of Language and Social 
Psychology {n = 4, 6.15%), American Psychologist {n = 2, 3.08%) and Journal of 
Pragmatics {n = 2, 3.08%). Collectively, these five journals account for almost half 
of all articles in this field {n = 29, 44.62%). Most articles {n = 47, 72.31%) were 
published in the US. Countries in my sample that published two or more articles on 
sexist language were New Zealand {n = 3, 4.62%), Australia {n = 2, 3.45%), Canada 
(n = 2, 3.08%) and China {n = 2, 3.08%). One article was published from each of the 
following countries; England, India, Italy, Norway, Poland, Romania, Scotland, and 
Spain. Clearly, during this period, sexist language research in English was a concern 
of English-speaking scholars working at the intersection of psychology and women’s 
studies.
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I used citation counts to determine which papers had the most impact and thus 
warranted sustained critical analysis. The most frequently cited articles in modern- 
day sexist language research were Moulton, Robinson, and Elias (1978) (« = 64 
citations, 13.01% of all citations) with an average of 1.88 citations per year since 
publication; Hyde (1984) {n = 43, 8.74%) with 1.54 citations annually; Gastil (1990) 
(« = 38, 7.72%) with 1.81 annually, and Gannon, Luchetta, Rhodes, Pardie, and 
Segrist (1992) {n = 32, 6.50%) with 1.60 per year. Therefore, I focused my analysis 
on these four papers.
[2.2] ‘Neutral’ language that isn’t
Janice Moulton, George Robinson and Cherin Elias (1978) are sometimes credited 
with having co-authored the first empirical study on linguistic sexism in English. 
This early research involved 264 university student participants whom the authors 
described as women and 226 who are described as men. Moulton et al. (1978) 
assessed the interpretation of pronouns by randomly assigning these participants to 
one of six groups without informing them of the authors’ hypothesis that pronoun 
usage is not gender-neutral and can introduce sex bias. Participants were asked to 
create a story about a fictional character that fit the theme provided by the 
researchers and instructed not to write about themselves, in order to invoke pronoun 
usage. Participants were given one of two themed sets of instructions, with three 
groups of participants receiving each theme. In the three groups that received the 
same theme, one group received the pronoun ‘his’ in the blank spaces, one group 
read ‘their’, and another group read ‘his or her’. The researchers reported that fewer 
story characters were ‘female’ when ‘his’ was used (35%) than when ‘their’ was 
used (46%) or than when ‘his or her’ was used (56%), and the effect of this pronoun 
manipulation was statistically significant {p < .001). The results supported the 
researchers’ hypothesis that masculine generic pronouns leads people to envision 
men even when the contexts are explicitly gender-neutral, though effects of ‘sex of 
subject’ (sic) and content were also statistically significant.
Two critical issues with Moulton et al.’s (1978) study are relevant to 
misgendering. First, the researchers’ interpretation depended on the cisgenderist 
assumption that the gender of fictional characters can be determined accurately and
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reliably from pronouns and from proper names. The follow-up question asked 
participants to name their fictional characters. Here the researchers used names to 
determine gender designations. This methodological decision had consequences: five 
participants wrote stories with proper names that the authors considered ‘gender 
ambiguous’ (footnote 2, p. 1034), apparently without using gender-marked pronouns. 
The exclusion of these participants’ data from the data analysis rendered invisible the 
possibility that real and fictional characters could exist outside of a cisgenderist 
paradigm, despite the contemporaneous presence in Ursula K. Le Guin’s award- 
winning, feminist science fiction novel. The left hand of darkness (Le Guin, 1969), 
of an entire society that existed outside of this paradigm. The researchers also 
acknowledged and subsequently excluded proper names that could not be clearly 
marked as ‘male’ or ‘female’, demonstrating how researchers’ assumptions regarding 
names and gender can interfere with data collection and potentially alter study results.
Elsewhere, the authors applied this cisgenderist approach to gendered names 
when challenging the alleged neutrality of masculine generics:
‘...the usual interpretation of 
Sophia is a man.
makes it false, or insulting. It is not taken to mean that Sophia is a member of 
the human species’ (p. 3).
This quotation ignored the possibility that people might not conform to cisgenderist 
norms—as when their given names or anatomical configurations are not typically 
associated with their self-designated gender. This sentence overlooked cases in 
which someone who identifies as a man might have a name such as ‘Sophia’ that 
many people will interpret as ‘female’.
Second, the authors consistently used ‘male’ and ‘female’ interchangeably with 
‘men’ and ‘women’. By so doing, they further reified the cisgenderist matching norm, 
documented in experimental research by Suzanne Kessler and Wendy McKenna 
(1978), that assumes all men are biologically ‘male’ and all women are biologically 
‘female’ according to medical norms of socially constructed ‘sex’ categories. For 
example, when describing the contexts in which masculine rather than gender-neutral 
terms are appropriate, Moulton et al. stated that ‘it would be a rare person who
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could... say of a female, “He’s the best.’” This statement simultaneously promoted 
the biological basis for gender pronoun usage that is typically used to justify 
misgendering of gender independent people and obscured pervasive experiences of 
misgendering by such people. When critiquing the statement ‘Sophia is a man’, 
Moulton et al. conflated ‘gender’ with ‘sex’. This conflation promoted a 
methodological approach in which particular anatomical ‘credentials’ are required 
for a person’s gendered name to be treated as valid.
[2.2.1] Telling tales about gender
Moulton et al. (1978) produced strong main effects with a sample size that was large 
enough to contribute to results with high statistical power. Their findings were 
relevant to how academic and research populations responded to pronouns. However, 
researchers increasingly recognised that a collegiate sample was unlikely to represent 
perception and cognition across the human population (e.g.. Sears, 1986). Indeed, 
this problem continues to concern researchers (e.g., Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 
2010). Limitations in Moulton et al.’s (1978) sample led in part to Janet Hyde’s 
(1984) later attempt to replicate and qualify these findings with participants from 
more diverse age groups.
Hyde (1984) conducted two experiments. Using a modified version of the task 
assigned by Moulton et al. (1978), she first evaluated usage and knowledge of 
generic masculine pronouns by 60 first graders (37 reported girls, 23 reported boys), 
67 third graders (33 reported girls, 34 reported boys), 59 fifth graders (33 reported 
girls, 36 reported boys), and 124 college students (67 reported women, 57 reported 
men) in the United States. The elementary school children included students from 
diverse socioeconomic backgrounds. All of the elementary school children were 
interviewed individually, with half receiving an interviewer whom Hyde described as 
a woman and half receiving one described as a man. As in Moulton et al. (1978), 
participants were asked to create a story about a fictional character from preliminary 
information, with children receiving an age-appropriate story from an interviewer. 
Students were asked to tell a story about a fictional child, and were prompted by ‘he’, 
‘they’ or ‘he or she’ for the fictional child’s pronoun. The interviewers recorded the 
character’s name and the basic story content.
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Hyde then evaluated these children’s understanding of generic masculine 
pronoun usage more directly. After the initial story, interviewers gave students three 
tasks: a fill-in-the-blank exercise involving sentences with missing pronouns (e.g.,
‘When a kid plays football, likes to play with friends’); a sentence pronoun
correction task in which students were asked to determine whether complete 
sentences that included pronouns were right or wrong and why (e.g., ‘The average 
kid likes to play football with her friends. Right or wrong? Why?’); and a question 
regarding whether their usage of the generic ‘he’ always refers to a boy and, if not, 
what the student meant when using that pronoun. University student participants 
were evaluated in groups rather than individually. These participants were given a 
printed form asking them to create a fictional character that fit the sentence theme 
about ‘the average student’ located ‘in a large coeducational institution’ (p. 699). 
Students were instructed not to write about themselves. Hyde assigned these students 
to three evenly split groups that received ‘his’, ‘his or her’, and ‘their’ in the blank 
space in the sentence. After students had completed this task, they responded to 
questions on the back of the form that addressed their understanding of and 
attribution of meaning to generic masculine language.
Replicating Moulton et al.’s (1978) findings with a more diverse sample, Hyde 
found a highly significant main effect of the pronoun used on the gender of the 
fictional story character {p < .001); 12% of stories overall were about ‘females’ when 
‘he’ was used, 18% were about ‘females’ when ‘they’ or ‘their’ was used, and 42% 
were about ‘females’ when ‘his or her’ (‘he’ or she’) was used. Hyde reported a 
statistically significant main effect for ‘sex of subject’ (sic); 38% of ‘females’ told 
stories about ‘females’, whereas only 8% of stories by ‘males’ were about ‘females’.
Hyde’s (1984) study design improved upon Moulton et al.’s (1978) method of 
determining character gender by explicitly asking elementary school participants 
whether their character was a boy or a girl, thus avoiding the assumptions that I 
critiqued above. Nonetheless, Hyde reproduced cisgenderism in developmental 
theory in three main ways: by failing to distinguish between ‘female/male’ and 
‘woman/man’; by uncritically accepting the assumption that children’s self­
designated genders should and do match their assigned gender categories; and by
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neglecting non-binary gender possibilities. First, when Hyde described the genders of 
characters in participants’ stories, it is unclear whether these characters were 
‘females’—a term that connotes biological attributes associated with a socially 
constructed medical category—or girls. As APA (2010) now reminds authors, 
‘remember that gender refers to role, not biological sex, and is cultural.’ If the 
children who participated in this study wrote stories that were concerned with 
genitals and secondary sex characteristics then Hyde did not report that finding. 
Similarly, she did not provide any description of how she determined ‘sex of subject,’ 
a variable that is often coded on the basis of children’s visual appearance at the time 
of evaluation, suggesting that she did not ‘ask (her) participants which designations 
they prefer’ (APA, 2010, p. 72).
Second, Hyde’s theoretical framework could not distinguish explicitly between 
self-designated gender and assigned gender, leaving external observers rather than 
those being categorised with the authority to determine gender. Citing 
Constantinople’s (1979) comment that Money (1965) produced evidence that a 
critical period for ‘gender identity’ acquisition occurs during the period of rapid 
infant language acquisition, Hyde stated that ‘even the very fundamental learning of 
gender identity is language based’ (p. 698). This statement constructed gender 
identity as an unremarkable ‘natural fact’ (Garfinkel, 1984) that develops in the same 
way for all people, obscuring cases in which linguistic gender assignments contrast 
with people’s gender self-designations. While some people discover their gender 
through external linguistic designations, gender independent people often report an 
awareness of themselves as ‘different’ well before they acquire the language to 
articulate their gender self-designation (Namaste, 2000; Serano, 2007).
I call attention to Hyde’s apparent confidence in her ability to determine 
children’s gender accurately to open up alternative interpretations of her statistical 
analysis. For example, while Hyde stated that ‘not a single first-grade boy told a 
story about a female’ (p. 700), it is possible that the sample included gender 
independent boys and young people with genders other than ‘girl’ or ‘boy’ who were 
unknown to her because of the limits of her ontology of gender. Hyde does not 
mention the use of gender verification procedures that involve the participants
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themselves, and such young people would likely be misgendered by Hyde’s apparent 
reliance on the designations listed on their school identity documents.
Hyde found that, overall, sentences with ‘she’ were judged incorrect more 
frequently (28%) than those with ‘he’ (19%). This finding may attest to mainstream 
usage of generic masculine language. However, this finding also suggests the 
presence of English generic feminine language in some instances.
Whereas feminist researchers like Hyde have raised awareness of 
androcentrism, Hyde’s findings also give insight into the problem of cisgenderism by 
documenting how people make rapid ascriptions of gender. Hyde reports that 
children’s judgements related to the ‘sex’ typing of the sentence, though her 
discussion described gender rather than sex. ‘She’ was judged wrong 39% in a 
sentence about football, while ‘he’ was judged wrong only 6% for the same sentence. 
Interestingly, Hyde documented age trends in the effect of sex typing on correct- 
sentence attribution, with only 18% of first graders but 67% of fifth graders judging 
‘she’ as wrong in the football sentence. When asked why they designated the 
pronoun usage in a sentence as ‘wrong’, almost all children gave irrelevant reasons 
or no reason. Yet older students increasingly objected to ‘her’ or ‘his or her’ in the 
football sentence claiming that ‘girls can’t play football’. Only one participant, 
described as a third-grade girl, challenged ‘his’ in the football sentence based on girls’ 
ability to play football.
Hyde’s second experiment aimed to directly test the effect of gender-related 
pronoun usage on occupational stereotyping using a fictitious occupation called 
‘wudgemaking’. Due to the finding in her first study that most first graders’ lacked 
knowledge that ‘he’ refers to all people in ‘gender-neutral contexts’, Hyde limited 
her participants to 132 third and fifth graders. Hyde used an identical task to the 
story-telling activity in Experiment 1, but added the pronoun ‘she’ as a fourth 
condition. She also asked children to rate women and men’s ability to serve as 
teachers, doctors, firemen or firefighters on a three-point scale from ‘very well’ to 
‘just okay’ to ‘not very well’. She then read a description of a fictional occupation 
called wudgemaker that was designed to be ‘gender-neutral’. Participants were
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evenly distributed to one of four pronoun conditions in which ‘he’, they’, ‘he or she’, 
or ‘she’ was used. Participants were then asked to rate women and men’s ability to 
do the job well. Hyde followed these questions by asking a series of questions to 
assess participant knowledge of generic masculine language usage. Hyde found that 
the manipulation of the pronoun had a highly significant effect {p < .0001) on the 
‘sex’ of the story character; only 17% of participants who received ‘he’ and 18% 
who received ‘he or she’ created stories with ‘female’ characters, compared with 
31% who received ‘they’ and 77% who received ‘she’.
Attending to my third point, that Hyde’s research methodology reinforced 
cisgenderism by neglecting non-binary gender possibilities, I now consider the 
implications of Hyde’s view of gender pronouns. Hyde claimed that ‘”his” is not 
gender neutral in a psychological sense’ (p. 703), but she missed how ‘he and she’ 
and ‘they’ might operate as differently psychologically. Hyde noted that ‘she’ 
produced a high percentage of stories about ‘female’ characters. She also found that 
a greater percentage of participants created ‘female’ characters when the gender- 
neutral pronoun ‘they’ was used than when participants received ‘he or she.’ 
However, she failed to acknowledge that leaving gender open for young people to 
determine may have offered greater opportunity for challenging gender ideology than 
merely providing binary gender options.
Hyde stated that 63 university students verified the wudgemaker description as 
gender neutral, based on their responses to two tasks. First, participants received a 
job description that used the pronoun ‘they’. Participants rated both women and 
men’s capabilities to do the job and the percentage of women and men in the 
profession. From the results of matched-group /-tests, Hyde determined that ‘the 
occupation was reasonably gender neutral’ (p. 702). Hyde explained that, ‘if the 
occupation is truly gender neutral, then when it is described with (‘they’ or ‘he and 
she’) there should be no significant differences between ratings of men and women 
on the job’ (p. 703). Yet these two pronouns are not, in fact, conceptually 
synonymous. Not only does ‘he and she’ impose a binary model that precludes 
people with third gender or neutral pronoun preferences, but the conflation of ‘they’ 
with ‘he and she’ is also insensitive to findings that link the ordering of gendered
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terms was introduced into English through an ideology that valued men over women 
(Bodine, 1975). The next study I analyse engaged with this question.
[2.2.2] Research incongruities
Feminist research claims like those made by Moulton et al. (1978) and Hyde (1984) 
that the generic ‘he’ leads to gender bias did not go unchallenged. John Gastil’s 
(1990) study on masculine generic pronouns was designed to address such concerns 
about possible methodological flaws in sexist language research. For example. Cole, 
Hill, and Dayley (1983) argued that the generic use of ‘he’ did not itself lead to 
gender bias and proposed instead that methodological flaws in earlier feminist 
research were responsible for this apparent link. Cole et al. conducted a series of 
experiments that alternated ‘he’, ‘he/she’, and ‘they’. While their results documented 
some evidence of masculine attribution when both ‘man’ and ‘he’ were used together, 
their findings did not support previous feminist theory linking generic masculine 
pronouns with increased view of men as prototypical.
In response, Gastil (1990) aimed to measure the effect of pronoun usage 
directly, keeping the study purpose unknown to participants, and ensuring that the 
study utilised mental images. Participants were described as 48 ‘women’ and 45 
‘men’ undergraduate students at a large, Midwestern university in the United States. 
Students read 12 sentences aloud, including six filler sentences and six sentences that 
included one of three generic pronouns referencing ‘neutral subjects’ (e.g., ‘person’ 
and ‘pedestrian’). After reading a sentence aloud, the student was asked to speak any 
image that came to mind into a tape recorder. Afterwards, students answered four 
questions that increased in specificity. The final question asked students to recall the 
gender of the sentence ‘subjects’ that they had visualised. Students were given the 
option of responding that they had not viewed any images. Students who reported 
having viewed images were recorded on tape when describing those images.
Gastil (1990) found that ‘he’ produced mostly ‘male’ images, ‘he/she’ 
produced more ‘male’ than ‘female’ images from participants reported as men, and 
that ‘they’ was more generic than ‘he/she’ for participants reported as men. Gastil’s 
findings suggest that ‘she or he’ might be an effective alternative to either ‘they’ or
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‘he or she’, though his study did not directly assess this possibility. Gastil 
unintentionally reinforced cisgenderism in three ways that I have already noted. He 
failed to consider the import of binary language in light of his findings on the impact 
of word order and selection; conflated humanity with binary gender; and overlooked 
a distinction between bodies and genders. As in the previous two studies, Gastil 
provided insufficient data on how participant gender was determined.
Gastil’s suggestion regarding the potential benefits of ‘she or he’ over ‘he or 
she’ is important when viewed alongside Bodine’s (1975) research on androcentrism 
in prescriptive grammar, which documented how early English grammarians used 
prejudicial gender ideology to substantiate their linguistic claims. Wilson (1560; as 
cited in Bodine, 1975) stated unambiguously, ‘the worthier is preferred and set 
before. As a man is sette before a woman’ (p. 234). Again, in the 17th century, Poole 
(1646; as cited in Bodine, 1975) explained with regard to relative pronoun and 
antecedent agreement that ‘the Masculine gender is more worthy than the Feminine’ 
(p. 21). In light of this historical evidence, Gastil’s (1990)’s explanation of why ‘he 
or she’ may be more problematic than ‘they’ suggests the need for researchers to 
focus on the semantics of word order in gendered language. Hegarty, Watson, 
Fletcher, and McQueen (2011) have recently shown that the names of dyadic 
romantic partners are ordered in a manner affected by the semantics of gender, 
regardless of whether the two partners are women, men, or a woman and a man.
Gastil’s awareness that word order might influence cognitive understanding of 
gender did not translate into an awareness of how word omissions might affect 
people’s representation of gender categories. Gastil equated the category ‘human’ 
with being ‘male or female’, reinforcing the dehumanisation of those who fall 
outside of these binary categories. For example, Gastil’s categorisation of gendered 
images included ‘male, female, mixed (male and female), or neither (e.g., no humans 
in the image)’. Unless participants visualised males, females, or males and females, 
the images were coded as having ‘no humans’.
Like Moulton et al. (1978) and Hyde (1984), Gastil did not clarify whether his 
classification of participant responses refers to presumed bodies or genders, and his
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usage o f ‘female/male’ interchangeably with ‘woman/man’ repeats the practice 
identified in the previous studies. Considering Gastil’s meticulous efforts to highlight 
the impact of linguistic decisions on gender bias, his inattention to linguistic 
distinctions between gender and sex is striking. Indeed, during the time when Gastil 
conducted this research, some feminist psychologists had already published work 
that challenged the uncritical use of definitions of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ that failed to 
distinguish between social and biological factors (e.g., Unger, 1979).
[2.2.3] Who watches the watchers?
Experimental research by Moulton et al. (1978), Hyde (1984), and Gastil (1990) 
provided evidence to support feminist claims that generic masculine language leads 
to misgendering and prejudicial gender cognition. Yet psychologists were not subject 
to scrutiny of sexist language in their own research until Linda Gannon, Tracy 
Luchetta, Kelly Rhodes, Lynn Pardie, and Dan Segrist’s (1992) content analysis of 
sexism in psychological research. This systematic analysis, ‘Sex bias in 
psychological research: Progress or complacency?’, examined 4,952 articles 
published at five-year intervals between 1970 and 1990. The addition of Dan Segrist 
as a co-author was a response to reviewer critique that a research team of women 
could not research sexism with appropriate neutrality (Gannon et al., 1992, para, top 
of p. 391). Not only was the paper’s authorship by women viewed as a problem that 
required redress, but the reviewer’s approach to this ‘problem’ also constructed the 
publication process as a battle between two binary genders. This combative frame is 
oppressive to the women and men on whom it is imposed, and enacts erasure of 
those people whose genders are not that of women or men. Similar concerns about 
the inclusion of gender independent authors, particularly those with non-binary 
genders, have yet to be addressed in ‘mainstream’ psychological research.
Gannon et al. found that non-sexist language had increased over time, but that 
gender bias remained, especially in physiology and social psychology journals. 
Editorial policy had a significant negative correlation with the percentage of studies 
that contained sexist language (r = -.61,p<  .001), suggesting that editorial policies 
can be effective interventions to reduce sexist language among psychologists. 
Although Gannon and her colleagues made a meaningful contribution to sexist
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language research through this analysis, they also reproduced several cisgenderist 
assumptions in their analysis. First, they ignored the possibility that authors in their 
sample may have misgendered participants or the authors whom the articles cited. 
Second, they uncritically accepted the APA requirement to specify participant ‘sex’. 
Third, they used cisgenderist assumptions to determine the gender of authors in their 
sample. As in the previous studies, ‘female/male’ is used interchangeably with 
‘women/men’.
When coding studies for ‘sex bias’, Gannon et al. stated that ‘...single-sex 
studies were not viewed as such if there was an obvious reason for using only one 
sex (e.g., a study of dysmenorrhea...)’ (p. 394). This assumption that only one ‘sex’ 
(read: gender) can experience dysmenorrhea excluded gender independent men who 
may experience dysmenorrhea from the realm of scientific research. Thus Gannon et 
al. provided only limited acknowledgement of misgendering when they failed to 
code cisgenderist exclusions of this sort as forms of ‘sex biased’ methodology. In 
addition, Gannon et al. described their use of ‘clues’ about author gender using what 
can be identified as cisgenderist assumptions. From the authors’ description, it 
appears that these ‘clues’ were actually cues that merely suggested participant 
membership in particular gender categories without providing any indication of 
whether these suggestions were accurate. Gannon et al. coded ‘sex bias’ on the basis 
of whether a discussion section ‘contained inappropriate generalisations’ (p. 393) 
while engaging in inappropriate generalisations characteristic of misgendering in 
their own analysis. This discrepancy suggests that Gannon et al.’s analysis may have 
failed to identify some relevant instances of ‘sex bias’ that involved misgendering in 
the articles literature.
[2.3] Discussion
My examination of feminist research that addressed misgendering in psychology 
reveals how frameworks for researching sexist language have been circumscribed by 
cisgenderist ideology. The historical reliance on cisgenderist assumptions in these 
influential papers from the 1970s-1990s has led to the current narrow focus on 
masculine generics as the most important issue in feminist psychology and in APA 
guidelines to reduce sexist language. Thus far, I have discussed elements of
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misgendering that include determining gender from given names (e.g., Moulton et al., 
1978) or ‘clues’ (e.g., Gannon et al., 1992); conflating gender designations with 
biological ‘sex’ categories (e.g., Gannon et al., 1992; Gastil, 1990; Hyde, 1984; 
Moulton et al., 1978); assuming that people’s gender self-designation should and 
does match their assigned gender category (e.g., Hyde, 1984); failing to explain 
adequately how participant or author gender was determined (e.g., Gannon et al., 
1992; Gastil, 1990; Hyde, 1984; Moulton et al., 1978); and ignoring the existence of 
people with non-binary gender (e.g., Gannon et al., 1992; Gastil, 1990; Hyde, 1984; 
Moulton et al., 1978).
Current empirical studies on sexist language contain the same cisgenderist 
assumptions found in the four studies that I analysed. These assumptions include 
determining gender from external sources, such as visual appearance (e.g., Lee & 
Collins, 2010); conflating gender designations with biological ‘sex’ categories (e.g., 
Lee & Collins, 2010; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Prewitt-Freilino, Caswell, & Laakso, 
2012); assuming that people’s gender self-designation should and does match their 
assigned gender category (e.g., Lee & Collins, 2010; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; 
Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012); failing to explain adequately how gender was 
determined for participants, confederates, or others included in the study (e.g., Lee & 
Collins, 2010; Mallett & Wagner, 2011; Prewitt-Freilino et al, 2012); and ignoring 
both the existence of people with non-binary gender and the contemporary gender- 
neutral pronouns they often employ (e.g., Lee & Collins, 2010; Mallett & Wagner, 
2011; Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012). As a clear demonstration of the enduring impact 
of the four papers in my current analysis, I note that the most recently published 
sexist language article (Prewitt-Freilino et al., 2012) cites three of the four studies 
analysed in the current paper: Gastil (1990), Hyde (1984), and Moulton et al. (1978).
These aspects of my analysis focused narrowly on theoretical commitments 
enacted by the methods of particular studies. Yet the components of misgendering 
that I have identified therein have far-reaching consequences for some real people’s 
everyday lives. If, as Kleinman (2002) claimed, ‘male-based generics are another 
indicator—and, more importantly, a reinforcer—of a system in which "man" in the 
abstract and men in the flesh are privileged over women’ (p. 300), then how might
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the cisgenderist language evident in these studies privilege people whose gender self­
designation matches their assigned gender category over people whose self­
designation differs from that assigned category? To address this question, I now 
detail some societal inequities that are directly relevant to the theoretical aspects of 
misgendering highlighted by my analysis.
[2.3.1] What gender is my name?
Gastil’s (1990) assumption that people’s given names match their gender self­
designation in obvious ways substantiated a version of ‘natural facts’ that contrasts 
markedly from the experiences of many gender independent people. While many 
gender independent people acquire formal recognition for first and middle names that 
are normatively associated with their gender self-designation, many others are either 
unable or unwilling to do so. In English-speaking contexts, multiple barriers can 
limit one’s ability to gain formal recognition of a name that matches one’s own 
gender, including lack of access to gender-affirming medical care, residence in a 
jurisdiction that prohibits changes of names that are not considered to ‘match’ one’s 
assigned ‘sex’ classification, and having a culturally or linguistically specific gender- 
associated given name that is misunderstood by English-speaking authorities. Many 
gender independent people continue to fight for legal recognition of given names that 
match their gender self-designations (e.g., Currah & Minter, 2000; Weiss, 2011). 
Many gender independent people still find themselves denied this recognition due to 
the legislative requirement in many jurisdictions for people to validate their gender 
by producing evidence of their biological attributes (e.g.. New York Civil Liberties 
Union, n.d.).
In some regions, increased public acceptance of gender independent people has 
led to an increase in the number of people who change their perceived social gender 
while retaining a given name associated with their original designation. This growing 
list includes award-winning lawyer and activist Shannon Minter, who kept his 
original given name when he affirmed his gender publicly as a man (Mangaliman, 
2005). Reliance by Gannon et al. (1992) and other researchers on name-based ‘clues’ 
to determine his gender would likely result in misgendering. Researchers who 
employ cisgenderist research methods might also misgender influential spiritual
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leader Mr Barb Greve, a member of the Unitarian clergy who co-founded 
Transgender Religious Professional Unitarian Universalists Together (TRUUsT) 
(Greve, 2006). Given the wide variation of gender-specific associations with given 
names across cultures, English-speaking researchers who use name-based cues may 
also promote ethnocentrism. Such researchers would be particularly likely to 
misgender people such as Anna Hazare, a politically prominent man in India who has 
received both national and international press coverage.
[2.3.2] Conflating gender designations with biological s^ex^  categories 
I now revisit Moulton et al.’s (1978) assertion that ‘Sophia’ could not be a man. 
Research documents numerous instances of gender independent people being denied 
medical treatment that involves parts of their anatomy not typically associated with 
their gender (e.g., Craig, 2005; Dewey, 2008). Gender independent men have 
encountered hospital computer systems that do not permit anyone whose electronic 
profile is labelled ‘male’ to book pelvic exams or pap smears without changing to 
‘female’ (Bauer, Hammond, Travers, Kaay, Hohenadel, & Boyce, 2009), a common 
reason why a gender independent man who instructs his friends to address him as 
‘Matt’ may elect to remain ‘Sophia’ on official medical records—and thus to the 
medical professionals with whom ‘Sophia’, who is indeed a man, must interact. Here 
Moulton et al.’s attempt to challenge sexist language obscured the kinds of double 
binds that Matt would face when attempting to access routine health screening 
typically associated with ‘women’. Further, gender independent people have 
previously described being refused necessary medical care, avoiding essential 
medical care, or omitting vital medical information that would reveal their gender 
independent history or experience due to prior traumatic experiences of 
misgendering by professionals (Bauer et al., 2009; Craig, 2005; Dewey, 2008; 
Dutton, Koenig, & Fennie, 2008; Namaste, 2000; Whittle, Turner, & Al-Alami,
2007). These traumatic experiences include misgendering through pronouns and 
titles; the use of misgendering anatomical language to describe people’s body parts 
(e.g., assuming that it is acceptable to refer to a self-designated man’s genitals as 
‘vagina’ and ‘clitoris’ when he may understand them as his ‘frontal opening’ and 
‘cock’, respectively, or that it is acceptable to refer to a self-designated woman’s 
genitals as ‘penis’ and ‘testicles’ when she may prefer more woman-centric
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language) (e.g., Craig, 2005); being assigned to a gender-specific hospital ward or 
residential facility that does not match one’s gender self-designation (e.g.. Whittle et 
al., 2007); and other forms of misgendering that violate people’s privacy and safety.
At least one example of categorical misgendering that appeared in Gannon et 
al.’s (1992) study could lead to negative health outcomes for gender independent 
people. When describing their coding methodology, Gannon et al. stated that 
‘...single-sex studies were not viewed as such if there was an obvious reason for 
using only one sex (e.g., a study of dysmenorrhea...)’ (p. 394). This explanation 
systematically negated the medical and psychological health needs of men who were 
assigned ‘female’ and who may experience menstrual pain, highlighting the dangers 
of equating woman/man with male/female. The exclusion of these men from 
contemporary studies related to menstruation and other physical experiences that 
cisgenderist ideology links with a single ‘sex’ category is particularly relevant given 
the high rates of polycystic ovary syndrome (PCOS) among gender independent men 
(e.g.. Baba et al., 2007; Baba et al., 2011; Dutton et al., 2008). PCOS is a risk factor 
for several major medical conditions such as type 2 diabetes mellitus, cardiovascular 
disease, obstructive sleep apnea, metabolic dysfunction and endometrial cancer (e.g., 
Bhathena, 2011; Feamley et al., 2010; Nitsche & Ehrmann, 2010; Tomlinson, 
Millward, Stenhouse, & Pinkney, 2010).
Medical needs of gender independent women are also ignored when 
researchers assume that research about menstruation sufficiently addresses women’s 
gender-specific health needs. Few researchers have explored medical needs of gender 
independent women that include the prevention of oestrogen-induced prolactinomas 
(benign pituitary tumours) (Bunck et al. 2009) or diabetes mellitus (Feldman, 2002) 
during hormone administration. Gender independent women also have distinct 
gynaecological needs that can require adaptation of existing screening procedures 
and examination methods (e.g., Weyers et al., 2010; Weyers, Verstraelen, et al.,
2009; Weyers, Decaestecker, et al., 2009).
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[2.3.3] Assuming that people ^ s gender self-designation and assigned gender 
category should match
The assumption that people’s self-designated gender and assigned gender category 
should match can translate into discriminatory practices in clinical encounters and 
affect the extent to which people disclose clinically relevant information. Previous 
authors have discussed how psychomedical gatekeeping of gender affirmation 
resources like hormones and surgery forces gender independent people to prove the 
authenticity of their gender due to this assumed ‘match’ (e.g., Dewey, 2008; Namaste, 
2000; Serano, 2007; Whittle et al., 2007). This forced justification requirement often 
constrains people to reproduce uncritically the narratives they think clinicians and 
researchers want to hear, thus perpetuating inaccurate stereotypes. Professionals who 
provide these services often fail to acknowledge the discriminatory nature of 
requiring ‘proof of gender validity only from gender independent people. Research 
cannot be divorced from the context of systemic inequalities within which it is 
produced. Gender independent people continue to struggle for basic legal rights like 
marriage that are often denied when their gender self-designations are not recognised 
as equally valid (Vertuno, 2011). Quality research and practice in medical and 
mental health environments will require professionals to create situations in which 
people engaging with research or health services are agentic, equal participants.
[2.3.4] Failing to recognise people outside a two-gender ideology
Hyde’s (1984) professional wudgemaker may appear ‘neutral’ at first glance, yet the 
uncritical determination of a profession that isn’t associated with ‘men’ or ‘women’ 
as neutral imposes a culture-specific gender ideology that precludes the possibility 
that other genders may exist and that specific professions may be linked to them. The 
limited utility of Hyde’s approach becomes evident when we consider societies with 
more than two recognised genders. For example, the Bugis society of Sulawesi, 
Indonesia recognises at least five gender categories (Davies, 2007). One recognised 
gender, Bissu, constitutes both a profession of communal spiritual leadership and a 
distinct gender. Like wudgemakers, Bissu are not considered women or men and are 
given access to both women’s and men’s gender-restricted spaces in their 
communities. Yet they are considered to occupy a distinctly gendered social space, 
rather than being ‘neutral’ as Hyde’s definition would imply (Davies, 2007).
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All people can benefit from exposure to the abundant variety of humanity, and 
people who have non-binary gender self-designations may find exposure to others 
with non-binary genders pivotal to self-acceptance and emotional wellbeing. For 
example, ‘Judah’ (Ansara, 2010) described feeling misunderstood and treated as 
‘entertainment’ by a binary-gendered mental health clinician prior to finding one 
with whom Judah shared a non-binary gender. Judah described this therapist’s non­
binary gender as a significant aspect of the positive experience: ‘This therapist 
understands—and actually had first-hand experience of—my gender experience. Ze 
is able to acknowledge the complexity and contradictions of my experience...’ (pp. 
177-178). Judah’s usage o f ‘ze’ (pronounced ‘zee’ and sometimes spelled as ‘zie’), 
an English pronoun preferred by some people who have non-binary gender self­
designations over ‘she’ or ‘he’, marks an extremely rare exception to the virtual 
absence of specific language to describe non-binary gender in psychological 
literature. Cisgenderist and ethnocentric methodology has led feminist researchers to 
neglect this potential source of validation for people who have non-binary gender 
self-designations and to overlook this resource for non-sexist language research more 
generally.
[2.3.5] Contemporary misgendering
The examples above illuminate how the linguistic cisgenderism that I highlighted in 
psychological research maps onto and can enact structural violence that affects 
people’s everyday lives. Although my analysis focused on four widely cited articles 
on sexist language published from 1978 through 1992, these papers continue to 
influence contemporary sexist language research. The problem of cisgenderist 
misgendering remains pervasive in psychology at large. As my empirical study of 
journal articles on children’s gender and expression that were published from 1999 
through 2008 found, psychologists’ usage of cisgenderist language had not decreased 
over the decade (Chapter 3). This study also found that authors from mental health 
professions were significantly more likely to use cisgenderist language than other 
authors.
The cisgenderist assumptions found in the four papers I analysed from the 
1970s-1990s continue to be reproduced in more recent feminist literature. For
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example, Unger’s epistemological concerns about the conflation of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ 
in psychology (e.g., Unger, 1979; Unger, 1983; Unger, 1998; Unger, 2000; Unger & 
Denmark, 1975) were not applied consistently in her later work. The Handbook of 
the Psychology of Women and Gender for which she served as editor (Unger, 2001) 
contained a chapter that consistently conflated ‘sex’ and ‘gender’, used cisgenderist 
assumptions, and promoted a highly cisgenderist developmental approach (i.e., 
Zucker, 2001). This example is provided not to cast doubt on Unger’s prolific 
scholarship, but to illustrate how challenging it is for even those researchers whose 
work seeks to expose and critique gender ideology to recognise how this ideology 
can affect their own work. Hegarty et al.’s (2011) research on the effects of gender 
stereotypes on the order of romantic partners’ names made a similarly cisgenderist 
assumption to that of Moulton et al. (1978) by using names as ‘clues’ to determine 
whether participants were thinking about women or men. Hegarty et al. (2011) did 
not provide caveats to acknowledge the methodological limitation of this assumption.
The widespread practice of determining other people’s genders without their 
explicit agreement is an effect for which I advise non-cisgenderist researchers to 
require explanation. In this analysis, I engaged in fact checking to verify people’s 
gender self-designations. This careful approach is consistent with scientific research 
principles that are currently applied to other coded variables. I made my best effort to 
find information regarding each author’s gender self-designation at the time of 
preparing my analysis and omitted gender pronouns for authors where this 
information was unavailable. I apologise sincerely to any author whom I have 
unintentionally misgendered or degendered. I hope that future researchers will 
engage in similar efforts to ensure that they do not misgender or degender their 
participants or the authors of studies that they cite.
[2.3.6] Health rationale for non-cisgenderist language 
I now return to the second of the four POETs discussed at the beginning of this 
analysis, the POET that asserts that ‘your theories are covered in our blood’ (cited in 
Namaste, 2009). The notion that institutionalised cisgenderism can be lethal may 
seem far-fetched to those with limited exposure to the logistical challenges faced by 
gender independent people today. Raymond’s (1980) government-funded study that
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evaluated US federal aid for indigent and incarcerated ‘transsexuals’ who were 
seeking health and rehabilitation services resulted in the elimination of federal and 
some state-wide funding for these people. This decision in turn led many private 
health insurance companies in the US to adopt ‘trans exclusion clauses’ that deny 
various kinds of medical coverage to gender independent people, often even for life- 
saving treatment for breast or genital cancers (e.g., Stryker, 2008, p. 112). A more 
recent example of how institutionalised cisgenderism can kill was provided in the 
2001 documentary film Southern Comfort, which won awards the Sundance Film 
Festival, the Seattle International Film Festival and the Berlin Film Festival. This 
film chronicled the final year in the life of Robert Eads, a gender independent man 
who died of ovarian cancer after having been repeatedly denied medical care due to 
his gender self-designation (Davis, 2001). Similar examples of how institutionalised 
cisgenderism can endanger equal access to potentially life-saving health care for 
gender independent people have been documented in the decade since the film (e.g., 
Craig, 2005; Dewey, 2008; Dutton, Koenig, & Fennie, 2008; Whittle et al., 2007).
[2.4] Conclusion
As I have demonstrated in my analysis, misgendering can be a destructive form of 
social exclusion that can generate and maintain both sexism and cisgenderism. 
Feminist researchers who seek to identify and critique discriminatory language can 
better achieve these intended aims by using non-cisgenderist research methods. As I 
demonstrated in this analysis, there are areas of shared relevance between the fields 
of feminist psychology and cisgenderism studies. Challenging cisgenderist forms of 
discrimination and social exclusion in research will require lecturers, supervisors, 
researchers, authors, reviewers and journal editors to adopt new practices and 
challenge existing ways of conducting professional work. I also encourage 
supervisors, lecturers and journal editors to develop and implement formal policies to 
promote non-cisgenderist research methods and professional practices.
In the cun'ent chapter, I examined cisgenderist ideology in the field of sexist 
language research. Although cisgenderist assumptions continue to influence 
contemporary feminist research on sexist language, some psychologists have claimed 
that approaches to gender independent people have improved over time in
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psychology in general. In the following chapter, I evaluate this claim through a 
quantitative content analysis of research on children’s genders and gender-associated 
expression.
83
Chapter 3
Cisgenderism in Psychology
Chapters
Cisgenderism in Psychology: A Content Analysis
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[3.1] Introduction
My finding in the previous analysis that cisgenderist assumptions continue to inform 
and constrain feminist research on sexist language demonstrates that even 
researchers who analyse and critique gender/sex ideology can produce and 
communicate such ideology in their writing. In the current analysis, I tested the claim 
that psychology is becoming less cisgenderist. I shifted from a discursive analytical 
approach to a quantitative one that would allow me to analyse and characterise a 
broad spectrum of papers across the discipline of psychology.
The three POETs through which I approached this chapter were the 2008 
American Psychological Association (APA) Council of Representatives Resolution 
on Transgender, Gender Identity and Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, a 2008 
radio transcript that discussed psychologist Kenneth Zucker’s use of aversive 
conditioning techniques to change a child’s own designation of her gender to match 
her assigned gender/sex category, and the 2005 claim by researchers Darryl Hill and 
Brian Willoughby that attitudes towards gender independent people among mental 
health professionals have become positive overall. These three texts showcase the 
multilinearity of responses to gender independent people in psychology. Collectively, 
they may signal tensions between psychologists regarding how they should respond 
to gender independent young people and suggest shifts in actual or perceived practice 
with these young people.
[3.1.1] The APA non-discrimination resolution
In August 2008, the APA Council of Representatives adopted the Resolution on 
Transgender, Gender Identity and Gender Expression Non-Discrimination, 
acknowledging that ‘transgender and gender variant people frequently experience 
prejudice and discrimination and psychologists can, through their professional 
actions, address these problems at both an individual and a societal level’ (American 
Psychological Association [APA], 2008, para 1). In this document, APA’s Council of 
Representatives recognised that ‘psychological research has the potential to inform 
treatment, service provision, civil rights and approaches to promoting the well-being 
of transgender and gender variant people’ (APA, 2008, para 12) and that 
‘psychologists are in a position to influence policies and practices in institutional
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settings’ (APA, 2008, para 11). The APA defined the ‘professional role’ of 
psychologists as one that requires ‘the provision of appropriate, nondiscriminatory 
treatment to transgender and gender variant individuals’ (APA, 2008, para 17), 
urging psychologists ‘to take a leadership role in working against discrimination 
towards transgender and gender variant individuals’ (APA, 2008, para 17).
Among ‘transgender and gender variant individuals’, children are uniquely at 
risk for severe consequences of discrimination. As acknowledged in the APA 
resolution, many of these children face multiple risks to their wellbeing, including 
‘harassment and violence in school environments, foster care, residential treatment 
centers, homeless centers and juvenile justice programs’ (APA, 2008, para 10).
Unlike adults, children in most countries do not have the legal right to make 
autonomous decisions about their educational or living environments. The lack of 
these legal rights means that children who experience discrimination may benefit 
even more than adults from advocacy on their behalf by psychologists.
The APA resolution demonstrates how some psychologists have begun to 
respond to the disparity between mainstream psychological theories and ‘transgender 
and gender variant’ individuals’ accounts of their own genders. Some time ago,
Parlee (1996) identified misrepresentation of such individuals by psychologists, and 
asserted that psychological approaches to gender research were overwhelmingly 
pathologising. Parlee found that psychologists failed to identify participants’ genders 
on participants’ own terms, remaining limited to theories and terms that view 
external classifications as more authoritative than self-designations. More recently, 
other authors have addressed erasure (Namaste, 2000), maligning language (Winters, 
2008) and pathologising (Namaste, 2000; Serano, 2007; Winters, 2008) of 
participants’ genders. Namaste’s (2000) social critique was informed by qualitative 
interviews she conducted for community outreach projects; her text provides detailed 
narratives that were absent from official agency reports. Both authors echoed 
Parlee’s (1996) view that psychological literature omits people’s experiences ‘as they 
are lived and socially organised’ (Namaste, 2000, p. 65).
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Some authors have critiqued psychological research for similar problems, 
including the failure to respect children’s own gender designations (e.g.. Winters,
2008). The recognition of children’s own genders is essential both to APA’s desired 
leadership role in ending discrimination (APA, 2008) and to APA’s stated goal of 
‘objectivity in scientific reporting’  ^ through ‘reducing bias in language’ (APA, n.d.). 
Accordingly, in the present content analysis, I examined recent psychological 
research on children to evaluate whether the sentiments expressed in the 2008 APA 
policy reflect or contrast with the Zeitgeist of the journal article literature.
[3.L2] The Zucker and Bradley method: Delegitimisation as therapy 
My second POET is a radio transcript that I will discuss in its historical context. 
Whereas most children worldwide learn to identify themselves with gender 
categories, many majority world societies offer traditional pathways for children to 
self-designate or change their recognised gender/sex category (e.g., Bartlett, Vasey,
& Bukowski, 2000; Davies, 2007; Graham, 2004; Honingmann, 1964; Vasey & 
Bartlett, 2007). However, minority world mental health professions have historically 
viewed children whose self-designated gender differs from the gender category to 
which they were assigned as having a mental disorder (Bryant, 2008; Hill, Rozanski, 
Carfagnini, & Willoughby, 2005; Vasey & Bartlett, 2007).
Psychologist John Money and his colleagues initiated this field of research 
during the 1950s when they began studying the concept of ‘gender’ in children 
whose biology did not conform to social norms of ‘male’ or ‘female’ (e.g., Hampson, 
Hampson, & Money, 1955; Money, Hampson, & Hampson, 1955a, 1955b). During 
the 1960s, Richard Green co-authored several studies with John Money on 
‘effeminate’ behaviour in boys (e.g.. Green & Money, 1960, 1961, 1962); Richard 
Stoller was also a leading researcher during that decade (Bryant, 2008).
Psychological literature documents the use of behavioural modification to ‘fix’ 
children’s gender identities and expression throughout the 1970s. Spearheaded by 
George Rekers, this research addressed topics that included ‘deviant sex-role
’ Note that ‘scientific objectivity’ has been used to obscure prejudicial ideologies focused on 
marginalised populations and that many scientists have critiqued ‘objectivity’ as a social construct that 
is fashioned from the subjective experiences o f  the researchers. See Crasnow (2008); Danziger (1990); 
Fairchild (1991); Fernando (1988), (2009); Jiménez-Dominguez (2009); Spanier (1995); and Stanley 
and W ise (1983) (esp. p. 174).
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behaviors’ (Rekers & Lovaas, 1974), ‘feminoid boys’ (Rekers & Yates, 1976) ‘a pre­
transsexual boy’ (Rekers & Vami, 1977) and ‘childhood gender disturbance’
(Rekers, Rosen, Lovaas, & Rentier, 1978).
Bricolage reflective box: Moving to the margins o f ‘minority’ and ‘majority"
I used ‘majority world' and ‘minority world' here and in Chapter 2 to highlight the 
ethnocentrism of grand narratives about gender in psychological literature. Invoking 
this binaiy was part of my technique of moving to the margins, shifting monolincar 
notions about which people and which views constitute a ‘minority^’. However, this 
binaiy can function to obscure important distinctions between societies designated as 
‘majorit}^’ or ‘minority’ world, .lust as the ‘cis/trans’ binaiy' was a useful way for 
previous researchers of gender and body delegitimisation to problematise oppression 
before the cisgenderism approach, the majority/minority binaiy is a strategic 
placeholder that may address ethnocentrism effectively only while the constmct of 
‘ethnicity’ remains in wide use.
In 1980, ‘gender identity disorders’ first entered the American Psychiatric 
Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual (American Psychiatric Association, 
1980). However, as documented by Bryant (2008), the ‘Gender Identity Disorder of 
Childhood’ (GIDC) model dates back to the 1960s. Indeed, related concerns can be 
seen in Terman and Miles’s writings from the 1930s (Hegarty, 2007). Between 1980 
and the present, various psychological approaches have been proposed to ‘treat’ 
children classified as having a ‘GIDC’ (Bryant, 2006). Currently, Zucker and 
Bradley’s (1995) version of this model is the most widely used approach to these 
children in psychology. This approach involves behavioural modification techniques 
and aversive conditioning to ‘fix’ genders that do not match children and 
adolescents’ external gender assignments (Spiegel, 2008; Zucker & Bradley, 1995). 
While this model emerged decades after Rekers and Vami’s (1977) article on the 
‘pre-transsexual’ child and some of their original terminology has been replaced by 
newer terminology, both approaches share a focus on preventing transsexual 
adulthoods.
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One example of Kenneth Zucker and Susan Bradley’s (1995) method involved 
restricting the gender expression of a five-year-old self-designated girl, as described 
in a radio transcript from a program that aired on National Public Radio (NPR): 
Bradley would no longer be allowed to spend time with girls. She would no 
longer be allowed to play with girlish toys or pretend that she was a female 
character [ . . .]  As her pile of toys dwindled, [Bradley’s mother] realized 
Bradley was hoarding. She would find female action figures stashed between 
couch pillows. Rainbow unicorns were hidden in the back of Bradley’s closet. 
Bradley seemed at a loss, she said. They gave her male toys, but she chose not 
to play at all [ .. .]  Bradley would populate her pictures with the toys and 
interests she no longer had access to — princesses with long flowing hair, 
fairies in elaborate dresses, rainbows of pink and purple and pale yellow. So, 
under Zucker’s direction, [Bradley’s mother] and her husband sought to change 
this as well. (Spiegel, 2008; misgendering pronouns corrected)
Bradley’s mother described the negative impact of this aversive conditioning:
‘She was much more emotional. . . [ . . . ]  She didn’t want to go to school 
anymore,’ she says. ‘Just the smallest thing could, you know, send her into a 
major crying fit. And . . .  she seemed to feel really heavy and really emotional.’ 
(Spiegel, 2008; misgendering pronouns corrected)
Some psychological publications have critiqued Zucker and Bradley’s (1995) 
approach as problematic or archaic (e.g., Burke, 1996; Hegarty, 2009; Hill et al., 
2005; Langer & Martin, 2004; Lev et al., 2010; Wilson, Griffin, & Wren, 2002). 
Some psychological models have also discarded direct behavioural modification for 
therapeutic interventions described in psychological literature as ‘supportive’ and 
‘affirmative’ towards children’s self-designated genders (e.g.. Hill, Menvielle, Sica, 
& Johnson, 2010; Klein, 2009; Raj, 2008; Vanderburgh, 2009).
Indeed, some recent psychological approaches suggest an ideological shift in 
minority world psychomedical discourse from depicting ‘gender variance’ as 
pathology to viewing self-designated gender as a natural phenomenon. For example, 
Herbert Schreier, a child psychologist based at Oakland Children’s Hospital and 
Research Center, has described ‘gender variance’ not as ‘GIDC’ but instead as 
children ‘becoming more aware of how it is to be themselves’ (Brown, 2006, p. 2,
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para 1). Therapist Diane Ehrensaft has assisted some children in achieving social 
recognition for their self-designated genders. Ehrensaft ‘does not think parents 
should try to modify their child’s behavior’ and ‘does not see transgenderism itself as 
a dysftmction’ (Spiegel, 2008, Section ‘Another Family, Another Approach’, para 
16). Adolescent psychiatrist Edgardo Menvielle, founder of a US-based outreach 
group for parents of ‘gender variant’ children that now has over 200 members, 
asserts that ‘the goal is for the child to be well adjusted, healthy and have good self- 
esteem’ (Brown, 2006, p. 2, para 3).
While some of these newer models appeal directly to children’s wellbeing 
and autonomy, many also support the eradication of children’s self-designated 
genders for paternalistic reasons. For example, one recent psychological approach 
describes the erasure of children’s self-designated gender and expression as a 
positive therapeutic outcome because the intervention aims to reduce ‘comorbid’ 
behaviour associated with ‘extreme cross-gender’ behaviour (Rosenberg, 2002). 
Thus, even some ‘supportive’ approaches use pathologising terms like ‘severe’, 
‘conditions’, ‘extreme’ and ‘comorbidity’, similar to earlier clinical models designed 
to reduce ‘atypical’ gender behaviour (see also Roen, 2011).
[3.1.3] Hill and Willoughby 2005 ‘Itgets better* claim 
My third POET was Hill and Willoughby’s (2005, p. 532) claim that while ‘early 
studies of attitudes toward transsexuals among medical and psychiatric professionals 
documented fairly negative views.. .  attitudes among mental health professionals 
seem to be fairly positive 20 years later’. Brown (2006) made a similar claim that 
psychologists are adopting more positive attitudes over time. Brown (2006, p. 1) 
argued that ‘until recently, many children who did not conform to gender norms in 
their clothing or behaviour and identified intensely with the opposite sex [sic] were 
steered to psychoanalysis or behaviour modification’, but that nowadays ‘children as 
young as 5. . .  are being supported by a growing number of young parents, educators 
and mental health professionals’. In contrast, some authors contend that mental 
health professionals and psychology at large are lagging behind other arenas in their 
lack of recognition and support for children’s own self-designated genders (e.g., 
Kennedy, 2008; Lelchuk, 2006; Winters, 2008). However, questions about the nature
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and stability of approaches towards children among mental health professionals and 
psychologists more generally remain open. I addressed these questions through a 
content analysis of the psychological literature.
[3.2] The present study
In the present study, I examined whether cisgenderism has characterised the 
language of scientific communication about children in psychology in the period 
since Parlee’s (1996) critical article. The study drew conceptually on feminist 
research (e.g., Diekman, Eagly, & Johnson, 2010; Gannon, Luchetta, Rhodes, Pardie, 
& Segrist, 1992; Sherif, 1998; Voss & Gannon, 1978) and content analyses of 
psychological literature (e.g., Ader & Johnson, 1994; Edwards & Pedrotti, 2008; 
Morin, 1977), in its assumption that scientific language about participant groups both 
represents and perpetuates ideology. I evaluated article records (i.e., abstracts, 
keywords, subjects, titles, etc.) archived on PsycINFO for two kinds of cisgenderism. 
Pathologising is the construction of people’s behaviour or characteristics as 
pathological or disordered (Newcomb, 1996; Winters, 2008). The diagnostic 
classification of gender independent people’s gender self-designations as a ‘disorder’ 
in mental health professions led me to predict that pathologising language would be 
common in this sample. Pathologising items that addressed a focus on assessment 
and evaluation were based on Herek et al.’s (1991) guidelines for avoiding 
‘heterosexist bias’ in psychological research. Misgendering occurred where 
psychologists categorised a child into a gender category or gendered behavioural 
description with which the child themselves did not identify.
To assess Hill and Willoughby’s (2005) claim that accounts of ‘transgender 
people’ in psychology are becoming more positive, I examined whether cisgenderism 
was increasing or decreasing in the literature over time. I also assessed whether 
cisgenderism was unevenly distributed across psychology’s sub-disciplines, testing 
the specific prediction that authors from mental health professions would be more 
likely to pathologise children with self- designated genders. Finally, I examined one
 ^Adapted from Serano’s (2007) usage o f  the verb ‘ungendering’ to define ‘an attempt to undo a trans 
person’s gender by privileging incongmities and diserepancies in their gendered appearance that 
would normally be overlooked or dismissed if  they were presumed to be cis- sexual’. Note that the 
current analysis defines a categorical distinction between ‘cissexual’ and ‘transsexual’ classes o f  
people as problematic.
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problem that might sustain cisgenderism, despite increasing recognition regarding 
this mechanism. Quinones-Vidal, Lopéz-Garcia, Penaranda-Ortega and Tortosa-Gil’s 
(2004) content analysis of the Journal o f Personality and Social Psychology (JPSP) 
showed that citations in that area of psychology were most common among networks 
of collaborating authors. Quinones-Vidal et al. classified these networks as ‘invisible 
colleges’ (see also de Solla Price & Beaver, 1966). I tested whether there were 
similar networks or ‘invisible colleges’ among authors actively writing about 
children with self-designated genders and whether the impact of such networks could 
help us to explain the persistence of cisgenderist theories in psychology. To test this 
hypothesis, I examined the citation count, or impact, of the articles sampled. Authors 
in this area sometimes describe citation count as a measure of merit or influence 
(e.g., Zucker & Cantor, 2005), but some researchers debate actively the reasons why 
scientists cite each other and the extent to which high citation counts can be used as a 
measure of scientific merit (e.g., Bommann & Daniel, 2008).
[3.2.1] Method
[3.2.1.1] Sample selection
I sampled articles using PsycINFO, the APA-compiled database that constitutes the 
largest peer-reviewed literature resource of academic journal articles and other 
publica-tions in the fields of behavioural science and mental health. I conducted 
Boolean/Phrase searches by restricting results to English language journal articles 
published between January 1999 and December 2008 inclusive. I restricted the Age 
Group field to the following PsycINFO categories: childhood (birth-12 years); 
neonatal (birth-1 month); infancy (2-23 months); preschool age (2-5 years); and 
school age (6-12 years), and the Document Type field to journal articles. Books, 
book reviews, commentaries, conferenee proceedings, dissertation abstracts and 
replies were excluded. I counted original articles only and not duplicate entries or 
reprints. I treated piecemeal publications as distinct cases only when the abstract 
content differed.
I combined the primary filtering search string ‘(child*) or (girl*) or (boy*)’, in 
the first search field, with 74 search terms, phrases or etymological roots that 
referenced aspects of gender and/or gender expression in a second search field (see
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Appendix A). Search results included only article records that matched in both fields 
(e.g., articles that focused on gender differences between girls and boys but which 
did not specifically address children’s gender identity or expression itself would not 
have shown up in my search). Search combinations included terms from cross- 
cultural contexts and addressed both assigned and self-designated genders and both 
‘typical’ and ‘atypical’ gender-associated expression, to capture as many article 
records as possible. No specific fields were selected for search terms.
Bricolage reflective box: Tracing the hidden social relations of power
^^jpmmW ct of ‘the child’ and psychological theories of ‘childhdod’ have beeUj^^.j:# 
critiqued as ahistorical, ethnocentric, and disconnected from ‘children’s’ own 
u m ^ ^ ^ ^ m ÿ ,o f  their experiences (Burraan, 2008; James, 1998). John Morss (2002) 
‘development’ does not actually exist and critiqued the biological 
which ‘developmental’ approaches rely (Morss, 1990). Valerie : 
Waikerdine (1998; Walkerdine, Lucey, & Melody, 2001) has explored how social 
constructions of childhood function to produce gender ideology about the cognitive 
abilities o f ‘girls’ and obscure how class, ethnicity and gender discrimination can 
produce a variety of contrasting ‘childhoods’ Based on these critiques, I faced a 
methodological hilemma regarding whether and how to define ‘childhood’. After 
considering and subsequently rejecting a variety of options, I made the strategic 
methodological decision to use the category system in PsycINFO. This decision was 
based on my récognition of ‘childhood’ as a concept onto which psychologists 
project gender,ideology. By using the category of ‘child’ to identify articles in my 
sample, I was able to analyse collectively the presence of pathologising and 
misgendering language in psychological literature that uses this construct.
After I had removed duplicate entries, 159 article records remained. I excluded 
41 articles where the article record did not specifically mention children’s assigned 
or s e lf  designated genders or gender-associated expression in children. In an 
additional 23 articles, the only mention o f search terms occurred in the list o f author 
surnames (e.g., secondary search term ‘butch’ in the author field under surname 
‘Butcher’). I excluded these 64 articles and one additional reprint, for a total o f 65 
excluded articles. I retained 94 article records for this analysis.
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Journals with article records included in my sample (N=  49) covered a wide 
range of fields both within and outside of psychology. Most journals published only 
one article in my sample {n = 35, 71.43%)(see Appendix B for a complete list). 
Among the journals in my sample that published more than one artiele each (« = 14, 
28.57%), six journals published two articles each in my sample, including Child and 
Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics o f North America; Early Child Development and 
Care; Gender and Psychoanalysis; International Journal o f Psychoanalysis; Journal 
o f Psychology and Human Sexuality; and The Psychoanalytic Study o f the Child. 
Child Development and Hormones and Behavior each published three articles in my 
sample; Developmental Psychology and Journal o f Gay and Lesbian Social Services 
published four articles each in my sample. Three journals (6.12%) published five or 
more articles each in our sample. The most prolific journal in my sample was 
Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry {n= 11), followed by Archives o f  Sexual 
Behavior {n = 9), Sex Roles {n = 8) and Journal o f the American Academy o f  Child 
and Adolescent Psychiatry {n = 5).
[3.2.1.2] Content coding
I assessed levels of pathologising and misgendering language in these article records 
(See Appendix C for the coding sheet). Specifically, I coded the presence or absence 
of each of four types o f pathologising language in each article record: (1) labelling 
childhood gender non-conformity (CGNC) as pathology (e.g., ‘research on empathy 
in gender identity disordered hoys’); (2) mentioning interventions to address CGNC 
(e.g., ‘patient referred to a gender specialist for affirmative therapy'; ‘behavioural 
modifications to reduce cross-gender play’); (3) voicing support for treatment 
interventions to reduce or stop CGNC (e.g., ‘gender-appropriate play therapy 
r^educed the patient’s cross-gender desires ’); and (4) assessing and/or diagnosing 
CGNC (e.g., ‘screenedfor gender-appropriate mannerisms’, ‘BoyhoodFemininity 
Test' or ‘sample included 22 girls with gender identity disor^der').
Similarly, I coded four kinds of misgendering: (1) designating participant sex 
or gender in the Keyword(s), Subject(s) and/or Population(s) fields in a manner that 
contradicts information about participant self-designated gender in the Abstract (e.g.. 
The population is listed as Male, Keyword boy, and/or Subject boys and the Abstract
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contains the text ‘aparticipant who thought he was a girl]; (2) mispronouning 
(Ansara, 2010), which refers to the use of gender-specific pronoun(s) that differ from 
participants’ own gender (e.g., ‘Thispaper reports on a female-to-male transsexual 
and her psychosocial development ’ or ‘Mary insisted that she was a hoy and said to 
call her John]; (3) using gender-specific nouns (e.g., ‘boy’, ‘girls’, ‘lesbian’, 
‘daughter’, ‘brother’) that differ from the individual or population’s gender identity 
(e.g., ‘Girls in this study reported cross-gender identities as boys ’); and (4) labelling 
participant gender identity and/or expression as inauthentic, dishonest, or fantasy 
(e.g., ‘He pretended to be a girl from ages 18 mo to 4 yrs’).
Both I and a second coder, who was unaware of my research hypotheses, coded 
each article record for each individual type ofpathologising or misgendering 
language (see Table 1). While one or more authors typically serve as coders in 
content analyses (e.g., Buhrke, Ben-Ezra, Hurley, & Ruprecht, 1992; Imada & 
Schiavo, 2005; Peterson & Kroner, 1992; Simoni, 1996), many content analyses do 
not use multiple coders for the entire data set as we did (e.g., Buhrke et al., 1992; 
Peterson & Kroner, 1992; Simoni, 1996). Cases of disagreement were resolved 
through discussion as is standard methodology for content analytic studies that use 
multiple coders. Each article record was coded as 0 if the relevant form of 
cisgenderism was absent and 1 if present. To calculate pathologising and 
misgendering language scores, I counted the number of each type of cisgenderism 
observed and divided by 4. Therefore, pathologising and misgendering language 
scores ranged from 0 to 1.
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Table 1. Interrater reliability for cisgenderism items
Dimension Item K SE LL UL
Pathologising 1 0.98 0.02 0.94 1.00
2 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
3 0.90 0.04 0.83 0.98
4 0.94 0.04 0.85 1.00
Misgendering 1 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
2 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00
3 0.96 0.03 0.90 1.00
4 0.82 0.12 0.58 1.00
Note: K , kappa; SE, standard error; LL, lower limit of
confidence interval; UL, upper limit of confidence 
interval
[3.2.1.3] Authorship type coding
I coded three authorship variables for each article: Mental Health Profession, Gender 
Clinic Affiliation and Invisible College Membership. Mental Health Profession was 
coded as 1 when first authors had a listed academic or clinical affiliation to a 
psychology (including counselling psychology), psychotherapy, psychiatry, or 
psychoanalysis department or clinic or (in the case of authors without a listed 
professional affiliation) an academic credential at the postgraduate level or above in 
any field of psychology (including counselling psychology), psychotherapy, 
psychiatry or psychoanalysis {n = 74, 78.7%) and as 0 otherwise {n = 20, 21.3%). 
First authors in the field of social work were coded as Non-Mental Health.^ Gender 
Clinic Affiliation was coded as 1 when the first author listed a gender clinic
 ^This classification reflects social work’s emphases on the impact o f  public policy and social 
environments that affect individuals and on challenging societal inequities (NYU Silver School o f  
Social Work, n.d.).
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affiliation {n = 22, 23.4%) and 0 otherwise {n = 69, 73.4%). Authors without a 
gender clinic affiliation listing but with a gender clinic affiliation listed in another 
article record in this sample were coded as 0 due to the inability to verify their 
gender clinic affiliation at the time of publication. Three cases for the gender clinic 
affiliation variable were left blank due to confusing or inconsistent available 
information.
Membership of the invisible college was determined inductively. The corpus 
contained articles by 191 authors and most published only once {n = 167, 87.4%). A 
minority of authors published 2 (« = 13), 3 (w = 3), 4 (w = 3), 5 (w = 1), 7 (« = 1) or 
11 times (« = 1). The most prolific author was Kenneth J. Zucker, who authored or 
co-authored 16 articles (17.0%) in the corpus, including the 11 articles co-authored 
by the next most prolific author Susan Bradley. Accordingly, we assessed 
membership in the invisible college around Kenneth J. Zucker through co­
authorship. Articles authored or co-authored by this author and those authored by one 
of his co-authors independent of him within this corpus were coded as 1 (« = 20, 
21.3%). Other articles were coded as 0 (w = 74, 78.7%). The distribution of articles 
by Mental Health Profession, Gender Clinic Affiliation and Invisible College 
Membership is shown in Table 2.
Table 2. Count of articles by authorship
Mental health Non-mental health
Discipline affiliation: GÇ NGC GC NGC
Inside invisible college: 20 0 0 0
Outside invisible eollege: 50 2 4 18
Note: GC, gender clinic affiliation; NGC, non-gender clinic affiliation
[3.2.1.4] Article impact
Two-year impact for each article was calculated by counting the number of citing 
articles archived in PsycINFO for the publication year plus the two consecutive full
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calendar years following publication (e.g., for an article published in May 2001, the 
2-year impact included times cited from May 2001 through December 2003 
inclusive).
[3.3] Results
This study was designed to assess whether cisgenderist language has been increasing 
or decreasing in psychological research in recent times, whether research by mental 
health professionals is more or less cisgenderist than research by other authors, and 
whether cisgenderist research is particularly impactful. As the cisgenderism scales 
were not normally distributed, I used non-parametric statistics throughout the 
analyses.
[3.3.1] Cisgenderism over time
To calculate whether cisgenderism is increasing or decreasing, I calculated bivariate 
correlations between pathologising, misgendering and year of publication. The two 
dimensions of cisgenderism were strongly correlated but distinct, rho (93) = 0.58, jD 
< 0.001.1 found no statistically significant association between year and either 
pathologising or misgendering, rho (93) = -0.02 and 0.09, respectively, bothp  > 
0.36. Cisgenderist language remained stable in early twenty-first-century 
psychology.
[3.3.2] Mental health professionals and cisgenderism
There were no articles within the invisible college whose first authors did not have a 
mental health affiliation. Accordingly, I re-categorised the articles into three distinct 
groups: those in the invisible college {n -  20), and those written by mental health 
authors {n = 54) and non-mental health authors outside the invisible college {n = 54 
and n = 20, respectively) (see Table 2). Omnibus Kruskal-Wallis tests revealed 
differences between these three groups of article records for both Pathologising 
language, (2, A =  94) = 34.05, p  < 0.001, and Misgendering language, (2, A = 
94) = \ \ . \2 ,p  = 0.004 (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1. Mean difference values {ms) representing two kinds of cisgenderism, 
pathologising and misgendering language, for each authorship group. Significant 
differences in pathologising were found between all three groups and in 
misgendering between mental health authors inside the invisible college and non­
mental health authors. No significant differences in misgendering were found 
between mental health authors outside the invisible college and non-mental health 
authors or mental health authors inside the invisible college. Standard enors are 
represented in the figure by the eiTor bars attached to each column.
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Bricolage reflective box: Floor effect for misgendering
Figure 1 communicates effectively the disciplinary production in psychology of 
pathologising forms of cisgenderism, I lowevcr, this figure presents less compelling 
information about misgendering* The floor effect for misgendering in this study may 
be an luider-representation of the extent of misgendering in psychological literature 
on children’s genders. My decision to use article records allowed me to analyse a 
larger sample than if  I had used full-length articles as my unit of analysis. Yet this 
methodological decision meant that 1 analysed records in which most studies had 
multiple participants- Consequently, these studies more frequently described 
participants in plural language (e.g., 'participants’, 'children’) rather than using any 
individual pronouns (e.g., 'she’, 'he’). Although time constraints prevented me from 
expanding my analysis to include full-length articles, I noticed while conducting the Y* 
analysis that although many of the article records did not contain misgendering 
language, many of the full-length articles did. I also noticed in both the abstracts and 
full-length articles that participants were more typically described using de- 
gendering language that omitted any reference to gender and used objectifying 
biological language instead. For example, articles by authors in the invisible college 
; often described gènder independent participants in strictly biological terms (e.g., 
'transsexual females’, 'transsexual males’, ‘male-to-female transsexuals’, 'pre­
operative transsexuals’) where other participants were recognised according to their 
. gender without specific reference to their physical attributes (e.g., ‘women’, ‘men’).
In retrospect, 1 would have also coded for de-gendering as distinct from
I performed Mann-Whitney tests to explore these effects further. All possible 
comparisons between groups were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 0.05 
adjusted to 0.017 in accord with Bonferroni corrections. Analysis of the 
pathologising language scores showed that all three groups were significantly 
different from each other (all z > 3.64, all p < 0.001). misgendering language was 
significantly more pronounced in the article records written by authors within the 
invisible college than those written by non-mental health authors (z = 3.23, p <
0.001). Article records written by mental health authors outside the invisible college 
did not differ in misgendering language from article records written by non-mental
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health authors (z = lA2 ,p  = 0.16) or article records written by mental health authors 
inside the invisible college (z = 235, p  = 0.019) (see Figure 1).
[3.3,3] Does cisgenderist research have greater impact?
Next, I evaluated whether impact was associated with cisgenderism. In the sample as 
a whole, articles were cited on average 2.77 times in the 2 years following 
publication. Moreover, impact was positively correlated with year of publication, rho 
(94) = 0.32, p  = 0.002; the impact of research in this area within psychology is 
increasing over time. Impact was not correlated with the use of either pathologising 
or misgendering language in the sample as a whole, rho (94) = 0.10 and 0.01, 
respectively, for bothp  > 0.35. However, a Kruskal-Wallis test showed that impact 
varied between the three groups of authors, (2, n = 94) = 19.29,/? < 0.001. Mann- 
Whitney tests showed that impact was greater among mental health articles written 
by those inside the invisible college (M = 5.90) than among articles written by either 
mental health authors outside the invisible college (M= 2.33, z = 2.85,/? = 0.004) or 
non-mental health authors (M= 0.80, z = 4.03,/? < 0.001). Impact also varied 
significantly between these last two groups of authors (z = 2.78,/? = 0.005).
[3.4] Discussion
Cisgenderist language is commonplace when psychologists communicate 
professionally with their peers about children. Mental health professionals are the 
authors who are most likely both to pathologise the children they study and to 
contradict those children’s own understandings of themselves in their writings. 
Among mental health professionals, those who are most closely tied through 
publication with the most prolific author in the field are also most likely to adopt 
pathologising and misgendering language. Such authors are also most likely to have 
their own work cited by later scientific publications. These factors may contribute to 
the maintenance of cisgenderism in psychology, despite moves within professional 
bodies like the APA to oppose this ideology.
Contrary to the opinions of some psychologists (e.g., Hill & Willoughby,
2005), cisgenderism -  at least with regard to children -  does not appear to have been 
decreasing in psychology in recent years. Rather, Parlee’s (1996) claim that
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psychologists’ ‘official knowledge’ has excluded and dismissed knowledge produced 
outside of clinical or academic settings by ‘transgender and gender variant’ 
individuals remains as relevant as ever. While I used a content analytic method that 
was designed to identify patterns and systemic components of large data sets 
efficiently, I hope that my empirical findings will motivate future research using 
methods suited to deep engagement with the ways that psychological articles 
characterise and discuss children’s genders.
Having documented the stability of cisgenderism towards children in 
psychology, should psychologists pessimistically predict its future stability? The 
language and concepts of the most prolific and impactful authors in my sample 
towards children’s self-designated genders contrast starkly with the vision of 
nondiscriminatory leadership espoused by APA policy. While some researchers have 
explored the extent to which self-citations may inflate impact factor in psychological 
publications generally (e.g., Anseel, Duyck, De Baene, & Biysbaert, 2004), some 
research suggests that removing self-citations fi*om citation counts may introduce 
methodological problems without removing the total effect of self-citations (e.g., 
Foley & Della Sala, 2010). This debate falls outside the scope of the current analysis. 
Regardless of whether self-citations may have affected my impact variables (indeed 
self-citations have been found to affect impact factor across the field), impact factor 
appears to be the increasingly dominant standard by which research funding 
decisions, fellowship awards, leadership position appointments, and other 
assessments of value are made in psychological research (Bommann & Daniel, 2008; 
Foley & Della Sala, 2010; O’Connor, 2010).
Indeed, the widespread use of impact factor to assess merit in the discipline of 
psychology may explain why invisible college members not only publish more 
impactful articles but also predominate on key policymaking committees in the 
mental health professions such as the American Psychological Association Task 
Force on Gender Identity, Gender Variance, and Intersex Conditions (e.g., Kenneth J. 
Zucker), the American Psychiatric Association Workgroup on Sexual and Gender 
Identity Disorders preparing the 2012 edition of the DSM-5 (e.g., Peggy Cohen- 
Kettenis and Kenneth J. Zucker) and the World Professional Association for
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Transgender Health (formerly the Harry Benjamin International Gender Dysphoria 
Association) Standards of Care Workgroup Committee (e.g., Peggy Cohen-Kettenis 
and Kenneth J. Zucker). Alternative Standards of Care based on informed consent 
and harm reduction principles exist outside of these structures (e.g., Dimensions 
Clinic, 2007; International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy 
[ICTLEP], 1993). However, these less cisgenderist clinical standards have had little 
effect on the research literature. The three aforementioned organisations continue to 
exert the most widespread international influence over policies, diagnostic 
procedures, and treatment approaches towards people with self-designated genders 
within psychology and mental health fields. My findings suggest a pessimistic 
outlook until such time as these influential organisations take a stronger position on 
the use of cisgenderist language.
Far fi-om fulfilling a ‘leadership role in working against discrimination towards 
transgender and gender variant individuals’ (APA, 2008, para 17), the continuation 
of misgendering language in psychology suggests that psychological journal 
publication policies are falling behind those of other professions. Since 2006, 
journalists have been directed by the Associated Press to ‘use the pronoun preferred 
by the individuals who have acquired the physical characteristics of the opposite sex 
[sic] or present themselves in a way that does not correspond with their sex at birth’ 
(Gay & Lesbian Alliance Against Defamation [GLAAD], 2010). Similarly, The New 
York Times cautions authors that ‘unless a former name is newsworthy or pertinent, 
use the name and pronouns (he, his, she, her, hers) preferred by the transgender 
person’ and, ‘if no preference is known, use the pronouns consistent with the way the 
individuals live publicly’ (GLAAD, 2010). While many journalists continue to 
disregard these policies, the lack of similar policies against misgendering in 
psychological publications illustrates the current gap between the APA resolution 
and current psychological policies.
By way of contrast, a recent article that was published in an APA journal and 
C O - authored by the head of the invisible college identified in my sample referred to 
participants who self-identified as boys as ‘girls with gender identity disorder’ in 
both title and body (Drummond, Bradley, Peterson-Badali, & Zucker, 2008). Hegarty
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(2009) critiqued this article on the grounds that these children’s ‘gender identities’ 
had been described as ‘disordered’ and in need of modification. In response, Zucker, 
Drummond, Bradley and Peterson-Badali (2009, p. 906) dismissed Hegarty’s critique 
due to its focus on ‘politically incorrect language’. By so doing, Zucker et al.’s 
(2009) rejoinder overlooked the possibility that language might shape research 
questions, methodology, interpretations and impact (Crasnow, 2008; Danziger, 1990; 
Messing, Schoenberg, & Stephens, 1983). Research findings suggest that beliefs in 
‘political correctness crusaders’ are more common among those with conservative 
gender ideologies (Lalonde, Doan, & Patterson, 2000). In light of Zucker et al.’s 
(2009) response, my finding that Archives o f Sexual Behavior, ajournai for which 
Zucker serves as editor, was among the two journals that published the largest 
number of psychological articles on children’s genders and expression may explain 
how editors in this field can fail to notice or address cisgenderist ideology in articles 
submitted for publication.
Reducing cisgenderist bias in psychological publications on children will 
require the active collaboration of researchers, editors and leading figures in APA.
Y et psychologists and mental health professionals need not turn to journalistic 
guidelines to accomplish this task, as a minority of authors in my sample offered 
existing conceptual frames that would decrease cisgenderism in the literature. For 
example, a programme evaluation study of a cultural intervention with African 
American girls reported an increase in androgynous gender roles in the intervention 
group as a positive outcome and noted that the intervention decreased relational 
aggression (Belgrave et al., 2004). By avoiding the assumption that non-nomiative 
gender expression leads to developmental and social problems, Belgrave et al. (2004) 
gained valuable data that suggests gender normativity and hypemormativity, rather 
than anormativity, as psychological risk factors for children.
In addition to following Belgrave et al.’s (2004) example, authors can use non- 
misgendering language to describe research participants with self-designated 
genders. For example, authors might describe a participant as a self-designated hoy 
rather than as a ‘girl who wants to be a boy’. Authors can take care to treat self­
designated and externally assigned participants equally. Addressing non-parallel
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cisgenderist language might mean referring to sample groups in terms of ‘self­
designated girls and externally assigned girls’, rather than providing strictly 
biological descriptions like ‘transsexual natal female’ or ‘gender variant male’ for 
self-designated young people where gender categories like ‘boys and girls’ are used 
for other participants.
Cisgenderism and ethnocentrism may intersect (e.g., Bulilan, 2008; Koyama,
2006). The title of one article in my sample asks, ‘can cultural beliefs cause a gender 
identity disorder?’. This article describes a Thai child’s gender as ‘disordered’ 
because it contrasts with a minority world psychomedical gender assignment (Tucker 
& Jürgen Keil, 2002). Such work fails to acknowledge the cultural nature of 
psychological science (Danziger, 1990), that all gender assignments are made within 
cultural contexts, or that the use of biological attributes to assign gender is itself a 
non-universal cultural practice (e.g., Bartlett et al., 2000; Graham, 2004; 
Honingmann, 1964; Mitsuhashi & Hasegawa, 2006; Singh, 2001; Williams, 1992). 
Rather than be written off as ‘culture’, some majority world ways of gendering may 
provide useful guides for the cultural evolution of minority world psychology (e.g., 
Bulilan, 2008; Jiménez-Dominguez, 2009; Martin-Baro, 1985; Munoz, 2008).
Another possible intersection of ethnocentrism and cisgenderism of particular 
relevance to sexuality researchers may occur in the form of coercive queering 
(Ansara, 2010, p. 181), a type of benevolent cisgenderism that is often present in 
ostensibly ‘supportive’ and ‘affirming’ accounts of children with self-designated 
gender. Coercive queering refers to the practice of lumping children with self­
designated gender into the categories ‘queer’ or ‘LGBTF without attention to 
whether this categorisation is consensual or conceptually appropriate. As Bryant’s 
(2008) historical account of the GIDC model suggests, this practice of coercive 
queering is often situated alongside attempts to distance more acceptable 
‘homonormative’ children from those whose own gender differs from their assigned 
category. Bryant cites trans historian Susan Stryker’s (2008) description that 
‘homonormative’ was used by ‘trans-activists’ to describe ‘LGBTQ intergroup 
dynamics’ (Bryant, 2008, p. 456) in which ‘homosexual [sic] community norms 
marginalized other kinds of sex/gender/sexuality difference’ (Stryker, 2008, p. 147).
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This usage is consistent with my description of ‘homonormative’ approaches that 
simultaneously de-pathologise and defend children’s same-gender attractions and 
‘non-conforming’ gender expression, while problematising children whose assigned 
administrative gender category does not fit their own understanding of their gender.
In this homonormative approach, children with behaviours that are labelled as 
‘gender non-conforming’ in their cultural context are considered non-pathological 
unless they classify their own gender in a way that has not been recognised by their 
external assignment; the cisgenderist message that underlies this approach is that 
children’s own classifications of their gender are invalid and pathological where they 
disagree with the labels that adults have imposed on them. Bryant described this 
function of homonormativity as one that positions same-gender attractions as 
normative by embracing heteronormative gender norms. He argued that ‘in 
defending pre-homosexual children, these others become the justifiably pathologized 
class’ (Bryant, 2008, p. 467). Thus homonormative dynamics involve shifting the 
delineator of pathology from one associated with sexuality and sexual attraction to 
one that pathologises ‘pre-transgender’ or ‘pre-transsexual’ children.
Bryant analysed in-depth interviews and analysis of ‘LGBTQ’ community 
publications, documenting the harm that the GIDC model has done both to children 
with same gender attractions and to those whose genders differ from those typically 
associated with their biology in minority world contexts. Bryant notes that minority 
world researchers seeking to challenge the GIDC model often defend children with 
non-normative attractions and social expression while simultaneously positioning 
children with self-designated genders as the proper targets for pathologising and 
behavioural modification. It is worth noting that a highly pathologising article record 
in my sample authored by the director of a gay and lesbian programme documented 
her efforts to ‘fix’ the ‘gender identity disorders’ of children with self-designated 
genders whose attractions to others were not described in the article record 
(Rosenberg, 2002).
In light of my other results, Bryant’s (2008) finding that homonormative ‘anti­
homophobia’ critiques of the GIDC model have obscured and pathologised gender
106
Chapter 3
Cisgenderism in Psychology
independent children suggests that cisgenderism, rather than ‘homophobia’, accounts 
for the prevalence of this model. I suggest that researchers exercise caution when 
using the ‘Alphabet Soup Approach’ (Ansara, 2010, p. 187) epitomised by umbrella 
terms like ‘queer’ and ‘LGBTF. This ‘Alphabet Soup Approach’ conflates distinct 
categories of human experience such as sexuality (L for lesbian, G for gay, and B for 
bisexual), gender history or experience (T for trans), and physical characteristics (I 
for intersex) into a single label. In so doing, this approach eclipses the substantive 
differences between the experiences of people across the domains of sexualities, 
kinship ties, genders, and bodies. This approach also obscures the distinct forms of 
exclusion and marginalisation that can be perpetrated by people who experience 
sexuality-associated oppression against people who experience oppression focused 
primarily on their genders and bodies; this homonormative form of cisgenderism was 
documented by Bryant (2008). Furthermore, social services and clinical programmes 
that meet the needs of those children with same-gender attractions whose gender 
self-designations are acknowledged by their assigned gender category may be 
inappropriate or hostile to gender independent children; careful consideration should 
be given to the needs of each individual child and to the degree of cisgenderism 
among staff and policies in each individual setting before determining that a 
particular ‘queer’ or ‘LGBTF resource is suitable.
More careful survey items in psychological research may also reduce 
cisgenderism. Instead of treating externally assigned biological categories as 
authoritative, researchers can ask participants to self-identify their gender and 
include a separate question regarding whether this self-designation contrasts with an 
externally assigned classification. Authors can consider the potential error introduced 
by coding gender uncritically as a single dichotomous variable, leading them to 
categorise participants in a manner contrary to their self-designation.
Language used to describe identity and behaviour in children with self­
designated genders (e.g., ‘extreme’, ‘persistent’, ‘comorbid’) differs substantially 
from language used to describe the same characteristics in children whose genders 
and behaviour are normatively aligned with their gender assignments. I can identify 
this language as cisgenderist based on Eichler’s (1991) classification of non-parallel
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language and asymmetrical concepts as forms of sexist language in research. I 
therefore consider cisgenderist language to be a type of sexist language that reveals 
the influence of ideology on psychological science. As Eichler notes in her critique 
of ‘gender dysphoria syndrome’, individuals can be judged to suffer from a ‘gender 
identity disorder’ ... ‘when they admit to liking to cook, being interested in theatre 
news, liking flowers and houseplants, and so on’ (Eichler, 1991, p. 121). The wide 
scope of ‘disordered’ activities from which children may be barred or discouraged 
raises serious ethical concerns about the use of cisgenderist language in 
psychological literature.
Cisgenderist ideology reaches beyond science and touches on children’s basic 
human rights. The United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) 
(1989), an international human rights treaty that has been ratified by over 190 nations 
and all members of the United Nations except Somalia and the United States 
(Kielburger & Kielburger, 2009), guarantees all children the right to unrestricted 
freedom of play and expression, both of which are pathologised by current DSM-IV- 
TR diagnoses (American Psychiatric Association, 2000) and those proposed for 
DSM-5 (to be published in 2012; see APA, 2010). 1 agree with Zucker, Bradley, 
Owen-Anderson, Kibblewhite and Cantor (2008, p. 287) that there are no good 
epidemiological prevalence studies of ‘GID’ and that ‘accordingly, we have been 
limited in our research, which now spans 30 years, to the study of clinic-referred 
children ’ (emphasis added). This acknowledgement is consistent with my finding 
that research has been predominantly limited to children seen only in clinical 
contexts wherein children’s definitions of themselves have been effectively erased.
This erasure persists despite recent findings from researchers using 
participatory methods that children can be knowledgeable and competent co­
researchers whose own experiences, perceptions, and social agency are often 
necessary for successful health interventions (e.g., Bergstrom, Jonsson, & Shanahan, 
2010; Conroy & Harcourt, 2009). Medical providers who are given discretionary 
authority frequently misjudge when children experience physical pain, are capable of 
experiencing pain, or are in need of pain medication, when they discount and 
contradict children’s self-reports (e.g., Atkinson, Chesters, & Heinz, 2009;
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Schechter, 1989; Walco, Cassidy, & Schechter, 1994; Weisman, Bernstein, & 
Schechter, 1998). Similarly, mental health professionals who misgender may leave 
children in distress unnecessarily due to their failure to recognise how children 
determine their own genders and their expression. Ehrensaft cautions, Tf we allow 
people to unfold and give them the freedom to be who they really are, we engender 
health. And if we try and constrict it [ ...] , we engender poor mental health’ (Spiegel, 
2008, para 16).
The high risk of violence and harassment noted in the APA resolution suggests 
that critical interventions by psychologists are needed in school systems and in the 
realm of public policy. Even ‘affirmative’ clinical interventions can promote 
cisgenderism and lead to ‘poor mental health’ outcomes when they focus solely or 
primarily on the intrapsychic issues of children with self-designated gender, thereby 
failing to address the systemic inequities that some authors (e.g., Giordano, 2008; 
Marksamer, 2008; Roen, 2011) suggest are largely responsible for these children’s 
problems. Some clinicians have already adopted this approach. Raj (2007) describes 
how people with self-designated gender can benefit from therapeutic interventions in 
the form of advocacy and activism to address societal inequities.
New forms of medical intervention prompt further need for reflection about 
cisgenderism. Several clinics and physicians now offer hormone blockers that delay 
pubertal changes, an option made available by recent developments in paediatric 
endocrinology (Moller, Schreier, Li, & Romer, 2009; Roen, 2011). These hormone 
blockers may facilitate socialisation with peers of children’s own self-designated 
gender, prevent severe distress and inhibit physiological changes that are difficult to 
reverse without expensive adult surgical interventions (Giordano, 2008; Marksamer, 
2008; Roen, 2011), However, access to hormone blockers for young people typically 
requires evaluation and approval by mental health professionals, even in countries 
where pathways for adult access to hormones are available outside of mental health 
contexts. Thus I urge mental health professionals to challenge cisgenderism through 
advocacy and policy changes and by increasing access to medical technologies, 
rather than by adopting an intrapsychic ‘affirming’ approach that does little to 
address cisgenderist structural violence.
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Psychological research on these children could also contribute significantly to 
children’s rights in legislative and public policy contexts. Numerous school systems 
around the world have already implemented policies designed to promote inclusion 
and wellbeing of gender independent students (Brown, 2006; Lelchuk, 2006;
Marech, 2004), such as a school district in north-east Thailand that has created 
separate ‘transsexual bathrooms’ for students designated ‘male’"^ at birth who have a 
self-designated gender (Head, 2008).^ In 2004, the Family Court of Australia 
approved a sex designation change on the birth certificate and official documents of a 
13-year-old boy seeking legal recognition of his self-designated gender (Sandor, 
2007). In 2007, an Argentine court approved the first legally sanctioned gender 
affirmation surgery for a minor in the nation (Schweimler, 2007). Psychologists with 
a sincere desire to ‘affirm’ children’s own genders can advocate within their local 
legislative and educational systems for similar advances.
[3.5] Conclusion
Where some researchers (e.g., Zucker et al., 2009) see mere semantics, others 
consider sexist language an abusive and destructive form of hate speech (e.g., Lillian,
2007). Cisgenderist language can function to dehumanise, silence and erase. Indeed, 
even Parlee’s (1996) important criticism of cisgenderist language is limited by 
numerous instances of misgendering,^ an illustration that shifting the discourse is 
extremely difficult even for those engaged in critical analysis. Editors, peer 
reviewers, psychological researchers, mental health professionals and professional 
organisations all have ethical duties to address institutional cisgenderism, including 
cisgenderism that is institutionalised in scientific communication.
 ^ See Laqueur (1990) and Parlee (1996) for critiques o f  psychologists’ treatment o f  ‘sex’ as an 
ahistorical, ‘scientific’ construct and the social construction o f  a sex/gender binary as ‘official 
knowledge’. See Spanier (1995) on how gender ideology influences molecular biology.
 ^ In Thai society, these self-designated genders include kathoey, girls, and phuyingpraphet song  (a 
second kind o f  woman) (Winter, 2006). The term kathoey is a self-designated gender associated with 
the gender o f  man or boy who identify as ‘gender nonconforming’ in some w ay (Winter, 2006), 
though some kathoey identify as women (Matzner, 2001). While some Thai people self-identify as 
kathoey, this term is considered pejorative and inaccurate when used to refer to people who have self­
designated genders o f  phuying  (women) or phuying praphet song  [‘a second kind o f  wom an’ (Winter, 
2006)]. Each o f these terms has divergent meanings and implications that vary by context. See 
Matzner (2001) and Winter (2006) for discussion o f  the distinctions between these three Thai genders. 
 ^For example, Parlee describes Brandon Teena as ‘a woman living as a man’ (p. 631) and refers to 
him using female pronouns (e.g., ‘her’); describes the first ‘FTM Conference o f  the Americas’ as an 
event ‘for women living, dressing, or having surgery to become, men’ (p. 631); and refers to Tyra 
Hunter, a woman with a self-designated gender, as a ‘crossdresser’ and ‘man’ (p. 632).
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My findings in this study suggest that the current APA policy is a statement of 
intent that has yet to be implemented. Given that cisgenderism appears to be 
particularly widespread among mental health professionals, and particularly among 
those whose professional practice focuses on gender, those attempting to implement 
this policy are likely to encounter resistance. My findings suggest that psychological 
scientists have yet to challenge cisgenderism in their construction of knowledge.
In this analysis, 1 investigated disciplinary claims regarding the treatment of 
gender independent people in psychological literature. My findings suggest that 
cisgenderism in psychological literature is often based on biological essentialism and 
the consequent function of the physical attributes that are collectively termed ‘sex’ as 
insignias (e.g., Garfinkel, 1967). These insignias appear to bestow an automatic 
entitlement to be treated as a ‘woman’ or a ‘man’. My finding that all of the authors 
in Zucker’s invisible college were affiliated with medically oriented gender clinics 
led me to ask questions about the functions and permutations of cisgenderism at 
work in the medical construction of gender/sex. Therefore, 1 wanted to apply the 
cisgenderism framework beyond the limited scope of ‘trans’ studies and to consider 
how the cisgenderism approach could contribute to intersex studies. Thus in the next 
chapter, 1 shifted from analysing static texts to applying experimental methodology 
to the study of cisgenderism in medical communication.
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[4.1] Introduction
Through my findings that cisgenderist ideology remains an influential component of 
both feminist research on sexist language (Chapter 2) and psychological literature on 
children’s genders and gender-associated expression (Chapter 3), 1 documented how 
‘biological sex’ can fonction as the primary and authoritative insignia of gender. 
These findings led me to question the historical and cognitive origins of biological 
essentialism about gender and the relation between delegitimisations of people’s own 
designations of their genders and bodies. My analysis also prompted my increasing 
recognition of how authoritative medical constructions o f ‘sex’ categories affect 
whether people’s own gender and body designations are treated as valid.
Two POETs informed my shift from a focus on psychology to the focus on 
medicine in the current enquiry. The first was painter José de Ribera’s (1631) oil on 
canvas figure painting La Mujer Barbuda (tr. The Bearded Woman). The second was 
influential paediatric endocrinologist Andrea Trader’s (1954) diagram that illustrates 
Trader’s model for understanding ‘infant genital virilisation’. Both images depict 
people whose physical characteristics are delegitimised by contemporary medical 
norms of ‘female’ or ‘male’.
[4.1.1] Ribera^s (1631) La Mujer Barbuda
La Mujer Barbuda (see Figure 1) depicts a ‘bearded woman’ who is breastfeeding 
her baby, while a man with grave eyes looks on from the background with a sombre 
expression. The breastfeeding woman is cast in lighter tones that give the appearance 
of a spotlight, an effect accentuated by the artist’s use of chiaroscuro technique to 
play with light and shadow. This painting captured my attention as much for the lack 
of levity or ridicule in the artist’s presentation as for its potential to evoke and 
thereby render visible how gender ideology could influence the viewer’s perception 
of the painting.
When 1 searched for more information about the family depicted in this 
evocative painting, 1 learned that the woman in the picture was Magdalena Ventura, a 
woman who had given birth to three children before growing a natural beard at the 
age of thirty-seven (Fundacion Casa Ducal Medinaceli, n.d.) The man in the
113
Chapter 4
Cisgenderism in Paediatric Medicine
background was her husband, Felici Amici. I also discovered multiple peer-reviewed 
articles and book chapters in medical texts about Ribera’s La Mujer Barbuda. These 
texts were overwhelmingly focused on answering the question of ‘what’s wrong with 
the bearded woman?’ A variety of amateur medical detectives had attempted to 
classify the medical ‘disorder’ that was responsible for Magdalena’s male-associated 
physical characteristics (e.g., Azziz, 2007; Imperato-McGinley, Peterson, Gautier, & 
Sturla, 1979; London, 1987; Tunbridge, 2010). Whereas Ribera’s painting had 
portrayed Magdalena with dignity and grace, the authors of these medical texts had 
constructed Magdalena in a way that emphasised their ascription of pathology to her 
biological lived experience.
1 found Ribera’s painting so evocative and compelling that 1 began to use it as 
an entry point for discussions about gender ideology in lectures with my students. 
When a friend who was a professor in a doctoral clinical psychology programme 
asked me to provide her with an activity that would get her students thinking about 
gender and sex in new ways, 1 decided to conduct an informal experiment. 1 asked 
her to show the painting to her students, and then to instruct them to take a few 
minutes to write what they see. 1 asked her to make sure that her instructions 
contained no reference to gender, the title of the painting, or any contextual 
information.
The results of this classroom activity were surprising and informative. Over 
half of the students in the class saw a priest baptising a baby or a baby with two 
heads. These students reported being surprised by the professor’s mention of the 
breast, despite its deliberate placement by Ribera at the centre of the painting. During 
the class discussion, students explained that Magdalena’s stereotypically ‘male’ 
facial appearance had led them to assume that she was a man. In this case, gender 
ideology may have inhibited people’s ability to observe salient visual stimuli because 
it clashed with their existing view o f ‘female’ and ‘male’ physical characteristics.
The remaining students described the central figure in the painting as ‘a man 
breastfeeding a baby’. Given the widespread assumption in social, medical and 
legislative contexts that factors such as chromosomes, genitals, and (to a lesser 
degree) ‘secondary sex characteristics’ determine people’s ‘real sex’, it is striking
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that all participants interpreted a central figure who is explicitly engaged in 
breastfeeding as ‘male’ due to her stereotypically ‘male’ facial characteristics and 
hairline. This experience made me question the extent to which gender ideology can 
influence perceptions and uses of images that depict physical characteristics.
Figure 1. La Mujer Barbuda. Oil on canvas, 1631. José de Ribera.
[4.1.2] Prader’s (1954) diagram
When I first encountered Prader’s (1954) diagram in the context of readings about 
medical approaches to intersex people, I was surprised to discover that the field of 
paediatric endocrinology officially recognises seven distinct human genital variations. 
This recognition of ‘natural’ human biological diversity seemed inconsistent with the
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contemporary medical convention that requires people who receive medical services 
to identify as either ‘female’ or ‘male’. From a scientific perspective, if one were to 
identify seven distinct flowers, one would give a separate name to each one (e.g., 
rose, lily, carnation, plumeria, sunflower, carnation, and orchid). I wondered how 
medical science could explain the decision to construct ‘sex’ in a manner that would 
be as scientifically inaccurate as insisting that all flowers are‘really’ roses or orchids.
Normal F I II III IV V Normal M
s / "
Figure 2. Prader’s (1954) diagram of infant genital virilization
Table 1. Descriptions of different degrees of virilization in Praeder’s (1954) scale
Stage Description
I clitoromegaly without labial fusion
II clitoromegaly and posterior labial fusion
III greater degree of clitoromegaly, single perineal urogenital orifice, and 
almost complete labial fusion
IV increasingly phallic clitoris, urethra-like urogenital sinus at base of clitoris, 
and complete labial fusion
V penile clitoris, urethral meatus at tip of phallus, and scrotum-like labia 
(appear like males without palpable gonads)
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Bricolage reflective box: Strategic decision-making for social justice aims
Although 1 made the explicit decision to reject pathologising terminology such as 
‘disorders of sex development' and to avoid describing intersex as a ‘condition', I 
was dissatisfied with the implicit reification of the ‘male/female’ sex binary 
embedded in the concept o f ‘intersex’—literally ‘between' the two medically 
legitimised bodies. Given my earlier critique of binarising forms of cisgenderism and 
my decision to critique ‘trans’ tenninology (Chapters 2 and 3). 1 was concerned that 
my use of ‘interscx’ terminology would exemplify the ‘gender as socially 
constructed, sex as natural fact’ approach that Oycwùmi (1997), Garfinkel ( 1967), 
and others had critiqued. When evaluating my options, J returned again to my 
previous concept of the ‘strategic binaiy’. I reject the assumption in the term 
‘interscx' that people whose bodies reflect another permutation than ‘female’ or 
‘male’ occupy a liminal space between two valid bodies. As long as the 
‘female/male’ sex binary retains primacy in medical and legislative contexts, 
attempts to give names to each of the five additional bodies depicted in Prader's 
(1954) diagram are likely to meet with ridicule or hostility  ^(e.g., Fausto-Sterling, 
2000). In the field of interscx studies, the current debate is between ‘disorders of sex 
development’ and ‘intersex’. Davis (2014) documented a variety of self-descriptions 
among people whose bodies are often described using interscx terminology, and 
found that some people did not wish to be described as ‘intersex'. 1 have reluctantly 
chosen to use ‘interscx’ based on my opposition to pathologising terminology on 
social justice grounds. However, 1 hope that medical nonns will shift in time towards 
the use o f ‘intersex'. Once ‘disorders of sex development' terminology has been 
thoroughly replaced by ‘intersex', a further shift in terminology will be needed to 
move from a binarising approach to one that grants legitimacy to the many different 
bodies that occur naturally among people.
Although Prader’s (1954) model (see lower row of images in Figure 2) 
recognised seven distinct infant genital variations, five of these seven bodies are 
acknowledged in a strictly pathologising manner. The first and seventh images are 
labelled as ‘Normal Female’ and ‘Normal Male’, respectively. The other five images 
are described in terms of clinical stages of disorder from I to V. In Prader’s model, 
genitals depicted in Prader Stages I through V are described as problematic due to 
the challenge their mere existence presents to the two-sex binary that constructs
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‘female’ and ‘male’ as opposites. For example, Prader Stage V is described in 
medical terminology as having a ‘penile clitoris’ and ‘scrotum-like labia (appear like 
males without palpable gonads)’, combinations of genital traits that cisgenderist 
ideology treats as ‘opposites’ (e.g., penis vs. clitoris, scrotum vs. labia). Prader’s 
treatment of sex similarities such as the ‘penile clitoris’ as pathology rejected the 
naturalness of sex similarities, which had been a core element of Renaissance 
anatomical models. Thus this prior recognition of sex similarities was supplanted in 
the medical canon by Prader’s treatment of sex similarities as pathology and sex 
differences as ideal. Prader Stage V, which is considered the most ‘extreme’ stage of 
infant genital virilisation, is viewed as the most severely pathological precisely 
because of its visual and structural similarity to Prader’s ‘Normal Male’. Thus the 
historically recent ‘two-sex’ model discussed later in this chapter is reinforced by the 
practice of pathologising genital similarities between female and male genitals.
[4.1.2.1] Standard medical practice today
Prader’s (1954) schema remains ubiquitous in paediatric medicine. Prader’s 
diagrams of the seven infant genital variations (see lower row of images in Figure 2 
above) and Prader’s accompanying textual descriptions (see Table 1 above) appear in 
numerous recent medical textbooks and journal articles in the fields of paediatrics, 
obstetrics, and gynaecology fi*om Australia (Hutson, Wame, & Glover, 2012, p. 65; 
Royal Children’s Hospital Melbourne, n.d.), India (e.g., Kulshreshtha, Eunice, & 
Ammini, 2012), the UK (e.g., Balen, Creighton, Davies, MacDougall, & Stanhope, 
2004), and the US (Speiser & White, 2003, Figure 4). These images are so iconic and 
enduring in the field of paediatric endocrinology that medical publications routinely 
classify medical photographs of infant genitals based on Prader’s original diagram 
and descriptions; thus these diagrams remain the standard for diagnostic 
classifications of infant genitals, even when the actual diagrams are not displayed 
(e.g., Kulshreshtha, Eunice, & Ammini, 2012; Paniel & Rouzier, 2009, p. 221).
Although many people are bom with bodies that vary fi*om Prader’s Normal 
Female and Prader’s Normal Male, contemporary medical science typically assumes 
that surgery is necessary to ‘fix’ genitals that vary from this binary (Karkazis, 2008; 
Yankovic et al., 2013). In 2011, Yankovic, Cherian, Steven, Mathur, and Cuckow
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(2013) conducted an anonymous online survey regarding the ‘feminizing’ surgical 
practices for people diagnosed with congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) of 162 
medical specialists, 60% of whom were paediatric urologists or other paediatric 
surgeons, who attended the IVth World Congress of the International Society of 
Hypospadias and Disorders of Sex Development (ISHID) (sic) in 2011. Yankovic et 
al. found that 78% of surgeons stated their preference for performing early surgery 
for intersex infants below the age of two years old, and that most surgeons reported 
that they routinely perform surgical alteration of the clitoris, labia and vagina. Most 
surgeons also reported that their regular surgical techniques involve surgical removal 
of clitoral erectile tissue.
In paediatric and neonatal specialties such as paediatric endocrinology and 
paediatric urology, Prader’s (1954) schematic diagram is the most routinely used 
visual image in decision-making about infant genital surgeries (Rink, Adams, & 
Misseri, 2005). Nominally if not ideologically ‘interdisciplinary’ or 
‘multidisciplinary’ teams of medical and mental health professionals use Prader’s 
classification system when deciding whether to perform medically unnecessary 
‘normalising’ surgeries on infant genitals. Psychosocial rationale such as societal 
views of ‘normal’ genitals and parental acceptance are often used to justify health 
professionals’ surgical decisions to ‘normalise’ intersex infants’ genitals (Fausto- 
Sterling, 2000; Karkazis, 2008; Hutson, Wame, & Glover, 2012).
In 2006, Hughes, Houk, Ahmed, Lee and the Lawson Wilkins Pediatric 
Endocrine Society (LWPES)/European Society for Paediatric Endocrinology (ESPE) 
Consensus Group (2006) published a consensus statement that its authors presented 
as a definitive statement of best practice regarding the medical treatment of intersex 
people in the field of endocrinology. In this statement, Lee and Houk recommended 
the use of ‘Disorders of Sex Development’ language to describe intersex people, 
even labelling families in which one family member is intersex as ‘DSD families’ 
(ibid., p. 560). Hughes et al. also advocated the use of ‘normalising’ genital surgeries 
on infants. In reference to psychosocial rather than medical rationale for ‘normalising’ 
surgery, they assert that ‘it is generally felt that surgery that is carried out for 
cosmetic reasons in the first year of life relieves parental distress and improves
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attachment between the child and the parents’ (p. 557). However, Hughes et al. note 
that ‘the systematic evidence for this belief is lacking’ (ibid., p. 557), an observation 
that suggests an ideological rather than scientific basis for the consideration of 
psychosocial factors in decisions to conduct ‘normalising’ genital surgeries. The 
ongoing lack of systematic evidence to support childhood ‘normalising’ genital 
surgeries persists without tangible indication that medical professionals involved in 
these procedures are in the process of rectifying this gap (Creighton, Michala, 
Mushtaq, & Yaron, 2014). Some resarchers have suggested that these practices will 
continue until societally normative gender ideology ceases to conflate genders and 
bodies, to treat gender as permanently fixed, and to construct intersex people’s 
bodies as disordered or abnormal (e.g., Davis & Murphy, 2013).
Although Hughes et al. have positioned their statement as a ‘consensus’, some 
medical specialists and scholars have raised concerns that these ‘normalising’ 
surgeries are stigmatising and demeaning (e.g.. Diamond, 2009), and that they 
violate young people’s legal rights (e.g., Tamar-Mattis, 2006; Tamar-Mattis & 
Diamond, 2007). In an editorial letter published in the Archives of Sexual Behavior, 
Diamond (2009) critiqued the use of pathologising terminology such as ’Disorders of 
Sex Development‘ to describe ‘people’s bodies, noting that he ‘had not encountered 
any parent or adult that was pleased with being informed they or their child had a 
disorder’ (p. 172). Thus the claim by Hughes et al. that intersex children’s bodies are 
themselves responsible for parental distress obscures the possibility suggested by 
Diamond’s (2009) critique that it is not intersex children’s bodies per se but rather 
medical professionals’ construction of these children’s bodies as disordered that 
leads to parental distress:
Personally, I have not encountered any parent or adult that was pleased with being 
informed they or their child had a disorder. I have met many that accept that there 
are differences (p. 172).
Liao and Simmonds (2014) discuss how medical professionals’ construction of 
intersex children’s bodies as problems that require immediate correction reduce 
parents’ abilities to participate in decision-making and inhibit helpful responses that 
address parents’ needs, such as peer support from other parents of intersex children.
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As discussed previously (Chapter 1), Spears and Smith (2001) claim that 
experiments can be beneficial precisely because they can reveal the workings of 
ideology in ostensibly ‘neutral’ situations such as lab environments. Consequently, I 
decided that conducting experiments might reveal the extent to which the framing of 
intersex children’s bodies can affect determinations about the acceptability of 
‘normalising’ surgeries. Parents whose children’s bodies are labelled as ‘disordered’ 
may be more likely to seek or consent to surgical interventions that will fix aspects of 
their children’s bodies that are constructed as problematic by health professionals. In 
response to the claim that ‘Disorders of Sex Development’ diagnosis was necessary 
to ensure parents’ and adults’ ability to get insurance coverage for intersex-related 
medical treatment. Diamond reminded readers of other situations in which 
phenomena ‘do not have to be labelled as a disorder to benefit from insurance 
coverage and they occur without being stigmatic and demeaning. The prime example 
is pregnancy’. Diamond had previously advocated the use of non-stigmatising 
language such as ‘Variations in Sex Development’ (VSD) or ‘Differences of Sex 
Development’ (a substitute that was intended to rectify the stigmatising nature of 
‘DSD’ without altering the initialism). Hughes et al.’s (2006) approach to 
‘consensus’, like Boring’s (1945) similar attempt within psychology, functions to 
silence dissent by framing critique by professionals such as Diamond as outside the 
realm of professionally accepted science. Furthermore, claims by Boring (1945) and 
Hughes et al. (2006) regarding scientific objectivity can be interpreted as attempts to 
ensure that the production of valid knowledge is restricted to those who share a 
particular viewpoint. Accordingly, Diamond’s (2012) Letter to the Editor of the 
International Journal o f Pediatric Endocrinology challenged dismissive and 
inaccurate statements that some Consensus Statement authors had written in the 
journal about intersex activists and about Diamond’s own past work.
[4.1.2.2] Ethical and health concerns about ‘normalising’ surgeries 
Some medical critics of these ‘normalising’ genital surgeries have documented that 
these surgeries often cause permanent harm and genitourinary dysfunction (e.g., 
Creighton, 2006). Crouch, Liao, Woodhouse, Conway, and Creighton (2008) 
documented that women with CAH who had been subjected to ‘feminising’ genital 
surgery had significant impairment in clitoral sensitivity. Crouch et al. (2008) found
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that two thirds of women who had undergone clitoral reduction reported impaired 
clitoral sensitivity in the surgically affected area and no decrease in areas that had not 
been subjected to surgery. All participants in Minto, Liao, Woodhouse, Ransley, and 
Creighton’s (2003) study who had prior clitoral surgery reported impairment of 
sexual functioning, and Creighton (2004) found that intersex people who had a 
history of any clitoral surgery were significantly more likely to have difficulty 
achieving orgasm, with 26% of respondents reporting an inability to orgasm. These 
and other ethical and health concerns have led some medical specialists to call for 
these practices to be banned or discontinued (e.g.. Diamond & Sigmundson, 1997).
The genitals that are mapped as pathology in Prader’s (1954) diagrams are not 
universally perceived as disordered. Lloyd, Crouch, Minto, Liao and Creighton 
(2005) documented extensive variation in the dimensions and anatomical positioning 
of ‘normal female’ genitals. It is worth noting that although the stated aim of 
feminising genitoplasty is a ‘normal’ appearance, the creation of a clitoral hood has 
not been discussed in published articles on operative techniques (Hutson, Wame, & 
Grover, 2012). Existing standardised assessment tools that measure long-term 
surgical outcomes do not even evaluate the presence of a clitoral hood (Hutson, 
Wame, & Grover, 2012). Thus normative medical practice regarding infant genital 
surgeries retains an androcentric and binarising focus on surgically manufacturing a 
greater degree of separation between ‘female’ and ‘male’ genitals than naturally 
exists.
Given the historical exclusion of women from medical fellowships with 
founding paediatric endocrinologist Lawson Wilkins during the early years of the 
profession (Blizzard, 2003), the continued absence of the clitoral hood in surgical 
evaluation and outcomes assessment suggests that Weisstein’s (1971) claims about 
disciplinary sexism may also apply to the field of paediatric endocrinology. The 
exclusion of women from paediatric endocrinology during foundational moments in 
this field meant that women’s input and views about their bodies were not considered 
when models of genitals such as Prader’s were being developed. This exclusion is 
likely to have resulted in medical views of infant genitals that differ from those in the 
general population.
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Recent evidence suggests that men physicians have more negative clinical 
evaluations of unaltered women’s genitals than women physicians, and that clinical 
evaluations of women’s genitals differ between professionals from different medical 
specialties. Reitsma, Mourits, Koning, Pascal, and van der Lei (2011) presented 164 
physicians (80 general practitioners [GPs], 43 plastic surgeons, and 41 
gynaecologists; 68 reported as ‘female’ and 96 reported as ‘male’) in the Netherlands 
with four pictures of vulvas with a different size of labia minora and asked to rate the 
naturalness, attractiveness, personal preference, and believed societal ideal. The 
physicians were not informed that before completion of the study that two of the 
pictures represented vulvas after a labial reduction and two represented natural 
vulvas.
The physicians were also asked to state at which labia minora size they would 
perform a labial reduction procedure for strictly physical complaints, strictly 
cosmetic complaints, and both physical and cosmetic complaints. Ninety percent of 
all physicians rated Picture A, one of the pictures of a post-reduction vulva, as close 
to representing society’s ideal and as attractive and all physicians agreed that Picture 
B, the other surgically altered vulva, had a natural appearance and was close to their 
ideal. Physician judgements were more varied when evaluating natural vulvas. 
Pictures C and D. GPs and gynaecologists considered the natural vulvas more 
attractive and natural, whereas plastic surgeons considered this vulva less attractive 
and unnatural. None of the groups considered this image as conforming to society’s 
ideal. Male plastic surgeons preferred the appearance of Picture A, although all other 
surgeons preferred the appearance of Picture B. Thus physician judgements about 
genital attractiveness and normality vary even within medical specialties and are not 
inevitable or objective determinations. Reitsma et al. found that men physicians were 
significantly more likely to recommend surgery.
The finding that physician gender and specialty affect clinican judgements 
concerning labia minora size and appearance suggests that genital evaluations in 
medical contexts are influenced by ideology. The finding that personal aesthetic 
preferences influence physicians’ clinical decision-making regarding a labia minora 
reduction procedure provides further evidence for the subjective and variable nature
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of such decisions. Overall, these findings highlight the need for physicians to be 
more aware of how ideology affects their clinical judgements and surgical decisions.
In this chapter, I use an experimental method to examine the practice in 
contemporary minority world medical science of simultaneously recognising and 
pathologising the existence of more than two infant genital configurations as defined 
by Prader’s (1954) model.
[4.1.2.3] Historical and cross-cultural shifts
In contemporary minority world medical science, ‘biological sex’ is often treated as 
an authoritative material fact (Karkazis, 2008; Kessler, 1990). In minority world 
societies, widespread belief in two distinct and ‘opposite’ biological sexes obscures 
the historically recent nature of this belief. Historical evidence has documented that 
‘sometime in the eighteenth century, sex as we know it was invented’ (Laqueur, 1990, 
p. 149). Laqueur (1990) used medical and artistic anatomical diagrams to illustrate 
that Renaissance science understood sex as a continuum, even though Renaissance 
society was organised around two distinct social ‘sexes’. For example, Laqueur 
presents penis-like diagrams of ‘female’ genital anatomy from sources that include 
founder of contemporary human anatomical science Andreas Vesalius’s (1543;
Figure 20 in Laqueur, 1990) De humani corporis fabrica (On the structure of the 
human body), surgeon Georg Bartisch’s (1575; Figures 30-31 in Laqueur, 1990) 
Kunstbuche, and surgeon and anatomist Vidus Vidius’s (1611; Figure 21 in Laqueur, 
1990) De anatome corporis humanis. To a contemporary observer, these images 
could easily be mistaken for diagrams o f ‘male’ genitals. ‘Female’ genitals were also 
described using androcentric terms such as ‘vaginal shaft’ and ‘penile clitoris’. This 
taxonomy reveals the emphasis on sex similarities between categories that are 
essentialised as dichotomous sex differences in human anatomical science today. As 
in contemporary European medicine, gender dimorphism was conceptualised as 
natural. However, unlike today, there was no predominant belief that biological ‘sex’ 
was the basis for social ‘sex’ (Laqueur, 1990). The essentialist view of two ‘opposite’ 
biological sexes became the predominant view in Europe around the 1850s (Laqueur, 
1990).
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[4.1.2.3.1] From classification to normalisation
Until around the 1950s, standard medical approaches to bodies that did not appear 
normatively ‘female’ or ‘male’ focused on trying to classify and explain these 
variations, rather than promoting biochemical or surgical intervention (Karkazis, 
2008). Prior to the 1950s, there was no widespread agreement on surgical 
intervention and these interventions were not widespread (Karkazis, 2008). By the 
1950s, the idea that a ‘penile clitoris’ constituted normal human anatomy had been 
virtually eradicated from medical thought (Laqueur, 1990). The dominance of the 
two-sex model facilitated new approaches to infant genital diversity. Beginning in 
1950, one approach involved the administration of steroid therapy (Blizzard & 
Wilkins, 1957). Another approach that became prominent during the 1950s favoured 
surgical intervention to ‘normalise’ infant genital variations beyond medical norms 
of ‘female’ and ‘male’. Two of the most influential figures in the new science of 
surgical intervention were Andrea Prader and John Money.
[4.1.2.3.2] Prader’s (1954) model
In 1962, University of Zurich Children’s Hospital Director and Professor Andrea 
Prader initiated the field of paediatric endocrinology in Europe by organising the first 
meeting of paediatricians and endocrinologists in what later became the European 
Society of Paediatric Endocrinology (ESPE) (Sippell, 2011). His efforts to organise 
this meeting were motivated by the exclusion of paediatric endocrinology from the 
4* Acta Endocrinological Congress, a professional conference that featured the latest 
European developments in endocrine research and practice (Sippell, 2011). Lawson 
Wilkins had previously established the field of paediatric endocrinology in the US, 
and was the pre-eminent physician in the first generation of paediatric 
endocrinologists after whom the Lawson Wilkins Pediatric Endocrine Society (now 
Pediatric Endocrine Society) was named (Sippell, 2011). Lawson Wilkins also 
trained the second generation of paediatric endocrinologists; Prader visited Johns 
Hopkins University in the summer of 1951 to study with Wilkins (Sippell, 2011). In 
addition to his pivotal role as ‘a founding father [sic] of paediatric endocrinology’ 
(Sippell, 2011, p. 101), Prader is known as ‘one of the most influential figures in 
European paediatrics’ (Sippell, 2011, p. 101); the eponymous Andrea Prader Prize is 
given annually by the ESPE for distinguished achievements in paediatric
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endocrinology (Sippell, 2011). His professional stature stems not only from his 
numerous pivotal contributions to paediatric endocrinology, but also for his many 
contributions to paediatrics beyond the field of endocrinology in fields as diverse as 
paediatric cardiology (e.g., Rossi & Prader, 1948) and genetics (e.g., Froesh, Prader, 
Labhart, Stuber, & Wolf, 1957). His work remains widely cited and high impact. For 
example, a Google Scholar search for articles authored by Andrea Prader yielded 68 
results, of which 9 articles had been cited more than 100 times, one cited over 500 
times, and another cited over 600 times (Google Scholar, 2012).
Prader co-authored the first publication that identified the potentially lethal 
form of lipoid congenital adrenal hyperplasia (CAH) known as lipoid CAH (Prader 
& Siebenmann, 1957). CAH is considered the most frequent cause of external genital 
appearance that differs from stereotypical ‘female’ or ‘male’ genitals (Karkazis, 
2008). This condition is characterised by lack of an enzyme used by the adrenal 
glands to produce the essential hormones cortisol and aldosterol. There are multiple 
forms of CAH, some of which involve overproduction or deficiencies in hormones 
associated with ‘sex’ characteristics such as fat and hair distribution and 
genitourinary appearance. Trader’s medical emphasis on the genitals of these 
children was evident early in his work on CAH: The same year that Prader founded 
the ESPE, Prader, Anders, and Habich (1962) published a paper titled ‘On the 
genetics of the congenital adrenogenital syndrome (virilizing adrenal hyperplasia)’ 
(translation). The term ‘andrenogenital syndrome’ used in this paper was later 
replaced in the literature with ‘congenital adrenal hyperplasia’. Trader’s (1954) 
model (see Figure 2 & Table 2) for understanding ‘infant genital virilisation’ was 
based on his CAH-related research. This model continues to be the most widely used 
international model that sets paediatric medical standards for infant genital 
classifications and interventions.
[4.1.2.3.3] Money’s approach 
In 1971, at the IC^  ^ESPE Annual Meeting in Zurich, Andrea Prader was on the 
Organising Committee that selected CAH, testosterone and testes and ‘male 
pseudohermaphroditism’ among the topics, with an emphasis on endocrinological 
issues that were believed to have psychological foundations or implications (Sippell,
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2011). Trader’s Committee selected US psychologist John Money to present a paper 
on “Development of Sexual Identification and Optimal Timing of Surgical 
Correction of Ambiguous Genitalia”, with follow-up group discussions and 
workshops on ‘psycho-endocrinology’ and CAH included in the conference program 
following Money’s talk (Sippell, 2011). Money and Prader were already linked 
before the ESPE meeting through their shared professional contact with Lawson 
Wilkins at Johns Hopkins. Money’s presentation and the subsequent discussions 
about his work amongst the 140 practitioners at the ESPE Meeting (Sippell, 2011) 
have had an enduring impact on the fields of paediatric endocrinology and psycho­
endocrinology.
John Money remains a controversial figure in the history of minority world 
understandings of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’. Writing in the context of a two-sex model of 
‘gender’. Money was one of the first modem minority world professionals to claim 
that one’s internal sense of self and psychosocial ‘gender’ should be considered when 
evaluating requests for hormones and surgery firom people whose gender 
assignments did not accurately reflect their gender self-designations. Money, who is 
credited with being ‘the world’s first pediatric clinical psychoendocrinologist’ 
(University of Minnesota, n.d.), was invited to join Johns Hopkins by the first 
paediatric endocrinologist, Lawson Wilkins—recall that Prader had previously 
trained with Wilkins at Johns Hopkins, where he learned Wilkins’ approach to CAH 
(Sippell, 2011).
In 1966, Money founded the Gender Identity Clinic at Johns Hopkins, a clinic 
that provided ‘sex reassignment surgeries’ for people assigned as ‘male’ who met 
criteria for the label ‘transsexual’ according to a pathologising medical model 
(University of Minnesota, n.d.). Some of Money’s views and practices may appear 
superficially contradictory: While espousing the view that ‘transsexual’ women 
should be given hormones and surgery to affirm their gender self-designations, he 
held that gender was malleable based on environmental and social factors—but only 
until the age of eighteen (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). Money’s views have often been 
mischaracterised in popular media and medical literature as treating gender as solely 
a social construction (e.g. Beh & Diamond, 2000; Colapinto, 2000; Diamond, 1982;
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Zuger, 1970; see Fausto-Sterling, 2000 for further discussion). The explanations in 
his publications were more nuanced:
Theoretically, our findings indicate neither a purely hereditary nor a purely 
environmental doctrine of the origins of gender role... is adequate. On the one 
hand it is evident that gender role and orientation is not determined in some 
automatic, innate, instinctive fashion by physical agents like chromosomes. On 
the other hand it is also evident that the sex of assignment and rearing does not 
automatically and mechanistically determine gender role and orientation 
(Money, Hampson, & Hampson, 1957).
Money’s multidimensional view emphasised the importance of including 
diverse biological and psychosocial factors when determining gender assignment and 
interventions that involved surgical ‘sex reassignment’. Although his professional 
activities spanned areas as diverse as learning disabilities, dyslexia, and Kaspar 
Hauser syndrome (a form of ‘psychosocial’ dwarfism that results from child abuse) 
and human sexual arousal, he is most widely known for work in the field of ‘sex’ and 
‘gender’ (University of Minnesota, n.d.). The modem concept of gender identity has 
its historical basis in Money’s concept of ‘gender identity/role’ (University of 
Minnesota, n.d.).
In 1972, the year following Money’s presentation at the ESPE Meeting, Anke 
Ehrhardt and Money co-authored a university textbook titled Man & woman, boy & 
girl: The differentiation and dimorphism of gender identity firom conception to 
maturity (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972), in which Ehrhardt and Money elucidated the 
binary view of gender that Money had espoused in his ESPE presentation. Ehrhardt, 
who collaborated with Money early in her professional career, was a German clinical 
psychologist who continued her work on gender and sexual development and 
intersex young people after Money’s death in 2006. Money’s work appeared to 
support some feminist approaches to gender that distinguished between sex, defined 
as anatomical and physiological characteristics, and gender, defined as social forces 
that shape behaviour. Money shared with his 1970s second wave feminist 
contemporaries an uncritical view of ‘physical sex’ that did not acknowledge how 
the same social forces that shape people’s gender-associated behaviour and identity
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can also affect how people view ‘physical sex’. Several decades later, in a 
publication credited as the first ‘disciplinaiy-based challenge to psychology’s 
essentialist views about maleness and femaleness’ (Unger, 1993, p. 212), feminist 
Naomi Wesstein (1971) critiqued psychologists’ and psychiatrists’ claims to 
understand women and their promotion of ‘the fundamentalist myth of sex organ 
causality’ (p. 197). Weisstein critiqued psychologists and psychiatrists for embracing 
sexist cultural norms, accepting theories without evidence, and attempting to explain 
people and human behaviour based on inner traits rather than social context. Central 
to her claims was the notion that sexist norms affect the construction of 
psychological theories and the subsequent questions asked to validate those theories.
John Money’s conduct in the David Reimer case typified ‘psychology’s 
essentialist views about maleness and femaleness’ (Unger, 1993, p. 212) as critiqued 
by Weisstein (1971). In their 1972 text. Money and Ehrhardt used the now-infamous 
case of David Reimer to substantiate Money’s existing views. David Reimer was a 
child whose botched circumcision had left him with a penis that Money did not 
consider to be ‘viable’. Money insisted that David take oestrogen and performed a 
vaginoplasty on him. Based on his view that rearing and not biological factors could 
determine a child's own gender. Money convinced Reimer's parents to raise Reimer 
as a girl and not to reveal the truth about Reimer's genital history. This tragic 
decision was a factor in Reimer's eventual suicide. Money initially reported this case 
as evidence for his belief in the social construction of gender. One biography of 
David Reimer claims that Money was so certain of his view that he ignored Reimer's 
own wishes on numerous occasions, pushing Reimer to undergo ‘feminising’ 
medical procedures that Reimer tried unsuccessfully to resist (Colapinto, 2000).
In the 1990s, intersex activists involved in the new intersex rights movement 
led by the now-defunct Intersex Society of North America (ISNA) challenged the 
surgical alteration of intersex young people advocated by Money and those who 
followed his protocols (Hegarty & Chase, 2000). Milton Diamond, a sexologist who 
believed in biological bases for ‘gender’, also publicised Money's failure in the 
Reimer case. After a number of poor clinical outcomes and suicides, the Johns 
Hopkins clinic discontinued their ‘sex reassignment’ surgeries. Although the Reimer
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case is the most widely publicised of John Money’s surgical reassignment cases, one 
of his publications documented his involvement in 45 cases in which children with 
penises deemed insufficient for a ‘male’ assignment were surgically and 
biochemically reassigned as ‘female’ and raised as girls (Money, 1975).
One aspect of Money’s model that continues in clinical practice today is the 
distinction between protocols for children and adults. In a study of six medical 
experts in the field of paediatric intersexuality, Suzanne Kessler (1990) conducted 
interviews on the case management of intersex infants with a clinical geneticist, two 
paediatric endocrinologists, a general endocrinologist, a psychoendocrinologist, and 
a urologist. Despite their varying disciplinary specialties, all of these specialists 
agreed that their management of intersex infant cases was founded on Money’s 
theory of gender (Money, Hampson, & Hampson, 1955; Money & Ehrhardt, 1972). 
One stated that physicians ‘have been raised in the Money theory’ (Kessler, 1990, p. 
8) and that treatment of intersex infants had ‘been dictated to a large extent, by the 
work of John Money and Anke Ehrhardt...’ (Kessler, 1990, p. 8). These findings 
indicate the need to reconsider the increasingly widespread belief that specialists 
from distinct disciplines within ‘multidisciplinary ’ teams will be able to consider the 
clinical assessment of intersex young people fi*om diverse perspectives and achieve 
beneficial outcomes for these young people.
Whereas Money stressed the importance of interventions to ‘normalise’ young 
people to ensure what he viewed as healthy (i.e., normative) psychosocial 
development, he viewed adults whose own designations of their genders were 
independent of their assigned genders as being past the malleable period of 
childhood during which gender assignments could be imposed successfully. Thus 
Money assisted some adult women who were designated as ‘male’ in altering their 
bodies through genital surgery, even as he imposed gender assignments and 
corresponding invasive medical interventions on children like David Reimer. This 
practical distinction continues in a different form today: Whereas ‘transsexual’ adults 
are viewed as needing to undergo rigorous screening to determine the legitimacy of 
their gender self-designations prior to gaining approval for medical intervention, the 
presumption with ‘intersex’ children is that their physical differences from
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stereotypical ‘female’ and ‘male’ biology will lead to interpersonal difficulties that 
will impede their ability to develop socially into ‘normal’ women or men.
[4.1.2.3.4] Recent developments to Prader’s model 
Some more recent publications present Prader’s Normal Female as stage 0 and either 
omit Prader’s Normal Male or classify this body as 6 (e.g., Beltz, Swanson, & 
Berenbaum, 2011). Other researchers (Rink, Adams, & Misseri, 2005) have recently 
proposed the ‘PVE’ classification system, which is intended to address Prader’s 
(1954) lack of consideration for bladder function. The ‘P’ refers to the phallus length 
and width in centimetres, the ‘V ’ to the distance in centimetres between the vaginal 
confluence and the bladder neck and to the urogenital sinus (UGS) opening, and the 
‘E’ to the degree of external genital virilisation using Prader Stages I-V 
classifications. This newer and less widely cited Rink, Adams, and Misseri (2005) 
PVE model uses Prader’s classifications of external genitals and represents an 
expansion of Prader’s model rather than a fundamentally distinct schema. Although 
both models share a binarising and pathologising view of human anatomical diversity, 
the existence of two competing classification norms and practices demonstrates that 
medical views and the contexts from which they are formed continue to shift. The 
contrast between these medical views raises questions about the variety of views that 
can be formed outside of medicine. The present experiments explored whether there 
is psychological variation in views of this physical diversity among laypeople.
Medical professionals’ clinical judgements can affect mental health 
professionals’ clinical decisions. For example, the authors of the World Professional 
Association for Transgender Health (WPATH) Standards o f care fo r  the health o f 
transgender, transsexual and gender nonconforming people edition (S0C7)
depathologised ‘transsexual, transgender, and gender nonconforming’ people’s own 
genders and recognised their genders as natural variations instead of as ‘gender 
identity disorders’. In contrast, this same document pathologised people whose 
bodies are not strictly ‘male’ or ‘female’ as having ‘disorders of sex development 
(DSD)’ (WPATH, 2011, p. 69). The proposed changes to the Edition o f the 
diagnostic and statistical manual o f mental disorders (DSM-V) guidelines also 
specifically distinguish between people based on whether they have been medically
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diagnosed with a ‘DSD’ (Meyer-Bahlburg, 2009). Although the S0C7 authors 
recommend that physicians require psychological screening and therapy before 
prescribing gender-affirming hormones to people labelled as having a ‘DSD’, earlier 
sections of the document state that ‘psychotherapy is not an absolute requirement for 
hormone therapy and surgery’ (WPATH, 2011, p. 28) for adults with strictly ‘female’ 
or ‘male’ bodies whose genders are independent fi*om their assigned ‘sex’ may not 
need therapy prior to starting hormones.
Thus ‘transsexual’ adults are often delayed or denied when seeking the same 
hormones and surgeries that were imposed on ‘intersex’ infants and adolescents and 
the genders of intersex adults who seek to correct involuntary or coerced medical 
treatments are treated as uniquely suspect. These approaches are not as contradictory 
as they may first appear: both protocols serve to promote normativity, as in Money’s 
day. Money has also made an enduring contribution to clinical practice with young 
people. The psychological and social factors Money stressed when making medical 
decisions about intersex people's ‘sex’ assignments are increasingly considered in 
cases of older children and adolescents today. Medical claims to consider 
psychosocial factors when evaluating intersex infants for ‘normalising’ surgical 
interventions seem misguided at best, given that infants have yet to develop enough 
for these factors to be known. Yet Money’s influence on the field of endocrinology 
endures today in the form of the routine involuntary or coerced ‘normalising’ genital 
surgeries imposed on intersex infants in many countries throughout Europe and in 
Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US.
Current policies in medical and psychological professions are consistent with 
Money’s approach. These policies recommend the consideration of both 
‘psychosocial’ and biological rationale in gender/sex assignment protocols.
Misguided efforts to predict the future ‘gender orientation’ of newborns based 
primarily on biological characteristics or on ‘psychosocial’ assumptions—which are 
almost entirely based on biologically essentialist gender ideology—continue to 
inform medical practice with intersex infants, even in ostensibly ‘multidisciplinary’ 
treatment teams (e.g., Conway, 2014; Roen & Pasterski, 2014). These biologically 
based practices are contraindicated by research evidence, such as the study that found
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most children with cloacal exstrophy rejected their infant gender/sex assignment as 
‘female’ before the age of nine years old (Reiner & Gearhart, 2004). In this study, 
"normalising" survey for infants with cloacal exstrophy led to much lower 
satisfaction with gender/sex assignment than simply allowing children to grow up 
with a provisional gender assignment and no surgical intervention. In both cases in 
which children in this study did not receive surgical intervention, the children were 
satisfied with their provisional social gender. Thus even when surgical intervention is 
medically necessary rather than cosmetic, the outcomes of surgical gender/sex 
assignments remain perilous and unpredictable.
Gender/sex assignments based on cisgenderist binarising also fail to consider 
the existence of people who have non-binary genders. In a study of 69 intersex 
participants, 26% of participants reported that they did not ‘unambiguously’ perceive 
themselves as either women or men, with 7% reporting having a gender role that was 
not included in the gender binary, 24% reported having a ‘mixed’ gender identity 
that fluctuated between woman and man, and 3% reporting that they did not identify 
as women or men (Schweizer, Brunner, Handford, and Richter-Appelt, 2014). 
Schweizer et al.’s findings provide further evidence to support the discontinuation of 
surgical interventions based on predictions of the binary gender with which an 
intersex child will identify as an adult.
Several international human rights bodies have recognised young people’s 
right to genital autonomy and recommended criminalisation of ‘normalising’ genital 
surgeries conducted on intersex infants, including the Swiss National Advisory 
Commission on Biomedical Ethics (NEK-CNE) (2012) and the UN Special 
Rapporteur on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, Juan E. Mendez (2013). Despite scholarly and human rights debates that 
contest surgical interventions on intersex infants’ genitals, these procedures remain 
part of standard medical recommendations and practices around the world and there 
have been few legislative penalties.
Wlien infant genitals are depicted through the ideological firame of Prader 
diagrams, particular ways of seeing and understanding may appear as neutral
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scientific facts. When infant genitals are depicted from a health and human rights 
perspective such as that of the World Health Organization, the non-inevitable nature 
of Prader’s model becomes apparent. The World Health Organisation (WHO) has 
classified Female Genital Mutilation (FGM) into four types by extensiveness of 
excision. Type 1 refers to clitoridectomy (also called clitorectomy), which involves 
partial or total removal of the clitoris and, in rare cases, removal of the prepuce, or 
fold of skin surrounding the clitoris. Type 2 refers to clitoral and/or labial excision, 
which involves partial or total removal of the clitoris and labia minora, sometimes 
with excision of the labia majora. Type 3 refers to infibulations, a practice that 
involves narrowing the vaginal opening through creation of a seal formed by cutting 
and repositioning the inner or outer labia, sometimes with clitoral removal. Type 4 is 
a catchall category used to describe ‘all other harmful procedures to the female 
genitalia for non-medical purposes, e.g., pricking, piercing, incising, scraping and 
cauterizing the genital area’ (WHO, 2010). The WHO states that there are no health 
benefits to FGM (WHO, 2010), thus the procedures involved in FGM do not 
constitute medically necessary or ‘therapeutic’ interventions. Trader’s Normal 
Female closely resembles Type 1 FGM, whereas the WHO Normal Female may have 
characteristics that would be labelled as Prader Stage I or II disorder in Trader’s 
model. The contrast between what constitutes ‘best practices’ in this area from a 
health and human rights perspective and a mainstream medical one suggests that 
societal norms and ideological views play a role in the determination of whose 
genitals are disordered and require surgical intervention.
Prior to the current standard of favouring ‘feminising’ surgery. Money 
lamented the influence of discriminatory ideology in medical determinations of 
intersex infants’ genitals: ‘It thus appears that the prejudices of physicians skew 
today’s hermaphoriditic (sic) sex reassignment statistics in favor of change from girl 
to boy’ (Money & Ehrhardt, 1972, p. 154). However, Money’s own ‘prejudices’ even 
in his more recent work are at least partly responsible for the ongoing and 
widespread acceptability of ‘feminising’ genital surgeries on intersex infants among 
health professionals, as evinced by his inaccurate, androcentric understanding of 
genital physiology: In 1994, Money wrote that ‘the penis is the only organ in the 
body that contains the spongy tissue (corpora cavernosa) responsible for erection....
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There is no particular corresponding obstacle to feminizing reconstructive surgery’ 
(Money, 1994, p. 45). No obstacle, that is, except for the structurally equivalent 
corpora cavernosa of the clitoris. Thus the persistence of androcentrism in paediatric 
endocrinology and related fields can be linked directly to Money’s androcentric 
anatomical science. Similar manifestations of androcentric science may account for 
the exclusion of the clitoris from most medical literature and the framing in medical 
texts and illustrations (e.g.. Trader’s 1954 diagram o f ‘male’ genitals as the standard 
against which ‘female’ genitals should be compared in medicine at large; see Moore 
& Clarke, 1995). Money’s lack of attention to possible contrasts between young 
people’s views and those of professionals meant that his proposed alternative was 
psychological rather than medical assessment, neither of which focus on an intersex 
child’s own stated wishes.
Despite these concerns, numerous medical and psychological guidelines claim 
that professionals’ medical communications with parents about these surgeries are 
‘objective’, ‘neutral’, or ‘value-free’ (e.g., Lee, Houk, Ahmed, & Hughes, 2006; 
World Professional Association for Trans Health, 2011). Despite claims by Hughes, 
Houk, Ahmed, Lee, and LWPES/ESPE Consensus Group’s (2006) and Ahmed, 
Gardner, and Sandberg (2014) that ‘DSD’ disorder terminology was the result of 
international consensus. Diamond (2009) has clarified that this pathologising 
language ‘was not derived at by any official organization but by a self-selected group’ 
(p. 172). Liao and Roen (2014) note that attendance at this meeting, which occurred 
in Chicago, was by invitation only and that the so-called ‘consensus statement’ 
producted at this meeting ‘was not intended as a clinical guideline’ (p. 1). Legal 
scholar Kishka-Kamari Ford (2001) critiqued the current medical standard of treating 
parental consent for ‘normalising’ childhood genital surgeries as equivalent to 
informed consent by intersex infants and children themselves. This ethically fraught 
conflation and substitution of parental consent by proxy with actual informed consent 
by the individual who will be subjected to surgery is commonplace in research and 
bioethical publications on intersex young people, even in publications by authors 
who claim to advocate for these young people (e.g, Tamar-Mattis, Baratz, Baratz 
Dalke, & Karkazis, 2014).
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[4.1,3] Framing effects
Framing effects provide one possible explanation for how ideologies such as 
cisgenderism can be embedded in medical decision-making processes. The term 
‘framing effects’ has been used to describe the effects that varying the presentation 
of information can have on people’s decisions (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).
Framing effects have been observed in numerous aspects of medical decision-making. 
For example, a study of 79 university students who were reported as women found 
that women who received a pamphlet on breast self-examination (BSE) that focused 
on negative consequences (i.e., a loss-frame) had more positive attitudes towards 
BSE, were more likely to intend to conduct BSE and were more likely to carry out 
their intentions to conduct BSE than participants who received a gain-frame or no­
arguments pamphlet (Meyerowitz & Chaiken, 1987). Even medical professionals are 
susceptible to framing effects in decision-making (Bomstein & Emler, 2001). In their 
review of literature on doctors’ decision-making biases, Bomstein and Emler 
identified a variety of biases that affect doctors’ information gathering, interpretation 
of evidence, diagnostic reasoning and treatment decisions. Brooks, LeBlanc, and 
Norman (2000) tested medical students and experts by showing them head-to- 
shoulder photographs of patients with obvious features of the presenting medical 
problems displayed, using a majority of images taken from medical textbooks. The 
extent to which seemingly obvious features were identified was strongly influence by 
context. Brooks et al. found that both participant groups identified more of the 
obvious features when the accepted diagnosis was suggested to them and that both 
groups experienced about 20% increased diagnostic accuracy when key features that 
were clearly visible in the photographs were verbally described for them.
There are almost no framing studies of intersex diagnoses in psychology.
One published study of framing effects in parental decision-making about 
‘normalising’ genital surgery suggests that both parents and medical professionals 
may be unaware of some key influences that affect such decisions. Streuli, Vayena, 
Cavicchia-Balmer, and Huber (2013) analysed data from a focus group of 89 third- 
year medical students who were randomly assigned to watch either a medicalised 
six-minute presentation by an endocrinologist and the other presented a 
demedicalised six-minute presentation by a psychologist as prospective parents and
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to provide self-reported survey data on the impact of the video on their decision. Of 
the 89 ‘prospective parents’, 66% who were shown the medicalised video 
recommended surgery for their imagined child and only 23% who were shown the 
demedicalised video recommended surgery. The prospective parents attributed their 
surgical decisions mainly to their personal attitudes, despite the significant impact 
the video had on their perspective and on their desired outcomes for their imagined 
child. Based on these findings, the researchers concluded that parental decisions 
about ‘normalising’ genital surgery for intersex infants was heavily influenced by the 
ideological content of the counselling they received fi*om medical professionals, and 
that neither parents nor health professionals were aware of the extent to which this 
ideological content in health counselling could affect parental decisions. The authors 
further noted that multidisciplinary approaches would not in themselves reduce the 
risk that ideology in health counselling material would impede parental decision­
making in the interests of intersex children. Based on the relatively small sample size 
and the fact that Streuli et al.’s participants were not actual parents making actual 
medical decisions, further research is needed to evaluate the impact of pathologising 
ideology on parents’ surgical decisions about intersex infants. It is also worth noting 
that, although the ‘demedicalised’ and ‘medicalised’ approaches differed in terms of 
whether they defined the child as passive or as an active agent and whether they 
viewed ideal aid as community-based or hospital-based, both approaches used 
pathologising language (i.e., ‘DSD’) and both constructed intersex people’s bodies as 
disordered. This disciplinary consistency between the endocrinologist and 
psychologist raises questions about the extent to which ‘multidisciplinary’ teams can 
transcend a medicalised, pathologising approach.
Some researchers have found that the format in which information is presented 
can also affect parents’ understanding of clinical risks and benefits. In a randomised 
internet survey of 4685 parents who received risk/benefit information about 
participation in a paediatric study of post-operative pain control. Tait, Voepel-Lewis, 
Zikmund-Fisher, and Fagerlin (2010) found that pictographs were more effective in 
transmitting understanding than text and tables, among parents of all numeracy levels. 
Parents perceived the pictographs as more effective, helpful, and trustworthy than 
text and tables. Parents who received risk/benefit information in pictograph format
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were statistically significantly more likely to consider research participation as more 
beneficial and lower risk. When considered together, findings firom Streuli et al. 
(2013) and Tait et al. (2010) suggest that a variety of understudied and unknown 
factors may interact to affect parents’ surgical decisions about intersex young 
people’s medical care.
According to psychologist Hal Arkes (1991), forms of decision bias occur 
because of differential psychological coding of equivalent information. Arkes 
identified multiple types of decision bias, including psychophysical errors. Arkes 
theorised psychophysical errors as the result of non-linear mapping of physical 
stimuli into psychological representations, as in the non-linear mapping of infant 
genitals into Trader’s visual diagram. Psychophysical errors may function at the level 
of cognitive encoding of information and can thus be difficult to correct; they may 
also be a useful way to understand how ideology can shape or constrain cognitive 
processes, as in the student responses I described in my POET about La Mujer 
Barbuda. Arkes suggests that reframing the options, such as by changing the 
reference point or standard of comparison, can be an effective technique for 
correcting psychophysical errors. In the current research, I challenge cisgenderism 
through the use of experimental methods to reframe the standard of comparison 
against which intersex infants’ genitals are classified as ‘disordered’.
Pathologising ideology remains the dominant framing of intersex people’s 
bodies in the field of paediatric endocrinology today. An online questionnaire and 
audit of ‘DSD’ literature conducted by Pasterski, Prentice, and Hughes (2010) found 
that paediatric endocrinologists from all 60 medical centres in the study, including 
respondents from 23 European countries, reported using ‘Disorders of Sex 
Development (DSD)’ terminology. Some medical professionals and many intersex 
activists have claimed that pathologising terminology used to describe intersex 
people’s bodies, such as ‘Disorders of Sex Development’ (DSD) promotes 
‘normalising’ surgeries (e.g.. Diamond, 2009). Some research also suggests that 
people who adopt ‘DSD’ terminology to describe themselves also report having less 
positive sense of self (e.g., Davis, 2014), although the relation between ‘DSD’ 
terminology and sense of self has not been tested empirically. Medical professionals
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and some other intersex activists have challenged this claim and asserted that ‘DSD’ 
terminology is unrelated to the prevalence of these surgeries (e.g., Intersex UK,
2012; Lee et al., 2006). To date, to the best of my knowledge, no previous research 
has evaluated these claims about linguistic framing effects empirically or 
experimentally. I addressed the verbal framing effects of pathologising and 
binarising language in Experiment 1.
Current claims of medical ‘consensus’ about intersex infants’ genitals may 
share Boring’s (1945) underestimation of the extent to which societal and ideological 
influences affect scientific thinking. Some researchers have found that ideological 
influences affect the ordering and understanding of graphs more extensively than is 
typically recognised in cognitive or realist approaches (e.g., Hegarty, Lemieux, & 
McQueen, 2010). ‘DSD’ debates between intersex people and medical professionals 
have focused primarily on linguistic framing to the exclusion of other recognised 
framing effects such as those observed in graphing (e.g., Hegarty & Lemieux, 2011). 
Visual framing has been shown to affect people’s understanding and judgements in 
areas such as gender. Although Trader’s (1954) ordering of the seven infant genital 
configurations is viewed as an ideologically neutral scientific diagram, some 
researchers have documented how the order in which sexes are displayed in graphs is 
influenced by ideology, how difficult it is for people to recognise this ideology 
during attempts to evaluate graphs for ideological bias, and how the ordering of 
sexes in graphs changes when people change their ideological frameworks to 
understand the groups being graphed (Hegarty & Lemieux, 2011). The experiments 
in this chapter test hypotheses about how such framing effects can affect the extent to 
which people classify intersex infants’ genitals as disordered and recommend 
medically unnecessary ‘normalising’ surgery for these genitals.
Based on these previous findings, these experiments tested whether people 
outside of clinical contexts would make the same recommendations for infant genital 
surgery as those made by mainstream medical professionals. By shifting the context 
from a clinical setting to an experimental one, I provided a contextual frame in which 
normative medical ideology about intersex infants was not embedded. Using an 
experimental setting, I was able to restrict the informational stimuli that participants
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received to ensure that they did not receive any visual or textual material that would 
prime them to make judgements biased in favour of pathologising or surgical 
intervention. These experiments consider Hegarty and Lemieux’s (2011) finding that 
ideological influences affect people’s ordering of graphs by testing whether 
laypeople recommend surgery for bodies that medical professionals view as 
requiring surgical intervention. Experiment 1 tested the ideological effects of verbal 
instructions. Experiment 2 tested the ideological effects of visual presentation in the 
ordering of image and the presence or absence of accompanying text.
[4.2] Experiment 1
Medical ideology defines valid bodies as strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ and pathologises 
bodies that vary from this definition. Although this ideology is hegemonic in the 
field of medicine, it is not universally accepted or uncontested. This experiment 
tested whether participants would recommend surgery for all Prader Stage I-V bodies 
that are classified as disordered and recommended for surgery in current normative 
medical practice (Karkazis, 2008; Yankovic al., 2013), following Trader’s (1954) 
model. I also tested whether binarising (i.e., being asked to label bodies as either 
‘male’ or ‘female’) and pathologising (i.e., being asked to label some bodies as 
‘disordered’) verbal communication affected people’s decisions to recommend or 
reject normalising infant genital surgery and their confidence in their surgical 
decisions. Binarising and pathologising conditions were evaluated against a free-sort 
control condition in which participants did not receive binarising or pathologising 
verbal communication (i.e., being told that people ‘are bom with many different 
kinds of bodies’ and asked to categorise the images in any way that made sense to 
them). This experiment evaluated whether participants who received binarising or 
pathologising verbal instmctions would be more or less likely to recommend surgery 
than current normative medical practice (per Trader’s aforementioned 1954 model) 
and more or less confident in their decisions to recommend or reject nonnalising 
surgery.
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Bricolage reflective box: Moving to the margins and reflexive empiricism
Experimental researchers typically treat a ‘controP group as 'condition-free' 
standards of comparison with groups of participants in their experimental conditions. 
When considering how to frame my participant groups for these experiments. 1 was 
aware that it would not be possible to find participants who had not already been 
exposed to one of the ubiquitous forms of cisgenderism present in UK society at 
large. Given my social justice aim of challenging medical cisgenderism and the 
continued authority medical professionals in determinations of people’s legitimate 
gender/sex status, I chose to constmet the taken-for-granted medical norm depicted 
in Trader’s (1954) diagram as an ‘effect to be explained’. By default, this positioned 
laypeople’s gender/sex norms as the standard of comparison. In this case, laypeople's 
existing gender/sex ideology in the ‘control’ group is contrasted with Trader’s 
gender/sex ideology for the strategic aim of challenging claims by medical 
professionals that the psychosocial rationale discussed earlier in this chapter is a 
valid justification for ‘nonnalising’ surgery.
[4.2.1] Method
[4.2.1.1] Participants
Participants were 37 undergraduate students recruited from a university campus in 
Surrey, England. The sample included 17 first-year students (45.9%) and 20 second- 
year students (54.1%). Participants were aged 18-22 (M= 19.43, SD = .987). Of the 
total participants, 32 participants identified as female, woman, girl and/or feminine 
(86.49%), in contrast to only five participants (13.51%) who identified as male 
and/or men. Participant self-reported genders were ‘female’ (n = 31, 83.78%), ‘girly, 
friendly, caring’ {n = 1, 2.70%), and ‘male’ {n = 5, 13.51%). Some participants who 
described their genders as ‘female’ also described themselves as woman {n = 2, 
5.41%) or feminine {n = 1, 2.70%), and one participant who described having a 
‘male’ gender also listed man (« = 1, 2.70%). Most participants identified as some 
variety of white and/or Caucasian (e.g., ‘White Cornish’, ‘British-Irish (white)’) {n = 
27, 72.97%), and four participants (10.82%) described their ethnicities simply as 
British or European. Two participants identified as Pakistani or Asian British 
(5.41%), two participants identified as Black British Caribbean or Black African + 
Caribbean (5.41%), and two participants as Mixed-Wliite and Asian or white, mixed
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(5.41%). A majority of participants {n = 34, 91.89%) reported having sole British, 
English, Welsh, or UK citizenship, two participants had Lithuanian citizenship 
(5.41%), and one participant reported having joint British, Swiss, and Panamanian 
citizenship (2.70%). All participants reported fluency in English language. Two 
participants listed fluency in Lithuanian (5.41%), one in Spanish (2.70%), one in 
Welsh (2.70%), and one in Urdu (2.70%).
Bricolage reflective box: Tracing hidden and diffuse social relations of power
In my description of participant genders, 1 provided more detail than is t>'picai)y 
given in psychological literature. Given my previous critiques of cisgenderism 
ideology in A PA st}-le guidelines and my view of these guidelines as a form of 
episteinology (Chapters 2 and 3), 1 decided to provide participants’ own descriptions 
of their genders, to state explicitly when and how alterations to pailicipants’ own 
descriptions were made, and to acknowledge participants' use of multiple gender 
terms to describe their genders. Although APA style guidelines ask authors to ‘be 
clear' and avoid being ‘ambiguous' (APA. 2010, p. 73), this instruction can have the 
unintended effect of promoting false ‘consensus' regarding participants’ genders. By 
attempting to provide a more transparent description of how 1 ascribed participant 
gender and to align my descriptions as closely as possible with participants’ own and 
often complex self-descriptions. I tried to apply the non-cisgcndcrist research 
techniques that 1 advocated in my previous analyses (Chapters 2 and 3).
I conducted an a priori power analysis in G*Power to determine the sample 
size required to detect a large effect size (f=  0.4) for an ANOVA with fixed effects, 
special, main effects, and interactions, with an a = 0.05, power (1 -  p) = 0.80, 
numerator df=2, «groups = 3. The required sample size was 64, which was my initial 
desired sample size for Experiment 1. Subsequently, I discovered that the limitation 
of 35 lab tokens per researcher total per semester limited my ability to recruit the 
desired number of undergraduate student participants, as most undergraduate 
students were unwilling to participate in research without the lab token incentive (see 
Appendix E for more information about the Lab Token Scheme). I then did another a 
priori power analysis to calculate the effect size I could attain with the expected 
sample size of 36 participants (12 in each of my three experimental groups).
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According to this power analysis, I could attain a large effect size of .542 with this 
small sample. The unavoidable sample size constraint was a limitation of this study.
Bricolage reflective box: ‘Subjects’ vs. ‘participants’
In my description of my study design and statistical analyses. I have described 
comparisons between groups of people who participated in my research as ‘bctwcen- 
participants’ rather than ‘bctwcen-subjccts’. The British Psychological Society 
( 1991 ) critiqued the term 'subjects’ as demeaning and ethically problematic for 
implying that people who take part in research are passive. Some reesarchers have 
even recommended a ban on the use of the term 'subjects’ to describe people who 
participate in research (e.g., Boynton, 1998). Despite some criticism of the recent 
linguistic shift from 'subjects’ to 'paiticipants’ (e.g., .lackson. 1999) and suggestions 
that multiple other terms such as ‘volunteers’ or ‘patients’ are needed to describe 
people involved in a varictv' of research designs (e.g., Chalmers, 1999). many 
researchers now prefer the term 'participants’ because of the respect and 
consideration this term conveys for people without whose involvement research 
would not be possible. Historian of science Kurt Danzigcr ( 1990) describes the 
trends and countertrends in the use of the term 'subjects’. Danzigcr notes that, 
between 1894-1936, 'the tendency to refer also to children as “subjects"... may have 
been part of a more general tendency to emphasize the scientific pretensions of the 
discipline, pretensions that demanded that psychological research be concerned with 
abstract relationships rather than with people’ (Danzigcr. 1990, p. 99). Although 
many psychologists use ‘participants’ instead of ‘subjects’ to describe those who 
contribute to their research, the use of the phrase ‘between-subjects* to describe 
experimental studies that compare distinct groups of participants typifies the 
remnants of depersonalising ideology in quantitative research. Thus T have chosen to 
describe my experimental research design as ‘between-participants’ (Chapters 4 and 
5).
[4.2.1.2] Design
This experiment used a between-participants design to evaluate the linguistic framing
effects of binarising (i.e., anchored by the binary extremes of ‘Normal Female’ and
‘Nonnal Male’) and pathologising (i.e., classified as disordered) verbal
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communication on people’s surgical decisions to recommend or reject ‘normalising’ 
infant genital surgeries and their confidence in their surgical decisions.
[4.2.13] Measures
[4.2.1.5.1] Independent variable
The independent variable of linguistic framing (the experimental condition) had three 
levels: A free-sort control condition with verbal instructions that described children 
as ‘bom with many different kinds of bodies’ (« = 13); a binarising condition with 
verbal instmctions that described children’s bodies as ‘male or female’ (« = 12); and 
a pathologising condition with verbal instmctions that described people’s bodies as 
‘disordered or not disordered’ (« = 12).
[4.2.1.3.2] Dependent variables
The three dependent variables were category fit, a continuous variable defined as the 
extent to which participants felt each image fit the category they assigned on a Likert 
scale of 1-7, with 1= not at all and 7 = completely; surgical decision, a categorical 
variable with 1 = recommend surgery and 0 = reject surgery; and confidence in 
surgical decision, a continuous variable defined by participants’ rating of their 
confidence in their judgement to recommend or reject surgical intervention on a 
Likert scale of 1-7, with 1 = not at all and 7 = completely. Confidence in surgical 
decision was computed on a 15-point scale for each image by treating surgical 
confidence ratings as positive or negative values, depending on whether participants 
did or did not recommend surgery. For example, a participant who did not 
recommend surgery for Prader Stage IV and rated their surgical confidence as +5 
would be coded as -5. A score of -7 for confidence in recommending surgery would 
indicate that a participant was completely confident in not recommending surgery, 
and a score of +7 would indicate that a participant was completely confident in 
recommending surgery. One participant indicated that they were (7) completely 
confident that they were not sure whether to recommend surgery. This response was 
coded as 0 to reflect a ‘complete’ midpoint between -7 and +7.
144
Chapter 4
Cisgenderism in Paediatric Medicine 
[4.2.1 A] Materials and procedure
Participants were recruited through campus flyers, University recruitment emails, 
and the University of Surrey SONA Online Recruitment System. The recruitment 
text stated only that the study would involve ‘medical diagrams of babies’ bodies’. 
Participants from the School of Psychology (n = 34) were offered lab tokens for 
completion of the experiment (see Appendix E for more information about the Lab 
Token Scheme). One participant was from the School of Biochemistry and 
Physiology, and two participants’ departmental affiliations were unknown. 
Participants were randomly assigned to one of the three experimental conditions. 
Participants met with the researcher one at a time.
Participants were provided with the information sheet and consent form prior 
to the start of the experiment. These documents specified that the experiment would 
involve viewing medical diagrams of infant genitals. After participants completed the 
consent form, they were provided with 7 wallet-sized, laminated cards with one of 
each of the seven images from Prader’s (1954) diagram with the image side face­
down. Participants were given an A3 sized blank piece of paper, a clear tape roll, and 
a pen.
Participants were asked to shuffle the cards face-down on the table without 
looking at them or turning them over. They were told that they would receive a 
verbal instruction about how to sort the cards, after which they should turn all cards 
over at the same time before sorting them. They were told that after they had finished 
sorting the cards, they should tape their sorted cards to the sheet and clearly label 
their classifications. Participants were told they could orient the paper in any 
direction.
After the participant had shuffled the cards, the researcher read an instruction 
from one of the three experimental conditions. Participants in the binarising 
condition were told, “Some children’s bodies are male and some are female. Sort 
these images into male and female.” Participants in the pathologising condition were 
told, “Some children’s bodies are disordered and others are not. Sort these images 
into those that are and are not disordered.” Participants in the free-sort control
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condition were told, “Children are bom with many different kinds of bodies. Sort 
these images into categories that make sense to you.” The instmction was repeated if 
necessary. Participants then turned all seven cards over to reveal printed images of 
each of the seven Prader (1954) drawings of infant genital configurations (see lower 
row of images in Figure 2 above) on each card.
Participants were then given a diagram of a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (‘not 
at all’) to 7 (‘completely’). They were asked to use this scale to rate the extent to 
which the body in each image fit the category they had assigned. Participants wrote 
their responses next to each image.
Next, participants were told, “Sometimes doctors operate on children’s bodies 
to give them a more normal appearance. Which, if any, of these children’s bodies do 
you think are in need of surgical intervention?” Participants were asked to write a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to surgical intervention for each of the seven images. Participants were 
then asked to rate their confidence in their judgement about surgical intervention 
using the aforementioned 7-point scale. The researcher then labelled the sheet with 
the participant number and photographed the completed A3 sheet, while participants 
completed a demographic questionnaire. Figure 3 provides an example of a 
participant’s completed A3 sheet.
The questionnaire began with questions about participant age, current 
educational level, nationalities, and language fluencies. Next, the questionnaire asked 
participants which term(s) they would use to describe their ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, and biology. After providing this demographic information, the 
questionnaire asked whether participants had prior exposure (‘e.g., heard about, 
viewed, etc.’) to genital configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’, the 
seven distinct genital configurations depicted in the diagrams, the exact diagrams 
used in this study, and the practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries.
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Figure 3. Completed participant sheet.
The questionnaire then asked participants who indicated any prior exposure to 
genital configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’, the seven distinct 
genital configurations depicted in the diagrams, the exact diagrams used in this study, 
or the practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries to describe their 
prior exposure. Following completion of the demographic questionnaire, participants 
received a debrief sheet that explained the different ways of categorising infant 
genitals in each of the three conditions, that the images were from the most widely 
used medical diagram in the field of paediatric endocrinology, and that normalising 
infant genital surgeries do actually occur. The debrief sheet also provided support 
and advocacy resources for participants and contact infonnation for the researcher 
and supervisor. Psychology students then received lab tokens and all participants 
were invited to provide their email addresses for future updates on study results on a 
separate sheet that was not linked with their study data. The recruitment text, 
information sheet, consent fonn, demographic questionnaire, and debrief sheet are 
provided in Appendices D-H.
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[4.2,2] Results
This experiment evaluated whether binarising or pathologising linguistic framing in 
verbal instructions would affect participants’ surgical decisions and confidence in 
their surgical decisions, and whether participants’ classifications as disordered and 
recommendations for surgery would differ fi*om classifications and surgical decisions 
in current normative medical practice that follows Trader’s (1954) model.
Parametric tests were used for variables with z-scores < ± 1.96 for skewness 
and kurtosis. Non-parametric tests were used for variables with z > ± 1.96 for 
skewness and kurtosis, except when otherwise stated. All two-group comparisons 
were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 0.05. Holm’s (1979) sequential 
Bonferroni correction was used to determine significance for three-group 
comparisons; in such cases. Holm set significance at .05/3 or .017 for the most 
significant result, .05/2 or .025 for the second most significant result and .05/1 or .05 
for the third most significant result. Fisher’s Exactp  values were used for 
comparisons of categorical variables where one or more cells had an observed value 
of < 10. A relation between variables was determined to be ‘approaching significance’ 
if/7 < .07. Effect sizes for /-tests were evaluated based on Cohen’s (1988) convention 
(small <7 > .20, medium <7 > .50, and large <7 > .80).
Participant gender similarities and differences were not evaluated in this 
analysis due to the limited gender diversity of this sample (see Participants section).
[4.2.2.1] Participants’ vs. Prader’s surgical recommendations 
I tested whether the number of Prader Stages I-V bodies for which participants 
recommended surgery differed from standard medical practice. Specifically, I used a 
one-sample /-test to compare participants’ decisions to recommend surgery with the 
contemporary medical norm, which recommends surgical intervention for all 
Trader’s Stage I-V bodies {Ho'. M=  5). When compared with an expected value of 5 
in the medical model, participants made fewer recommendations for surgical 
intervention for Stages I-V bodies (Af = 1.54, SD = .99). Moreover, all participants 
recommended surgery for fewer images than Trader’s medical model; / (36) = - 
21.284, SEM= .163,p  < .001 (two-tailed); d=  -3.495. Furthermore, no participants
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recommended surgery for all Prader Stages I-V bodies. In sum, participants were far 
less likely to recommend surgery than in Trader’s medical model.
[4.2.2.2] Effects o f linguistic framing on surgical decisions 
I tested whether framing affected people’s surgical decisions. Specifically, I used 
one-way between-participants ANOVAs to test for differences in the mean number 
of surgical decisions to recommend or reject surgery for all seven bodies and for 
Prader Stages I-V bodies between participants in the free-sort control, binarising, 
and pathologising conditions. For variables that did not have homogeneity of 
variance, I used Welch’s F  test. There were no statistically significant differences in 
total recommendations for surgery across all seven bodies between the participants in 
the binarising (M= 1.33, SD = . l ’è), pathologising (M = 2.00, SD = .95) and free-sort 
control (M= 1.46, SD = 1.27) groups, F  (2,22.22) = l . l l , p  = .194. Furthermore, 
when group differences between surgical decisions only for Trader’s Stages I-V 
bodies were tested, there were no statistically significant differences in total 
recommendations for surgery between participants in the binarising (M= 1.25, SD 
= .62), pathologising (M= 1.92, SD = .90) and participant sense-making (M= 1.46, 
SD = 1.27) groups, F  (2, 21.43) = 2.16,/? = .140. Thus my results indicated that 
linguistic framing did not have a statistically significant effect on surgical decision.
[4.2.23] Effects o f linguistic framing on confidence in surgical decision 
I tested whether framing affected people’s confidence in their decisions to 
recommend surgery. Specifically, I used a one-way ANOVA to test whether 
linguistic framing affected confidence in surgical decision when recommending 
surgery. Confidence in surgical decision when recommending surgery did not differ 
significantly by linguistic framing between the binarising (M= 3.86, SD = 1.70), 
pathologising (M= 4.88, SD = 1.66) and free-sort control {M= 4.28, SD = 1.22) 
groups, F  (2, 29) = 1.212,/? = .312. Therefore, linguistic framing did not have a 
statistically significant effect on confidence in surgical decision when recommending 
surgery.
Next, I tested whether framing would affect people’s confidence in their 
decisions to reject surgery. Specifically, I used an Omnibus Kruskal-Wallis test to
149
Chapter 4
Cisgenderism in Paediatric Medicine
test whether linguistic framing affected confidence in surgical decision when 
rejecting surgery. Confidence in surgical decision to reject surgery did not differ 
significantly by linguistic framing between the binarising (M = 5.40, SD = 1.92), 
pathologising (M= 5.88, SD = .73) and participant sense-making (M= 5.51, SD = 
1.80) groups, p  = .929. Thus linguistic framing did not have a statistically significant 
effect on confidence in surgical decision when rejecting surgery.
I tested whether people were more confident in their decisions overall when 
they recommended or rejected surgery. Specifically, I used a paired samples Mest to 
compare confidence when recommending surgery with confidence when rejecting 
surgeiy across all images. There was a statistically significant difference between 
confidence when recommending surgery {M= 4.36, SD =1.58) and confidence when 
rejecting surgeiy {M= 5.87, SD = 1.14); ^(31) = 6.53, p  < .001; <7= -1.110. In other 
words, participant surgical decision had a statistically significant and large effect on 
participant confidence, and participants were significantly more confident in their 
surgical decisions when they rejected surgery than when they recommended surgery.
[4.2.2.4] Effects o f linguistic framing on category fi t  rating .
I tested whether framing affected people’s ratings of the extent to which each image 
fit the category to which it had been assigned. Omnibus Kruskal-Wallis tests were 
used to test whether linguistic framing affected the category fit  rating for Trader’s 
Normal Female (M= 6.14, SD =1.23), Prader Stage II (M= 5.46, SD = 1.10), Trader 
Stage IV (M= 5.97, SD = 1.21), Prader Stage V (M = 6.35, SD = 1.21), and Trader’s 
Normal Male (M= 6.24, SD = 1.30). Linguistic framing had a statistically significant 
effect on category fi t  rating for Prader Stage V  { p -  .02) and Trader’s Normal Male 
(p = .005), but not for Trader’s Normal Female (p = .086), Trader Stage II (p = .615) 
or Trader Stage IV (p = .100). One-way ANOVAs were used to test whether 
linguistic framing affected the category f i t  rating for Trader Stage I {M= 5.46, SD = 
1.12) and for Trader Stage III (M= 4.89, SD = 1.51). Linguistic framing did not have 
a statistically significant effect on category fit  rating for Trader Stage I, F  (2, 34)
= .036, p  = .964, or Trader Stage III, F  (2, 34) = .742, p  = .484. Out of all seven 
images, linguistic framing had a statistically significant effect on categoiy fi t  rating 
only for Trader Stage V and Trader’s Normal Male.
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[4.2.2.5] Effects o f prior exposure and age on surgical decisions 
As these experiments are the first to study framing effects in decisions to recommend 
or reject ‘normalising’ genital surgeries and found that people were significantly less 
likely to recommend surgery than in Trader’s model, I investigated whether 
participant recommendations were affected by other factors such as prior exposure or 
age. No participants reported prior exposure to the seven distinct genital 
configurations depicted in Trader’s diagram or the exact diagrams used in this study. 
Six participants in the ffee-sort control condition, 8 participants in the binarising 
condition, and 5 participants in the pathologising condition reported prior exposure 
to information about infant genitals that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’. A Mann- 
Whitney U test was conducted to evaluate whether prior exposure to genital 
configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ had an effect on participants’ 
decisions to recommend surgery. There was no statistically significant association 
between prior exposure to these genital configurations and total recommendations for 
surgery for all seven images {p = 1.00) or for the five Trader Stages I-V images {p 
= .962).
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to determine whether prior exposure to 
the practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries had an effect on 
participants’ decisions to recommend surgery across all seven images and for the 
Trader Stages I-V images. There was no statistically significant association between 
prior exposure to the practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries and 
total recommendations for surgery for all seven images (p = .610) or for the five 
Trader Stages I-V images {p = .514).
To evaluate whether age affected participants’ surgical decisions, I calculated 
the bivariate correlation using Tearson’s r. There was no statistically significant 
correlation between age (M= 19.43, *50 = .99) and total recommendations for 
surgery across all seven images (M= 1.59, *50 = 1.04), r (36) = -.18, jr? = .297, or for 
the five Trader Stages I-V images (M= 1.54, *50 = .99), r (36) = -.16,p  = .342.
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[4.2.2.6] Effects o f prior exposure and age on confidence in surgical decision 
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to evaluate whether prior exposure to genital 
configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ or prior exposure to medically 
unnecessary infant genital surgeries had an effect on participants’ confidence in 
surgical decision to recommend surgery. There was no statistically significant 
association between prior exposure to these genital configurations and confidence 
when deciding to recommend surgery {p = .077) or between prior exposure to 
medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries and confidence in surgical decision to 
recommend surgery (p = .386).
To evaluate whether age affected confidence in surgical decision to 
recommend surgery (M= 4.36, SD = 1.58), I calculated the bivariate correlation 
using Pearson’s r. There was no statistically significant correlation between age and 
confidence in surgical decision to recommend surgery, r (36) = -.004,/» = .982.
[4.2.2.7] Effects o f prior exposure and age on surgical confidence when rejecting 
surgery
Mann-Whitney U tests were conducted to evaluate whether prior exposure to genital 
configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ or prior exposure to medically 
unnecessary infant genital surgeries had an effect on confidence in surgical decision 
to reject surgeiy. There was no statistically significant association between 
confidence in surgical decision to reject surgery and prior exposure to genital 
configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ {p = .648) or prior exposure to 
medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries {p = .386).
To evaluate whether age affected confidence in surgical decision to reject 
surgery, I calculated bivariate correlations using Spearman’s rho. There was no 
statistically significant association between age and mean confidence in surgical 
decision to reject surgery {rho = -.24, p  = .148). Age did not affect people’s 
confidence in their surgical decisions.
The finding that people recommend surgery less than medical professionals 
was consistent across the sample. People’s recommendations for surgery and their
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confidence in their surgical decisions to recommend or reject surgery did not vary 
significantly by age group, by prior exposure to genital configurations that are not 
strictly ‘male’ or ‘female’, or by prior exposure to the practice of medically 
unnecessary infant genital surgeries.
[4,23] Discussion
Current mainstream medical guidelines recommend medically unnecessary 
‘normalising’ surgeries for all five Prader Stages I-V genitals. These surgeries are 
often justified based on medical professionals’ views of society’s ideal genitals. This 
study found that laypeople were less likely than medical professionals to recommend 
surgery for Prader Stages I-V genitals. This finding challenges psychological and 
medical practitioners’ claims that their recommendations for ‘normalising’ intersex 
infants’ genital surgeries reflect society’s ideals. This finding also undermines 
medical claims that ‘normalising’ genital surgeries based on psychosocial rationales 
are justified due to laypeople’s purported inability to accept intersex people.
In this experiment, linguistic framing did not significantly affect participants’ 
surgical decisions or confidence in their surgical decisions to recommend or reject 
‘normalising’ surgery. Despite Brooks et al.’s (2000) finding that verbal descriptions 
can alter the perceptions and diagnostic evaluations of medical students and experts, 
the verbal descriptions in Experiment 1 did not increase people’s conformity to 
Trader’s diagnostic model for determining whether to recommend or reject surgery. 
Previous researchers have documented that people appear to consent to or 
recommend ‘normalising’ surgery much more frequently in medical environments 
than in my study (e.g., Liao & Simmonds, 2014; Karkazis, 2008; Reiner & Gearhart, 
2004; Streuli et al., 2013). This contrast suggests that environmental factors may 
influence people’s decisions about ‘normalising’ surgery.
One possible explanation for the discrepancy between the low number of 
recommendations for surgery in this study and the high numbers of recommendations 
for surgery in medical practice is the visual framing. Participants in this study viewed 
individual genital images from the lower row of Trader’s diagram without the 
pathologising text or binarising order used in medical contexts. Although people do 
not appear to agree with the medical practice of enforcing a two-sex model, this
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study only examined the verbal form of linguistic framing. The lack of condition 
effects in this study suggests that people’s decisions to recommend ‘normalising’ 
surgery may be influenced by other forms of framing, such as the text and ordering 
of images used in Trader’s diagram. The psychological representation of bodies 
mapped in the ordered Trader’s diagram may be more likely to invoke the 
psychophysical errors described by Arkes (1991), which are likely to be artefacts of 
cisgenderist ideology and not a priori biological processes. A second study with 
participants from a wider age distribution was conducted to evaluate whether 
Trader’s diagram without any text and Trader’s diagram with accompanying text 
would promote agreement with a two-sex model that pathologises intersex people’s 
bodies and to explore whether the use of text and ordered images that communicate 
this model would promote ‘normalising’ infant genital surgeries.
[4.23.1] Limitations and directions for future research
The use of Trader’s (1954) line-drawing diagram in this study reflects the enduring 
ecological validity of this diagram in determinations by medical professionals. 
However, more detailed and direct representations of infant genitals in visual media, 
such as photographs and audiovisual content, may have greater ecological validity 
for the investigation of decisions made by parents rather than by medical 
professionals. As Streuli et al.’s (2013) findings suggest, informational content can 
influence parents’ decisions to recommend or reject ‘normalising’ surgery for 
intersex infants. Potential limitations of this study include the use of an 
undergraduate university sample rather than participants who are or will soon be 
actual parents (a similar limitation of Streuli et al.’s sample); the small sample size; 
the use of Trader’s diagram, which is a static line drawing, instead of more detailed 
and life-like visual representations such as photographs; the use of static versus 
moving media such as videos; and the focus on surgical decisions rather than 
descriptive explanations of participants’ rationale for their surgical decisions. 
Although I had initially intended to use a geographically diverse sample of 
prospective parents, this was not possible due to logistical constraints. The use of an 
undergraduate university sample in Experiment 1 may limit the applicability of the 
findings to decision-making contexts that involve new parents. Future research 
should use a sample of prospective parents drawn from diverse ages, cultural
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backgrounds, and geographical regions. It will also be important to conduct research 
with a larger sample size to further evaluate the extent to which the findings of this 
study can be generalised to the population at large. In Experiment 2 ,1 recruited a 
more culturally diverse sample that included undergraduate and postgraduate 
students, who ranged in age fi*om 21-64.
[4.3] Experiment 2
Experiment 2 tested whether exposure to the genital images in Trader’s diagram and 
accompanying text would affect people’s surgical decisions about normalising infant 
genital surgery and their confidence in their surgical decisions. All participants 
received the pathologising verbal instruction from Experiment 1, but each of the 
three experimental groups received a different visual communication. One group of 
participants received the same laminated cards used in Experiment 1. These cards 
each contained one image from Trader’s diagram, without the original ordering or 
accompanying text. A second group received Trader’s diagram with the original 
ordering of images, but without the accompanying text (see Figure 4). The third 
group of participants received Trader’s diagram with both the original ordering of 
images and the accompanying text (see Figure 5). Note that some participants wrote 
‘ND’ for ‘Not Disordered’ or ‘D’ for ‘Disordered’ instead of writing out the full 
words each time.
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Figure 4. Completed participant sheet for diagram only condition.
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Figure 5. Completed participant sheet for diagram with text condition.
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The diagram only and diagram with text conditions were evaluated against a 
control condition in which participants did not receive any text or ordering of images. 
In this condition, as in the free-sort control condition in Experiment 1, participants 
received each of the seven images face-down on laminated cards and were asked to 
sort the images prior to making surgical decisions. This experiment evaluated 
whether participants who received the framing diagram only or diagram with text 
framing would be more or less likely to recommend surgery than current normative 
medical practice (per Trader’s aforementioned 1954 model) and more or less 
confident in their decisions to recommend or reject normalising surgery. Based on 
the results of Experiment 1 ,1 predicted that participants across all conditions would 
classify fewer bodies as disordered and recommend surgery for fewer bodies than 
current normative medical practice (Karkazis, 2008; Yankovic et al., 2013) that 
adheres to Trader’s (1954) classification of Prader Stages I-V bodies as disordered 
and in need of normalising surgery.
In Experiment 1, the images of infant genitals were not placed within an 
ordered scale from least to most “virilised” or mapped according to ‘psychology’s 
essentialist views about maleness and femaleness’ (Unger, 1993, p. 212). In contrast, 
the androcentric mapping from Trader’s (1954) diagram was used to frame visual 
information in the diagram only and diagram with text conditions in Experiment 2. 
Based on this difference in overall framing between Experiment 1 and Experiment 2,
I predicted that people across all conditions would be more likely to recommend 
surgical intervention in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1.
Trader’s Normal Female and Trader’s Normal Male, the bodies that are 
considered ‘normal’ in Trader’s model and used as the standard of comparison for 
determining which bodies are disordered and which need surgery. I predicted that 
framing could lead people to classify these ‘normal’ bodies as disordered and to 
recommend surgery for these ‘normal’ bodies. Genitals that are more typically 
female, or gynic, are often characterised on terms of their deficiencies in comparison 
to typically male, or phallic, genitals (e.g.. Money, 1994). Based on this phallocentric 
norm, I predicted that people would be more likely to classify gynic bodies as
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disordered than phallic bodies, and that people would be more likely to recommend 
surgical intervention for gynic bodies than for phallic bodies.
[4.3.1] Method
[43.1.1] Participants
All participants (N= 36) were students recruited from the University of Surrey. 
Participant ages ranged from 21-64 (M= 28.31, Mdn = 25, SD = 9.47); one 
participant did not provide an exact age (‘40+’). Most participants were PhD level 
students {n = 23, 63.89%). Ten participants were MSc students (27.78%), two were 
undergraduate students (5.56%), and one participant (2.78%) did not specify an 
educational level. Participants were students in a variety of disciplines that included 
cognitive neuroscience, English, music, psychology (various fields), sociology, and 
unspecified. Due to ethical considerations about the privacy of the two participants 
who volunteered personal narratives following completion of this experiment (see 
Appendices M-N), I have omitted further details about student disciplinary 
affiliations.
Most participants described their genders as women, female, and/or feminine 
{n = 28, 77.8%). Eight participants (22.2%) described themselves as men or male. 
Most participants {n = 24, 66.67%) identified as some variety of white and/or 
Caucasian (e.g., ‘White British’, ‘white western European’, ‘Caucasian, White’, etc,). 
Three participants (8.33%) identified as Thai, Indian, or Asian Punjabi (Indian), 
respectively. Three participants (8.33%) identified as having multiple ethnicities; 
these participants described themselves as ‘both British and Greek’, ‘European and 
Spanish, Celtic’, and ‘half English half Turkish’, respectively. Of the remaining six 
participants (16.67%), two participants identified simply as ‘British’, and the 
remaining four participants identified as ‘German’, ‘Greek-Orthodox’, ‘middle 
European’, and ‘proud, glorious’, respectively. Most participants reported having 
‘British’, ‘English’, or UK citizenship {n = 24, 66.67%); three of these participants 
also reported dual citizenship with Greece, Turkey, and the United States, 
respectively. Two participants reported having Cypriot citizenship (5.56%), two 
reported Spanish citizenship (5.56%), and the remaining eight participants reported 
having Austrian, Belgian, Dutch, German, German and French, Hungarian and
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Russian, Malaysian, and Thai citizenship, respectively. All participants reported 
fluency in English language. Sixteen participants (44.44%) listed fluency in one to 
four additional languages. Four participants reported fluency in German (11.11%), 
four in French (11.11%), three in Greek (8.33%), two in Flemish/Dutch (5.56%), two 
in Russian (5.56%), two in Spanish (5.56%), and one each in Galician, Hungarian, 
Italian, Malay, Maori, Punjabi, Tamil, Thai, and Turkish.
[4.3.1.2] Design
This study used a between-participants design to evaluate the effects of the 
categorical independent variable framing type on the continuous dependent variables 
extent of pathologising, surgical decision and confidence in surgical decision. All 
participants received the same pathologising verbal communication used in 
Experiment 1.
[4.3.1.3] Measures
[4.3.1.3.1] Independent variable
The independent categorical variable of Framing Type (the experimental condition) 
had three levels: A free-sort control condition in which participants received a 
pathologising verbal instruction and viewed each of the seven Trader’s (1954) 
images on a laminated card and sorted the cards {n = 12); a diagram only condition 
in which participants received a pathologising verbal instruction and viewed the 
lower row of Trader’s (1954) diagram with the seven infant genital configurations 
ordered from left to right, from least to most phallic {n =12); and a diagram with text 
condition in which participants received a pathologising verbal instruction and 
viewed the same Trader’s diagram alongside Trader’s pathologising labels and 
descriptions for these genitals {n = 12).
[4.3.1.3.2] Dependent variables
The three dependent variables of surgical decision and confidence in surgical 
decision were calculated in the same way as in Experiment 1. A third variable, extent 
o f pathologising, was added.
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Surgical decision was a categorical variable with 1 = recommend surgery and 0 
= reject surgery; and confidence in surgical decision was a continuous variable 
defined by participants’ rating of their confidence in their judgement to recommend 
or reject surgical intervention on a Likert scale of 1-7, with 1 = not at all and 7 = 
completely.
Confidence in surgical decision was computed on a 15-point scale for each 
image by treating surgical confidence ratings as positive or negative values, 
depending on whether participants did or did not recommend surgery. For example, a 
participant who did not recommend surgery for Prader Stage IV and rated their 
surgical confidence as +5 would be coded as -5. A score of -7 for confidence in 
recommending surgery would indicate that a participant was completely confident in 
not recommending surgery, and a score of +7 would indicate that a participant was 
completely confident in recommending surgery. One participant indicated that they 
were (7) completely confident that they were not sure whether to recommend surgery. 
This response was coded as 0 to reflect a ‘complete’ midpoint between -7 and +7.
To measure extent of pathologising, participant ratings of the extent to which 
they considered each body as ‘disordered’ were computed for each image by treating 
category fit ratings as positive or negative values, depending on whether participants 
classified an image as disordered or ‘not disordered, respectively. For example, a 
participant who classified Trader’s Normal Female as not disordered and rated the 
image as fitting the participant-designated category 5 on the seven-point scale would 
be coded as -5. A score of -7 for extent of disorder rating would indicate that a 
participant designated the image as completely fitting the category of ‘not 
disordered’, and a score of 7 would indicate that a participant designated the image 
as completely fitting the category of ‘disordered’.
[4.3.1.4] Materials and procedure
Students were recruited via the SONA system. University email lists, Facebook posts, 
and through word-of-mouth. The recruitment text stated only that the study would 
involve ‘medical diagrams of babies’ bodies’. Participants were randomly assigned 
to one of the three experimental conditions.
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Participants were provided with the information sheet and consent form prior 
to the start of the experiment. These documents specified that the experiment would 
involve viewing medical diagrams of infant genitals. After participants completed the 
consent form, all participants received a pathologising verbal communication: “Some 
children’s bodies are disordered and others are not. Sort these images into those that 
are and are not disordered”. Participants in each condition received different visual 
framing. In the free-sort control condition, participants were asked to sort and label 
each of the seven laminated cards used in Experiment 1; these images were not 
ordered or labelled for participants. Participants in the diagram only condition 
received a sheet containing the external genital row from Trader’s (1954) diagram, 
which contains seven infant genital configurations ordered from left to right, from 
least to most phallic. Participants in the diagram with text condition received a sheet 
containing the external genital row from Trader’s (1954) diagram with genitals 
ordered from left to right, from least to most phallic, with Trader’s accompanying 
labels and descriptions.
First, participants were asked to classify each image as disordered or not 
disordered, and then to write their classification for each image. Participants were 
then given a diagram of a 7-point scale ranging from 1 (‘not at all’) to 7 
(‘completely’). They were asked to use this scale to rate the extent to which the body 
in each image fit the category they had assigned. Participants wrote their responses 
next to each image.
Next, participants were told, “Sometimes doctors operate on children’s bodies 
to give them a more normal appearance. Which, if any, of these children’s bodies do 
you think are in need of surgical intervention?” Participants were asked to write a 
‘yes’ or ‘no’ to recommend or reject surgical intervention for each of the seven 
images. Participants were then asked to rate their confidence in their judgement 
about surgical intervention using the aforementioned seven-point scale. The 
researcher then labelled the sheet with the participant number and photographed the 
completed responses, while participants completed a demographic questionnaire.
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Figures 3-5 contain examples of completed participant sheets for each of the three 
framing conditions.
The questionnaire began with questions about participant age, current 
educational level, nationalities, and language fluencies. Next, the questionnaire asked 
participants which term(s) they would use to describe their ethnicity, gender, 
sexuality, and biology. After providing this demographic information, the 
questionnaire asked whether participants had prior exposure (‘e.g., heard about, 
viewed, etc.’) to genital configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’, the 
seven distinct genital configurations depicted in the diagrams, the exact diagrams 
used in this study, and the practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries. 
The questionnaire then asked participants who indicated any prior exposure to 
provide a description. Following completion of the demographic questionnaire, 
participants were asked to write their best guess about the researcher’s specific 
hypothesis or hypotheses and/or research question(s) on the back of the questionnaire. 
Next, participants received a debrief sheet that explained the different ways of 
categorising infant genitals in each of the three conditions, that the images were from 
the most widely used medical diagram in the field of paediatric endocrinology, and 
that normalising infant genital surgeries do actually occur. The debrief sheet also 
provided support and advocacy resources for participants and contact information for 
the researcher and supervisor. Following the debriefing, participants were offered £5 
in cash (although several participants declined payment) and invited to provide their 
email address for future information about experimental findings; this participant list 
was not linked to any participant data obtained during the experiment. The study 
received a favourable ethical opinion from the University Ethics Committee at the 
University of Surrey. The recruitment text, information sheet, consent form, diagram 
only and diagram with text condition sheets, demographic questionnaire, and debrief 
sheet are provided in Appendices I-L.
[43,2] Results
This experiment was conducted to test whether visual framing that used Trader’s 
diagram only or Trader’s diagram with text would affect participants’ classifications 
of infant genitals as disordered, their decisions to recommend or reject surgery for
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infants with each genital configuration, and their confidence in their surgical 
decisions. I predicted that participants would classify fewer images as disordered and 
recommend surgery for fewer images than in Trader’s (1954) model followed by 
current normative medical practice. I also predicted that participant disorder 
classifications and surgical recommendations for Trader’s Normal Female and 
Trader’s Normal Male, the two ‘normal’ bodies Trader’s model uses as the standard 
of comparison to determine which bodies are disordered and which need surgery, 
would differ from Trader’s model.
Parametric tests were used for variables with z-scores <+1.96 for skewness 
and kurtosis and non-parametric tests were used for variables with z > ± 1.96 for 
skewness and kurtosis, except where otherwise specified. All comparisons between 
two groups were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 0.05 unless otherwise 
specified.
All two-group comparisons were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 
0.05. Holm’s (1979) sequential Bonferroni correction was used to determine 
significance for three-group comparisons. In such cases. Holm set significance 
at .05/3 or .017 for the most significant result, .05/2 or .025 for the second most 
significant result and .05/1 or .05 for the third most significant result. Fisher’s Exact 
p  values were used for comparisons of categorical variables where one or more cells 
had an observed value of < 10. A relation between variables was determined to be 
‘approaching significance’ i i p <  .07. Effect sizes for r-tests were evaluated based on 
Cohen’s (1988) convention (small d>  .20, medium <7> .50, and large <7> .80).
[4.3.2.1] Participants ’ vs. Prader’s (1954) classifications o f Prader Stages I- V 
bodies as disordered
In Trader’s model, Prader Stages I-V bodies are recommended for surgical 
intervention. A one-sample Mest was used to compare participants’ classifications of 
Prader Stages I-V bodies with the contemporary medical norm from Trader’s (1954) 
Stages I-V classifications {Hq. M =  5). Overall, participants rated fewer Prader Stages 
I-V bodies as disordered {M= 2.53, SD = 1.46) than Trader’s (1954) model, t (35) = - 
10.14, SEM= .24, p  < .001 (two-tailed); -1.689. Table 3 displays the frequencies
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of participants’ disorder classifications for Prader Stages I-V bodies. As shown in 
Table 3, 34 participants (94.44%) rated fewer images as ‘disordered’ than Trader’s 
(1954) model, and 17 participants (47.22%) classified between 0 and 2 of Prader 
Stages I-V genitals as disordered. Only four participants (11.12%) classified between 
4 and 5 of Trader’s Stages I-V genitals as disordered.
[43.2.2] Participants ’ vs. Prader's (1954) decisions to recommend surgery for  
Prader stages I-V, Prader’s normal female and Prader’s normal male bodies 
As the z-score for skewness was < ± 1.96 and the z-score for kurtosis was only -2.06 
for the total recommendations for surgery variable, I used a conservative parametric 
test. A one-sample t-test was used to compare participants’ surgical 
recommendations for Prader Stages I-V bodies with the contemporary medical norm 
(Karkazis, 2008), which recommends surgical intervention for all Prader Stage I-V 
bodies {Hq: M=  5). Overall, participants recommended surgery for fewer images 
than Trader’s medical model; t (35) = -15.78, M=  1.47, SEM= .22, p  < .001 (two- 
tailed); <7= -2.630. All 36 participants (100%) recommended surgery for fewer 
images than in Trader’s model (5); all 36 participants (100%) said no to surgery for 
at least one genital configuration for which surgery is routinely performed (Prader 
Stages I-V) and 14 participants (38.89%) said no to surgery for all Prader Stage I-V 
genitals.
The overall mean number of all seven bodies labelled as disordered across all 
three groups was 2.67, SD = 1.53, but the mean number of bodies for which people 
recommended surgery was 1.56, SD = 1.46. The mean number of Trader’s Stages I-V 
bodies labelled as disordered across all three groups was 2.53, SD = 1.46, but the 
mean number of Trader’s Stages bodies for which people recommended surgery was 
1.47,6'/)= 1.34.
I evaluated whether there were statistically significant differences between the 
number of bodies people rated as disordered and the number of bodies for which they 
recommended surgery. I used paired-samples t tests to test whether there were mean 
differences between the overall number of bodies labelled as disordered and the 
overall number of bodies for which people recommended surgery, and between the
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number of Trader’s Stages I-V bodies labelled as disordered and the number of 
Trader’s Stages I-V bodies for which people recommended surgery. There was a 
statistically significant difference between overall mean ratings of bodies as 
disordered and overall recommendations for surgery, /(35) = 4.73,^ < .001; <7 = 
0.789. There was also a statistically significant difference between the mean number 
of Trader’s Stages I-V bodies people rated as disordered and the mean number of 
Trader’s Stages I-V bodies for which they recommended surgery, ^(35) = 4.42, p 
< .001; d=  0.739. Across all three groups, people were significantly more likely to 
rate bodies as disordered than they were to recommend surgery for those bodies, both 
for all seven bodies overall and specifically for the Trader’s Stages I-V bodies. Thus 
even when people rated bodies as disordered, they did not necessarily recommend 
surgery. Table 3 displays the distribution of participant categorisations and surgical 
decisions for each of the seven images in Trader’s (1954) model. Classifications and 
surgical decisions that reflect most participants’ responses appear in bold.
Table 3. Participant categorisations and surgical decisions for genitals 
in Trader’s (1954) model
Image Genitals Disordered? Surgery Needed?
Yes No Yes No
Trader’s Normal Female 10
(27.78%)
26
(72.22%)
1
(2.78%)
35
(97.22%)
Prader Stage I 14
(38.89%)
22
(61.11%)
7
(19.44%)
29
(80.56%)
Prader Stage II 23
(63.89%)
13
(36.11%)
17
(47.22%)
19
(52.78%)
Prader Stage III 28
(77.78%)
8
(22.22%)
21
(58.33%)
15
(41.67%)
Prader Stage IV 11
(30.56%)
25
(69.44%)
6
(16.67%)
30
(83.33%)
Prader Stage V 5
(13.89%)
31
(86.11%)
2
(5.56%)
34
(94.44%)
Trader’s Normal Male 5
(13.89%)
31
(86.11%)
2
(5.56%)
34
(94.44%)
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As displayed in Table 3, participant categorisations of bodies as disordered or 
not disordered did not conform to Trader’s (1954) model; most participants did not 
classify Prader Stages I, IV, or V as disordered. Participant disorder ratings increased 
the more an image differed from the polar ends represented by Trader’s Normal 
Female and Trader’s Normal Male, rather than by increasing visual similarity to 
Trader’s Normal Male, as was the case in Trader’s model.
Similarly, participant recommendations for surgery did not increase as images 
became more similar in visual appearance to Trader’s Normal Male, as in Trader’s 
model (which treats the numbered Prader Stage bodies as increasingly disordered by 
increasing Stage number), but increased the more an image differed from the polar 
ends represented by Trader’s Normal Female and Trader’s Normal Male. Most 
participants rejected surgery for Prader Stages I, II, IV, and V. Only Prader Stages II 
and III were categorised as disordered by most participants, and Prader Stage III was 
the only body for which a majority of participants recommended surgery. For all 
images, fewer participants who classified genitals as disordered recommended 
surgery for those genitals. Pearson’s bivariate correlations were calculated to 
evaluate the relation between the total number of diagrams labelled as disordered and 
the total number of diagrams for which participants recommended surgery. There 
was a statistically significant correlation between disorder classifications and 
recommendations for surgery, r = .557, p  < .001.
As displayed in Table 3, for all bodies, participants recommended surgery for 
fewer genitals than they designated as disordered. Although most participants 
classified Prader Stages II and III as disordered, six of the 23 participants who 
classified Prader Stage II as disordered (26.09%) rejected surgery for this image, and 
seven of the 28 participants who classified Prader Stage III as disordered (25%) 
rejected surgery for that image. Trader’s Nonnal Female and Trader’s Normal Male 
are used as the standard of comparison for determining which bodies are disordered 
and which bodies need surgery. Trader’s Normal Female and Trader’s Nonnal Male 
not classified as disordered or recommended for surgeiy in Trader’s model. Some 
participants’ detenninations about Trader’s Normal Female and Trader’s Normal 
Male differed from Trader’s model. Ten participants (27.78%) designated Trader’s
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Normal Female as disordered and one recommended surgery; in contrast, only five 
participants (13.89%) designated Trader’s Normal Male as disordered and two 
(5.56%) recommended surgery.
[4.3.23] Effects offraming type on the number o f Prader stages I-V classified as 
disordered
I tested whether framing had a significant effect on the number of Trader Stages I-V 
bodies people classified as disordered. As some cell frequencies were below ten, 
Fisher’s Exact (3x2) tests were used to test the effect of framing type on 
classifications as disordered. Framing did not have a statistically significant effect 
overall on classifications as disordered for Trader Stages I-V bodies, Fisher’s Exactp  
-  .320. Next, I test whether framing type had a significant effect on disorder 
classifications for each of the Trader Stages I-V bodies. As some cell frequencies 
were below ten, Fisher’s Exact (3x2) tests were used to test the effect offraming type 
on each of the Trader Stages I-V bodies. Framing type did not have a statistically 
significant difference effect on classifications as disordered for Trader Stages I-III or 
V, all Fisher’s Exactp  > .320. The relation between framing type and classification 
as disordered for Trader Stage IV approached significance, Fisher’s Exactp  = .055. 
More participants in the diagram with text condition classified Trader Stage IV as 
disordered {n = 7, 58.33%) than in either the diagram only or free-sort control 
conditions (both « = 2, 16.67%).
[4.3.2.4] Effects offraming type on classifications ofPrader’s normal female and 
Prader’s normal male as disordered
I tested whether framing had a significant effect on disorder classifications of 
Trader’s Normal Female and Trader’s Nonnal Male. Due to actual cell frequencies 
below ten, Fisher’s Exact tests were conducted to determine whether framing type 
had an effect on classifications as disordered for Trader’s Normal Female and 
Trader’s Normal Male. Framing type had a statistically significant effect on disorder 
classifications of Trader’s Normal Female, Fisher’s Exact p  = .002, but not on 
disorder classifications of Trader’s Normal Male, Fisher’s Exact j!? = 1.0. Eight of the 
12 participants in the free-sort control condition (66.67%) classified Trader’s Normal 
Female as disordered, in contrast to only one participant out of 12 in the diagram
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only (8.33%) and diagram with text conditions (8.33%). In the free-sort control 
condition, more participants rated Trader’s Normal Female as disordered than Trader 
Stages I (M = 7), II {n = 7), IV (/? = 2), or V (w = 1). Figure 6 illustrates differences 
between disorder classifications for Trader’s Normal Female and Trader Stage IV by 
fram ing type.
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Figure 6. Disorder classifications of all seven bodies in Trader’s model by framing 
type.
To further investigate this finding, 1 computed two new ordinal variables that 
calculated the aggregated number of disorder classifications for Trader’s Normal 
Female, Trader Stage I and Trader Stage II as gymic disorder classifications and the 
aggregated number of disorder classifications for Trader Stage IV, Trader Stage V 
and Trader’s Nonnal Male as phallic disorder classifications. 1 used a related- 
samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank test to test whether there were statistically 
significant differences between the mean gynic disorder classifications and phallic  
disorder classifications overall and hy fram ing type. Overall, there were statistically 
significant differences between means for gynic disorder classifications {M  = 1.31,
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SD = .95) and phallic disorder classifications (M= .58, SD = .81),/» = .001. Across 
all three groups, people rated gynic bodies as more disordered than phallic bodies.
Next, I explored whether people would recommend surgery more often for 
gynic bodies than for phallic bodies. I used a related-samples Wilcoxon Signed Rank 
test to test whether there were statistically significant differences between gynic 
recommendations for surgery (M= .69, SD ~  .82) and phallic recommendations for  
surgeiy (M= .28, SD = .66) overall and by framing type. There were statistically 
significant differences between means for gynic recommendations fo r  surgery and 
phallic recommendations for surgery, p  = .014. Across all three groups, people 
recommended surgery for more gynic bodies than for phallic ones, but most people 
did not recommend surgery for either gynic or phallic bodies.
[4.3.2.5] Confidence in surgical decisions to recommend or reject surgery
I tested whether people were more confident in their surgical decisions when they 
recommended surgery or when they rejected surgery and whether confidence in 
surgical decisions varied by framing type. A one-way ANOVA was conducted to 
determine whether participants’ surgical confidence when recommending surgery 
varied by framing type. There was no statistically significant difference by framing 
type for surgical confidence in decisions to recommend surgery, F  (2, 19) = .18,/>
= .838. Overall, participants were more confident when they rejected surgery (M = 
5.21, SD = 1.50) than when they recommended surgery (M= 3.73, SD = 1.81).
[4.3.2.6] Effects offraming type on surgical decisions for Prader stages I-V bodies 
I evaluated whether framing type affected people’s surgical decisions for Prader 
Stages I-V bodies. Fisher’s Exact tests (3x2) were used to evaluate whether there 
were statistically significant differences in surgical decisions for Prader Stages I-V 
bodies between each pair of experimental conditions. There were no statistically 
significant differences in surgical decisions for Prader Stages I-V bodies by 
experimental condition, all/> > .150. Fisher’s Exact could not be calculated for 
Prader Stage 5 pairs due to frequency of 0 for participants who recommended 
surgery in the free-sort control condition. Most participants across all three
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conditions rejected surgery for Prader Stage V; there were no observed differences 
between pairs of conditions.
[43.2.7] Effects offraming type on surgical confidence for Prader Stages I-V bodies 
Omnibus Kruskal-Wallis tests were performed to evaluate whether confidence in 
surgical decision for Prader Stages I-V bodies varied by framing type. There were no 
statistically significant variations in surgical confidence across experimental 
conditions for Prader Stages, all > .100.
[4 3 3 ]  Discussion
In Chapter 4 ,1 found that Prader’s (1954) model with disorder classifications and 
recommendations for normalising infant genital surgery did not reflect how 
laypeople classify intersex infants’ genitals. Medical professionals who apply 
Prader’s model are significantly more likely to recommend infant genital normalising 
surgery than are laypeople. In Experiment 1 ,1 found linguistic framing of 
cisgenderist ideology did not have a statistically significant impact on laypeople’s 
recommendations for surgery or their confidence in their decisions to recommend or 
reject infant genital surgery. Participants were significantly more confident in their 
decisions when they rejected infant genital surgery than when they recommended it. 
Linguistic framing affected category fit ratings for Prader Stage V and Prader’s 
Normal Male. Prior exposure and age did not affect people’s surgical decisions to 
recommend or reject surgeiy, their confidence in their surgical decisions.
In Experiment 2, participants across all groups rated fewer images as 
disordered than did Prader’s model. Overall, participants recommended surgery for 
fewer bodies than in Prader’s model, and no participants recommended surgery for as 
many bodies as Prader’s model. Even when participants classified bodies as 
disordered, they did not necessarily recommend surgery. Across all three groups, 
participants were significantly more likely to classify bodies as disordered than they 
were to recommend surgery, both for all seven bodies and for only the Prader’s 
Stages I-V bodies. Most participants did not classify Prader Stages I, IV, or V as 
disordered. Participant disorder ratings and recommendations for surgery increased 
the more a body differed from the polar ends represented by Prader’s Normal Female
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and Prader’s Normal Male, as in the two-sex model described by Laqueur (1990), 
rather than by increasing visual similarity to Prader’s Normal Male, as in Prader’s 
(1954) model. Prader Stages II and III were the only bodies categorised as disordered 
by most participants, and Prader Stage III was the only body for which a majority of 
participants recommended surgery. Framing type had a statistically significant effect 
on disorder classifications of Prader’s Normal Female, but not on disorder 
classifications of Prader’s Normal Male. Most of the control participants classified 
Prader’s Normal Female as disordered, in contrast to only one in the diagram only 
and diagram with text conditions. In the free-sort control condition, more 
participants rated Prader’s Normal Female as disordered than Prader Stages I, II, IV, 
or V. Across all three groups, people rated gynic bodies as more disordered than 
phallic ones, and recommended surgery for more gynic bodies than for phallic ones; 
however, most people did not recommend surgery for either gynic or phallic bodies.
Although all participants in Experiment 2 received pathologising verbal 
instructions, all but two participants classified fewer Prader Stages I-V genitals as 
disordered than the mainstream medical model. As in Experiment 1, current 
mainstream medical guidelines recommend ‘normalising’ surgeries for more Prader 
Stages I-V genitals than did all laypeople. These findings provide further evidence 
against mainstream psychological and medical practitioners’ claims that their 
recommendations for ‘normalising’ intersex infant genital surgeries reflect society’s 
ideals.
Visual framing had a statistically significant effect on disorder classifications 
of Prader’s Normal Female and Prader Stage IV, but not on disorder classifications 
for any other bodies. Visual framing did not have a statistically significant effect on 
participants’ surgical decisions or surgical confidence for any images. However, 
there were interesting patterns in disorder classifications across each of the three 
experimental groups (see Figure 6). In the free-sort control group, each of the gynic 
bodies was classified as disordered by over half of the group. In contrast, fewer than 
20% of free-sort control participants classified the phallic bodies as disordered. In the 
diagram only group, disorder classifications were lowest at the extremes of Prader’s 
Normal Female and Prader’s Normal Male, with the percentage of participant
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disorder ratings increasing towards the centre image for gynic bodies but remaining 
consistently low for phallic bodies. In the diagram with text group, the percentage of 
disorder classifications was identical to the diagram only condition for all bodies 
except for Prader Stage I and Prader Stage IV. Thus the ordering of images and not 
the text effectively changed people’s classification of Prader’s Normal Female, 
Prader Stage II, Prader Stage III, Prader Stage V, and Prader’s Normal Male. For 
Prader Stage I, the diagram with text group had a slightly lower percentage of 
disorder ratings than the diagram only group. For Prader Stage IV, disorder 
classifications were identical for the free-sort and diagram only groups, and 
substantially higher for the diagram with text condition.
These findings document the existence of a societal norm that treats phallic 
genitals such as Prader Stages IV and V and Prader’s Normal Male as ideal and 
gynic genitals such as Prader’s Normal Female and Prader’s Stages I and II as less 
than ideal. However, even when people classified genitals as disordered, they often 
rejected surgical intervention.
[4.33.1] Limitations and directions fo r  future research
As in Experiment 1, the use of Prader’s (1954) line-drawing diagram in this study 
reflects the enduring ecological validity of this diagram in determinations by medical 
professionals. However, more detailed and direct representations of infant genitals in 
visual media, such as photographs and audiovisual content, may have greater 
ecological validity for the investigation of decisions made by parents rather than by 
medical professionals. As Streuli et al.’s (2013) findings suggest, informational 
content in video format can influence parents’ decisions to recommend or reject 
“normalising” surgery for intersex infants. Potential limitations of this study include 
the use of a university-based sample rather than participants selected from the 
general population; the small sample size; the use of Prader’s diagram, which is a 
static line drawing, instead of more detailed and life-like visual representations such 
as photographs; the use of static versus moving media such as videos; and the focus 
on surgical decisions rather than descriptive explanations of participants’ rationale 
for their surgical decisions. Although I had initially intended to use a geographically 
diverse sample of prospective parents, this was not possible due to logistical
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constraints. Experiment 2 used a more culturally diverse sample that included 
undergraduate and postgraduate students, who ranged in age from 21-64. The more 
diverse age range may contribute to findings that are more applicable to decision­
making contexts that involve new parents. However, the participants in Experiment 2 
were hypothetical parents, as in Streuli et al.’s (2013) study. Future research should 
use a sample of actual or prospective parents drawn from diverse ages, cultural 
backgrounds, and geographical regions. It will also be important to conduct research 
with a larger sample size to further evaluate the extent to which the findings of this 
study can be generalised to the population at large.
[4.4] General discussion of experimental findings
Prader’s (1954) mainstream medical model classifies more infant genital 
configurations as disordered than do laypeople. Prader’s model also recommends 
surgery for more infant genital configurations than do laypeople. This finding raises 
questions about the medical rationale that normalising intersex infants’ genitals is 
necessary for parents to accept their children. Lee et al. (2006) noted the lack of 
systematic evidence to support claims by some medical professionals that infant 
genital ‘normalising’ surgeries will improve parent-child attachment and reduce 
parental distress. Many professionals continue to perform normalising surgeries 
during the first year of life for infants with Prader Stages I and II bodies. Even those 
who disagree such as Lee et al. recommend these surgeries for infants with Prader 
Stages III-V bodies.
In current normative medical practice, Prader Stages I-V genitals are surgically 
altered to appear as Prader’s Normal Female, with Prader Stages III-V surgeries 
typically occurring in the first year of life. The mainstream medical ideal for ‘normal 
female’ genital anatomy contrasts with the majority of laypeople’s ideal. The finding 
that most participants in the free-sort control condition classified Prader’s Normal 
Female as disordered indicates that ‘normalising’ genital surgeries that feminise 
intersex infants’ genitals do not actually succeed in creating genitals that appear 
‘normal’ to laypeople.
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The finding in Experiment 2 that fewer participants who viewed Prader’s 
(1954) diagram without text viewed Prader’s Normal Female as disordered suggests 
that visual framing can be used to reduce pathologising views of infant genital 
variations. In the context of a society that recognises the two-sex binary model of 
human biology, a diagram with Prader’s non-phallic ‘Normal Female’ to the far left 
and Prader’s phallic ‘Normal Male’ anchored Prader’s Normal Female at one of the 
‘normal’ poles that would be familiar to participants. My finding that participants’ 
ratings of images as disordered and their recommendations for surgery increased in 
the diagram only and diagram with text conditions the more distal the location was 
from the ‘normal’ poles lends support for this interpretation.
The finding in Experiment 2 that significantly more participants in the diagram 
with text condition viewed Prader Stage IV as disordered than in either of the other 
two conditions illustrates that pathologising text can increase people’s classifications 
of genitals as disordered. The finding that more people recommended surgery overall 
in Experiment 2, in which all groups received a pathologising verbal instruction, than 
in Experiment 1, in which only one group received a pathologising verbal instruction, 
may suggest that verbal instructions may play a greater role in communicating 
cisgenderist ideology than the results of the cross-group comparisons in Experiment 
1 would suggest. Future research will be needed regarding the extent to which verbal 
instructions, schematic diagrams, textual descriptions, and permutations of these 
three variables can affect people’s disorder classifications and decisions to 
recommend or reject ‘normalising’ surgery.
Given that all participants received pathologising verbal communication in 
Experiment 2, the variation by visual framing for Prader’s Normal Female and 
Prader Stage IV suggests that visual communication can have greater influence on 
people’s acceptance of pathologising cisgenderist ideology than verbal instructions. 
Medical practitioners who avoid using pathologising verbal language with patients 
and their families still rely on cisgenderist visual rhetoric in the form of medical 
diagrams and textual labels and descriptions. Discriminatory ideology communicated 
by these forms of visual infonnation will need to be addressed before medical 
practice can focus on ethical principles such as patients’ best interests.
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Experiment 2 found that people respond differently to gynic genital images 
than to phallic ones. People are more likely to classify gynic genitals as disordered. 
People are also more likely to recommend surgery for gynic genitals than for phallic 
genitals. A primary rationale used in the medical profession for the standard practice 
of ‘normalising’ infant genitals through ‘feminising’ genital surgery is the result of a 
more ‘normal’ appearance that fits societal ideals. Findings of the current study 
suggest that medical professionals and laypeople do not agree on what constitutes a 
‘normal’ genital ideal. Whereas medical professionals who follow Prader’s model 
characterise disorder by increasing similarity to phallic genitals, results of this study 
suggest that laypeople classify disorder both by decreased similarity to either of two 
binarised male and female genital norms and as associated with more gynic rather 
than phallic genitals. These findings demonstrate the ideological and non-inevitable 
nature of binarising and pathologising classifications of infant genitals. Contrary to 
Lacqueur’s (1990) claim that the one-sex model that predominated to the 1850s has 
been fully supplanted, these experiments document the continued presence of 
competing and malleable sex ideology: Although participants rated bodies as 
increasingly disordered the farther away they were positioned from the Prader’s 
‘Normal’ poles (as in a two-sex model), they also rated gynic bodies as more 
disordered than phallic bodies (as in the one-sex model that treats ‘females’ as 
‘imperfect males’). These findings highlight the potential that a bricoleur’s 
recognition of multilinear sex ideologies can have for efforts to challenge the 
presumption of ‘sex’ as a stable and ideologically neutral scientific variable. The 
finding in Experiment 2 that people are more likely to recommend ‘normalising’ 
surgery for gynic bodies than for phallic ones suggests the continued function of the 
‘female as disordered male’ component of the one-sex model. The one-dimensional 
scale used in Prader’s model appears to successfully reframe the relation between 
‘normal’ and ‘disordered’ bodies from that of a one-sex model to that of a two-sex 
model.
These experiments did not involve the emotional content or sense of urgency 
that characterise actual experiences of these medical decisions. People may be more 
likely to defer to medical professionals’ recommendations for surgery during high- 
stakes medical situations such as those involved in making permanent decisions
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about infant genitals. In addition, these experiments used a medical diagram rather 
than more life-like images such as photographs. Although the use of realistic images 
may have evoked greater hesitancy to classify bodies as disordered or to recommend 
surgery, my use of Prader’s images is consistent with Garfinkel’s (1967) analysis of 
biological attributes as insignias of gender/sex. The ideological influence of these 
insignias in medical contexts may be a direct result of their impersonality and their 
depiction of body parts without accompanying faces to humanise them.
[4.5] Participant narratives
According to Spears and Smith (2001), experiments are often constructed as 
‘alienating paradigms of power that deny participants a voice’ (ibid., p. 326). One 
risk of my use of experimental method was that I would impose experimental 
constraints that limited the ability of my participants to respond to the experimental 
situation beyond the frames imposed by my use of Prader’s diagram. Readers of the 
medical literature on intersex people might assume that direct experience with people 
who have bodies that are not recognised by current medical norms is extremely rare 
and does not occur outside of clinical settings, yet existing statistics may 
underestimate people’s exposure to such phenomena. Following completion of the 
experiment, two participants shared their relevant personal experiences via email. 
Pseudonyms will be used for both participants to protect their privacy, and all 
personally identifying information has been removed. Both participants also gave 
written consent for their narratives to be used in my work, and both were informed 
that they could withdraw consent at any time in the future without adverse 
consequences.
Robert described an experience of having an undescended testicle and Lucy 
described having worked as a researcher for a longitudinal study of children with 
CAH and their siblings in a large European city. Both personal narratives (see 
Appendices M-N) illustrate several points relevant to the empirical findings of 
Experiments 1 and 2: First, decisions about surgery are often made quickly and 
without sufficient relevant information that people may want or need. Second, 
necessary relevant information can be unavailable to people, and there is a lack of 
accessible support and educational services for people, their families, and their peers.
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Third, ’normalising’ surgeries do not necessarily result in improvements to people’s 
psychosexual and interpersonal functioning and can have very negative impact on 
people’s lives in these domains. Fourth, having one’s body treated as problematic 
can have severely negative personal and interpersonal consequences.
[4.5.1] Hasty decision-making without fully informed/aware consent
Both participants described the haste with which surgical decisions were made, 
without an emphasis on making sure people themselves had given informed consent 
for these procedures. In Lucy’s case, the procedures were done to children who were 
too young to consent and parents were often pressured to decide on their children’s 
behalf due to a combination of pressure from medical professionals and their own 
lack of knowledge. For Robert, his GP did not focus on ensuring that he was fully 
informed, but instead reassured him that the procedure was ‘nothing to worry about’. 
Robert: When I was 171 told my mother I had an undescended testicle. She 
made an appointment with our GP, and I went to see him. He was quite kind 
and relaxed, and assured me that I had nothing to worry about, and could 
have an operation if I wanted, though the operation would be purely cosmetic. 
I am not sure I really fully understood what the operation would involve but I 
said I would like to have it done. I was duly admitted to a local hospital, 
(emphasis added)
Lucy: generally I believe the decision to operate was often something that 
happened very fast for parents, meaning whether it was for a medical reason, 
or whether it was cosmetic, it was something they felt they needed to decide 
very early on either due to recommendation by medical staff or because they 
were so underexposed to disorders such as CAH that they felt ‘unseen’ 
societal pressures for the wellbeing of their child to be able to raise them as ‘a 
boy’ or ‘girl’ without any ambiguity or need for explanation further down the 
road, (emphasis added)
[4.5.2] Lack o f adequate information and support
Robert: ...my ignorance of my body and sexuality was substantial. [...] I had no idea 
what changes should be taking place in my body. [...] ... it is not so much the
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operation that has stayed with me, but the years of doubt and confusion, and total 
lack of information. [...]...as a child I would have enormously benefltted from some 
level of information about how my body would change through puberty, and 
someone to turn to when I discovered that matters were not as I thought they should 
be. I remain amazed that intelligent people, charged with professional responsibilities 
towards children, presumably thought that providing such care and information was 
unimportant. Perhaps they assumed that such matters were handled in the home. 
However, as Tolstoy remarked in Anna Karenina: 'Happy families are all alike; every 
unhappy family is unhappy in its own way.' One cannot rely on the unhappy family. 
Instead, schools, and the state, have a duty of care (emphasis added).
Lucy: I believe that there could be more done to support families with children with 
CAH as I feel that perhaps the pressures (however real or perceived) and anxieties 
felt by parents are often neglected in place of supporting the individual with CAH 
themselves. Perhaps more support for both parents and children together would lead 
to wider-society having a greater understanding or knowledge of such disorders 
meaning that cases of hasty decisions to operate at birth and issue of the individuals 
consent to gender assignment would become fewer (emphasis added).
[4.5.3] Negative consequences o f surgery
Robert: I now have a scar, of about 10 centimetres, on the upper part of my left thigh. 
It seems to me that the undescended testicle was simply cut out, another incision 
made in my scrotum, and the testicle inserted. Given the scarring, and the fact that I 
have two testicle of substantially different size, I am not sure there really has been 
much of a cosmetic improvement. In fact, I was quite self-conscious about it for 
some time, especially in my 20s when I was sexually active (emphasis added).
[4.6] Conclusion
Cisgenderism in the communication of medical information can affect decision­
making about ‘normalising’ genital surgeries, particularly when that information is 
presented through visual representations such as Prader’s (1954) schematic diagram. 
My findings in this study and the two participant narratives illustrate the profound, 
long-tenn impact that cisgenderism can have on people’s health and quality of life.
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The context of major, irreversible surgical decision-making is not the only arena in 
which cisgenderism can have adverse consequences. Even mundane and 
comparatively trivial-seeming interactions can have harmful consequences for people 
who experience gender and body delegitimisation. People’s experiences of 
cisgenderism in everyday life, and even in routine health care, do not typically 
involve their genitals. For example, recall that students readily made gender 
attributions about Magalena Ventura without having seen or read about her genitals. 
Thus I was interested in exploring questions such as whether and when gender 
attributions are based on actual or perceived genitals, how people ascribe gender in 
the absence of genital ‘insignias’ (Garfinkel, 1967) or the presence of competing 
gender-associated physical insignias, and how misgendering works in social 
interactions. In the next chapter, I aim to explore people’s self-reported experiences 
of and reactions to misgendering, to identify the perceived mechanisms and 
explanations of misgendering, and to examine whether people’s reports of the effects 
of being misgendered vary based on their own gender experiences.
179
Chapter 5
Self-Reports of Cisgenderism in Everyday Life
Chapter 5
Self-Reports of Cisgenderism in Everyday Life: Exploring the Attributes and
Consequences of Misgendering
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[5.1] Introduction
Recall that after exploring how feminist researchers (Chapter 2) and psychological 
researchers (Chapter 3) have framed people’s own designations of their bodies and 
genders, I tested how changing the ideological framing of communication about 
‘normalising’ infant genital surgeries could affect people’s decisions to recommend 
or reject such interventions (Chapter 4). In the current chapter, I continue my use of 
experimental method to test cisgenderist assumptions. I applied the ‘moving to the 
margins’ technique to shift the frame of reference in my research from within 
disciplinary boundaries (e.g., academic feminism, psychology, paediatric 
endocrinology) to a focus on people’s own reports about their experiences of being 
misgendered by others and misgendering others in their everyday lives. By focusing 
on how people understand their experiences in their own words, I aimed to integrate 
complexity and multilinearity into my developing concept of misgendering in the 
cisgenderism framework.
My approach to studying self-reports of misgendering in everyday life was 
guided by two POETs. My first POET was a conversation with a friend about my 
cisgenderism framework. In response to my explanation of cisgenderism, my friend 
L. shared a story that raised questions relevant to my work. From a young age, L. had 
been mistaken for a boy by others and called ‘he’ or ‘young man’ in public. During 
adolescence, she had yet to experience breast growth. Due to her naturally flat chest, 
L. relayed her experiences of having been frequently mistaken for a boy by others.
As a result of this misgendering, she tried to avoid social situations when possible. 
She described feeling vulnerable and uncomfortable in public due to her body not 
reflecting her identity as a woman. After years of feeling misunderstood and 
excluded as a woman, L. decided to have breast augmentation. She wanted to be seen 
as and treated as a woman in all areas of her life. She was denied financial coverage 
of this procedure by the national health insurance in her region. In time, she saved 
enough money to afford the procedure. She described her experience as 
transformative and told me how affirming she found her new body. The breast 
augmentation procedure had changed her life, she said. She now felt able to make 
new friends, to date and to be an active participant in social situations.
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I was surprised by the similarities between the experience she described and 
some of the typical narratives that are typically attributed to ‘transgender’ people 
who affirm their genders. Yet this woman would not be described as ‘trans’: she was 
classified as ‘female’ at birth based on having a stereotypically ‘female’ infant body, 
and she had self-identified as a girl or woman throughout her life. Her hairstyle, 
clothing and jewellery were consistent with a stereotypically ‘feminine’ gender 
expression. When I relayed a de-identified version of her story to friends who had 
affirmed their genders, I received reactions of disbelief that a ‘cisgender’ or ‘non- 
trans’ person could have an experience that so closely resembled that of a ‘trans’ 
person. My friend’s account challenged the widespread belief that only ‘trans’ people 
are misgendered by others and that misgendering is an experience with a singular 
permutation (e.g., ‘transgender’ person gets misgendered by ‘non-trans’ or 
‘cisgender’ person).
A second account raised questions about the absence in ‘trans’ research of 
people’s own reports of being misgendered in everyday life. In May 2010,1 attended 
a lecture by Montreal-based scholar and disability rights activist Laurence Parent 
titled “Is this city my city?: Defining publiclessness and lifting the veil on the 
normalization of the ‘regular’ Montreal citizen” at the Critical Disability Studies 
Conference: Theorising Normalcy and the Mundane in Manchester. During her talk. 
Parent described an experience that she referred to as de-gendering. Parent explained 
the policy that Montreal buses let women disembark between stops at night to take 
them directly to their destinations. Montreal bus drivers are also supposed to allow 
women who are waiting at night to board buses from locations between official stops. 
These and other related measures have been approved as part of official measures to 
increase women’s safety in and access to public spaces. Parent described her 
experience of being repeatedly left unattended at night by Montreal bus drivers, 
despite the assistance that other women routinely receive from these drivers. She 
explained that the drivers do not view her as a woman due to her use of a wheelchair 
and her physical differences from the fictional hypemormal body that is typically 
considered to be ‘normal’. As someone whose gender as a woman was delegitimised. 
Parent felt that the drivers did not see her as having the same safety concerns
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regarding the potential for sexual assault in public city spaces at night as other 
women who utilise the bus services.
These two distinct accounts highlighted for me the multilinear aspects of 
misgendering and the complexity of factors at work in people’s experiences of being 
misgendered. Both of these lived experiences of being misgendered were shared with 
me by people who would be labelled as ‘cisgender’ by others and who would not 
typically have been considered by researchers of gender delegitimisation. Both 
experiences occurred in everyday social situations. Both women described the 
significant negative consequences of having been misgendered, particularly 
regarding their limited access to public spaces. L. attributed her lifelong social 
isolation and anxiety to her experiences of being repeatedly misgendered from 
childhood through her early adult life. In Parent’s narrative, her having been 
misgendered repeatedly by Montreal bus drivers—in her words ‘de-gendered’— had 
the consequence of excluding her from public services that were available to other 
women.
Yet each of these two women’s narratives has distinct features. Whereas those 
who have misgendered L. have mischaracterised her as a ‘normal’ and ‘able-bodied 
boy’. Parent’s status as a woman who is classified as ‘disabled’ by others is a key 
factor in her experiences of everyday misgendering. L. used medical intervention 
effectively to stop her from being misgendered; this does not appear to be an option 
for Parent, who has a different set of options and resources with which she can 
address the misgendering she has continued to experience. L. discussed having been 
misgendered by her social peers and by strangers in the general public. In contrast, 
although Parent may also experience similar ‘de-gendering’ in social spaces, her 
particular narrative focused on misgendering practices by bus drivers in the context 
of their professional roles as providers of transportation services to women of the 
Montréal public.
These two experiences raised several questions relevant to my research: Who is 
misgendered in everyday life, by whom, and under which conditions? How does the 
restriction of us questions to those who are labelled as ‘trans’ limit the availability of
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self-reports of being misgendered by people who would not be classified as ‘trans’? 
What are the explanatory resources used to justify or explain misgendering of others 
and which discourses do these explanations invoke? How do people respond to the 
discovery that they have misgendered another person? How does misgendering affect 
people who are misgendered by others? How do people make sense of and respond 
to their experiences of being misgendered by others? In asking these questions, I 
sought to gather self-reported data on the multilinear and complex manifestations of 
misgendering.
[5.1,1] A core motives explanation o f misgendering
I approached my analysis by considering how psychological researchers have 
previously conceptualised and explained phenomena that I define as misgendering. 
Fiske, Haslam and Fiske (1991) and Fiske (2009) proposed five core motives for 
human social behaviour: belonging, the need to belong to relationships or groups; 
understanding, the need for shared meaning that enables people to know quickly and 
predict well enough to function in everyday life in the sense that they can adapt to 
membership in social groups and to “the shared construction of reality”; control, the 
need for perceived contingency between behaviour and outcomes; enhancing self, the 
need to view oneself as basically worthy or improvable; and trusting, the need to 
view others as basically benign (Fiske, 2009, p. 16). According to this model, 
humans are motivated by one or more of these core social motives to make 
attributional errors in their social interactions. Misgendering may be motivated by 
the need for understanding, in that accepting a shared cisgenderist worldview may 
allow people to quickly understand others, and the need for belonging, in the sense of 
feeling part of a society in which particular views about gender attribution function 
as a major component of social life.
However, the cognitive sources of misgendering may differ from those that 
facilitate other attributional errors. Fiske, Haslam, and Fiske (1991) conducted seven 
studies that found cross-cultural evidence that human social interactions may be 
organised according to combinations of four psychological models. Communal 
sharing involves treating all members of a categoiy as equivalent to each other. 
Equality matching involves noting imbalances between people, market pricing
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involves positioning people based on ratios, and authority ranking involves a linear 
hierarchy of ordering from least to most authority. In the context of ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ 
ascription, a cisgenderist framework could be described as using authority matching 
to order people by perceived gender authenticity and conformity to externally 
assigned gender categories. Fiske (1993) and Fiske et al. (1991) both found that 
people make attributional errors between people of the same gender, not between 
different genders. Misgendering, which involves misclassification of a person’s 
gender, may be better explained in terms of the core social motives of understanding 
and belonging than by the psychological model of attributional errors discussed in 
Fiske’s ‘universal’ models of human social relations. In other words, the influence of 
cisgenderist ideology appears to inform people’s social cognition and lead to 
misgendering.
[5.1.2] Kohlberg^s cognitive-developmental theory
Next, I considered Kohlberg’s (1966) cognitive developmental theory of gender 
attribution. Kohlberg believed that children move from viewing gender as a variable 
and potentially malleable category to an invariant one based on permanent biological 
characteristics. Kohlberg viewed this shift as a developmental milestone he termed 
‘gender constancy’. Kohlberg determined children’s degree of cognitive 
developmental advancement based on whether they were able to ‘correctly’ identify 
someone as ‘female’ or ‘male’. Kohlberg’s definition o f ‘cognitive development’ 
appears less related to children’s acquisition of cognitive skills and more related to 
their acceptance of particular ideological views of gender.
[5.1.3] GarfinkeVs ethnomethodological approach
The phenomena Kohlberg describes as ‘development’ could also be read as 
ideological indoctrination. This interpretation is consistent with Garfinkel’s (1967) 
description of seven pervasive beliefs about gender held by adults in minority world 
contexts:
[that] society is populated by two and only two sexes; [that] the dichotomy of 
sex is morally legitimate; [that] everyone counts themselves as a member of 
one sex or the other; [that] all members are invariantly (i.e. ‘always have been, 
and always will be’) either male or female; [that] the essential identifying
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‘insignia’ for males is the possession of a penis and for females a vagina; [that] 
people will not wilfully or randomly transfer from one sex status to another; 
and [that] in the case of ‘ambiguous’ individuals whose sex status is not 
immediately obvious, it should still be possible, in principle, to classify them as 
either male or female (p. 122-128).
These seven beliefs are among the core tenets of cisgenderist ideology into 
which children are inculcated in minority world contexts. According to Garfinkel, 
these seven beliefs govern the process of gender attribution in minority world 
contexts. Whereas Kohlberg (1966) viewed gender attributions as natural outcomes 
of cognitive development, Garfinkel (1967) recognised the ideological bases of 
gender attributions. For this reason, misgendering is not simply a matter of using 
incorrect pronouns but one of delegitimising people’s own designations of their 
genders where these designations appear to challenge one or more of the seven 
beliefs Garfinkel described.
Whereas Kolhberg’s view was based on an abstract theoretical model,
Garfinkel studied how these seven beliefs functioned in the everyday life of ‘Agnes’, 
a woman who had been misgendered at birth as ‘male’. Through his 
ethnomethodological research on Agnes’s social life, Garfinkel provided the first 
psychological analysis of how cisgenderist ideology can affect people’s ability to 
meet the core social needs identified in Fiske’s (2009) model, such as the need to 
belong and the need to understand and be understood by others. For example, 
Garfinkel (1967, p. 132) described the pride that Agnes took in her breast size, noting 
that ‘she counted her breasts as essential insignia’ that ensured she would be 
understood as a woman by others. Garfinkel discussed Agnes’s fears that medical 
professionals might decide to remove her breasts and thus condemn her to ‘a 
misdirecting, frustrating, misunderstanding environment’. Thus Agnes’s potential to 
be understood as belonging to the category of ‘woman’ and her consequent ability to 
claim an understanding of the experience of being a woman were contingent on her 
conformity to cisgenderist assumptions about people’s genders and bodies.
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Garfinkel’s (1967) ethnomethodological study o f ‘Agnes’ was the first 
psychological study of how people who experience misgendering manage their 
gender presentation in interaction. His research set a precedent of examining the 
social construction of people’s perceived genders in terms of interactional processes, 
thus documenting that gender functions in social life beyond mere biological 
attributes. His research challenged the biological essentialism that characterised 
some influential gender research during the 1950s and 1960s (e.g., Kohlberg, 1966) 
by documenting variability and malleability in how biological categories of ‘female’ 
and ‘male’ are understood across contexts.
Despite these advances, his study of Agnes retained some limitations that 
continue to affect gender research today. For example, his use of the biological terms 
‘female’ and ‘male’ to discuss gender is similar to the conflation of gender with 
presumed biology in past and recent sexist language research (Chapter 2). Just as 
Parlee’s (1996) attempt to expose gender delegitimisation of ‘trans’ people several 
decades later contained instances of misgendering (Chapter 3), Garfinkel’s own 
writing did not transcend the cisgenderist ideological framework he explored in his 
work with Agnes. These examples of researchers whose practices contain elements 
of the ideology they critique highlight the cognitive challenge faced by individuals 
who seek ways of thinking about gender attribution beyond a cisgenderist framework, 
when they attempt to do so within a society where cognitively ‘developed’ adults are 
expected to accept this framework as a ‘scientific’ or ‘natural fact’.
[5.1.4] Kessler and McKenna*s approach
Garfinkel’s (1967) study of Agnes focused on the extent to which her self­
presentation was convincing to others (i.e., ‘passing’). In contrast, Kessler and 
McKenna (1985) focused on how the observer’s own ideological views affect gender 
attribution processes. Whereas Garfinkel (1967) was the first academic researcher to 
focus on how a person who was misgendered at birth constructs and manages their 
gender/sex presentation in interactions between individuals, some later researchers 
focused on ways to improve the treatment of those individuals in research contexts. 
Kessler and McKenna (1985) critiqued the ubiquitous assumption among 
ethnographers of assuming that gender attribution in all cultures and time periods has
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been determined by genitals, citing several examples of cultures in which gender 
attributions are made based on the roles people perform and the clothing they wear. 
Kessler’s (1990) research on how medical professionals managed intersex cases, 
which I discussed in the previous chapter, also identified and challenged gender 
ideology and biological essentialism in clinical decision-making about these cases.
Building on their earlier work, Kessler and McKenna (1985) later explored 
how people use cues such as beard stubble or the perceptions of others to make 
gender attributions. Both Agnes (Garfinkel, 1967) and my friend L (described earlier 
in this chapter) described their experiences of how typically ‘female’ breasts function 
as gender attribution cues. Kessler and McKenna (1985) explainedthat people whose 
clothing and hairstyles do not conform to societal norms can experience gender 
misattribution because they do not follow expected societal rules for gender 
presentation. Thus although the gender attribution process involves sensory 
perception, these sensory perceptions are influenced by gender ideology. Gender 
attribution processes involve not only the evaluation of how to classify individuals, 
but also the determination about whether these individuals belong to particular social 
groups such as ‘women’ or ‘men’.
[5.1.5] Speer *s approach to gender attribution processes 
Speer (2005) expanded on work by Garfinkel (1967) and Kessler and McKenna 
(1978; 1985) by exploring gender attribution processes that occur in situations of 
ambiguity, incongruity or complexity. Speer (2005) provided people with an 
opportunity to explain their misattributions or problems with attributing gender to 
images. When confronted with images with conflicting or ambiguous gender cues, 
participants explained their inability to understand or accurately read people’s 
genders as the result of the observees’ gender presentation rather than acknowledging 
how their ideological views of gender could influence their visual perceptions. Speer 
explained that ‘by highlighting that incongruity, members imply that the problem 
resides in the person in the picture, not them’ (p. 84). Thus Speer found that people 
who engaged in misgendering of people whom they considered ambiguous blamed 
those whom they misgendered for their inaccurate gender attributions. This finding
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highlights the utility of self-reports to explain how people make sense of and justify 
their misgendering of others.
Speer (2005) was the first researcher to expand on Kessler and McKenna’s 
(1978) theoretical claims about the contextual variations of gender attribution 
processes across time periods and cultures. Speer (2005) accomplished this task by 
acknowledging the situational aims that can alter how people make gender 
attributions even within the same time period and culture:
The task of attributing gender (and failing to attribute) is a complex 
interactional process that cannot be explained exclusively or primarily in terms of 
cognitive perceptual factors or rules, or members’ desire to apprehend and describe 
some ‘reality’. Rather, members consistently describe cognitive processes as part of 
doing things (Potter, 1996), and attributions get tailored to the context in which 
attributors find themselves. The precise gendered reality that members construct is 
very much dependent on the local interactional concerns of the present. For example, 
in this context, ambiguity is typically resolved or managed in ways that show a 
concern for the identity of the speaker (and here again, that remains true regardless of 
the precise demographics of that identity), (p. 84)
Speer critiqued the ‘abstract theoretical realm’ in which sociological debates 
about gender often occur (p. 84), noting that analyses of people’s actual interactions 
when using and ascribing gender categories involve ‘socially structured, morally 
accountable procedures that create a sense of dichotomous gender as an objective 
fact’ (p. 84). Instead, Speer used Conversation Analysis methodology to expand on 
the findings of Garfinkel (1967) and Kessler and McKenna (1978; 1985). Speer’s 
research (2005) examined the interactional work accomplished by gender attributions 
and documented variability in how people responses to ambiguity in gender 
attribution processes. In other words, Speer’s findings illustrated that ‘...members are 
not always in a rush to produce concrete male/female gender attributions, or generate 
clarity from ambiguity -  as a literal interpretation of Garfinkel and Kessler and 
McKenna’s documentary method of interpretation might lead us to believe’ (p. 84).
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The core social motives from Fiske’s (2009) model such as the need for 
belonging and the need for understanding appear to influence the gender attribution 
processes that Speer (2005) observed. As Speer notes:
In all of the examples of attributional trouble considered here, members 
manage their uncertainty such that, even when faced with ambiguously 
gendered cases, they quickly re-establish the normative order o f things and 
their belief in, and commitment to, dichotomous gender as an objective fact. 
Indeed, it is by indexing and commenting on the incongruity or non- 
normativity of what they see that members treat cases which appear to 
challenge the natural attitude as morally accountable, thus reinforcing its 
legitimacy. Moreover, in some cases, the very fact of the (constructed) 
incongruity works as a resource, (p. 83, emphasis added)
Speer’s finding that participants faced with challenges in gender attribution 
processes moved to re-assert normative ideology as objective fact is relevant to 
Fiske’s (2009) model because this finding demonstrated how the need to understand 
others can motivate cisgenderism. Speer’s (2005) finding is also consistent with 
Garfinkel’s (1967) aforementioned exposition regarding how the seven pervasive 
beliefs about gender he identified are produced, reinforced and maintained as 
authoritative ‘natural facts’.
[5.1.6] Serano *s perspective
One component of cisgenderist ideology is the treatment of gender independent 
people’s genders and bodies as problematic, when external authorities disagree with 
the linguistic categories to which they claim access. By applying an unequal lexicon 
to describe gender attribution processes, external actors can delegitimise people’s 
own understandings of their genders and bodies. In her (2007) book Whipping girl: A 
transsexual woman on sexism and the scapegoating o f femininity, scholar and trans 
activist Julia Serano further explored the construction of normative ideology as 
objective fact that was addressed by Speer’s (2005) analysis. Serano (2007) 
explained that the unequal application of terms used to describe gender attribution 
processes functions in everyday discourse to construct the relative legitimacy of 
people perceived as ‘trans’ as lesser. Serano described one such example:
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For instance, if a store clerk were to say, “Thank you, sir,” to a cissexual 
woman, nobody would say that she “passed” as a man or failed to “pass” as a 
woman; instead, we would say she is a woman and was mistaken for a man. 
Further, we never use the word “passing” to describe cissexual men who lift 
weights every day in order to achieve a more masculine appearance, or 
cissexual women who put on makeup, skirts, and heels to achieve a more 
feminine appearance (p. 176).
This example highlights by contrast how the active process of misgendering 
others is socially constructed as a passive cognitive process in a manner that obscures 
the workings of cisgenderist ideology in such determinations. In other words, as 
Garfinkel (1967) observed, misgendering others is an active ideological process and 
not the inevitable result of developmental or cognitive processes. As Serano 
explained, conceptualising gender attribution through the framework of ‘passing’ is 
problematic:
... the crux of the problem is that the words “pass” and “passing” are active 
verbs. So when we say that a transsexual [person] is “passing”, it gives the 
false impression that they are the only active participant in the scenario 
[...]However, I would argue that... the public is the primary active participant 
by virtue of their incessant need to gender every person they see as either 
female or male... Others may accuse the transsexual [person] of “passing”, 
even though they have not actively done anything. Thus, the active role played 
by those who compulsively distinguish between women and men (and who 
discriminate between transsexuals and cissexuals) is made invisible by the 
concept of “passing” ... (p. 177)
In her efforts to challenge what she describes as a double standard ‘between 
cissexual and transsexual genders’ (p. 179), Serano recommends adopting new 
language that can render the workings of cisgenderism more visible. By promoting 
this linguistic shift, Serano ‘moves to the margins’ based on a similar theoretical 
rationale to that used by critical disability studies scholars. In critical disability 
studies, researchers have reconceptualised ‘disability’ from a characteristic that 
resides within a person to a marginalised social status that is produced and
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maintained by a society that dis-ables people partly through the act of labelling them 
as ‘disabled’ (e.g., Goodley, 2001). Serano suggests the use of the term ‘misgendered’ 
(p. 179) as a description for ‘when a cissexual or transsexual person is a signed to a 
gender that does not match the gender they consider themselves to be’ (p. 179).
Serano suggests using ‘appropriately gendered’ when people’s gender assignments 
match their own designations of their gender, without linguistically marking whether 
their gender was administratively assigned or not.
[5.1.7] Previous experimental research
The current study returned to the question of framing that was explored in previous 
chapters by examining ordinary people’s experiences of being misgendered and of 
misgendering others. This examination follows Garfinkel’s (1967) treatment of 
gender attributions as ordinary, everyday events that can be studied. In this study, I 
theorise that these gender attribution events can be ideological. I explore the possible 
ideological aspects of everyday gender attributions by examining whether people’s 
understandings of misgendering differ depending on whether they misgender others 
or are misgendered by others.
I used Williams’ (2009) ostracism framework to test the hypothesis that being 
misgendered would be experienced as ostracism. According to Williams’
(1997/2009) model, ostracism affects people’s ability to meet four basic needs: 
belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence. ‘Self-esteem’ is used here 
as a measure of interpersonal relationships, operationalised by items such as ‘to what 
extent do you think [others] value you as a person?’. This model also proposed that 
ostracism would have an adverse impact on people’s moods and affect the extent to 
which targets and sources liked or disliked each other.
Researchers of ostracism have explored the effects of different forms of 
ostracism, and how context, duration, and target attributes such as age can mediate 
the affects of ostracism. Researchers have found that even cyberostracism that occurs 
during a brief interval as part of a consensual experiment can lead to detrimental 
effects. Williams, Cheung and Choi’s (2000) study of ostracism over the internet 
1486 participants in 62 countries found that participants who were ostracised during
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a brief ball-tossing game reported feeling bad, out of control and a lost sense of 
belonging.
Some research findings indicate that linguistic exclusion based on gendered 
language can function as ostracism and have similar adverse effects. Stout and 
Dasgupta (2011) conducted three studies to investigate whether the popular practice 
of using masculine generic language such as ‘he’ to refer to both women and men 
was experienced as ostracism by women as a group. In the first study, a final sample 
of 164 undergraduate participants (92 reported women and 72 reported men) read a 
job description of their prospective work environment and position, with descriptions 
of the work environment that used either gender-exclusive language such as ‘he, him, 
guys’ to describe employees or gender-inclusive language such as ‘him or her’. 
Participants then rated the extent to which they perceived the job description as sexist, 
their feelings of exclusion or inclusion in the work environment, their motivation to 
pursue the job, and the extent to which they identified with the job. Both reported 
women and reported men perceived gender-exclusive language as more sexist than 
gender-inclusive language. Reported women were significantly more likely to 
experience a greater intensity of ostracism in the workplace with the gender- 
exclusive language than in the workplace that used gender-inclusive language. 
However, gender-exclusive language did not significantly alter the intensity of 
ostracism that men experienced. Women reported that they were significantly less 
motivated to seek the job in the workplace that used gender-exclusive language than 
in the gender-inclusive workplace, although men reported greater motivation in the 
gender-exclusive workplace. More women than men reported decreased 
identification with the job in the gender-exclusive job description.
In Experiment 2, the researchers added a gender-neutral control condition to 
test whether gender-inclusive language during an in-person job interview would lead 
women to feel included, whether gender-exclusive language would lead women to 
feel excluded, or whether both processes would occur. The researchers also evaluated 
whether men’s motivation would increase when they received masculine gender- 
exclusive language. Experiment 2 found that women were more affected than men by 
gender-exclusive language and that such language affected women’s sense of
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belonging, their motivation and their identification with the job. This study also 
documented that experiences of linguistic exclusion can be experienced as ostracism 
in both written and verbal communication.
Findings by other researchers provide additional support for Stout and 
Dasgupta’s (2011) claim that gender-exclusive language can function as a form of 
ostracism. For example, Gaucher, Friesen, and Kay (2011) conducted a series of 
experiments that documented how subtle variations in the wording of job 
advertisements affected participants’ perceptions of professional environments. They 
found that the use of more masculine than feminine language led participants to view 
the profession as dominated by men and led women to be less interested in these jobs. 
Formanowicz, Bedynska, Cistak, Braun and Sczesny (2013) conducted experiments 
on how the use of gendered job titles in Polish would affect people’s evaluations of 
prospective job candidates during the hiring process. Formanowicz et al. applied a 
similar technique to that of Hyde (1984) by using fictitious job titles: diarolozka for a 
woman and diarolog for a man. They also conducted a similar study using existing 
job titles. Across these studies, women who applied for a position using a woman- 
associated job title were rated less favourably than either men applicants or other 
women applicants who used a man-associated job title. The current research builds 
on findings from the studies described above regarding how gender-exclusive sexist 
misgendering delegitimises women’s professional capabilities. To my knowledge, 
the current studies are the first experimental research to evaluate cisgenderist 
misgendering in daily life.
[5.2] Attributes and consequences of misgendering
[5.2.1] Social impact o f  misgendering
Earlier in this chapter, I discussed the experiences of gender and body 
delegitimisation shared by my friend L. and by scholar-activist Laurence Parent. 
These accounts provide anecdotal evidence to support the empirical finding by 
gender attribution researchers that inaccurate gender ascriptions can have harmful 
practical consequences. Misgendering can take numerous forms. The widespread 
medical practice of surgically ‘normalising’ intersex infants’ genitals can be 
conceptualised as a form of misgendering because it enacts assumptions about
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infants’ legitimate gender without the possibility of asking the infants themselves. In 
a cisgenderism framework, the concept of ‘passing’ can be viewed as integral to the 
perpetuation of misgendering because ‘passing’ assigns greater value to people’s 
visual and auditory conformity to local gender norms than to people’s own gender 
labels and expression.
Speer and Green’s (2007) research on ‘passing’ documented how interactional 
gender designations affected ‘trans’ people not only in terms of restricting their 
access to social capital and to the medical resources involved in medical gender 
affirmation, but also in terms of how they feel about and view their appearance.
Speer and Green (ibid, p. 346) analysed a gender clinic psychiatrist’s conversation 
with a self-identified woman seeking a letter of referral for surgical gender 
affirmation, Speer and Green illustrate how the psychiatrist’s non-reponses lead this 
woman—whom they de-gender as a ‘male-to-female pre-op’ (sic) in the title of their 
transcription excerpt (p. 346)—to shift rapidly from positively evaluating her ‘lovely 
figure’ to negatively evaluating her face with a self-deprecating joke about how she 
could benefit from putting a bag over her head. The denial of basic resources to 
people who do not ‘pass’ functions across diverse administrative domains that 
include schools, prisons, workplaces, public accommodations and housing (Browne, 
2004; Currrah & Minter, 2000; Spade, 2011; Stanley & Smith, 2011; Stryker, 2008). 
Thus misgendering can have the practical function of ostracising people in key 
domains of everyday life.
Previous studies that have explored incorrect gender attributions have focused 
primarily on the problem of generic masculine language that excludes women in 
general (e.g.. Stout & Dasgupta, 2011). To my knowledge, no prior studies have 
specifically focused on misgendering of people whom others perceive as ‘trans*’ (i.e., 
transgender, transsexual, etc.). Misgendering can be a major part of the life 
experiences of such people. For example, participants in multiple studies of 
‘transgender’ people’s healthcare experiences have identified misgendering as 
primary concern in medical interactions and as a factor that leads to negative health 
outcomes (e.g., Craig, 2005; Rorvig, 2012). A recent study of the medical 
experiences of 25 ‘transgender women’ residents of the San Francisco Bay area
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found that most participants spontaneously identified misgendering in health care 
settings as one of the primary causes of negative experiences (Rorvig, 2012).
Rorvig’s participants were aged between 29 and 66 years old (M = 46). 
Participants’ reported ethnicities were 48% white, 36% African American, 8%
‘mixed race’, one ‘Native American woman’, and one ‘Asian Pacific Islander 
woman’. Rorvig’s participants described a range of negative and even outright 
hostile behaviours from health professionals. Among all of these experiences, 
misgendering was the most commonly reported negative health care experience, 
which was disclosed by 13 of 25 participants (52%). Participants who were 
misgendered by staff in health care settings (including security guards, receptionists, 
nurses, and physicians) experienced this problem in every setting in which they 
received or attempted to receive health care. Participants even reported having been 
misgendered in trans-specific clinics in San Francisco. Many of these women 
described having been misgendered in front of staff and other patients.
In response to these incidents in which they were misgendered, women 
reported a range of emotional responses. These responses included feeling humiliated, 
insulted, belittled, frustrated, violated, degraded, unsafe, and even devastated. Some 
women reported having cried during or immediately after having been misgendered. 
One woman described how hospital staff had laughed and ridiculed her after she 
asked for the key to the women’s toilets. Some women described rough physical 
treatment by medical professionals. One particularly disturbing case that illustrates 
the potentially severe consequences of misgendering involved the placement of a 
woman who had recently been raped into a hospital room with a man.
Being misgendered can lead to negative health outcomes. One woman reported 
that she became so depressed after having been misgendered that she had decided to 
stop taking all of her medication, including her HIV medication. One woman shared 
the severe emotional pain she experienced due to having been misgendered, and 
expressed disappointment that such incidents could occur even in a place that has a 
reputation for welcoming ‘trans women’:
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I spent so much of my life trying to deny that I had this feminine part. And then 
when I finally, finally I go through all of this living hell to get to the point 
where I say, okay, this is me. I’m predominantly female, that’s how I’m going 
to live my life and that’s how I want to present myself, and then to have 
someone call you sir. I t ’s almost like somebody stabbing you right here [points 
to chest] in the middle o f your chest. I t ’s like SHRRP. It hurts that bad. 
Especially when you’re new, and you know, I was in San Francisco. See one 
thing was, you know, remember I said the Emerald City on the Hill? That’s 
what I  thought, oh my god, I ’m going to utopia. Well San Francisco ain ’t 
utopia. (Rorvig, p. 35, emphasis added)
As this participant describes, misgendering can often cause intense pain to its 
targets, to the extent that it can be felt as if it were a severe physical injury (see Biro, 
2010 for relevant discussion). That a majority of women had experienced 
misgendering even in a place like San Francisco, which is widely known as a ‘utopia’ 
for gender independent people, speaks to the omnipresent nature of cisgenderism in 
everyday life.
[5.2.2] Perspective-taking and empathy gaps
Researchers have found that the vantage point from which people experience social 
pain can affect their perceptions regarding the adverse impact of these experiences. 
Nordgren, Banas, and MacDonald (2011) conducted a series of studies to explore 
how people can systematically underestimate the degree of social pain experienced 
by others, until they experience the pain for themselves. This phenomenon has been 
described as the empathy gap effect. For example, in one of their studies, Nordgren 
et al. (2011) found that middle school teachers who had actively experienced social 
pain were more likely to have increased estimates of the pain caused by emotional 
bullying, and that this increased perception led teachers to be more willing to 
recommend more extensive assistance for students who had been bullied and to 
approve greater punishments for students who had bullied others.
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[5.2,3] The current study
Speer (2005) noted that the examination of gender misattributions, or misgendering, 
could enable researchers to understand ‘more fully and precisely how it is that 
members naturalize and thus reproduce current institutional arrangements’ (p. 84) 
such as those reflected in and produced by assumptions regarding the seven 
widespread gender beliefs discussed by Garfinkel (1967) and the selective use of 
‘passing’ discourse to place unequal scrutiny on the legitimacy of gender 
independent and intersex people’s own designations of their genders and bodies. 
Speer explained that this increased understanding of the mechanisms involved in 
gender attribution processes could provide insight regarding how to challenge and 
move beyond misgendering. Yet in the bricolage approach, the bricoleur is no 
passive consumer or revealor of knowledge, but an active participant in the 
reinterpretation of social phenomena who seeks to transform and challenge the taken- 
for-granted ideological assumptions that are manifested and constructed through 
everyday practices. In the present research, I aim to examine self-reported accounts 
from people’s actual experiences of misgendering. By examining these accounts, I 
aim to expand on existing knowledge of how people describe and strategise about 
these experiences, and to identify practical strategies to challenge the cisgenderist 
ideology that determines how gender attributions function in people’s everyday lives.
[5.2.3.1] Combining multiple research approaches and aims
This study, like the bricolage approach itself, is multilinear and serves multiple aims. 
Qualitative methods are increasingly accepted in biomedical sciences (Press, 2005) 
and integrated in multiple research approaches that challenge or transcend the 
quantitative/qualitative research binary (Denzin, 2012; Ercikan & Roth, 2006; 
Onwuegbuzie, Johnson, & Collins, 2009). Despite this trend, the value, quality, and 
appropriate uses of qualitative research continue to be debated by researchers in the 
fields of education, health and biomedical sciences, and social sciences (Lincoln, 
2010; Pope & Mays, 2009; Press, 2005; Reynolds et al., 2011; Ryan-Nicholls &
Will, 2009; Sandelowski, 2010). Overall, professionals in health and biomedical 
disciplines and in some social science contexts continue to treat statistical findings as 
more authoritative than qualitative data (Denzin, 2009; Lincoln & Cannella, 2004). 
Researchers often omit qualitative research from systematic reviews (Dixon-Woods
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et al., 2007), and qualitative research is explicitly excluded from many national 
research programs (Atkinson & Delamont, 2006; Denzin, 2009; Lincoln & Cannella, 
2004). Thus one of my strategic aims was to gain quantitative data that I could use to 
raise concerns about misgendering with professionals in these disciplinary arenas in 
which the merits of qualitative data continue to be contested. Based on the complex 
layers of ideological expression that can be at work in processes of gender 
misattribution (e.g., Serano, 2007; Speer, 2005), I also aimed to generate content-rich 
qualitative narratives that could showcase the diversity and complexity of people’s 
self-reported experiences of being misgendered and of misgendering others.
One component of the current study is an experiment that was framed to 
participants as a survey. This aspect of the study used existing measures from 
ostracism research to evaluate whether misgendering functions as a form of 
ostracism, whether targets and sources would have different perceptions of the 
effects of being misgendered, and whether people’s experiences of being perceived 
as ‘trans’ by others or of having a gender/sex marker that is matching or mismatched 
on their identity documents would affect people’s perceptions about and responses to 
gender misattribution. The qualitative component of this study is informed by 
Garfinkel’s (1967) study of Agnes and Speer and Green’s (2007) analysis of 
conversation between a psychiatrist and a woman seeking referral for surgical gender 
affirmation. These analyses identified subtle and taken-for-granted aspects of gender 
attribution experiences that can be rendered visible through attention to self-reported 
personal narratives such as those shared by Rorvig’s (2012) participants.
On an experimental dimension, the current study investigated the extent to 
which people would report being misgendered and misgendering others as common 
experiences. I also investigated whether there was an empathy gap in which people 
who reported being misgendered by others would rate being misgendered as having 
greater adverse effects than people did not report having been misgendered by others. 
These adverse effects were defined operationally using Williams’ (2009) framework, 
which explored how experiences of ostracism affected people’s core needs for 
belonging, self-esteem, control, and meaningful existence.
199
Chapter 5
Self-Reports of Cisgenderism in Everyday Life
In these two experiments, I tested several hypotheses. First, I tested whether 
people would report being misgendered and misgendering others as common 
experiences. Rorvig’s (2012) findings suggest that being misgendered is a common 
experience for gender independent women, even in ostensibly ‘trans’-fi-iendly 
environments. Rorvig’s finding that both clinical and administrative staff had 
misgendered gender independent women, even in health care settings that had ‘trans’ 
health as a primary area of focus, suggests that misgendering others may be 
commonplace. However, there are no psychological studies specifically focused on 
people’s self-reported experiences of being misgendered in everyday life.
Based on Nodrgren, Banas and MacDonald’s (2011) finding of an empathy gap 
between people who were targets of social pain and those who were not, I 
hypothesised that misgendering would have greater cognitive salience for people 
who were asked about having been misgendered by others than for people who were 
asked about having misgendered others. I also hypothesised that there would be 
differences in ratings of the perceived adverse effects of being misgendered between 
those who reported having been misgendered and those who reported having 
misgendered others.
My research questions were also informed by Stout and Dasgupta’s (2011) 
finding that gender-exclusive language functions as a group-based form of ostracism 
that can affect women’s emotions and their sense of belonging at an individual level. 
Based on these findings, I theorised that people who are classified as ‘trans’ by 
others, and who might therefore be more likely to experience group-level exclusion 
based on this classification, would rate the adverse impact of being misgendered as 
greater than people who were not classified as ‘trans’ by others. Similarly, I 
hypothesised that people with mismatched identity documents would rate being 
misgendered as having a greater adverse impact than people with matching identity 
documents, given the greater frequency with which people with mismatched 
documents might experience being misgendered by others.
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[5.2. S.2] Challenging the ‘cis/trans’ binaiy
Researchers often operationalise ‘trans identity’ based on assumptions that how 
researchers describe people, how people perceive themselves, and how people 
experience their gender in interpersonal interactions are identical. One aim of this 
study was to evaluate the utility of the transgender framework and widespread use of 
‘trans’ identity as a demographic variable in research conducted within this 
framework. Almost all of the previous research on ‘trans people’ has taken for 
granted that ‘trans people’ constitute a distinct type of being. In the present research,
I tested this assumption empirically by using two variables that measured distinct 
aspects of societal gender recognition—whether or not one reports being perceived 
as ‘trans’ by others and whether or not one reports having identity documents that 
match the administrative gender/sex category associated with one’s own gender self- 
designation. In this way, these studies evaluated the utility of the 
‘transgender/cisgender’ gender binary that ‘transphobia’ researchers have applied in 
their efforts to shift away from the woman/man gender binary. By using multiple 
ways of categorising people with regard to their self-reported and gender-associated 
experiences, I was able to explore whether the ‘transgender/cisgender’ gender binary 
was an accurate or adequate model for understanding the similarities and differences 
between people’s experiences of gender and body delegitimisation. I conducted two 
studies using a mixed methods approach (see Figure 1 for the sample breakdown).
Experiments 1 and 2 were part of a single study that was amended mid-study to 
include participants who did not report experiencing misgendering; thus participants 
who completed the study prior to this amendment were counted as part of 
Experiment 1, and participants who completed the study after this amendment were 
counted as part of Experiment 2. The only change in the study between Experiment 1 
and Experiment 2 was this instruction appended to the first study question, which 
participants viewed immediately after completing the online consent form and after 
random electronic allocation to one of the experimental conditions:
“If you cannot recall having had this experience, please write ’none’ 
or ’N/A’ in the text box and PLEASE ANSWER ALL FURTHER 
QUESTIONS ON OTHER PAGES OF THIS STUDY IMAGINING 
HOW IT WOULD BE TO HAVE HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.”
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The addition of this instruction was intended to reduce attrition among participants 
who reported not having experienced misgendering, thereby allowing them to reach 
demographic questions at the end of the study instead of exiting the survey after the 
first question. The amended instruction also made it possible for me to contrast the 
adverse impact ratings of participants who reported actual experiences of 
misgendering with ratings based on imagined experiences of misgendering.
Cognitive
salience
All other 
comparisons
A ll other 
comparisons
Excluded 
(« = 11)
Unique 
Experiment 1 
surveys 
{n =  149)
Unique 
Experiment 2 
surveys 
(n =  295)
Thematic 
analysis o f  
narratives as 
experienced
Excluded 
(« =  14)
Cognitive 
salience, 
comparison o f  
imagined vs. 
recalled
Experiment 1 
scales & 
narratives as 
experienced, +/- 
demographics 
{n = 131)
Experiment 2 
scales & 
narratives as 
experienced, +/- 
demographies 
{n =  155)
Participants who 
reported having not 
experienced 
misgendering exit 
study without 
completing scales or 
demographics
Participants who 
reported having not 
experienced 
misgendering rate 
imagined 
misgendering and 
give demographics
Figure 1. Distribution of participants across experiments and thematic analysis.
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[5.3] Experiment 1
This experiment tested five main hypotheses. First, this experiment tested the 
hypotheses that being misgendered is a rare experience among people in general. 
Second, this experiment tested the hypothesis that misgendering would be more 
cognitively salient for targets than for sources. Third, I predicted that targets, who 
were asked to report experiences of being misgendered, would rate the adverse 
effects of being misgendered as greater than sources, who were asked to report 
having misgendered others. Fourth, I predicted that people who reported not being 
perceived as ‘trans’ would rate being misgendered as having lesser adverse effects 
than those who reported being perceived as ‘trans’. Finally, I predicted that people 
who reported having mismatched identity documents would rate being misgendered 
as having greater adverse effects than those who reported having matching identity 
documents.
[5.3.1] Method
[5.3.1.1] Participants
Participants were recruited through a worldwide snowball sampling method that 
included posts on Facebook and Twitter (explained in the Procedures section). 
Facebook posts were made on open, closed, and secret trans-only and intersex-only 
group Walls. Multiple members of these groups reposted the recruitment text to their 
personal Walls and to other groups within and outside of Facebook. Transgender 
celebrity Kate Bomstein in the US and UK celebrity Max Zachs from the popular 
television show My Transsexual Summer both tweeted an abridged version of the 
recruitment text, and the link was retweeted by some of their Twitter followers.
After blank surveys and duplicates were removed, there were 149 participants. 
Ten participants who did not respond in the experimental condition that they were 
instructed to follow were removed from the sample (e.g., participants who responded 
to the question about whether they had misgendered another person by discussing 
their own experience of having been misgendered, without answering the question in 
the experimental condition to which they had been assigned). One additional 
participant was removed due to having left the experimental condition question blank, 
yet having filled in identical responses for all questions on the first page of the
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survey before leaving the study. Of the remaining 138 participants, 44 participants 
did not provide demographic data. Consequently, analysis of responses from these 
participants was limited to the parts of the analysis that did not use demographic 
variables, such as the test of cognitive salience of misgendering for targets versus 
sources and the tests of the perceived effects of misgendering for targets versus 
sources. Among the 94 remaining participants, seven participants who did not report 
experiences that met my definition of misgendering as a form of gender or body 
delegitimisation (see Procedures section) were included only in the test of the 
cognitive salience of targets versus sources because the cognitive salience variable 
addressed participants’ reported beliefs that they have experienced misgendering 
rather than determining whether misgendering had actually occurred. Thus 87 
participants were included in all analyses.
In Experiment 1, participants who responded in the negative (e.g., ‘no’ or 
‘N/A’) to the initial question about whether they had experienced misgendering 
exited the survey at that point, without reaching the demographic items at the end of 
the survey. This meant that it was not possible to compare whether experiences of 
misgendering were more likely to be reported by people with particular demographic 
profiles. (This concern was addressed in Experiment 2 by asking participants who 
did not report experiences of misgendering as targets or sources to “answer all 
further questions on other pages of this study imagining how it would be to have had 
this experience” in all caps at the end of the first question.)
[5.3.1.L I]  Sample demographics 
Participant locations were recorded through the automated GeoTracking feature in 
SurveyOizmo. The sample of 138 participants included 8 8  participants located in the 
United Kingdom (63.77%), 28 in the United States (20.29%), and three in Canada 
(2.17%). Australia, Denmark, and Germany had two participants each (1.45% each). 
France, Ireland, Lebanon, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Sweden, Thailand, and 
Turkey each had one participant (<1% each), and four participant locations (2.90%) 
were unrecordable by GeoTracking. Among the 94 participants whose demographic 
data were available, participants reported ages from 18- 67 {M= 35.15, Mdn = 31,
SD = 14.22). Of the 87 participants who provided occupational data, 28 reported
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their profession as paraprofessionals (32.18%), 25 as students (28.74%), 15 as 
professionals (17.24%), 10 skilled labourers (11.49%), eight as retired (9.20%), 
seven as unemployed (8.05%), and one as a homemaker (1.15%). As participants 
reported multiple terms for their ethnicities, ethnicity terms were calculated as 
distinct rather than mutually exclusive. Of the 92 participants who reported their 
ethnicity, sixty-nine participants identified as ‘white’ (75.00%), 30 reported as 
having Irish or a UK ethnicity (e.g., English, Scottish, Welsh, etc.) (32.61%), ten 
described themselves as ethnically European (10.87%), and one each (1.09%) as 
Australian, Black, and American, respectively. Participants used multiple terms to 
describe their genders. Gender terms were calculated as distinct rather than mutually 
exclusive variables. Of the 94 participants who reported their gender, 53 participants 
identified as female (56.38%), 17 identified as male (18.09%), 12 as genderqueer, 
mixed, or multiple genders (12.77%), 11 as some variety of trans* (e.g., transgender, 
transsexual, transman, transwoman, etc.). (11.70%), ten as women (10.64%), five as 
cis, cisgender, or cisgendered (5.32%), five as agender or not having any gender 
(5.32%), three as men (3.19%), two as ‘feminine’ (2.13%), two using terms for 
sexual orientations (e.g., ‘lesbian’) (2.13%), and one as ‘masculine’ (1.06%).
Due to targeted recruitment of participants from intersex, ‘trans’ and 
genderqueer sites, this study had a higher percentage of gender independent people 
than may be typical in the general population; of the 93 participants who responded 
to the relevant question, 37 (39.78%) reported that other people would classify them 
as ‘trans’, whilst 56 participants (60.22%) reported that other people would not. Of 
these 37 participants, 18 (48.65%) reported that they had matching identity 
documents and 19 (51.35%) reported that they did not. Of the 37 participants who 
reported that other people would classify them as ‘trans’, 6  (16.22%) reported that 
they did not classify themselves as ‘trans’. One of these six participants (16.67%) 
reported that they were intersex. In total, six of the 93 participants reported that they 
were intersex. Of these six participants, two (33.33%) reported that they would 
classify themselves as ‘trans’ and be classified by others as ‘trans’, two (33.33%) 
reported that they would neither classify themselves as ‘trans’ nor be classified as 
‘trans’ by others, one (16.67%) reported that they would be classified as ‘trans’ by
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others but not classify themselves as ‘trans’, and one (16.67%) reported that they 
would not be classified as ‘trans’ but that they would classify themselves as ‘trans’.
[5.3.1.1.2] Self-reported perceived trans status and self-reported identity 
document match
The independent categorical variable of self-reported perceived trans status had two 
levels: perceived as ‘trans’, for people who reported that other people would classify 
them as trans based on their self-designated gender and assigned sex, and not 
perceived as ‘trans’, for people who reported that other people would not. The 
independent categorical variable of self-reported identity document match had two 
levels: matching, a descriptor for participants who reported that the sex designation 
on their identity documents matched the sex designation typically associated with 
their current gender self-designation, and mismatched, for those who reported that 
their sex designation did not.
I tested whether self-reported identity document match varied by self-reported 
perceived trans status. I conducted a chi-square test to test whether there was a 
difference in self-reported identity document match for people who reported being 
perceived as ‘trans’ and those who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. There was 
a statistically significant difference between people who reported being perceived as 
‘trans’ and those who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ for self-reported 
identity document match, with more people who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ 
reporting mismatched identity documents, 93) = 23.39, < .001. There was
a moderate correlation between self-reported perceived trans status and self-reported 
identity document match {rho (91) = .502,/? < .001); these two variables have both 
been used in this analysis because they measure distinct components of societal 
gender recognition. Of the 56 participants who reported not perceived as ‘trans’, 52 
participants (92.86%) reported having matching identity documents, in contrast to 
only 18 of 37 participants (48.65%) who reported being perceived as ‘trans’. Table 1 
displays the frequencies of participants who reported having matching and 
mismatched identity documents by self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status (see Table 
1). The finding that 23 of the 93 participants (24.73%) would be classified differently 
depending on whether gender was defined based on self-identification or identity
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document match demonstrates the complex and variable ways in which ‘trans’ and 
‘cis’ can be defined.
Table 1. Frequency of self-reported matching identity documents by 
self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status.
Perceived ‘trans’ status Identity document match
Matching Mismatched Total
Not perceived as ‘trans’ 52 4 56
Perceived as ‘trans’ 18 19 37
[53.1.2] Design
This experiment used a between-participants design to test for differences in 
perceived effects of being misgendered by perspective (sources vs. targets), self- 
reported perceived trans status (perceived as ‘trans’ vs. not perceived as ‘trans’) and 
self-reported identity document match (matching vs. mismatched). Online 
participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions and given a written 
task to describe an experience of misgendering. In the targets condition, participants 
were asked to describe an experience in which they were misgendered. In the sources 
condition, participants were asked to describe an experience in which they 
misgendered another person. The dependent variables were adverse mood impact, 
threatened needs, intensity of ostracism, and perceived dislike. Narratives were 
analysed inductively to explore the circumstances of self-reported misgendering.
Perspective
The experimental condition of perspective had two levels: targets (i.e., people who 
were asked about having heen misgendered by others) and sources (i.e. people who 
were asked about having misgendered others).
Participants who consented to participate were assigned to one of two levels of 
the experimental condition of perspective: targets or sources. Targets were given the 
following instructions:
Many people find that other people most often refer to them using terms that 
imply their gender. For example, terms like woman, man, Ms, Mrs, Mr, Ma'am, 
Sir, she, and he all communicate the speaker's belief that a person is a woman
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or a man. However, sometimes people make mistakes and address or describe 
people by a term that doesn't match their gender. Can you think of a time when 
you were addressed or described in this way? If so, then please write a few 
sentences about this experience in the box below.
Sources were given the same instructions, but with the penultimate sentence: Can 
you think of a time when you addressed or described (a) person(s) in this way?
[5.3.1.3] Measures
In this study, I followed the same coding procedure as in Williams et al. (2000). This 
study used four dependent variables: adverse mood impact, threatened needs, 
intensity o f ostracism, and perceived dislike.
Adverse Mood Impact
Mood was assessed on a 7-point scale using four items from Williams, Cheung, and 
Choi (2000): bad-good (1 = bad, 7 = good), sad-happy (1 = sad, 7 = happy), tense- 
relaxed (1 = tense, 7 = relaxed), and rejected-accepted (1 = rejected, 7 = accepted).
As in Williams et al. (2000), the four items in the Adverse Mood Index were reverse- 
coded and added together, with higher scores representing ratings of greater 
detrimental effects on mood. The mood index had excellent inter-item reliability, a 
= .918.
Threatened Needs
Williams’ (1997) model characterised four core needs that could be threatened by the 
experience of ostracism: belonging, meaningful existence, control, and self-esteem. 
These four core needs were combined as the Threatened Needs Index (Williams, 
Cheung, & Choi, 2000). This index contained one item for each of the four core 
needs. Scores were evaluated by adding participant responses to each of four items 
on a seven-point scale (1 = not at all, 7 = completely): ‘How much did you feel you 
belonged in that setting?’ (belonging), ’’How true was the statement ‘Life is 
meaningless’?”, “How true was the statement ‘I am in control of my life’?” (control), 
and “To what extent did you think you were valued as a person?” (self-esteem). The 
three questions about belonging, control, and self-esteem were reverse coded and
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aggregated. The four items in the threatened needs scale had good inter-item 
reliability, a = .765.
Intensity o f Ostracism
Intensity of ostracism was measured by adding responses to two 7-point questions, 
ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely). The first item asked the participant, "To 
what extent did you feel that you were being ignored or excluded?" The second item, 
which was reverse scored, asked, "To what extent did you feel that you were being 
noticed or included?" The two items in the intensity of ostracism scale had good 
inter-item reliability, a = .687.
Perceived Dislike
Williams et al.’s (2000) ‘group cohesiveness’ scale was renamed as the Perceived 
Dislike Index, as the questions measure interpersonal liking or disliking and not 
necessarily ‘cohesiveness’. Perceived Dislike was assessed by adding two items that 
ranged from 1 (not at all) to 7 (completely), “How much did you like the other 
person?” and “How much did the other person like you?” Both items were reverse 
scored. The two items in the perceived dislike scale had good inter-item reliability, a 
= .764.
[53.1.4] Materials and procedure
The recruitment text stated that the study explores people’s experiences with 
language that describes gender, and informed participants that they would be asked 
to share their experience about an everyday event, followed by some personal 
questions. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two experimental 
conditions: targets or sources. All participants were anonymous; no personally 
identifying details were requested or collected.
Participants who selected a link to take this study were provided with an 
electronic information sheet that described the study as an exploration of people's 
experiences with language that describes gender. They were informed that they 
would be asked to share an experience about an everyday event and then asked some
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personal questions, that the study was anonymous and that no identifying details 
would be requested or stored.
Following completion of the demographic questions, participants were directed 
to a debrief page that explained the study purpose:
Thank you for participating! This study evaluated your experience of 
"misgendering," that is to say designating a person as a member of a gender 
category with which they do not identify. Some participants were asked to 
describe an experience in which they were misgendered. Other participants 
were asked to describe an experience in which they misgendered another 
person.
Misgendering may occur to anyone, but is a particularly common experience of 
people whose gender self-designations differ from the gender they were 
assigned (i.e., those often labelled 'trans' or 'intersex'). We hope this study will 
provide useful information about how misgendering affects people who 
experience or engage in misgendering and that our results will inform future 
interventions to address misgendering.
The debrief sheet also provided support and advocacy resources for participants and 
contact information for the researcher and supervisor. The recruitment text and a link 
to the text of the online study (including the electronic information sheet, consent 
form, demographic questionnaire, and debrief) are provided in Appendices 0-P.
Following data collection, the researcher and a second coder who was unaware 
of the researcher’s hypotheses independently coded all cases to determine whether 
they constituted reports of actual misgendering, which excludes people from the 
gender category to which they wish to belong or describes them using gender- 
associated language they do not prefer. There was perfect agreement between the two 
coders ( k  = 1.00). Both coders identified the same seven cases of people who did not 
report an experience of actual misgendering. For example, two participants in the 
target condition reported having been unintentionally described using language for 
the gender with which they secretly identified (e.g., “I was bom female, but 
frequently mistaken for a boy. I never really thought of it as a mistake because I 
always felt male on the inside. I transitioned to male 13 years ago”; “Yes, when I
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was a 16 year old (boy), I was referred to as Miss by a bus conductor. As a 
transgendered (M2F) person I found it exciting.”).
[5.3.2] Results
Recall that this experiment tested five main hypotheses. First, this experiment tested 
the hypotheses that being misgendered is a rare experience among people in general, 
rare among who report not being perceived as ‘trans’, and common among people 
who report being perceived as ‘trans’. Second, this experiment tested the hypothesis 
that misgendering would be more cognitively salient for targets than for sources. 
Third, I predicted that people asked to report experiences of being misgendered 
would rate being misgendered as having greater adverse effects than people asked to 
report having misgendered others. Fourth, I predicted that people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’ would rate being misgendered as having lesser adverse 
effects than those who reported being perceived as ‘trans’. Finally, I predicted that 
people who reported having mismatched identity documents would rate being 
misgendered as having greater adverse effects than those who reported having 
matching identity documents.
Parametric tests were used for variables with z-scores <±1.96 for skewness 
and kurtosis. Non-parametric tests were used for variables with z > ± 1.96 for 
skewness and kurtosis, except when otherwise stated. All two-group comparisons 
were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 0.05, unless otherwise specified. 
Holm’s (1979) sequential Bonferroni correction was used to determine significance 
for three-group comparisons; in such cases. Holm set significance at .05/3 or .017 for 
the most significant result, .05/2 or .025 for the second most significant result 
and .05/1 or .05 for the third most significant result. Fisher’s Exactp  values were 
used for tests of categorical variables where one or more cells had an observed value 
of < 5. Relations between variables beyond the main hypotheses were discussed in 
this analysis \ip <  .07.
[5.3.2.1] How widespread is misgendering?
I tested whether it was common across all participants to report having experienced 
misgendering. I added reported cases of misgendering for targets and sources. Of the
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136 participants for whom data were available, 90 (66.18%) reported having 
experienced misgendering as targets or sources compared to 46 (33.82%) who did 
not. Thus about twice as many participants reported either having been misgendered 
or having misgendered others as those who reported not either having been 
misgendered or misgendering others. Of the 72 targets, 53 (73.61%) reported having 
been misgendered, and 37 (57.81%) of the 64 sources reported having misgendered 
others. Overall, both being misgendered and having misgendered others were 
common experiences reported by most participants.
[5.3.2.1.1] Do targets who report not being perceived as ‘trans ’ experience 
being misgendered?
I tested whether targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others 
reported having been misgendered by others. I used cell counts in descriptive 
statistics. Of the 49 participants in the target condition for whom demographic 
information was available, 27 (55.10%) reported not being perceived as ‘trans’.
Based on popular perception, we would expect zero reported cases of having been 
misgendered among targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. I counted 
the number of reported cases of being misgendered among targets who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’. Of the 27 targets who reported not being perceived as 
‘trans’, 24 (88.89%) reported having been misgendered. Of these 24 participants who 
reported having been misgendered, 21(87.5%) met my definition of misgendering as 
a form of gender or body delegitimisation and 3 (12.5%) were cases of desired 
gendering. People who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ were much more 
likely to report having been misgendered than is commonly believed.
[5.3.2.1.2] Do sources who report being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others report 
having misgendered others?
I tested whether sources who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others reported 
having misgendered others. I used cell counts in descriptive statistics. Of the 42 
sources for whom demographic information was available, 15 (35.71%) reported that 
they were perceived as ‘trans ’. Of these 15 participants who reported being 
perceived as ‘trans ’,11 participants (73.33%) reported having misgendered others.
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[53.2.1.3] Do targets who report having matching identity  ^documents report 
having been misgendered?
I tested whether targets who reported having matching identity documents reported 
having been misgendered by others. Of the 49 targets for whom demographic 
information was available, 39 reported having matching identity documents. Of these 
39 targets, 36 (92.31%) reported having been misgendered by others.
[5.3.2.1.4] Do sources who report having mismatched identity documents 
report having misgendered others?
Of the 42 sources for whom demographic information was available, 13 (30.95%) 
reported having mismatched identity documents. Of these 13 sources, ten 
participants (76.92%) reported having misgendered others.
Bricolage Reflective Box: = .05’
I The disciplinary norm in psychology of |ising ‘the sacred .05 criterion’ (Cohen,
1994, p. 997) to test null hypothesis sigrlficance has been critiqued by various 
I scholars over the past forty years. Significance is defined differently across 
I disciplines; some sciences require replication studies instead of relying on p values. I 
I reported bothp values above to demons^ate the arbitrary and sometimes misleading 
: aspect of null hypothesis significance testing with p  values. A ‘significant’ finding 
I could become ‘not significant’, when the research question is subtly refrained. 1 have 
I chosen to explore these data using normative statistical tools in order to generate 
I dialogue about cisgenderism among quantitative researchers._____________________
[5.3.2.2] Cognitive salience o f misgendering by perspective 
I tested whether perspective would affect the cognitive salience of misgendering. I 
conducted a chi-square test to detennine whether there was a statistically significant 
association between perspective as targets or sources and participants having 
reported either having been misgendered or having misgendered others. The 
association between cognitive salience and perspective approached significance, with 
53 (73.61%) of the 72 targets who reported having been misgendered and 37 
(57.81%) of the 64 sources who reported having misgendered others, f { \ , N =  136)
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= 3.1S,p = .052 (two-tailed) [one-tailed Exactp  = .039]. Having been misgendered 
was marginally more cognitively salient than having misgendered others.
[53.2.3] Perceived effects o f being misgendered by perspective, self-reported 
identity document match, and self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status fo r  participants 
who reported having experienced misgendering
I tested whether the perceived adverse effects of misgendering varied by perspective, 
self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status, and self-reported identity document match 
among targets and sources who reported either having been misgendered or having 
misgendered others. I conducted 2 (perspective: targets, sources) x 2 (self-reported 
perceived ‘trans ’ status: perceived as ‘trans ’ by others, not perceived as ‘trans ’ by 
others) and 2  (perspective: targets, sources) x 2  (self-reported identity document 
match: matching, mismatched) between-participants ANOVAs to test the possible 
effects of the independent variables of perspective, self-reported perceived ‘trans’ 
status, and self-reported identity document match on the dependent variables of 
adverse mood impact, intensity of ostracism, threatened needs, and perceived dislike 
among targets and sources who reported either having been misgendered or having 
misgendered others. Due to low cell frequencies, it was not possible to use 
MANOVAs. Nor was it possible to test meaningfully for interactions between the 
two independent variables of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status and self-reported 
identity document match in this experiment.
[5.3.2.3.1] Effects on adverse mood impact 
There was a statistically significant main effect of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ 
status on adverse mood impact, F  (\, 65) = 12.62, jo = .001, = .163, observed
power = .938. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others (M=  23.55, 
SD = 3.78) rated the adverse mood impact of being misgendered as greater than 
people not perceived as ‘trans ’ (M= 19.88, SD = 4.39). Perspective did not have a 
statistically significant main effect on adverse mood impact.
There was a statistically significant interaction effect between perspective and 
self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status, F  (\, 65) = 7.82,/? = .007, Pp^  = .107, observed 
power = .787 (see Figure 2). For targets, people who reported being perceived as
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‘trans ’ (M= 24.06, SD  = 3.86) rated the adverse m ood impact of being misgendered 
as greater than people who reported that they were not perceived as ‘trans ’ (M = 
17.95, SD  = 4.33), r(37) = -A .6 \,p  < .001. For sources, there was no statistically 
significant difference in ratings of adverse mood impact between people who 
reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ and people who reported that they were not 
perceived as ‘trans ’, r(28) = -.55,/? = .59.
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Figure 2. Interaction between self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status and perspective 
for adverse mood impact. Sources rate the adverse mood impact of misgendering 
highly regardless of perceived ‘trans’ status. Targets’ ratings of adverse mood impact 
differ according to perceived ‘trans’ status. Although people who are not perceived 
as ‘trans’ report being negatively affected, they report much lower ratings than 
people who are perceived as ‘trans’.
For perspective and identity document match, there were no statistically significant 
main effects on adverse mood impact for perspective (p = .27) or self-reported 
identity’ document match (p = .64), nor interaction effect (p = .75).
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[53.2.3.2] Effects on threatened needs 
There was a statistically significant main effect of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ 
status on threatened needs, F (l, 65) = 5.51,p = .021, r|p^  = .079, observed power 
= .643. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others (M = 16.80, SD = 
5.78) rated the adverse impact on threatened needs of being misgendered as greater 
than people who reported not being perceived as ‘trans ' (M= 14.22, SD = 5.06). 
There was not a statistically significant interaction between self-reported perceived 
‘titans ’ status and perspective for threatened needs (p = .274). There were no 
statistically significant main effects on threatened needs for perspective (p = .981) or 
self-reported identity document match {p = .187), and there was not a statistically 
significant interaction between perspective and self-reported identity document 
match for threatened needs ip = .706).
[5.3.2.3.3] Effects on intensity o f ostracism 
The main effect of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status on intensity o f ostracism 
approached significance, F (l, 6 6 ) = 3.89,/? = .053, tjp^  = .056, observed power 
= .493. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others (M =8.17, SD =
3.50) rated the intensity o f ostracism of being misgendered as greater than people not 
perceived as ‘trans' {M= 7.33, SD = 3.22). Perspective did not have a statistically 
significant main effect on intensity o f ostracism (p = .308), and there was not a 
statistically significant interaction between perspective and self-reported perceived 
‘trans ’ status for intensity o f ostracism (p = .091).
The main effect of self-reported identity document match on intensity o f  
ostracism approached significance, 7 (^1, 6 6 ) = 3.89,/? = .053, r|p^  = .056, observed 
power = .493. People who reported being having matching identity documents {M= 
7.51, SD = 3.39) rated the intensity o f ostracism of being misgendered as lesser than 
people with mismatched identity documents {M= 8.18, SD = 3.25). Perspective did 
not have a statistically significant main effect on intensity o f ostracism, and there was 
not a statistically significant interaction between perspective and self-reported 
identity document match for intensity o f ostracism.
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[5.3.2.3.4] Effects on perceived dislike 
There were no statistically significant main effects of perspective (p = .251) or self- 
reported perceived ‘trans ' status {p = .746) on perceived dislike. There was no 
statistically significant interaction between perspective and self-reported perceived 
‘trans ’ status (p = .795).
There were no statistically significant main effects of perspective (p = .931) or 
self-reported identity document match (p = .962) on perceived dislike. However, 
there was a statistically significant interaction between perspective and self-reported 
identity document match for perceived dislike, F (l, 65) = 7.44, p  = .008, r|p^  = .103. 
observed power = .766 (see Figure 3). For targets, people who reported having 
matching identity documents (M= 9.61, SD = 2.55) rated the perceived dislike of 
being misgendered as greater than people who reported having mismatched identity 
documents {M= 7.88, SD = 1.64), t(31) = .077. For sources, people who reported 
having matching identity documents (M = 7.90, SD = 2.22) rated the perceived 
dislike of being misgendered as lower than people who reported having mismatched 
identity documents (M= 9.70, SD = 2.31).
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Figure 3. Interaction between self-reported identity document match and perspective 
for perceived dislike. Targets who reported having matching identity documents 
rated the perceived dislike of being misgendered as marginally greater than targets 
who reported having mismatched  identity documents. Sources who reported having 
matching identity documents rated the perceived dislike of being misgendered as 
lower than people who reported having mismatched identity documents.
[5.3.2.4] Self-reported experiences o f  misgendering
Among the 138 participant narratives in Experiment 1, only 38 participants (27.54%) 
reported not being able to remember any experiences of either having been 
misgendered or having misgendered others. Among the 100 participants who 
reported either having been misgendered or having misgendered others, 33 reported a 
specific instance of misgendering, 29 reported that they often experienced 
misgendering, 22 reported infrequent experiences of misgendering, and 7 reported 
experiences of misgendering that were temporally linked to a recent change in 
prefened pronouns and/or gender. There were 83 participants who reported having 
experienced actual misgendering, seven who reported having experienced desired 
gendering in a way that differed from an external gender presentation (see Section
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5.5.8 for descriptions of desired gendering), and two responses were missing or 
unclear. Participants in Experiment 1 reported misgendering experiences that 
occurred in a variety of media, including 55 in person or by video, ten by phone or 
radio, nine by third person only, and five in text.
Participants used a variety of explanatory resources to explain their experiences 
of misgendering, with 14 participants attributing the misgendering to physical 
characteristics, 13 to hairstyle, 11  to voice, 1 0  to sociolinguistic reasons (e.g., 
perceived grammatical need to use a gendered pronoun), 8  to difficulty adapting to 
changes in preferred gender language, and five each to behaviour, dress, the newness 
of a gender identity, and ‘trans’ status. Three participants attributed misgendering to 
age. Only two reported that that the misgendering was random or unexplainable.
These reported categories of physical characteristics, hairstyle, voice, sociolinguistic 
reasons, changes in preferred gender language, behaviour, dress, newness of gender 
identity, and ‘trans’ status were used to structure the discussion of participant 
narratives below.
A roughly even amount of 33 participants described the misgendering as 
justified, in comparison to 32 participants who described it as unjustified. Among 
participants who assigned blame for experiences in which a person was misgendered 
by others, 45 blamed the source or society and 27 blamed the target.
[5.3.3] Discussion
Contrary to widespread popular belief, misgendering is a common human experience. 
Most people reported experiences of misgendering. Although more people who 
reported being perceived as ‘trans’ by others reported having been misgendered by 
others than those who did not, most people who reported that they would not be 
perceived as ‘trans’ also reported having been misgendered. Regardless of perceived 
‘trans’ status, most people also reported having misgendered others, including almost 
two-thirds of people who reported that they would be perceived as ‘trans’. Most 
people who reported having matching identity documents also reported having been 
misgendered. The finding that misgendering has greater cognitive salience for people 
who are misgendered by others than for people who misgender others may account
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for the popular belief that misgendering is rare and that only people who are 
perceived as ‘trans’ experience being misgendered. These findings suggest that being 
misgendered by others and misgendering others are normative human experiences 
that deserve attention beyond the limitations of the ‘ cisgender/transgender ’ gender 
binary and by researchers across a variety of subject areas and population 
demographics.
Although being misgendered is a common experience, my findings indicate 
that being misgendered has a greater negative impact on the mood of people who 
report being perceived as ‘trans’ by others than on those who do not. Interestingly, 
although being misgendered had a greater negative impact on the mood of targets 
who report being perceived as ‘trans’ than on those who did not, there was no 
statistically significant difference by self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status for sources’ 
ratings of adverse mood impact. These findings indicate that differences in the 
negative emotional impact of misgendering are not solely about perceived identity 
categories or ‘trans experience’, but may instead be due to a combination of the 
empathy gap described by Nordgren et al. (2011) and the broader societal 
implications that being misgendered can have for people who are perceived as ‘trans’ 
by others and thus experience systemic gender and body delegitimisation. This 
interpretation is consistent with my finding that people who report being perceived as 
‘trans’ by others rate the adverse mood impact, threat to their core needs, and extent 
of ostracism as greater than those who report not being perceived as ‘trans’.
Targets with matching identity documents perceived greater mutual dislike 
with people who misgendered them than was reported by targets with mismatched 
documents, despite people with mismatched documents rating misgendering as more 
ostracising than people with matching documents. Yet sources of misgendering with 
matching identity documents rated targets’ perceived mutual dislike with people who 
misgendered them as lower than sources with mismatched identity documents. This 
interaction effect illustrates the psychoemotive functions of both cisgenderist 
privilege and the empathy gap for social pain. Targets with matching identity 
documents, whose genders have been legitimised by administrative officials, may 
have the cisgenderist privilege of feeling that they deserve to be gendered by others
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in accordance with their wishes, whereas those with mismatched identity documents 
may perceive less mututal dislike with people who misgender them, because they 
feel less entitled to having their genders respected by others. Sources with matching 
identity documents, who may have less frequent experiences of having been 
misgendered than sources with mismatched identity documents, may underestimate 
the extent to which people perceive mutual dislike with those who misgender them 
due to an empathy gap effect.
Most participants reported having either been misgendered or having 
misgendered others. Contrary to popular assumptions that ‘regular people’ do not 
experience being misgendered by others, most targets who reported not being 
perceived as ‘trans’ reported having been misgendered by others. In addition, most 
sources who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ reported having misgendered others. 
Although most people reported having been misgendered or having misgendered 
others, people were more likely to recall having been misgendered than to recall 
having misgendered others. This result may help to explain the popular perception 
misgendering is rare and that only people with gender presentations that are judged 
to be ‘atypical’ or ‘ambiguous’ experience being misgendered by others. This finding 
suggests that people may misgender others without realising they have done so.
Targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ rated the adverse mood 
impact of being misgendered as lower than targets who reported being perceived as 
‘trans’, but there was no statistically significant difference in adverse mood impact 
ratings between sources who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ and those who 
reported that they were not. Adverse mood impact ratings of people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’ were not consistently different from those of people who 
reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. The adverse effects of being misgendered are 
normative human responses to gender delegitimisation and not the result of any 
fundamental distinction between ‘trans’ and ‘cis’ people. This evidence does not 
support the essentialist notion of ‘the transperson’ as a fundamentally distinct type of 
being, nor the idea that the emotional experiences and responses reported by 
‘transpeople’ warrant distinct nomenclature (e.g., ‘transtrauma’, ‘cisnormativity’, 
‘cisprivilege’ in contrast to simply trauma, normativity, and privilege). The
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particularisation of ‘transpeople’s’ gender experiences in research literature, however 
well-intentioned, functions to marginalise forms of gender and body delegitimisation 
experienced by ‘transpeople’; to increase the invisibility of gender and body 
delegitimisations experienced by people who are not classified as ‘trans’ by others; 
and to problematise ‘transpeople’s’ responses to gender-related delegitimisation. In 
so doing, this linguistic manoeuver shifts the focus away from the harm caused by 
acts of gender delegitimisation towards a ‘victim-blaming’ ideology.
Based on these data, misgendering does not appear to fit Williams’ (2009) 
model of ostracism. Given Williams’ (2009) concept of ostracism as a group-level 
form of exclusion and marginalisation that can function at the individual level, if 
misgendering were a form of ostracism, I would expect more of an empathy gap as 
documented by findings of consistent, statistically significant differences by self- 
reported perceived ‘trans’ status for all dependent variables.
[5.3.3. IJ Limitations
Experiment I only asked people to rate adverse impact based on actual experiences 
of being misgendered or misgendering others. This meant that many participants who 
did not recall being misgendered or misgendering others exited the survey prior to 
completing the adverse impact scales and/or demographic questions. I conducted a 
second experiment to reduce missing demographic variables from participants who 
did not report having been sources or targets of misgendering.
[5.4] Experiment 2
Experiment 2 used the same variables and instructions as Experiment 1, with an 
additional instruction for sources and targets who did not report having been 
misgendered or having misgendered others. This additional instruction meant that 
participants who did not report having been targets or sources of misgendering could 
continue responding to the study questions by imagining rather than recalling an 
experience of being misgendered by others or misgendering others. This added 
instruction permitted the addition of an independent variable for experience type, 
which classified participant responses based on whether they had imagined versus 
recalled an experience of being misgendered or having misgendered others. Given
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that demographic questions were placed at the conclusion of the study in both 
experiments to avoid priming, the greater potential completion rate facilitated by the 
addition of an imagined misgendering option in Experiment 2 also permitted more 
cross-group comparisons than in Experiment 1.
[5.4.1] Method
[5.4.1.1] Participants
After blank surveys and duplicates were removed, there were 295 participants 
recruited using the same method as for Experiment 1 above. My Facebook Wall 
posts for Experiment 2 were reposted multiple times by respondents from diverse 
geographical regions that included Australia, Germany, Israel, Palestine, the 
Philippines, the United States, and Kenya. Fourteen participants who did not respond 
to the experimental condition that they were instructed to follow were removed from 
the sample. In total, 281 participants were included in the data set.
[5.4.1.1.1] Sample demographics 
As in Experiment I, participant locations were recorded through the automated 
GeoTracking feature in SurveyGizmo. The sample included 101 participants located 
in the United Kingdom and ICI participants in the United States (35.94% each), 
Australia had 14 participants (5.00%), the Philippines had 11 (3.91%), and South 
Africa had ten (3.56%). Canada had seven (2.50%), Germany had five (1.78%), and 
France had four (1.42%). Italy and New Zealand each had three participants (1.07%). 
Ireland, the Netherlands, Singapore, and Sweden each had two participants (<I% 
each). Cyprus, Denmark, Guernsey, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mozambique, 
Palestinian Territory, Portugal, Romania, Switzerland, and United Arab Emirates 
each had one participant (<I% each). GeoTracking data were blank for two 
participants (<I%). Of the 188 participants who provided their age, participants 
reported ages from 18- 74 (M= 36.32, Mdn = 32, SD = 13.08). Of the 187 
participants who reported their profession, there were 63 paraprofessionals (33.69%), 
50 professionals (26.74%), 41 students (21.93%), 15 skilled labourers (8.02%), II 
unemployed people (5.88%), four retired people (2.14%), and three homemakers 
(1.60%). As participants reported multiple terms for their ethnicities, ethnicity terms 
were calculated as distinct rather than mutually exclusive. Of the 187 participants for
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whom this demographic information was available, 101 identified as white; 42 as 
Irish, British, Scottish or another regional UK-based identity (e.g., Celtic); 22 as 
European (e.g., Polish, Italian, Dane, etc.); 19 as human, none, mixed, or another 
response (e.g., hybrid); 15 as one or more Asian identities (e.g.. South Asian, 
Filipino-Chinese, Chinese-American, etc.); 13 as Jewish; 13 as American or 
Canadian; 7 as African-American, Black, or a regional African-based identity (e.g., 
Nigerian); 6  as Indigenous or a First Nation ethnicity (e.g.. Native American, 
Mi’kmaq); 6  as Latino or a Spanish-speaking ethnicity; 4 as Australian or New 
Zealander; and 3 as Middle Eastern or Arab. As participants reported multiple terms 
for their genders, gender terms were calculated as distinct rather than mutually 
exclusive. Of the 188 participants who reported their gender, 102 identified as 
female; 32 as genderqueer, pangender, or mixed; 32 as male; 21 as women; 9 as trans, 
transgender or transsexual; 8  as fluid, gender-fluid, or variable (e.g., ‘depends on 
who is around’); 7 as no gender, agender, androgynous, or neutrois; 6  as other; 6  as 
intersex; 5 as feminine; 5 using terms associated with sexuality rather than gender 
(e.g., straight, gay, etc.); 4 identified as cis or cisgender; 4 as men or Lalaki (Filipino 
for man); 32 as genderqueer or mixed; and feminine or femme; and 2 as masculine or 
Butch. One participant each described their genders using language such as ‘not 
typical’, ‘gender variant’, ‘gender non-specific’, ‘unconventional 0 +’ or 
‘complicated’. One participant described having a gender that was ‘funny, cute, 
sensitive’, without reference to societally legitimised gender categories.
As in Experiment 1, the targeted recruitment of participants from intersex, 
‘trans’ and genderqueer sites in Experiment 2 resulted in a higher percentage of 
gender independent people than may be typical in the general population. Of the 190 
participants who responded to a question, ‘Based on your current self-described 
gender and your sex designation at birth, would other people classify you as ’trans’ 
(e.g., transgender or transsexual)?’, 139 (73.16%) reported that other people would 
not classify them as ‘trans’, whilst 51 (26.84%) reported that other people would 
classify them as ‘trans’. Of the 51 people who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ by 
others, 31 (60.78%) reported having matching identity documents and 20 (39.22%) 
reported having mismatched identity documents. Of the 51 participants who reported 
that other people would classify them as ‘trans’, 16 (31.37%) reported that they did
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not classify themselves as ‘trans’. Of these 16 participants, six participants (37.50%) 
reported that they were intersex. In total, 22 (11.58%) of the 190 participants 
reported that they were intersex. Of these 22 participants, ten participants (45.45%) 
reported that they would neither classify themselves as ‘trans’ nor be perceived as 
‘trans’ by others, six (27.27%) reported that they would both classify themselves as 
‘trans’ and beperceivedhy others as ‘trans’, and six (27.27%) reported that they 
would be perceived as ‘trans’ by others but that they did not classify themselves as 
‘trans’.
[5.4. L I .2] Self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status and self-reported identity 
document match
As in Experiment 1, the independent categorical variable of self-reported perceived 
‘trans’ status had two levels: perceived as ‘trans’ and not perceived as ‘trans’. The 
independent categorical variable of self-reported identity document match had two 
levels: matching and mismatched.
I tested whether self-reported identity document match varied by self-reported 
perceived ‘trans’ status. I conducted a chi-square test to test whether there was a 
difference in self-reported identity document match for people who reported being 
perceived as ‘trans’ and those who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. There was 
a statistically significant difference between people who reported being perceived as 
‘trans’ and those who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ for self-reported 
identity document match, with more people who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ 
reporting mismatched identity documents, { \ ,N =  190) = 20.06,/? < .001. These 
two variables have both been used in this analysis because they measure distinct 
components of societal gender recognition. Of the 139 participants who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’, 124 (89.21%) reported having matching identity 
documents. In contrast, only 31 (60.78%) of 51 participants who reported being 
perceived as ‘trans’ reported having matching identity documents. Table 2 displays 
the frequencies of participants who reported having matching and mismatched 
identity documents by self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status.
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Table 2. Frequency of self-reported matching identity documents by self-reported 
perceived ‘trans’ status
Perceived ‘trans’ status Identity document match
Matching Mismatched Total
Not perceived as ‘trans’ 124 15 139
Perceived as ‘trans’ 31 2 0 51
[5.4.1.2] Design
As in Experiment 1, this experiment used a between-participants design to test for 
variation in four dependent continuous variables, adverse mood impact, threatened 
needs, intensity of ostracism, and perceived dislike) by three independent categorical 
variables with two levels each: perspective (sources, targets), self-reported perceived 
trans status {perceived as ‘trans’, not perceived as ‘trans’) and self-reported identity 
document match (matching, mismatched). A fourth independent categorical variable, 
experience type, was added to Experiment 2 to distinguish between participants 
whose survey responses were based on imagined or recalled experiences of 
misgendering. Experience type was a categorical independent variable coded as 0 = 
imagined or 1 = recalled. Participants were coded as 1 if they reported having 
experienced misgendering and as 0  if they did not.
As in Experiment 1, online participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions and asked to describe in writing an experience of misgendering. In the 
targets condition, participants were asked about having been misgendered. In the 
sources condition, participants were asked about having misgendered others. 
Participants who did not report actual experiences of misgendering were instructed to 
respond based on a hypothetical experience of misgendering. The dependent 
measures were adverse mood impact, threatened needs, intensity of ostracism, and 
perceived dislike. Narratives were analysed inductively to explore circumstances of 
the misgendering.
[5.4.1.3] Measures
This study used the dependent variables of adverse mood impact, intensity o f  
ostracism, threatened needs, and perceived dislike, as described in Experiment 1.
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The measures all had good inter-item reliability; Adverse Mood Impact a = .< 
Threatened Needs a = .747; Intensity o f Ostracism a = .731; Perceived Dislike a 
= .753.
[5.4.1.4] Materials and procedure
The materials and procedure were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with the 
following instruction added in bolded text at the bottom of the first question in the 
survey:
If you cannot recall having had this experience, please write 'none' or 
'N /A ' in the text box and PLEASE ANSWER ALL FURTHER QUESTIONS ON 
OTHER PAGES OF THIS STUDY IMAGINING HOW IT WOULD BE TO HAVE 
HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.
[5.4.2] Results
Recall that Experiment 2 tested the hypotheses that being misgendered is a rare 
experience among people who report not being perceived as ‘trans’, and common 
among people who report being perceived as ‘trans’; that misgendering would be 
more cognitively salient for targets than for sources; that people asked to report 
experiences as targets would rate these experiences as having greater adverse effects 
than people asked to report experiences as sources; that people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’ would rate being misgendered as having lesser adverse 
effects than those who reported being perceived as ‘trans’; and that people who 
reported having mismatched identity documents would rate being misgendered as 
having greater adverse effects than those who reported having matching identity 
documents.
As in Experiment 1, parametric tests were used for variables with z-scores < ± 
1.96 for skewness and kurtosis. Non-parametric tests were used for variables with z > 
± 1.96 for skewness and kurtosis, except when otherwise stated. All two-group 
comparisons were tested with two-tailed significance levels of 0.05, unless otherwise 
specified. Holm’s (1979) sequential Bonferroni correction was used to determine 
significance for three-group comparisons; in such cases. Holm set significance 
at .05/3 or .017 for the most significant result, .05/2 or .025 for the second most
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significant result and .05/1 or .05 for the third most significant result. Fisher’s Exact 
p  values were used for tests of categorical variables where one or more cells had an 
observed value of < 5. Relations between variables beyond the main hypotheses were 
discussed in this analysis i i p<  .07.
[5.4.2.1] How widespread is misgendering?
I tested whether misgendering was a commonly reported experience across all 
participants. I added reported cases of misgendering for targets and sources. As 
displayed in Table 3, more than half of participants reported having either been 
misgendered or having misgendered others. Of the 155 targets, 93 (60.00%) reported 
having been misgendered, and 62 (49.21%) of the 126 sources reported having 
misgendered others. Overall, having been misgendered and having misgendered 
others were common experiences among participants.
Table 3. Reported experiences of misgendering by perspective.
Reported Targets- Being misgendered Sources- Misgendering others
Yes 93(60%0 62 (49.2%)
No 62 (40%) 64 (50.79%)
Total 155 (100%) 126(100%))
[5.4.2.1.1] Do targets who report not being perceived as ‘trans ’ experience 
being misgendered?
I tested whether participant data would confirm the popular perception that only 
‘trans’ people are targets of misgendering. Of the 106 targets for whom demographic 
information was available, 70 (66.04%) reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. 
Based on popular perception, there would be zero cases of reported experiences of 
having been misgendered among these 70 targets. I counted the number of reported 
cases of having been misgendered among targets who reported not being perceived 
as ‘trans’. Of the 70 targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’, 44 (62.86%) 
reported having been misgendered. Of these 44 cases, 38 (86.36%) were cases of 
actual misgendering and six (13.64%) were cases in which the reported experience 
constituted desired gendering rather than actual misgendering, based on the criteria 
described in Experiment 1. People who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ were
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much more likely to have been misgendered than is commonly believed; this finding 
replicates the similar result in Experiment 1.
[5.4.2.1.2] Do sources who report being perceived as ‘trans ’ mis gender 
others?
Of the 84 sources for whom demographic information was available, 15 reported 
being perceived as ‘trans \ Of these 15 cases, 10 (66.67%) reported having 
misgendered others.
[5.4.2.1.3] Cognitive salience o f misgendering by perspective
I tested whether misgendering would be more cognitively salient for targets, who 
were misgendered, than for sources, who misgendered others. Specifically, I used a 
chi-square test to determine whether there was an association between the 
independent variable of perspective {targets vs. sources) and participant reports of 
having either been misgendered or having misgendered others. The association 
between perspective and having reported an experience of being misgendered or 
misgendering others approached significance, ( % ^(1, # =  281) = 3.27,/? = .070.
[5.4.2.1.4] Cognitive salience o f misgendering by self-reported perceived 
‘trans ’ status
Next, I tested my second hypothesis that being misgendered would be rare for people 
who reported not being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others and common for people who 
reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ by others. Specifically, I conducted a chi-square 
test to test whether there was a statistically significant association between the 
independent variable of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status {perceived as ‘trails ’ v. 
not perceived as ‘trans ’ by others) and reported past experience of having either been 
misgendered or having misgendered others. There was a statistically significant 
association between self-reported perceived ‘trans ' status and reported experiences 
of having either been misgendered or having misgendered others, % \ l , N =  190) = 
13.23,/? < .001. Misgendering had significantly greater cognitive salience for people 
who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ than for those who reported not being 
perceived as ‘trans’.
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[5.4.2.L5] Cognitive salience o f misgendering by self-reported identity 
document match
I tested whether the cognitive salience of misgendering varied by self-reported 
identity document match. I used a chi-square test to determine whether there was a 
statistically significant association between self-reported identity document match 
and reported experiences of being misgendered or having misgendered others. There 
was a statistically significant association between self-reported identity document 
match and reported experiences of misgendering, with people who reported having 
mismatched identity documents significantly more likely to report having 
experienced misgendering, (1, N = 190) = 13.71,/? < .001. Misgendering had 
significantly greater cognitive salience for people who reported having mismatched 
identity documents than for people who reported having matching identity 
documents.
People who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ were significantly more likely 
to report either having been misgendered or having misgendered others. To explore 
this finding, I counted participants’ reported experiences of having either been 
misgendered or having misgendered others. As displayed in Table 4, being 
misgendered or having misgendered others is an experience shared by most people, 
whether they are perceived as ‘trans’ or not.
Table 4. Reported experiences of misgendering by perceived ‘trans’ status.
Reported Perceived as ‘trans’ Not perceived as ‘trans’
Yes 45 (88.24%) 84 (60.43%)
No 6  (13.33%) 55 (39.57%)
Total 51(100%) 139 (100%)
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[5.4.2.1.6] Cognitive salience o f misgendering by gender experience 
I tested whether the cognitive salience of misgendering varied by gender experience.
I used a chi-square test to determine whether there was a statistically significant 
association between gender experience and reported experiences of misgendering. 
There was a statistically significant association between gender experience and 
reported experiences of misgendering, Fisher’s Exact /? < .001. Misgendering had 
significantly less cognitive salience for people who reported not being perceived as 
‘trans ’ and having matching identity documents, with only 67 of 118 participants 
(56.78%) who reported not being perceived as ‘trans ’ and having matching identity 
documents reporting that they either had been misgendered or had misgendered 
others. In contrast, 29 of 36 participants (80.56%) who reported being perceived as 
‘trans ’ and having matching identity documents, and 30 of 32 participants (93.75%) 
who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ and having mismatched identity documents 
reported either having been misgendered or having misgendered others.
[5.4.2.2] Perceived effects o f misgendering by perspective and gender experience for  
participants who reported having experienced misgendering 
I conducted a series of 2x2 between-participants ANOVAs to test the relations 
between the independent variables of perspective, self-reported identity document 
match, and self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status, and their effects on perceived 
adverse effects of being misgendered {adverse mood impact, threatened needs, 
intensity o f ostracism, perceived dislike). Due to small cell counts, it was not possible 
to perform a 2x2x2 ANOVA that incorporated the independent variables adequately. 
Therefore, I performed ANOVAs for each of the four dependent variables {adverse 
mood impact, threatened needs, intensity o f ostracism, perceived dislike) using (self- 
reported perceived ‘trans ’ status * self-reported identity document match), (self- 
reported perceived ‘trans ’ status * perspective), and (self-reported identity document 
match * perspective) separately.
[5.4.2.2.1] Effects o f  self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status * self-reported 
identity document match
Self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status had a statistically significant main effect on 
adverse mood impact, F{\, 117) = 5.10,p  = .019, r]^ = .046, observed power = .659.
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People who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ (M= 23.02, SD = 4.88) rated the 
adverse mood impact of being misgendered as greater than people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’ (M= 20.17, SD = 4.71). Self-reported identity document 
match did not have a statistically significant main effect on adverse mood impact {p 
= .231). There was no statistically significant interaction effect between self-reported 
perceived ‘trans ’ status and self-reported identity document match on adverse mood 
impact (p = .211).
Self-reported identity document match had a statistically significant main 
effect on perceived dislike, F(l, 116) = 4.59,p  = .034, t? = .038, observed power 
= .565. People who reported having matching identity documents (M= 8.59, SD =
2.51) rated the effects of being misgendered on perceived dislike as greater than 
people who reported having mismatched identity documents (M= 8.82, SD = 1.81). 
The main effect of self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status on perceived dislike 
approached significance, F ( l,l  16) = 3.73,/? = .056, 77 = .031, observed power
= .482. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ by others (M= 9.82, SD = 
2.21) rated the effects of being misgendered on perceived dislike as greater than 
people who reported not being perceived as ‘trans ’ (M= 9.17, SD = 2.50). There was 
no statistically significant interaction effect between self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ 
status and self-reported identity document match on perceived dislike (p =.818).
Self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status had a statistically significant main effect 
on extent o f ostracism, F{\, 116) = 4.82,/? = .005, r] ^  = .066, observed power 
= .811. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ (M= 9.32, SD = 3.30) rated 
the extent o f ostracism of being misgendered as greater than people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans’ (M = 7.34, SD = 3.19). Self-reported identity document 
match did not have a statistically significant main effect on extent of ostracism (/?
= .108). There was no statistically significant interaction effect between self-reported 
perceived ‘trans ’ status and self-reported identity document match on extent o f  
ostracism {p = .548).
Neither self-reported identity document match (p = .560) nor self-reported 
perceived ‘trans ’ status (/? = .131) had a statistically significant main effect on
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threatened needs, nor was there an interaction effect between self-reported identity 
document match and self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status {p = .588).
[5.4.2.2.2] Effects o f  self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status "^perspective 
Self-reported perceived ‘trans ’ status had a statistically significant main effect on 
adverse mood impact, F{1, 117) = 7.34, p  = .008, 77 = .059, observed power = .766.
People who reported being perceived as ‘trans ’ (M=  23.02, SD = 4.88) rated the 
adverse mood impact of being misgendered as greater than people who reported not 
being perceived as ‘trans ’ (M = 20.17, SD = 4.71). Perspective did not have a 
statistically significant effect on adverse mood impact (p = .189).
There were no statistically significant main effects on perceived dislike for 
self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status {p = .276) or perspective (p = .692), nor was 
there an interaction effect between self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status and 
perspective (p = .885).
There was a statistically significant main effect of self-reported perceived 
‘trans’ status on extent of ostracism, F (l, 116) = 4.82,/? = .030, 77 = .040, observed
power = .586. People who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ (M = 9.32, SD = 3.30) 
rated the extent of ostracism of being misgendered as greater than people who 
reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ (M = 7.34, SD = 3.19). Perspective did not 
have a statistically significant main effect on extent of ostracism (/? = .116). There 
was no statistically significant interaction effect between self-reported perceived 
‘trans’ status and perspective on extent of ostracism (/? =.373).
Neither self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status (/? = .083) nor perspective (p 
= .35) had a statistically significant main effect on threatened needs. There was no 
interaction effect between self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status and perspective (p 
= .343).
[5.4.2.2.3] Effects o f self-reported identity documents "^perspective 
There were no statistically significant main effects on adverse mood impact for self- 
reported identity document match (/? = .897) or perspective (p = .299), nor an
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interaction effect between self-reported identity document match and perspective {p 
= .871).
There were no statistically significant main effects on perceived dislike for 
self-reported identity document match {p = .140) or perspective {p = .449), nor 
interaction between self-reported identity document match and perspective (p = .874).
There were no statistically significant main effects on extent of ostracism for 
self-reported identity document match (p = .705) or perspective {p = .152), nor was 
there an interaction between self-reported identity document match and perspective 
(p = .574).
There were no statistically significant main effects on threatened needs for self- 
reported identity document match {p = .955) or perspective {p = .696), nor was there 
an interaction effect between self-reported identity document match and perspective 
(p = .543).
[5 A. 2.3] Effects o f imagined versus recalled experiences o f misgendering 
I used 2x2 between-participants ANOVAs to test the relations between the 
independent variables experience type {imagined va', recalled) and perspective 
(targets vs. sources), and their effects on the dependent variables adverse mood 
impact, perceived dislike, extent o f  ostracism, and threatened needs.
Perspective had a statistically significant effect on adverse mood impact,
F (1,228) = 10.04,/? = .002, n = .042, observed power = .884. Sources who 
imagined or recalled misgendering others (M= 21.86, 5Z) = 4.74) rating the adverse 
mood impact of being misgendered as significantly greater than targets who 
imagined or recalled being misgendered {M= 19.89, SD = 5.06). Experience type did 
not have a statistically significant effect on adverse mood impact {p = .500), and 
there was no interaction effect between perspective and experience type {p = .2 0 2 ).
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Neither perspective (p = .726) nor experience type (p = .089) had a statistically 
significant impact on perceived dislike, nor was there an interaction effect between 
perspective and experience type.
Experience type had a significant main effect on intensity o f ostracism, F (l, 
185) = 4.99,/? = .027), r]^ = .026, observed power = .604. Participants who 
imagined misgendering (M= 8.85, SD = 2.42) rating the intensity o f ostracism of 
being misgendered as greater than people who recalled misgendering others (M= 
7.91, SD = 3.39). Perspective did not have a statistically significant main effect on 
participant ratings of the intensity o f  ostracism (/? = .141). There was no interaction 
effect between perspective and experience type on the intensity o f ostracism ip 
= .367). Although there was no interaction effect, targets who imagined hQing 
misgendered rated the intensity o f ostracism as greatest (M= 9.00, SD = 2.46), and 
sources who recalled misgendering others rated the intensity o f osti'acism as lowest 
(M= 7.18,5D = 3.16).
Perspective had a statistically significant main effect on threatened needs, F{\, 
194) = 8 .6 6 ,/? = .004, r]^ = .043, observed power = .834. Sources who imagined or 
recalled misgendering others (M= 16.66, SD = 4.61) rated the extent to which being 
misgendered threatened needs as greater than targets who imagined or recalled being 
misgendered (M= 14.65, -SD = 5.21). Experience type did not significantly affect 
threatened needs (p = .148). There was no interaction effect between perspective and 
experience type.
[5.4.2.4] Self-reported experiences o f misgendering
As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 provided qualitative data in the 
form of narrative responses that supplemented the quantitative findings discussed 
above. These data were analysed using the same techniques described for the 
qualitative data in Experiment 1. Among the 281 participant responses, 6 6  
participants reported not being able to remember any experiences of misgendering,
54 reported a specific instance of misgendering, 63 reported that they often 
experienced misgendering, 34 reported infrequent experiences of misgendering, and 
2  reported experiences of misgendering that were temporally linked to a recent
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change in preferred pronouns and/or gender. There were 144 participants who 
reported having experienced actual misgendering, ten who reported having 
experienced desired gendering, and two responses were missing or unclear. 
Participants reported misgendering experiences that occurred in a variety of media, 
including 82 in person or by video, 16 by phone or radio, 15 by third person only and 
17 in text. Participants used a variety of explanatory resources to explain their 
experiences of misgendering, with 31 participants attributing the misgendering to 
physical characteristics, 30 to sociolinguistic reasons, 16 to hairstyle, 13 to dress, 12 
to voice, nine each to behaviour and to difficulty adapting to changes in preferred 
gender language, eight to trans status, seven to the newness of a gender identity, six 
each to age and to random or unexplainable misgendering and two due to not having 
yet met. A roughly even amount of 59 participants described the misgendering as 
justified, in comparison to 56 participants who described it as unjustified. Among 
participants who assigned blame for misgendering, 73 blamed the source or society 
and 49 blamed the target.
[5.4.3] Discussion
In Experiment 2 ,1 replicated the finding from Experiment 1 that misgendering was a 
common human experience that is not limited to those who are categorised as ‘trans’ 
or those who have mismatched identity documents. Most targets reported having 
been misgendered, and almost half of sources reported having misgendered others.
As in Experiment 1, most targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ 
reported having been misgendered, and most sources who reported being perceived 
as ‘trans’ reported having misgendered others. Misgendering had greater cognitive 
salience for people who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ than for those who 
reported that they were not, and greater cognitive salience for people who reported 
having mismatched identity documents than for those who reported having matching 
documents.
Experiment 2 replicated the findings from Experiment 1 that people who 
report not being perceived as ‘trans’ by others rate the experience of being 
misgendered as having a lesser negative impact on mood and as less ostracising than 
people who report that they are perceived as ‘trans’. This finding indicates that the
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common experience of misgendering may have more profound psychosocial impact 
on people who experience gender and body delegitimisation at broader societal and 
structural levels; such people may be more likely to experience social exclusion 
beyond individual acts of misgendering and to experience being misgendered in 
systemic acts that enact or promote other people’s authority to determine whether 
they are included or excluded from key domains of social life.
I also found that people who imagined or recalled misgendering others rated 
the adverse mood impact of being misgendered and the extent to which being 
misgendered threatened core needs as greater than people who imagined or recalled 
being misgendered. One possible explanation for this finding might be that people 
who may be less accustomed to being misgendered may underestimate the resilience 
of people whose experiences of being misgendered have necessitated adaptation to 
oppressive social conditions. Further research is needed to examine in depth how 
memory and imagination can affect people’s perceptions of the psychosocial 
consequencs that can result from being misgendered.
[5.5] Misgendering themes
Participant narratives from both experiments were analysed inductively using an 
open coding technique similar to that used in Grounded Theory (Glazer & Strauss, 
1967). An independent coder who was unaware of the specific hypotheses of this 
study then viewed the narratives about misgendering in the open text response fields 
and counted cases in which the codes were present. Items were then grouped 
conceptually into themes through discussion between the researcher and the 
independent coder. Note that percentages are not provided here because these counts 
reflect participants’ open narrative responses.
[5.5.1] Misgendering can happen to anyone
Contrary to claims that being misgendered only happens to people who are perceived 
as ‘trans’ by others, multiple participants who reported not being classified as ‘trans’ 
also reported being misgendered frequently due to external appearance:
Happens all the time, even though I'm buxom & femme, because my hair is 
short. Cashier in a London drug store called me sir once. To my surprise, when
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she heard my voice, she simply switched smoothly to Ma'am. Mostppl fa ll over 
themselves apologizing, even though I  don't generally correct or try to shame 
them.
If there is a lack of universal agreement between people regarding someone’s 
‘correct’ gender, this seems to be at least partly due to the presence of competing and 
seemingly contradictory cues that challenge the observer to make sense of binary 
options that do not adequately reflect people’s bodies and presentations. Thus even a 
‘buxom and femme’ woman can be misgendered ‘all the time’ because of her short 
hair. The cashier’s smooth switch from Sir to Ma’am in this interaction may 
demonstrate the fluidity with which one component of cisgenderist ideology (e.g., 
‘people with short hair are men’) can be supplanted by another (e.g., ‘people with 
high voices are women’). Despite her experiences of being persistently misgendered, 
the ‘buxom & femme’ participant is able to display the insignias of gender (see 
Garfinkel, 1967) that make ‘most ppl fall over themselves apologising’ without her 
having to correct them. In contrast, some participants who reported being classified 
as ‘trans’ by others described numerous experiences of having been intentionally 
misgendered by unapologetic sources. As one participant explained, she has 
experienced being misgendered:
Many times. Being trans* I  am often misgendered, even by people to whom I  
have introduced myself to as female, and who use my chosen, female name.
Even when this ‘trans* female’ has provided multiple gender cues to others, 
her own gender designation is disregarded. People with whom she interacts do not 
‘fall over themselves apologising’ as they do for the aforementioned ‘buxom and 
femme’ participant because this ‘trans*’ participant may not display the requisite 
physical insignia. However, sources of misgendering behaviour were not corrected 
by either participant.
Misgendering has distinct components depending on the social categories to 
which targets are perceived to belong by sources. Like the participant above, 
multiple people who identified as women reported experiences of exclusion when 
they violated norms of ‘female’ dress, hairstyle, and behaviour. Just as Stout and
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Dasgupta (2011) found that gender-exclusive language in job settings functioned to 
exclude women, the ‘buxom & femme’ participant was excluded from the category 
of ‘woman’ due to gender-exclusive physical norms that she challenged with her 
short hair. Multiple participants shared having been similarly delegitimised in a 
variety of social contexts. This suggests the need for future research to investigate 
the relation between gender delegitimisation and body delegitimisation.
[5.5.2] Physical characteristics
Trader’s (1954) medical model reflects and perpetuates the two-sex model in which 
‘females’ and ‘males’ are depicted as having distinct and discrete physical 
characteristics. Participants reported both frequent and occasional misgendering due 
to other people’s perceptions of their physical characteristics. Hair was one of the 
more frequently mentioned characteristics of external appearance. One participant 
explained:
I  am a woman and have short hair. I  am often addressed by people as Mr at 
first and then when they look 'properly' they correct themselves. They would 
often comment that they cannot clearly gender tag me because o f my hairstyle. 
This participant’s experience of being misgendered because of her hairstyle 
contrasts with the medical norm that people’s biological ‘sex’ characteristics as 
universally agreed and accepted. This participant’s assertion that people need to look 
‘properly’ implies that one cannot assign other people’s genders accurately without 
first knowing the rules, such as those Garfinkel (1967) discussed. It appears that 
cognitive attention to this cultural logic occurred between the first glance and the 
second, ‘proper’ one. This narrative also highlights the lack of universal agreement 
by illustrating that people often disagree with themselves about other people’s 
genders within moments of their previous assessments. As one participant noted, 
“people usually read me as male, but sometimes as female.”
Children’s hair was a recurring source of confusion in participants’ experiences 
of misgendering:
when I  was a child and had short hair people would sometimes refer to me as a 
‘peedie (Orkney dialect fo r small) boy’
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In addition to hair length, some participants reported that they were more likely 
to experience misgendering due to a particular hairstyle:
When I  have my hair tied hack I  am sometimes referred to as "sir" to this day, 
it happened most frequently when I  was 11-13 before I  developed any female 
characteristics. It used to offend me when I  was a child but as an adult I  shrug 
it off, it doesn't matter to me.
The malleability of gender/sex categories becomes apparent when one 
considers that perceived gender can be altered merely by tying one’s hair back. The 
participant’s statement that she did not have any ‘female characteristics’ prior to age 
13 reveals how ‘sex’ and ‘gender’ are conflated in everyday life. Although the 
participants’ genitals, gonads and genetics appear to have remained stable, so-called 
‘secondary sex characteristics’ such as breast development and other biological 
changes associated with puberty appear to be more central to the participants’ 
understanding of herself as ‘female’.
Another participant who had a stereotypically ‘feminine’ hairstyle was 
misgendered, when she put her braids up:
As a young girl I  had long braids. At the home offamily friends I  wore my 
braids pinned on top o f my head as it was a hot day. I  had a crush on the young 
boy o f the friends. He saw me walking down the stairs & told me he mistook me 
for a neighbor boy.
As in the case of the participants above, numerous participants described 
having been misgendered by others prior to puberty:
When I  was very young, around 3 years old, 1 had my hair cut short and the 
other kids at school called me a boy for a couple o f days, it was quite traumatic.
Some of the narratives above show that episodic experiences of misgendering 
can be upsetting or emotionally harmful. They also reveal that young people may 
find the adverse effects of misgendering particularly traumatic.
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Although some of the aforementioned narratives involved misgendering based 
on cursory observations and subsequent correction, some participants reported 
having been misgendered during sustained social interactions:
I  was 14 and at a party for one o f my parent's friends and got speaking to a 
woman there, at the time my hair was fairly long fo r  a boy's, and it transpired 
that throughout the conversation she had believed that I  was a girl.
Misgendering can also occur during social interactions that may involve 
romantic attraction:
i thought my ex girlfriend was a bloke when i first met her and i said to my 
mum ‘he looks like the guy from glee ’
Although people typically describe gendered attractions and relationships as 
linked to sex (e.g., ‘same-sex’ marriage), this narrative documents how people can 
misgender people to whom they are physically attracted and thus complicates the 
assumption that attraction is based on people’s actual rather than assumed biology.
[5.5.3] Attire
Clothes can also lead people to misgender others, and perceptions of people’s 
genders can in turn affect observers’ perceptions of their ages. For example, one 
participant described having been “referred to as "boy" by a woman on the street, 
presumably due to how I dress. (I am female).”
Another participant described how a man misgendered her, based on the 
gendered societal assumptions associated with hair length and clothing:
1 have very short hair, 1 was wearing shorts and was just going into the Ladies 
loo. A man shouted loudly over and over again that it was the Ladies. When I  
eventually realised he was addressing me, 1 turned round and he then saw I  
was female.
Societal assumptions about aspects of attire such as nailpolish can also be involved in 
misgendering:
1 also like to paint my nails and this often leads to people presuming I'm a 
woman because o f the societal assumptions about painted nails.
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Despite frequent use of stereotypical gender cues in explanations for misgendering 
others, observers can disregard these gender cues when making gender attributions;
I  said aloud after seeing a very cute infant in a store, "He’s so adorable!". My 
wife said quietly to me, "That’s probably a girl baby, see the pink? " I  then 
looked again realized the baby was in pink clothes, and had a pink blanket. 1 
said in the mom's direction as we walked on, "I'm soiry about that, she's very 
pretty. " I  wondered i f  the mother had taken offense. I  realized the pink 
indicated nothing to me. I  told my wife later how the mom had probably 
surrounded her baby in pink to make it clear she was female, and how our 
society goes to these lengths—that it's so important that gender be obviously 
specified and not questioned.
Other participants, both those who misgendered others and those who were 
misgendered by others, described experiences in which their gender-associated 
clothing was disregarded. One participant described having been misgendered by a 
hotel employee, who appeared to prioritise hair length over clothing when 
determining the participant’s gender:
I  was at a professional conference and checking out o f my hotel. A staff 
member referred to me as sir. 1 have short hair, but believe I  was wearing a 
dress.
Misinterpretation of clothing-based gender cues can lead to gender misattributions in 
social interactions and reveal the limitations of gender-based sexuality categories:
1 was at a party in May that was predominantly gay men and I  was dressed in 
all camouflage-1 don't think anyone actually called me 'sir' or anything, but 
when I  was talking to one o f my friends- he was told 1 was a girl, and I  could 
see some o f the other men (aside from the one 'warning' my friend) look a 
little confused when they realized I  was a woman.
[5.5.4] Name
Names are frequently used as cues to determine people’s genders, both in research 
contexts and in everyday life. Unfortunately, names appear to be far less reliable and 
accurate indicators of gender than may be commonly believed. Many names are not 
clearly gendered, which can lead people to misgender others:
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Because I  have a unisex name I  am often addressed as Sir or Mr. mistakenly. 
Thus knowing someone’s first name is not a safeguard against misgendering:
Talking about a child starting in my school, knew their name but not their 
gender. Assumed wrongly from their name they were a boy.
For one respondent who reported being classified as ‘trans’ by others, her name 
was disregarded as a suitable gender cue. Instead, her name itself was altered to 
match the listeners’ misclassification of her gender:
I  frequently get miss-gendered, usual only happens when I  am on the phone, 
people assume I  am male and even correct the spelling o f my name to the male 
equivalent...
Some names do not have gender-specific associations:
Because I  have a unisex name I  am often addressed as Sir or Mr. mistakenly. 
Multiple participants reported having misgendered others or having been 
misgendered due to linguistic variation in the gender associated with given names 
across cultures. For example, English speakers frequently make gender attributions 
based on their subjective perceptions of non-English given names. As one participant 
explained:
I  work with many people who do not have English names. I  sometimes assume 
they are male or female based purely on the sound o f their name.
One participant described having repeatedly misgendered a boy named Cormac, 
because the participant was unaware that Cormac is an English and Gaelic boy’s 
name (‘Mac’ is Gaelic for ‘son of):
I  taught an art class in an area in which many kids have wacky rich white 
person names, and I  called a pretty, petite boy named Cormac "she" fo r  weeks, 
wondering all the time why her friends didn't seem to notice she was a girl. 
Cormac was not in fact a girl or presenting as a girl.
In addition, the gender-specific associations of some fairly traditional and popular 
English given names may be unfamiliar to some English speakers. For example:
the name Gretchen - 1 thought it was a man but was later informed that it was 
a woman.
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Some participants explained misgendering as a consequence of cross-cultural 
variations in gender associations of given names:
An internet hosting company based abroad/using overseas operators addressed 
me as Mr until I  wrote and explained that Alison was a female name in the UK. 
Several participants noted similar difficulty in avoiding cross-cultural misgendering:
I  am Thai and because some Thai names are neutral I  made mistakes for a few  
times.
And:
I  once had a Chinese penpal who addressed the mailing envelope to me as 
Miss. I  wrote him my Chinese name which contained a feminine character and 
he thought I  was female.
Misgendering of people who have non-binary gender self-designations is 
sometimes explained based on the source’s perception of the gender associated with 
a particular given name:
A genderqueer friend changed their name to a more typically male sounding 
one. I  then used the pronoun 'he' about them in conversation with a second 
friend. This person looked non-commital about my pronoun use so I  contacted 
the first person on twitter DM  and they confirmed that despite the name change 
their pronoun was still 'they'
As with other factors to which people attribute their gender attributions, people can 
misgender others who have unambiguously gendered given names:
One o f my veiy dear friends is a masculine woman. When we first met I  
remember having to avoid all pronouns despite the fact that her name was 
"Ruth. " I  was still confused.
In some cases, people who engaged in misgendering insisted on using names 
associated with their gender misattribution, even after the person whom they had 
misgendered had corrected their mistake repeatedly:
I  was contacted by a senior IT  manager in my organisation in response to an 
email query I  had sent him. My forename was clearly stated on the email but 
because he heard an apparently male voice - 1 am openly transgender - he 
called me by a different male name. This happens over and over again to me. 
The conversation went like this: Him, 'Hello could I  speak to Neil?' Me, 'It's
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Nell actually.'Him, 'Yes Neil.'Me, 'No it's Nell, my name's Nell.'Him, 'Yes 
hello Neil. ' Me thought, 'Oh what's the point!' 'Yes hello. '
Although people who misgender others may attribute their gender misattributions to 
the presence of gender-associated signifiers that support these misattributions, these 
narratives suggest that people may alter their reports of gender-associated signifiers 
retroactively to justify having misgendered others.
[5.5,5] Social roles
Misgendering is often based on people’s relationship to other persons in an 
interpersonal context. The influence of gender ideology on such determinations 
becomes visible in the following examples of androcentric misgendering:
When a friend told me they had visited the doctor, I  asked “What did he say? ”, 
when - in fact - the doctor was female.
I  am often adressed [sic] in letters and emails as Mr. My first name is rare and 
many people are not able to deduct a gender from it. Especially since I  
received a Ph.D. I  receive mail adressed to Mr. It seems people imagine Ph.D. 
holders to be male.
Multiple participants who reported having non-binary genders recalled daily 
experiences of being misgendered. As one participant shared:
/  am always addressed in confused terms because o f my confusing gender 
expression.
Another participant described this dilemma:
Neither gender is a goodfit for me. I'm addressed incorrectly daily by people 
making assumptions o f which category I f i t  in.
This narrative is a reminder that assuming there are only two genders will lead to 
misgendering of people who do not identify as women or men. Multiple participants 
who reported having non-binary genders reported having been misgendered, and 
multiple participants reported having misgendered people with non-binary genders. 
Cisgenderist norms may affect the salience of people’s non-binary genders. For 
example, people may be less likely to reliably recall the preferred pronouns of people 
whose genders do not fit within this binary:
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I  am a fan o f a female-bodied genderqueer performer that prefers the pronoun 
"they". Although I  usually remember to use this pronoun, sometimes Iforget 
and use "she".
[5.5.6] Voice
In addition to misattribution of people’s genders based on these four criteria, 
misgendering also occurred when people made incorrect gender ascriptions based on 
voice:
yes I  have been called Mr on the phone as I  have a strong deepr than average 
voice. It is annoying I  would rather be given a neutral descritpor over mis 
gendering
People who were misgendered by others often reported that their visual appearance 
was disregarded when their vocal gender cues were associated with another gender:
I  have a 60/40 split o f being called by the wrong set ofpronouns, mostly I  get 
adressed [sic] as Madam, her she etc but often it is Sir, him his etc. This is 
because I  have a very public job and whilst I  lookfemale my voice isn't so they 
refer to me as male.
Misgendering can have a profound effect on people’s everyday lives and their 
access to community resources. The following narrative illustrates how much impact 
being misgendered can have even over the telephone:
I  am on the phone to someone in a call centre, I  ask them a question to which 
they do not know the answer. They turn away to a supervisor and say 'I have a 
lady on the phone who... ' this made me feel veiy embarrassed so 1 hung up 
before they came back on 
The participants’ withdrawal from the interaction was a direct result of the call centre 
operator’s misgendering language. Multiple participants reported having withdrawn 
from situations in which they were misgendered. This experience also supports a 
view of misgendering as a form of ostracism.
[5.5.7] Passing
Serano (2007) asserted that framing gender misattribution experiences of gender 
independent people as ‘passing’ treats misgendering as a natural consequence of such
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people’s characteristics instead of as an active form of gender delegitimisation. 
Multiple participants who reported that others would classify them as ‘trans’ used the 
concept of passing to explain their experiences of having been misgendered:
When I  didn’t ‘pass ' and was not respected in my gender, people (including my 
friends and family) would call me by the wrong pronouns, name, and title. It 
made me pretty depressed and confused.
Multiple participants also linked passing to being less frequently misgendered 
by others:
I  am a Transwoman and this can happen frequently, although I  do find  I  am 
passing fairly well now but I  am finding it very hard to use my feminine voice 
in public and once this happens things should be even better.
The participant above appears to blame herself for her having been misgendered due 
to her not having used her ‘feminine voice in public’. In contrast to this participant’s 
self-critical narrative, multiple ‘cis’ participants expressed with firm clarity that their 
having been misgendered was due to another person’s error:
I  received mail yesterday addressed to Mr instead o f Miss. But this was 
obviously a mistake and there was no offence intended (emphasis added) 
People’s physical characteristics are used to legitimise other people’s 
misgendering behaviour. People may be particularly vulnerable to being 
misgendered at the beginning of a gender affirmation process. People who seek 
gender affirmation are typically misgendered
Many times, mostly throughout the earlier stages o f medical transition and it 
could be anywhere; by anyone.
The contrasts between these narratives provide support for Serano’s (2007) 
claim regarding the unequal validity given to gender independent people’s claims 
about their genders. The availability of medical interventions for gender affirmation, 
which is governed by medical norms, affects people’s ability to acquire physical 
insignia that grant social legitimacy to their genders. Thus the public lives of gender 
independent people are constrained by their ability to access medical gender 
affirmation services.
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[5.5.8] Desired gendering
An approach that focuses on ‘trans’ people’s ability to ‘pass’ while treating gender 
attributions of people who are not classified as ‘trans’ as unremarkable phenomena is 
likely to obscure the complexities and contradictions of gender misattributions. This 
complexity is highlighted by examples in my sample of misgendering that was 
actually desired gendering. For example, three participants in the target condition 
indicated that they had not actually been misgendered because they have genderqueer, 
fluid or bi-gender genders (e.g., a participant who identified their gender as ‘balanced, 
androgynous, bigender, genderqueer’ described the following incident:
People usually read me as male, but sometimes as female. For the purposes o f  
this study, since most people consider me male, Pll describe the time I  was at a 
quick-service restaurant in Gainesville, Florida, a liberal college town in a 
conservative area. I  was clean-shaven and my hair was long enough to be 
ambiguous or feminine, and I  was waiting in line with my head down. The clerk 
asked, "What will you have, ma'am?" and then backtracked: " S ir?  Pm sorry. 
SIR. " I  laughed and smiled and said "You addressed me with respect. That's 
the only thing that matters. " In the comments section, this participant explained 
that “the clerk recognized a feminine part o f me (I'm genderqueer; I  think o f  
myself as both male andfemale in varying proportions, usually balanced 
within 40/60-60/40, but present as male with as much androgyny as the context 
allows.).
Similar responses were provided by a participant who described their gender as 
‘ genderqueer/female/sometimes I like to dress as a boi’, by one participant who 
identified as both intersex and trans and who referred to the supposed ‘mistake’ in 
scare quotes and by another participant who noted that ‘I felt happy with the event (I 
like my gender presentation to be ambiguous) but tense about the possible reaction of 
the colleagues I was dining with.’). One participant in the source condition stated that 
‘a former female boss insisted people call her sir, it was a military environment.’ 
Although the title ‘Sir’ does not usually match how women prefer to be described, 
this does not constitute misgendering because it was the preferred gender language of 
the military boss herself and the participant made no reference to the boss having
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objected to the use of women’s pronouns.
[5.6] General discussion
Most people appear to experience misgendering at least some of the time, regardless 
of whether they report having the same administrative gender/sex category they were 
assigned at birth and regardless of whether they report having matching identity 
documents. People often report confusion regarding other people’s genders in 
everyday social situations, including when dating or meeting a prospective partner. 
People also report confusion regarding the ‘correct’ criteria they should use to 
determine other people’s genders. Hair length and other malleable physical 
characteristics can confound social actors and such factors are often used as rationale 
for misgendering others or having been misgendered. Misgendering is a human 
experience not limited to people who are perceived as having a ‘trans’ status. 
Although misgendering is a human experience, the explanations used to justify 
misgendering and its perceived effects on targets appear to depend on a variety of 
social factors. Androcentrism and cisgenderism intersected in multiple participant 
narratives of misgendering. Misgendering can be used to exclude women from equal 
membership in professions associated with men, but it can also be used to enact 
erasure on people with non-binary genders, as in some participant narratives. These 
studies provide a new framework for understanding the ideological character of 
gender misattribution.
[5.6.1] Limitations and future research
These experiments used retrospective self-reported data. Nordgren et al. (2011) 
documented that people can underestimate their own social pain, when reporting 
incidents that occur in the past. Although the fact that all participants reported past 
experiences means that variation between participant responses is unlikely to be the 
result of this effect, the extent of variation may differ between targets and sources by 
temporal proximity to the reported event or how frequently it occurs. Another 
limitation was the lack of a pre-experimental baseline against which participant 
responses could be evaluated. Spears and Smith (2001) cautioned experimental 
psychologists against treating participants as interchangeable. Determinations of 
adverse impact may be more accurate when measured against an individual’s own
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responses prior to an experience of either being misgendered or misgendering 
another person. Given the number of variables and conditions, the small cell 
frequencies for some combined independent variables constrained the analysis.
Despite these methodological limitations, the present study provides 
compelling evidence of internal contradictions between components of cisgenderist 
gender/sex ideology and highlights that gender/sex categories operate in everyday 
life with much greater fluidity than is depicted in medical constructions of 
sex/gender such as Trader’s (1954) model. These findings challenge the popular 
beliefs that accurate gender attributions can be made by external observers without 
asking the person whose gender is being determined and that other people’s genders 
will be perceived identically by all people in a given situation. Therefore, efforts to 
reduce misgendering must ensure that gender authority is vested securely in people’s 
own hands.
[5.7] Point of Exit Text: Cisgenderism and erasure in the research situation
As discussed in earlier chapters, the settings in which experiments are conducted 
have political dimensions. However, it is not only in the actual running of 
experiments that political ideology can affect the research process. To illustrate this 
point, I will recount my experience with the University Ethics Committee from 
which I was required to receive a favourable ethical review, prior to commencing the 
online studies of misgendering described in this chapter.
In most academic institutions, review by an Institutional Review Board (IRB) 
or ethics committee has become a requirement of the research process, and the 
practice of relying on university ethics committees has become an international 
standard (Edgar & Rothman, 1995). Although such committees are often depicted as 
authoritative bodies that can inspire public confidence, I had a different experience. 
One of the first respondents to my recruitment text post stated that ‘previous 
experience with academic surveys suggests that approval by an "ethics committee" is 
meaningless as far as trans people are concerned.’ For this participant and for many 
of my other participants, my background in ‘intersex’ and ‘trans’ activism and the 
various testimonials people posted about me in ‘trans-only’ and ‘intersex-only’
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spaces were far more pivotal to people’s willingness to participate in my research. 
This institutionally unauthorised and geographically disparate ‘ethics committee’, in 
the form of ‘trans-only’ and ‘intersex-only’ social networks, filled an essential role in 
safeguarding participants in my recruitment process that the institutionally authorised 
ethics committee did not.
My supervisor and I were both misgendered during the administrative process 
of seeking formal ethical review for studies of misgendering. The participant 
experience quoted above tracks with my own encounters with my University Ethics 
Committee (UEC), who often responded to my ethics applications for cisgenderism 
research with behaviour characteristic of the ideology I was applying to study. In 
written responses to my proposed study of misgendering, a senior ethics committee 
member repeatedly misgendered my supervisor—a man who was assigned male at 
birth—by calling him ‘she’ and a ‘woman’ (personal correspondence). This 
misattribution occurred despite my supervisor’s stereotypically ‘male’ name Peter. 
An application to study whether people who misgender others underestimate the 
extent of social exclusion and emotional harm experienced by people who are 
misgendered was challenged by several members of the committee, who 
characterised the response options for emotional reaction questions—drawn from 
established research by scholars studying social exclusion (Stout & Dasgupta,
2011)—as ‘overly dramatic’ and ‘exaggerated’ (personal correspondence). The 
committee’s underestimation of the severe harm experienced by people who are 
misgendered by others (e.g., Rorvig, 2012) was characteristic of the empathy gap I 
aimed to study. This invalidation of my emotional reactions caused the very kind of 
emotional harm from which ethics committees are intended to spare research 
participants. For many people, misgendering is a painful everyday experience that 
can lead to social exclusion (e.g., Rorvig, 2012). By challenging my description of 
misgendering as an ‘everyday situation’, the committee again invoked their 
experiential privilege in a way that de-legitimised my experiences of having been 
misgendered frequently and the experiences of the many people who have reported 
being misgendered many times daily.
251
Chapter 5
Self-Reports of Cisgenderism in Everyday Life
The committee also explicitly employed the ‘experience as expertise’ discourse 
in additional ways. The committee acknowledged some of their comments as 
‘methodological rather than ethics’ (personal correspondence), their claim to 
methodological authority relying on the fact that ‘one UEC member knows two 
people who had a sex change (sic) from man (sic) to woman who are now lesbians’ 
(personal correspondence). The role of cisgenderism in shaping the production of 
knowledge becomes visible when an ethics committee justifies recommendations that 
go beyond the remit of their ethical focus on the basis of a sole member’s second­
hand experience. Given my own experience as a gay man who was not raised as a 
boy, I did not find the ethics committee’s reminder that gender independent people 
with same-gender attractions exist to be a helpfiil contribution. Rather, this 
declaration revealed the ethics committee’s cisgenderist assumption that gender 
independent people are objects of enquiry and not researchers. I did not require an 
ethics committee to inform me that I do, in fact, exist.
In my case, institutional cisgenderism was both the focus of my research 
enquiry and a tangible barrier that impeded the process of that enquiry at multiple 
junctures. Such a situation called for a research methodology that acknowledged the 
active agency of methodology, challenged the notion of extra-ideological research 
guidelines, and validated the methodological cunning necessary to navigate 
hierarchies of cisgenderist power relations sueh as that of the university ethics 
committee. When I was asked to change my research in ways that would have fiirther 
marginalised gender independent people’s everyday lives, my supervisor and I 
sueeessfully challenged the committee’s specific cisgenderist recommendations, 
even as I sought a method of creating broader institutional change. When I received 
an invitation several months later to give a presentation to the university ethics 
committee about research on ‘sensitive topics’ (personal communication), I chose 
instead to give detailed guidance to the ethies committee regarding how to avoid 
cisgenderism during the research review process. As a result of our intervention, the 
committee has changed several policies and has become much more careful about 
ascribing gender or gender history to research applicants.
252
Chapter 5
Self-Reports of Cisgenderism in Everyday Life
As I worked to uncover and reveal social relations of power by studying 
cisgenderism, I experienced being a target of cisgenderism. For example, one 
respondent who was asked about having misgendered others responded with 
hostility:
Really? Is this the best research idea you could come up with? More and more
identity and gender studies? Haven't we had enough o f this?
This same respondent stated that ‘people use this stuff to exert control. If s 
usually anger about something else.’ This respondent seemed to dismiss the 
legitimacy of my research by misclassifying my research. Despite my intentionally 
vague recruitment text, my research was explicitly not about ‘gender’ per se, nor was 
it about ‘identity’. As stated in the debriefing, this study was explicitly about 
misgendering. Ironically, this treatment of misgendering as an invalid research topic 
functions to delegitimise people for whom misgendering is a salient aspect of social 
life, and can therefore be considered a form of cisgenderism. This participant 
responded to the survey with intentionally uninformative responses of ‘yes’ to 
questions about nationality, occupation, and degree, which may suggest either an 
intentional resistance or a refusal to take the research seriously.
This hostile reaction to an optional, online study on misgendering is 
reminiscent of Boring’s (1945) hostile approach to questions that explored 
alternatives to the normative scientific explanations of his time. Gender 
misattributions are complex phenomena that defy a single explanation. As Speer 
(2005) found, and as my findings convey, misgendering does not work the same way 
across all contexts between all actors.
After employing a discursive ‘we’ to suggest that the respondent’s view 
reflects a consensus, the respondent then moves to claim that research on 
misgendering is unnecessary and unwanted. In contrast, many other respondents 
shared experiences of having been misgendered on a daily basis and discussed 
having faced similar severe emotional impact to that described by Rorvig’s (2012) 
participants. Multiple participants thanked me for providing them with an 
opportunity to discuss a topic that has been largely overlooked in previous research.
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Several said it was the first time when they had felt encouraged to share their story 
and to explore the harmful consequences of having been misgendered.
The intensity and volume of unsolicited participant comments praising or 
dismissing my studies of misgendering has demonstrated the need for further 
research in this area. Clearly, ‘we’ have not all had enough of research on 
cisgenderism. ‘We’ shall give texture to the silences through which cisgenderism is 
manufactured and maintained. ‘We’ shall revel in the affordances of deconstruction 
and dissent. ‘We’ shall ask the unaskable questions. ‘We’ have barely begun.
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[6.1] Aims of this research
I now return to the research aims stated at the beginning of this thesis. My first aim 
was to develop and refine my cisgenderism framework for thinking about and 
studying forms of gender and body delegitimisation. Using the cisgenderism 
framework, I aimed to address some of the limitations of previous research 
frameworks such as transphobia, genderism and anti-trans prejudice. Second, I aimed 
to present research about forms of gender and body delegitimisation that have been 
overlooked or addressed only obliquely in previous psychological research, such as 
misgendering (Chapters 2, 3 and 5) and extra-linguistic forms of communicating 
cisgenderist ideology, such as those oceurring through medical diagrams (Chapter 4). 
Finally, I aimed to inform effective strategies for challenging forms of cisgenderism 
(Chapters 2-6). In this thesis, I have used a bricolage approach to achieve these three 
aims. In this chapter, I discuss how I have used the six bricolage techniques (Chapter 
1) applied in this thesis. I then provide a synthesis of my findings across my research 
on cisgenderism and discuss recommendations for future interventions to reduce 
cisgenderism.
[6.2] Application of bricolage techniques
[6.2.1] Rigour in the absence
Silence is a central theme of this thesis—silence about the epistemological limits of 
cisgenderist gender/sex ideology, silence about how eisgenderist ideology can affect 
research questions and study design, and silence about the wide variation in people’s 
experiences of gender and body delegitimisation. In each piece of research in my 
bricolage, I sought to make these silences visible and to offer new ways to examine 
what was missing. I used this technique of rigour in the absence to produce concepts 
and develop tools that did not previously exist in the field of psychology. In Chapter 
2 , my analysis of sexist language research on masculine generic language read these 
texts from a new perspective that identified how assumptions in this field had limited 
researchers’ ability to perceive gender/sex ideology in their work. In Chapter 3, in 
the absence of suitable measures for evaluating how psychological researchers 
conceptualise young people’s genders and gender-associated expression, I created 
measures to operationalise pathologising and misgendering forms of cisgenderism. 
Using these two new measures, I was able to study phenomena that had not
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previously been addressed in empirical research in psychology. In Chapter 4, in the 
absence of contemporary alternatives to Trader’s (1954) model, I created laminated 
cards that contained one image per card, without the ordering or text from Trader’s 
model. In so doing, I created a new visual representation of the world as it could be, 
a world in which all children’s bodies are accepted and allowed to develop without 
normalising medical interventions. In Chapter 5 ,1 focused on people’s self-reported 
experiences of having been misgendered and having misgendered others. In so doing, 
I conducted what is, to my knowledge, the first empirical study in psychology to 
focus primarily on people’s own reports of being misgendered.
[6.2.2] Tracing and exposing the hidden and diffuse social relations o f power 
Each of the previous five chapters begins with a critical history in which I attempt to 
trace and expose the hidden and diffuse social relations of power at work in the 
particular domain under investigation. In Chapter 2 ,1 trace the history of feminist 
writings about gender independent people and expose the ongoing influence of 
cisgenderist ideology on contemporary sexist language research. In Chapter 3 ,1 trace 
the rise of gender pathologising in psychology and expose the role that highly 
cisgenderist authors from within an ‘invisible college’ of mental health professionals 
have continued to play in the communication of pathologising ways of thinking 
about and talking about gender independent young people. In Chapter 4 ,1 trace the 
androcentric origins of Trader’s (1954) model for understanding infant genital 
diversity, expose the intersecting histories of psychology and paediatric 
endocrinology, and explore the historical forces that facilitated the rise of Trader’s 
model as the dominant medical approach to intersex people. Finally, in Chapter 5 ,1 
explore the history of psychological approaches to gender attribution and 
misattribution, analysing how constructions of misgendering define who is 
considered ‘at fault’ when gender misattribution occurs.
Collectively, these critieal histories function to document the social relations of 
power that operate in the disciplinary and societal spheres examined in this bricolage. 
Yet these historical inquiries also function independently as psychological research 
exercises. Unlike Boring (1945), I have endeavoured to weave such histories as
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multilinear tales that highlight the complexity and dissent characteristic of human 
endeavours.
[6.2.3] Reflexive empiricism
My empirical research in this thesis has been conducted with the critical self-inquiry 
that is an integral aspect of bricolage. I used Talmudic style reflective boxes to 
challenge and further explore my own research processes and decisions. In Chapter 3, 
I juxtaposed my use of the majority world/minority world regional binary with my 
critique of the cisgender/transgender gender/sex binary, and explored the contextual 
factors that led me to adopt this critical regionality. I examined the limited utility of 
this binary for challenging ethnocentrism. In another reflective box, I queried the 
construct of ‘the child’ and my decision to use PsycINFO’s internal classification 
system to define ‘the child’ in my article search parameters. In another reflective box, 
I explored how my decision to use article records rather than full-length articles may 
have led to the floor effect for misgendering. I also questioned my decision not to 
distinguish between ‘misgendering’ and ‘degendering’ in my analysis.
In Chapter 4 ,1 critically evaluate my decision to use ‘intersex’ terminology and 
discuss how the concept of ‘intersex’ can promote a ‘sex’ binary that delegitimises 
people whose bodies are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’. I explore the strategic uses of 
intersex terminology and discuss the circumstanees under whieh this term will cease 
to be useful to researchers and activists who critique eisgenderism. In another 
reflective box, I discuss my decision to construct laypeople’s views as the ‘control’ 
or standard against which medical norms are evaluated. I also critique APA’s style 
guide on participant demographic reporting requirements for ‘gender’ and explore 
how these requirements function to perpetuate cisgenderism. In my final reflective 
box of Chapter 4 ,1 explain my use of ‘between-participants’ instead of ‘between- 
subjects’ by providing a brief, critical history of the ideologieal distinctions between 
the terms ‘subjects’ and ‘participants’ in statistical descriptions. I counter the 
ongoing practice of using the term ‘subjects’ in methods and results sections, in 
psychological literature that adopts a critical stance towards the depiction of research 
participants as passive objects. The final reflective box of the thesis appears in 
Chapter 5, when I consider the effect that my use of ‘the sacred .05 criterion’ (Cohen,
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1994, p. 997) has on how I interpret my results and the extent to which my findings 
will be considered authoritative to quantitative researchers.
[6.2.4] Research as strategic decision-making towards social justice aims
In each piece of research, I made strategic decisions about how to construct and 
represent my topic in a way that would challenge inequities and improve societal 
conditions. In Chapter 2, my analysis of sexist language research was designed to 
challenge ongoing cisgenderism in feminist research and to promote non-cisgenderist 
research methods. In Chapter 3, my aim was to challenge pathologising and 
delegitimising ways of constructing gender independent young people’s genders. I 
did so by treating normative professional approaches to these young people as 
problems to be studied. In Chapter 4 ,1 aimed to dispute empirically the claims of 
medical professionals who justify normalising medical interventions and 
pathologising language to describe intersex people, based on these medical 
professionals’ elaims that their practiees reflect the views of laypeople. In Chapter 5, 
my aim was to raise awareness about the ubiquitous nature of misgendering and its 
far-reaching consequences. Thus social justice concerns motivated my research 
throughout this thesis.
[6.2.5] Moving to the margins
I have also challenged disciplinary frames of reference thoroughout this thesis. In 
Chapter 2 ,1 moved to the margins by redefining gender-exclusive language in a way 
that considered gender independent people. I moved the margins by making critical 
research aimed at challenging sexism the focus of my own critical research to 
challenge cisgenderism. In Chapter 3 ,1 moved to the margins by repositioning as 
objects of enquiry the psychological researchers who study ‘trans people’ as their 
objects of enquiry. In Chapter 4 ,1 moved to the margins by positioning the dominant 
medieal model as the ‘effect to be explained’ and laypeople’s model as the ‘control’ 
in my experimental design. Although many gender independent people report having 
been misgendered by others frequently in everyday life, there is a popular 
assumption that such experiences are rare. When people misgender others, they may 
often attribute their errors to characteristics about the person whom they have 
misgendered and not to their own beliefs or errors (Speer, 2005). In Chapter 5 ,1
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moved to the margins by treating people who misgendered others as the objects of 
study and by relying on self-reports rather than observational data; this use of self- 
reports was particularly relevant given that the problem of misgendering is one that 
involves inaccurate observations by others.
[6.2.6] Point o f  Entry Text (POET)
I have used the POET technique throughout this thesis to ensure that personal 
experiences can inform my work and that I retain an awareness of the particular 
influences and assumptions that I bring to my research. Chapter 1 contains my 
autobiographical POETs that describe some key influences on my research intuition 
and approach, including my background in Tahnudic learning, my childhood 
experiences with guân.xï in China, my gender and body history, and my activist and 
community leadership experiences. In Chapter 2 ,1 begin my enquiry with three 
POETs: APA’s style guide for reducing bias in language on gender, a quotation from 
a ‘trans’ activist button, and an experience that occurred during a women’s studies 
course. In Chapter 3, my POETs are an APA policy statement that promotes non- 
discriminatory approaches to ‘trans’ people, a radio transeript that documents 
Kenneth Zucker’s cisgenderist clinical approach, and a statement by psychologists 
that mental health professionals have more positive views of ‘trans’ people now than 
in the past. In Chapter 4 ,1 use two POETs, Ribera’s (1631) Ta Mujer Barbuda and 
Trader’s (1954) diagram, to illustrate contrasting ways of representing people who 
are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’. Chapter 5 begins by considering two narrative 
POETs: These two narratives from women who were both assigned as ‘female’ at 
birth and raised as girls recount experiences that challenge common assumptions 
about the gender and body histories of people who are misgendered by others. 
Chapter 5 concludes with two Point of Exit Texts. The first is an account of having 
been misgendered by my University Ethics Committee. The second is a reflection on 
the hostile response of one research participant, whose comments are contrasted with 
the narratives of other participants who expressed their appreciation for my research 
on misgendering. My use of these POETs ensured that I remained attuned to some of 
the ways that my experiences and feelings guided my research decisions. Using the 
POET technique also ensured that my cisgenderism framework was developed to 
have practical relevance for everyday life.
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[6.3] Summary and synthesis of research findings
In Chapter 2 ,1 found that the most widely cited empirical papers in the field of sexist 
language research communicate cisgenderist ideology that continues to influence the 
field. Sexist language researchers made gender attributions in four main ways: names, 
biological attributes, assignations made by others, and the assumption that there are 
only two genders. Researchers who use name-based clues overlook the cross-cultural 
variability of linguistic gender associations. Reliance on biological attributes to 
ascribe gender to others reinforces cisgenderist gender/sex ideology. The overarching 
assumption in sexist language research that gender maps onto biology in particular 
ways appears to signal the endurance of the core beliefs about gender/sex that 
Garfinkel (1967) described.
In Chapter 3 ,1 found that pathologising language was more common than 
misgendering language in psychological literature about children’s genders and 
gender-associated expression from 1999 to 2008.1 found that articles on children’s 
genders and gender-associated expressions were increasingly high impact in 
psychology; that cisgenderism was neither increasing nor decreasing overall; and that 
mental health professionals are more cisgenderist than other authors. I also found that 
articles by members of the ‘invisible college’ structured around the most prolific 
author in this area were more cisgenderist and higher impact than other articles.
In Chapter 4 ,1 found that Trader’s (1954) model of disorder classifications and 
recommendations for normalising infant genital surgery did not reflect how 
laypeople classify intersex infants’ genitals. Medical professionals who apply 
Trader’s model are significantly more likely to recommend infant genital normalising 
surgery than are laypeople. In Experiment 1 ,1 found that linguistie framing of 
cisgenderist ideology did not have a statistically significant impact on laypeople’s 
recommendations for surgery or their confidence in their decisions to recommend or 
reject infant genital surgery. Tarticipants were significantly more confident in their 
decisions when they rejected infant genital surgery than when they recommended it. 
Linguistie framing affected category fit ratings for Trader Stage V and Trader’s 
Normal Male. Trior exposure and age did not affect people’s surgical decisions to 
recommend or reject surgery, their confidence in their surgical decisions.
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In Experiment 2, participants across all groups rated fewer images as 
disordered than did Trader’s model. Overall, participants recommended surgery for 
fewer bodies than in Trader’s model, and no participants recommended surgery for as 
many bodies as Trader’s model. Even when participants classified bodies as 
disordered, they did not necessarily recommend surgery. Across all three groups, 
participants were significantly more likely to classify bodies as disordered than they 
were to recommend surgery, both for all seven bodies and for only the Trader’s 
Stages I-V bodies. Most participants did not classify Trader Stages I, IV, or V as 
disordered.
Tarticipant disorder ratings and recommendations for surgery increased the 
more a body differed from the polar ends represented by Trader’s Normal Female 
and Trader’s Normal Male. Trader Stages II and III were the only bodies categorised 
as disordered by most participants, and Trader Stage III was the only body for which 
a majority of participants recommended surgery. Framing type had a statistically 
significant effect on disorder classifications of Trader’s Normal Female, but not on 
disorder classifications of Trader’s Normal Male. Most of the control participants 
classified Trader’s Normal Female as disordered, in contrast to only one in the 
diagram only and diagram with text conditions. In the free-sort control condition, 
more participants rated Trader’s Normal Female as disordered than Trader Stages I, 
II, IV, or V. Across all three groups, people rated gynic bodies as more disordered 
than phallic ones, and recommended surgery for more gynic bodies than for phallic 
ones; however, most people did not recommend surgery for either gynic or phallic 
bodies.
Finally, in Chapter 5, Experiment 1 found that both being misgendered and 
misgendering others are commonly reported experiences. Contrary to popular belief, 
most targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ reported having been 
misgendered, and most sources who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ reported 
having misgendered others. Most targets who reported having matching identity 
documents reported having been misgendered, and most sources who reported 
having mismatched identity documents reported having misgendered others. Overall, 
people who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ rated the adverse mood impact of
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being misgendered as higher than people who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’. 
There was an interaction effect between self-reported perceived ‘trans’ status and 
perspective for adverse mood impact; targets who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ 
rated the adverse mood impact of being misgendered as higher than targets who 
reported not being perceived as ‘trans.’ However, there was no statistically 
significant difference in adverse mood impaet ratings between sources who reported 
that they were and were not perceived as ‘trans’. There was a statistically significant 
interaction effect between perspective and self-reported identity document match for 
perceived dislike. Targets who reported having matching identity documents rated 
the perceived dislike of being misgendered as marginally greater than targets who 
reported having mismatched identity documents. However, sources who reported 
having matehing identity documents rated the perceived dislike of being 
misgendered as significantly lower than people who reported having mismatched 
identity documents.
In Experiment 2 ,1 replicated the finding in Experiment 1 that misgendering 
was a common experience. Most targets reported having been misgendered, and 
almost half of sources reported having misgendered others. As in Experiment 1, most 
targets who reported not being perceived as ‘trans’ reported having been 
misgendered, and most sources who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ reported 
having misgendered others. Misgendering had greater cognitive salience for people 
who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ than for those who reported that they were 
not, and greater cognitive salience for people who reported having mismatched 
identity documents than for those who reported having matching documents. People 
who reported being perceived as ‘trans’ by others rated the extent of ostracism of 
being misgendered as greater than people who reported that they were not perceived 
as ‘trans’.
My research findings have developed and expanded my cisgenderism 
framework. I now return to Kincheloe and Berry’s (2004) point that bricolage 
involves ‘developing the theme that the world is more complex than we thought’ 
(Kincheloe & Berry, 2004, p. 45), and that ‘bricoleurs familiar with eomplexity can 
no longer accept a unidimensional view of the world’ (ibid, p. 45). My findings from
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the bricolage of research that I have presented in this thesis defy a unidimensional 
interpretation. The disciplines that I have analysed are moving targets. Even the 
research act of studying and identifying cisgenderism was an intervention that 
transformed the landscapes in which my research was conducted. Yet there are a few 
important insights about cisgenderism that I have gained from viewing cisgenderism 
across the multilinear transparencies of my bricolage research:
1) Cisgenderism is not inevitable.
2) Cisgenderism is not unilinear.
3) Illuminating the contradictions between cisgenderist assumptions can be an 
effective resistance technique.
4) Cisgenderism is sustained through interconnected webs of influenee across 
disciplinary domains, yet it operates through distinct processes and mechanisms 
in each domain.
5) Cisgenderism intersects with, and is sustained by, forms of sexism, 
heterosexism, and ethnocentrism, and yet it is a distinct ideology with unique 
components.
6) Transphobia is a hostile and overt manifestation of cisgenderism. Most 
cisgenderism is neither hostile nor overt.
7) Cisgenderism can be challenged effectively by applying non-cisgenderist 
methods to research and insights from cisgenderism research to activism.
[6.3.1] Cisgenderism is not inevitable
One of the most crueial and inspiring insights I gained through this research was that 
cisgenderism is not inevitable. Although I documented the cisgenderism embedded 
within feminism (Chapter 2), psychology (Chapter 3), medicine (Chapter 4), and 
numerous contexts in self-reports of everyday life (Chapter 5), I discussed evidenee 
of dissent in each of these four, sometimes overlapping domains. I found that 
reframing information and changing terminology could rapidly—sometimes even 
instantly—undo eisgenderism. For example, when I first designed the experiments in 
Chapter 4, my supervisor and I debated whether I should include Trader’s Normal 
Female and Trader’s Normal Male with the five Trader’s Stage images rated by 
participants. Initially, we did not expect that framing would alter people’s 
understanding of bodies that are considered unambiguous and culturally intelligible
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as ‘normal’. That more participants rated Trader’s Normal Female as disordered than 
Trader Stages I, II, IV, or V in the free-sort condition showed that people do not 
necessarily follow disciplinary norms in the absence of ideological information to 
orient them in that way.
Current cisgenderist ideology is not eternal and ahistorical, nor is cisgenderism 
the ‘natural’ consequence of people’s cognitive need to categorise objects and people. 
Through my historical research (Chapters 1-5), I have become aware of how 
cisgenderism emerged in particular sites and historical contexts in response to 
particular dilemmas sueh as the dilemma regarding how to address the societal 
problem of people whom existing administrative gender/sex categories did not 
recognise. The use of surgical techniques to ‘fix’ this administrative problem is 
increasingly questioned in international contexts, and some regions have adopted an 
approach of creating additional administrative categories instead of attempting to 
‘normalise’ people who do not fit.
[6.3.2] Cisgenderism is not unilinear
Cisgenderist ideology comprises contrasts, contradictions, and silences that obscure 
and confound those contrasts and contradictions. For example, although participants 
rated bodies as increasingly disordered the farther away they were positioned from 
the Trader’s ‘Normal’ poles (as in the two-sex model), they also rated gynic bodies 
as more disordered than phallic bodies (as in the one-sex model that treats ‘females’ 
as ‘imperfect males’).
[6.3.3] Illuminating contradictions
Illuminating the contradictions between cisgenderist assumptions can be an effective 
resistance technique. Boring (1945) worked hard to silence contradictions because of 
their potential to destabilise what scientists treat as objective ‘truths’. Identifying 
contradictions between cisgenderist assumptions has been usefril in my research 
situation.
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[6.3.4] Distinct yet interconnected
Cisgenderism is sustained through interconnected webs of influence across 
disciplinary domains, yet it operates through distinet processes and mechanisms in 
each domain. Garfinkel (1967) observed that assumptions about sex/gender are 
positioned in both laypeople’s and professionals’ discourse as ‘natural facts’. As 
documented in my cross-disciplinary research (Chapters 2-4), cisgenderist ideology 
functions differently in different domains. Yet cisgenderist ideology in one domain is 
often used to justify cisgenderism in another, as when medical ideology about the 
primacy of physical attributes in the determination of ‘correct’ sex leads 
psychologists to define some people’s genders as ‘disordered’. This process can also 
function in reverse, as when psychologist’s evaluations of intersex young people lead 
them to recommend medical normalisation in an attempt to impose a gender that 
appears to fit the young person’s physical characteristics.
[6.3.5] Intersections with other ideologies
Cisgenderism intersects with, and is sustained by, forms of sexism, heterosexism, 
and ethnoeentrism, and yet it is a distinct ideology with unique components. In this 
thesis, I identified instances of misgendering that share elements in common with 
sexist language (Chapters 2 and 5). I also explored androcentrism in medical 
ideology (Chapter 4). At multiple points, I have highlighted the intersections of 
ethnocentrism and cisgenderism (Chapters 2-3 and 5). Some scholars such as 
Browne (2004) and Parlee (1996) have constructed the woman/man gender binary as 
the problem, and gender independent people as ‘beyond the binary’. As I have 
documented in this thesis, pathologising, misgendering, and other forms of 
cisgenderism operate in distinct ways that are not solely related to the variety of 
competing gender/sex binaries in common use.
[6.3.6] Manifestations o f cisgenderism
Transphobia is a hostile and overt manifestation of cisgenderism, yet most 
cisgenderism is neither hostile nor overt. The relation between transphobia and 
cisgenderism is analogous to the relation between text and discourse, with the latter 
manifested in, but not being fully encapsulated by, the former. The concepts of 
transphobia and genderism address only a limited portion of the ideological
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phenomena that can be studied in the cisgenderism framework. For example, many 
of the cases of misgendering that were reported in Chapter 5 did not involve hostility. 
Yet people who reported being misgendered by others in ostensibly benign ways 
often reported adverse emotional effects. Although some feminist writers have been 
overtly hostile towards gender independent people, the sexist language researchers 
whose work I critiqued in Chapter 3 were neither hostile nor intentionally 
exclusionary to gender independent people. In addition, genderism and transphobia 
exclude from consideration people who do not fit a ‘trans’ paradigm. In contrast, the 
cisgenderism framework incorporates concerns raised by people who are dis-abled 
by society, intersex people, immigrants whose names are misunderstood by others, 
women in professions associated with men, young people who have not yet 
developed some of the adult insignias of gender like breasts and beards, women with 
polycystic ovary syndrome, and other people whose genders and bodies are 
misunderstood by others.
[6.4] Reducing cisgenderism by applying non-cisgenderist methods
[6,4,1] Insights for research
Researchers who manufacture scientific knowledge can challenge cisgenderism 
effectively by modelling non-cisgenderist methods. There are a variety of strategies 
in which researchers can engage to reduce cisgenderism. Based on my analysis of 
cisgenderism in sexist language research (Chapter 2) and psychological research on 
young people’s genders (Chapter 3), I recommend that researchers seeking to apply 
non-cisgenderist methods to their research determine participant gender by self- 
report, rather than by attempting to use given names, ‘sex’ categories listed on 
official records, visual appearance, or other potentially misleading ‘clues’.
Substantial errors and omissions ean result from relying on such ‘clues’ (Harrison, 
Grant and Herman, 2012; Los Angeles County Department of Public Health, 2012). 
Prior to determining which terminology to use about participant gender or anatomy, I 
recommend that researchers ask participants themselves for their preferred terms. I 
advise researchers to be aware that participants’ official documentation or 
descriptions by others may not aecurately reflect their own designations of their 
genders and thus should refrain from relying on information from third parties when 
classifying participant gender.
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I caution researchers against determining participant ‘gender’ using ‘female’ or 
‘male’ response options. These categories imply biological rather than ‘gender’ 
categories. A formulation that asks participants to ‘select one’ from a list that 
includes three choiees such as ‘woman, man, and transgender’ excludes the many 
gender independent people who identify simply as women or men. This failure to 
acknowledge that many people whom others label as ‘trans’ do not self-identify with 
that term can yield misleading findings. Instead, researchers can offer two separate 
questions: First, participants can be provided with a blank text box in which to 
respond to the question ‘how do you currently describe your gender?’. If actually 
relevant to researchers, additional questions can ask whether their prior birth 
certificate or medical records have listed them as having a ‘sex’ that is not typically 
associated with their current description of their gender. Someone’s assigned ‘sex’ 
does not automatically provide any clear or relevant medical or biological 
information, and may not be a useful cue for understanding their physical needs. For 
researehers who insist on using a ‘tick-box’ format, I advise the use of multiple, 
itemised gender options and the user option to ‘select all that apply’ instead of 
forcing participants to select only one.
I recommend that researchers avoid using ‘female’ and ‘male’ interchangeably 
with ‘woman’ and ‘man’ in their writing, as doing so promotes misgendering. 
Degendering language delegitimises people’s own current descriptions of their 
genders by foeusing on their presumed past or current biological attributes (e.g., 
‘post-operative natal male’, ‘female-to-male transsexual’, ‘biological female’, or 
‘genetic woman’). I recommend the avoidance of this terminology wherever other 
women and men would be described in non-biological gendered language such as 
‘woman’ or ‘man’, except when a participant requests such language. Retroactive 
misgendering, a form of misgendering that disregards people’s current descriptions 
of their genders when describing time periods prior to those self identifications, can 
also be avoided by asking people how they deseribe their own gender in the past. 
Avoiding de-gendered biological language inereases research accuracy: Few 
researchers actually have sufficient medical information to determine whether a 
participant’s genetic or gonadal makeup is most closely associated with a particular 
‘sex’ category. Another way to expose and reduce misgendering in research is to
268
Chapter 6
Challenging Cisgenderism
specify exactly how gender is determined for participants, authors, confederates, 
characters, or others whose gender is discussed.
[6.4.1.1] Coding and reporting gender
I recommend the use of gender coding schemes that encompass a diverse range of 
participant genders instead of excluding as ‘outliers’ people whose genders are 
insufficiently addressed by existing methods. Non-cisgenderist methods of 
classifying gender facilitate potential responses from people with non-binaiy gender 
and use coding schemes that can incorporate a participant who may identify neither 
as a woman nor as a nian, as both a woman and a man, as having no gender, or as a 
combination of genders beyond this binary (e.g., Bissu or genderqueer). In some 
cases, this inclusive approach may require researchers to code gender as a continuous 
rather than dichotomous variable and may require coding gender categories such as 
‘woman’ and ‘man’ as separate rather than competing variables. This approach of 
treating ‘woman’ and ‘man’ as distinct variables is compatible with previous feminist 
approaches, such as Bem’s (1974) definition of stereotypical ‘femininity’ and 
stereotypical ‘masculinity’ as independent rather than mutually exclusive variables. 
Given the numerous ways in which people understand and describe their genders and 
bodies, a one-size-fits-all approach to describing gender is unlikely to promote non- 
cisgenderist methods. Researchers should avoid collectively describing all 
participants as ‘transgender people’, ‘transwomen’, ‘transmen’, or ‘trans community 
members’ unless verified by each participant. I caution researchers to avoid using 
language such as ‘with a trans identity’ in the recruitment of participants, unless the 
researchers have intentionally decided to exclude people whom they might describe 
as ‘trans’ who identify simply as women or as men. I envision as more inclusive the 
recruitment methods that include culturally diverse gender terminology and 
acknowledge that even those who relate to the term ‘trans’ may consider it to be their 
history, their experience, or their administrative status rather than their ‘identity’.
Where researchers are unable to discern the gender of published authors whom 
they wish to cite, attempts to contact those authors direetly are prudent. Although 
some past researchers have relied on ‘clues’ such as faculty profile pictures or first 
names to determine gender, such clues can be unreliable and misleading. Where one
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cannot contact authors directly, avoidance of pronouns (including third gender 
pronouns that may inappropriately misgender someone who prefers ‘she’ or ‘he’) 
does not constitute degendering. A brief footnote ean be added to explain that 
authors whose own descriptions of their genders were not verified were described 
without using any pronouns.
[6.4.1.2] Visual representations
In clinical and other settings where images are displayed, I recommend attending to 
the ordering of images and the subtle but powerful ideological components of visual 
rhetoric. When using medical diagrams in communications with laypeople or in 
clinieal assessment, cisgenderism can be reduced through the eareful review of such 
media and by active efforts to seek and develop alternative representations. I advise 
the simultaneous presentation of multiple ways of representing the world, 
particularly those that celebrate human gender/sex diversity.
[6.4.2] Insights for activism
[6.4.2.1] Limitations o f the ‘transphobia' paradigm and identity-focused approaches 
Based on my findings in Chapter 3, the overuse of the transphobia concept by those 
seeking to challenge forms of gender and body delegitimisation may render other 
forms of marginalisation and oppression experienced by ‘trans’ people more 
invisible and socially normative. This overuse also obscures the mistreatment and 
oppression faced by people who do not fit into a ‘trans’ paradigm, including intersex 
people and women with PCOS. People from many different backgrounds can 
experience gender and body delegitimisation for a variety of reasons. When activists 
conceptualise and describe these experiences as limited solely to a particular identity 
group, they may unwittingly marginalise that identity group and reduce the 
likelihood that people who do not define themselves as members of that group will 
be able to relate to, emphathise with, and take action about those experiences. This 
kind of identity-focused approach can further marginalise the experiences of people 
who share a similar experience without identifying within the designated in-group 
(e.g., a woman with PCOS might wonder, ‘if non-trans people do not experience 
misgendering, then what is wrong with me?’).
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Instead of adopting a factionalist approach, activists can focus on universal 
messages that position misgendering as a widespread human experience. Although 
this experience happens more frequently to people in some demographic categories 
than to others, although it can have a more profoundly oppressive impact on some 
people than on others, the fact that it is a common human experience means that 
activists should be able to get a large amount of people to care about it and to view it 
as relevant to their lives. This personal relevance criterion is the hook that leads to 
successful activism. Activists can often miss opportunities to create common ground, 
when they particularise the experiences of people associated with marginalised 
groups or labels. By normalising particular human experiences and their attendant 
emotional responses, activists can promote the effective reach of their messages and 
transform the thinking and practices of people beyond their own demographic label.
[6.4.2.2J The importance o f critical investigative histoiy to activist campaigns 
Some insights from the research in this thesis have particular practical implications 
for activist work. One insight that activists can draw from my findings is that 
effective activist campaigns and strategies need to be informed by critical 
investigative history. Activists often invoke historical narratives in their campaign 
strategies. These narratives often speak about particular situations in the past and 
present, and provide a vision of how the situation should be in the future. Yet these 
visions are often based on misrepresentations of the past and present, as doeumented 
by my findings in Chapters 2-5. In Chapter 3, my empirical investigation refuted the 
popular assumptions that cisgenderism has been decreasing steadily in mental health 
professions and that psychologists’ treatment of gender independent young people 
has improved in general. In this case, the stark contrast between popular perception 
and empirical evidence demonstrates the importance of engaging in critical historical 
investigation and the need to base activist campaigns on empirically grounded 
understandings of the past and present. When activists accept historical accounts 
based on cisgenderist views, then activists may falsely believe that they have to 
accept a lesser status that they mistakenly believe was always accepted in the past. 
For example, the false belief that ‘they’ was never an accepted singular pronoun or 
that ‘he or she’ is a strange, feminist innovation means that the arguments of activists 
who attempt to convince the general public that one non-gendered pronoun option
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preferred by some people with non-binary genders will be less authoritative and less 
convincing. These activists will be more likely to effect change by challenging the 
widespread assumption that ‘they’ is a modem innovation; by documenting that ‘they’ 
was a traditional, historically accepted singular pronoun; and by exposing the sexist 
reasons why masculine generics were formally adopted in a particular legislative 
context at a particular historical juncture.
In multiple studies (Chapters 2, 3, and 4), my research documented that 
popular assumptions about the ‘traditional’ or ‘historical’ way or approach was 
actually a modem revision motivated by oppressive ideology. For example, in 
Chapter 4 ,1 found that people invoke history and do not know the history of the field 
of paediatrie endocrinology. Thus they do not understand how the androcentric and 
misogynistic practices during the foundational period of the field contributed to the 
later cisgenderism, such as the pathologising of gynic bodies and the pathologising of 
similarities between bodies classed as ‘female’ or ‘male’. The history of anatomical 
views of so-called ‘biological sex’—and, indeed, the entire concept of ‘biological 
sex’—the idea that what is now considered a mainstream and universal scientific fact 
about ‘sexual differentiation’ is actually a culturally specific historical development 
that emerged as recently as the 1850s. If activists purport to base their arguments on 
‘science’, activists should interrogate accepted claims that ‘everybody knows’ or 
which are considered to be ‘common sense’. Often, these ‘scientific facts’ are based 
on a limited range of information and on views that have changed over time. The 
argument that human bodies are now understood better than in the past is misguided, 
when one considers that there are scientifically documented physical similarities 
between bodies labelled as ‘female’ and ‘male’. The overemphasis of the supposed 
physieal differences is based not on scientific fact, but on the erasure of anatomic 
features that highlight biological similarities (e.g., paraurethral/Skein’s glands) and 
the concurrent and competing ways of labelling and understanding anatomy (e.g., 
‘vaginal corona’ vs. ‘hymen’). These erasures have profound political and 
sociocultural ramifications for people so labelled, particularly where the presence of 
an intact ‘hymen’ is required for access to many basie social rights in some societies.
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[6.4.2.3] Using quantitative methods to challenge oppressive ideology 
Activists often dismiss quantitative methods as reductionist and uncritical forms of 
hegemonic reproduction. However, this anti-quantitative attitude is itself a 
hegemonic reproduction of a one-dimensional approach to activism. My ability to 
expose oppressive disciplinary ideology through the quantitative components of my 
research (Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5) provides a lesson to activists that quantitative 
methods can challenge taken-for-granted assumptions in a way that will be taken 
seriously in disciplines that value quantitative research and contest the value of 
qualitative research (see section 5.2.3.1). This research also demonstrates how ‘truths’ 
people think they know and therefore invoke in their advocacy messages may not 
actually be accurate. For example. Hill and Willoughby (2005) and Brown (2006) 
took for granted that mental health professionals’ treatment of young people is 
getting better, but because they were making statements about conditions improving 
without systematic evidence to substantiate these claims, their assumptions 
undermined their efforts to advocate effectively for young ‘trans’ people. Had they 
conducted empirical research prior to making these public statements, they would 
likely have discovered that the situation was not improving and responded 
accordingly.
Cisgenderist professionals’ claims vary depending on their audience; such 
professionals will often communicate very different messages to community activists 
than they do when speaking with colleagues in professional and clinical contexts in 
which they do not expect the presence of activists or community members (Chapters 
3 and 4). This is a lesson for community activists that they need to pay attention to 
professional codes of practice, clinical bulletins, and peer-reviewed journal articles to 
get an accurate understanding of how professionals are communicating with their 
peers. As documented in my findings, professionals may court the support of 
community activists for the purpose of obtaining grant funding to work with or study 
populations that experience gender and body delegitimisation. When activists 
disregard these communications within professional contexts, activists miss the 
opportunity for oversight of professionals’ cisgenderist activities. My finding that 
gender clinics were sites of highly cisgenderist knowledge production (Chapter 3)
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demonstrates that activists need to consider how to change systems that grant these 
clinics a pivotal role in gender affirmation processes.
[6.4.2.4] Self-reflective practice can challenge unexamined assumptions 
Another insight from my findings that is relevant to activists is the crucial need for 
critical thinking and an awareness of as many of one’s own unexamined 
asssumptions as possible. I was not initially going to include Trader’s Normal 
Female or Trader’s Normal Male in the study, because I assumed that I could not get 
people to view these bodies as other than ‘normal’. I had initially taken for granted 
the immalleability of people’s perceptions and judgements. I learned that 
cisgenderism is not inevitable and that ‘realities’ that seem beyond question must be 
questioned. It is very powerful for activists to take the fundamental building blocks 
of cisgenderist ideology, such as Trader’s (1954) diagram, and reffame them in 
different ways that allow activists to demonstrate alternatives to current dominant 
paradigms. Again, this shows that experimental methods can be powerful ways of 
challenging unexamined assumptions and that unexpected data sources (e.g., the 
post-debrief participant narratives) can be used to inform research. This bricolage 
technique of taking source material from anywhere can be helpful to activists. Across 
the thesis overall, the use of TOET technique in bricolage research can increase the 
ecological validity of research, because this research commences with actual 
experience rather than top-down theorising or navel-gazing.
[6.4.3] Activism and research can be synergistic
Activists often dismiss researchers as out-of-touch academics, and both activists and 
researchers typically speak about researchers and activists as mutually exclusive 
populations. My finding that the most widely cited authors were the most 
cisgenderist and that highly cisgenderist papers are more widely cited (Chapter 3) 
highlights the need for activists to seek research training that will enable them to 
publish high quality scientific research that can provide viable alternatives to the 
research being published by cisgenderist authors. These alternatives can then provide 
evidence-based rationale for professionals in highly cisgenderist disciplines such as 
psychiatry and paediatric endocrinology to think, research, write, and practice in 
ways that challenge oppressive ideology in their respective disciplinary cultures.
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Given the increasing influence associated with ‘evidence-based medicine’, it is 
essential for activists to contribute to that body of evidence. Communications limited 
to other activists and community members are not going to effect change in 
professional disciplines or in public life. Activists will need to find situations in 
which they can engage with professionals on an equal footing, because most of the 
interactions with professionals seem to be occurring in clinical contexts that have a 
clear hierarchy and unequal footing (Chapters 3, 4, and 5). Activists should consider 
refusing to engage unless they can do so with equal footing. Engagement lends 
credibility to cisgenderist practices.
My findings highlight that activists should be engaging in empirical research 
using a variety of methods, including experimental methods, self-reports, and the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data (e.g.. Chapter 5). Although 
observational data may be considered superior by many researchers, self-reports 
allow activists to promote the agentic participation of people who have experienced 
marginalisation. This combination of multiple research approaches can make it 
possible for activists/researchers to construct a multi-faceted and nuanced 
understanding of cisgenderism that would not have been possible using a single 
method. To study cisgenderism effectively, researchers need to understand that the 
effective study of cisgenderism may require researchers to innovate and combine 
multiple research approaches. Throughout my research, I also found that existing 
psychometric measures are often cisgenderist, irrelevant, or filled with problematic 
assumptions. Rather than using an existing scale because it has credibility, these 
measures often are so inappropriate to the topic that they undermine the credibility of 
the research. As I did in this thesis, I advise activist-researchers to create their own 
measures, validate them, and contribute the body of empirical measures that can be 
sourced by future researchers.
[6.5] Directions for future research
[6.5,1] Chapter 2
To further explore my finding that cisgenderist practices which lead to misgendering 
are common in research intended to challenge oppressive ideology, I would conduct 
a study in which researchers are given a research topic and basic details about the
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question to be studied, then asked to design a study while they narrate their thought 
process using a think aloud protocol. I would conduct post-design interviews using 
laddering to examine the core rationale and underlying assumptions that led to their 
decisions. I could also conduct a follow-up analysis to determine whether sexist 
language research varies between linguistic contexts, as I only analysed English 
language articles in this study. Through this multilingual analysis, I might also 
identify some intersecting aspects of misgendering and ethnocentrism.
[6.5.2] Chapter 3
In future research, I could conduct a similar content analysis using full-length journal 
articles instead of article records. This content analysis was limited to articles about 
people who were categorised as children. A follow-up analysis could test for 
variations in cisgenderism in journal articles about people of different ages. I could 
also analyse and test for variation across diverse forms of media (e.g., disciplinary 
policy statements in different professions, mass media articles, television shows, 
etc.). I could also conduct a similar content analysis of pathologising and 
misgendering of intersex young people, as the current study focused more on gender 
delegitimisation and people who would be categorised as ‘trans’ or as having ‘GID’ 
than on intersex people.
[6.5.3] Chapter 4
To follow up on my findings in Chapter 4 ,1 could conduct a study similar to 
Experiment 2, but with actual or expecting (prospective) parents and a larger sample 
size. I could also add an independent variable of future outcomes (e.g., how a child 
might turn out). Another independent variable I could evaluate would be exposure to 
success stories, to evaluate whether exposure to the personal narrative of someone 
who was not surgically altered and who had a good psychosocial outcome might 
affect parents’ surgical decisions and their confidence in their surgical decisions. I 
could also evaluate whether a surgical case narrative formulated to highlight either 
risk or benefit of surgery would affect people’s surgical decisions. Other independent 
variables I could introduce would be presentation format (e.g., line drawings vs. 
photographs vs. video vs. live meeting of a confederate who is introduced as an 
intersex person), display region (e.g., face only, genitals only, full body nude, and
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full body clothed), and role of the information source (e.g, psychologist, social 
worker, psychiatrist, nurse, paediatrician, paediatric endocrinologist, parental peer, or 
intersex adult). I could also explore further the reversal of people’s categorisations 
for Trader’s Normal Female, Trader’s Stage IV, and Trader’s Normal Male based on 
variation on framing type and investigate further whether the use of graphs and 
quantitative figures to illustrate the benefits or drawbacks of surgery can influence 
people’s surgical decisions. Another independent variable would be the extent of 
urgency/speed with which decision must be made and whether parents are given 
information about intersex support groups.
[6.5.4] Chapter 5
Using the themes identified in participant narratives and the contexts in which they 
described having experienced misgendering, I could conduct experimental research 
to obtain direct observations of how people respond when they are misgendered and 
when they misgender others. I could conduct post-experiment interviews using 
laddering. I can also use my findings to design a psychometric measure of 
misgendering behaviour to be taken by people who misgender others and to evaluate 
the extent and impact of being misgendered by others. I could also conduct an 
experiment in which I put people in situations where they are likely to misgender a 
confederate and see whether they are aware of that they have misgendered another 
person. I could use a think aloud protocol to further explore the cognitive and 
psychoemotive dimensions of misgendering behaviour.
[6.6] Conclusion
The cisgenderism framework that I have developed and refined in this thesis has 
been a useful tool for challenging the delegitimisation of people’s own designations 
of their genders and bodies. Research in this paradigm scrutinises delegitimisation 
rather than its targets. The research that I have presented here initiates a new field of 
studies—cisgenderism studies. I hope that future researcher-activist-scientist- 
practitioners will find the cisgenderism framework useful for achieving social justice 
aims.
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Appendix A -  List of 74 gender-associated text units used in PsycINFO search
(abnormal* gender*) 
androgyn*
(anormal* gender*)
(atypical* gender*)
(binary* gender*) 
butch 
cisgender* 
cissex*
(crossdress*) or (cross-dress*)
(crossgender*) or (cross-gender*)
(cross-sex*) or (cross sex*) 
effemin*
(female féminin*)
(female masculin*)
(feminine boy*)
(feminine girl*)
(gender* atypical*)
(gender* bend*) or (genderbend*)
(gender* binary*)
(gender* blend*)
(gender* chang*)
(gender* conform*)
(gender* confu*)
(gender* devia*)
(gender* disturb*) (gender* diverg*)
(genderdiverse) or (gender-diverse) or (gender diverse)
(gender* dysphori*)
(gender* flexib*)
(gender* fluid*)
(gender* heteronorm*)
(gender* identity disorder*) (gender* incongru*)
(gender* minorit*)
(gender* nonconform*) or (gender* non-conform*)
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(gender* problem*)
(genderqueer*) or (gender-queer*) (gender* transgress*)
(gender-aschematic*)
genderis*
gender-typical
(gender varian*) or (gender-varian*) 
hijra*
hyperfeminin*
hypermasculin*
(incongru* gender*)
(kathoey) or (kathooey*) 
kinnar*
(male féminin*)
(male masculin*)
(masculine boy*)
(masculine girl*)
(nonbinar* gender*) or (non-binar* gender*)
(non-norm* gender*)
(non-traditional* gender*) or (nontraditional* gender)
(norm* gender*)
(normal* gender* ) (normative* gender*) (sex* chang*) 
sissi* sissy* tomboy*
(third-gender*) or (third gender*) (transaffirm*) or (trans-affirm*) transex* 
transgender*
(transnegativ*) or (trans-negativ*) 
transphobi*
(transpositiv*) or (trans-positiv*) 
transsex* transvesti* travesti* 
two-spirit 
(typical* gender
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Appendix B -  List of 35 journals that had one article each in my sample
American Behavioral Scientist
Behavior Genetics
British Journal o f Sociology
Canadian Journal o f Education
Child and Adolescent Social Work Journal
Child Psychiatry and Human Development
Child Welfare Journal
Child: Care, Health and Development
Development and Psychopathology
Educational Psychologist
European Child and Adolescent Psychiatry
Gender and Society
Global Journal o f Child Research
Health Education and Behavior
International Journal o f Adolescent Medicine and Health
International Journal o f Behavioral Development
International Journal o f Transgenderism
Journal o f Abnormal Child Psychology
Journal o f Black Psychology
Journal o f Child Psychology and Psychiatry
Journal o f  Community Psychology
Journal o f Developmental and Behavioral Pediatrics
Journal o f  Personality and Social Psychology
Journal o f Pragmatics
Journal o f  Secondaiy Gifted Education
Journal o f  Sex and Marital Therapy
Journal o f Sport Behavior
Men and Masculinities
Professional School Counseling
Psychoanalytic Psychotherapy
Psychological Science
Sexuality Research and Social Policy
Social Development
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Social Policy
The Career Development Quarterly
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Appendix C -  Coding Sheet for Content Analysis
Case #: [ ] Coder #: [ 1 Exclude Case (Y/N)? \ 1 Reason:
Please refer to the relevant fields in the PsycINFO article record provided.
Section 1 -  Basic Information
1. Author Sumame(s): 2. Source:
3. Publication year:
4. Peer-reviewed?: Yes [ ] No[ ]
5. Methodology(-ies):
Please read the attached instruction sheet for basic definitions of CGNC and related 
terms prior to coding. Please mark ONE box per question, unless otherwise specified. 
Some questions refer to clarifying statements. Examples of clarifying statements: 
“This patient is described as heterosexual despite identifying as a man attracted 
exclusively to men, because...” or “At the time of the study, all boys were male, all 
girls were female.”
Section 1 -  Terminology:
Based on the article record provided, the anthor(s) of this article...
1. Uses sex and gender categories interchangeably in the Title and/or 
Abstract fields
e.g. “The study compared boys and girls with gender identity disorder; males 
displayed first evidence of cross-gender behaviour earlier than femalesT
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[ ]
2. Uses sex and gender categories interchangeably across fields 
e.g. Abstract mentions ‘boys and girls’ and Population lists ‘Male’ and ‘Female’. 
‘Boys and girls’ does not necessarily mean that both ‘males’ and ‘females’ are 
included in the sample.
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[ ]
3. Designates participant sex or gender in the Keyword(s). Subject(s) 
and/or Population(s) fields in a manner that appears to differ from participant 
gender identity in the Abstract
e.g. The Population is listed as Male, Keyword boy, and/or Subject boys, and the 
following text appears in the Abstract or Title: “.. .in a participant who thought he 
was a girl. ..”
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[ ]
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4. Uses gender-specific pronoun(s) that appear to differ from those 
typically associated with participant gender identity 
e.g. “This paper reports on a female-to-male transsexual and her psychosocial 
development”; “Mary insisted that she was a boy and said to call her John.”
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[ ]
5. Uses gender-specific nouns (i.e. ‘boy’, ‘girls’, ‘lesbian’, ‘daughter’, 
‘brother’) that appear to differ from the individual or population’s gender 
identity
e.g. "Girls in this study reported cross-gender identities as boysT 
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[
6. Labels participant gender identity and/or expression as inauthentic,
dishonest, or fantasy
e.g. “Hepretended to be a girl from ages 18 mo to 4 yrs....”
Yes[ ] No[ ]
.7. Uses the phrase(s) ‘opposite sex(es)’ or ‘opposite gender(s)’
Yes[ ] No[ ]
8. Uses sexual orientation terminology that appears discordant with 
participant gender identity
e.g. “The female-to-male transsexual was attracted to men\ this heterosexual 
case...”
Yes[ ] With Clarifying Statement[ ] No[ ]Absent[ ]
9. Uses the acronym ‘LGBT’ or ‘GLBT’ or writes ‘gay, lesbian, bisexual, 
and transgender’ (Note: If the authors do not appear to differentiate GLB from 
transgender or provide specific data on trans participants, please select 
Undifferentiated.)
Yes[ ] Undifferentiated[ ] No[ ]
10. Mentions concepts related to same-gender sexual orientation, such as 
‘homophobia’, ‘heterosexism’, etc.
e.g. “Fear of homophobia was a reason Charlotte did not wear dresses in public.” 
(Note: This does not include mentioning participant sexual orientation(s))
Yes[ ] No[ ]
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Section 2 - Theoretical Approach
Based on the article record provided, the author(s) of this article...
1. Labels childhood gender nonconformity (CGNC) as pathology 
e.g. ""treatment of an atypically gender identity disordered boy.”
Yes[ ] No[ ]
2. Questions or challenges the concept of CGNC as pathology
Yes[ ] No[ ]
3. Mentions and/or speculates about the relationship between CGNC and
pathology(-ies) or negative attribute(s)
e.g. Pathology: “This study questions the proposed link between leukemia and 
atypical gender identity''’', “the comorbidity o f GID and anxiety'"’. Negative attribute: 
""Lower academic achievement."
Yes[ ] No[ ]
4. Mentions or speculates about the relationship between gender
conformity and pathology(-ies) or negative attribute(s)
Yes[ ] No[ ]
5. Mentions and/or speculates about what causes CGNC
e.g. “This essay explores the aetiology ofgender identity disorder"', “the impact o f  an 
emotionally distant mother on masculine behaviour in girls."
Yes[ ] No[ ]
6. Mentions treatment and/or therapeutic interventions that address CGNC
e.g. “patient referred to a gender specialist for affirmative therapy”; “behavioural 
modifications to reduce cross-gender play.” (Note: This may include therapy that is 
encouraging, neutral, and/or discouraging of CGNC.)
Yes[ ] No[ ]
7. Appears_______ of treatment and/or interventions to reduce or stop
CGNC
e.g. “gender-appropriate play therapy reduced the patient’s cross-gender 
desires.”
Supportive[ ] Critical[ ] Unclear[ ] Absent[ ]
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8. Mentions assessment and/or diagnosis of CGNC
e.g. ""screened for gender-appropriate mannerisms”; ""Boyhood Femininity Test"', 
""sample included 22 girls with gender identity disorder"
Yes[ ] No[ ]
9. Compares or contrasts gender conforming and non-conforming 
participants, with gender normativity and/or gender-conforming people as the 
standard by which CGNC participants are assessed
e.g. “effeminate boys reverted to a gender-appropriate identification”; “the controls 
were children without gender identity disorder"', “transgender children had higher 
rates of depression than non-transsexual children.” (Contrast with: “Non-trans 
children had less depression than trans children.”)
Yes[ ] No[ ]
10. Mentions and/or speculates about relationship between CGNC and adult
sexual orientation e.g. “childhood femininity in homosexual men”; “infant cross­
gender play history in lesbians” (Note: This may include positive, neutral, and/or 
negative mention of gay, lesbian, and/or bisexual sexual orientations.)
Yes[ ] No[ ]
11. Includes participants who self-identify as trans and/or who appear to
have a gender identity that differs from the normative gender category 
associated with their current or prior sex designation.
e.g. “Kathoey”; “butch”; “Fa’afefine”; “two-spirit”; “transgender”. (Note: This 
would include articles with participants who self-identify as men or boys and 
had/have a prior/current sex designation as ‘female’, for example.)
Yes[ ] No[ ] Unclear[ ]
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Dear all,
We are recruiting Level 1 and 2 University of Surrey students as participants for a 
new study about how people understand medical diagrams of babies’ bodies. Lab 
tokens are available. Please sign up through the SONA system and/or contact me at 
v.ansara@surrev.ac.uk if you would like to participate. This study has received a 
favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey Ethics Committee. 
Thanks!
Gavi Ansara
PhD Researcher & Academic Tutor 
Department of Psychology 
Faculty of Arts & Human Sciences 
University of Surrey
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Welcome! To ensure your informed consent, you must read and consider the 
following information about this study.
Q: What is the purpose of this study?
A: The purpose of this study is to evaluate how people understand medical diagrams 
of babies’ genitals.
Q: How have I been selected?
A: You have been selected to participate in this study based on an invitation you 
received through online emails, the SONA participant recruitment system, and/or 
campus-based University of Surrey recruitment.
Q: Who is welcome to participate?
A: Level 1 and 2 undergraduate University Students who have not attended Gavi 
Ansara’s gender development lecture or his departmental symposium presentation on 
January 10^  ^are welcome to participate.
Q: What will my participation in this study involve?
A: If you consent to participate in this study, you will be asked to look at medical 
diagrams that depict representations of babies’ genitals and to respond to questions 
about these images.
Q: How long will this study take?
A: The study is expected to take 15-30 minutes of your time.
Q: What benefits will I get from participating?
A: A limited numbers of lab tokens will be available for completion of this study.
You may also gain valuable insight into your view of babies’ bodies.
Q: What are lab tokens and how can I use them?
A: Under the lab token scheme, you can earn a certificate if you earn 10 tokens 
(approx 5 hours over the year), and students who earn their certificates in both Level 
1 and 2 are permitted to use lab tokens in their final year for recruiting their own
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participants. There are many different studies available under this scheme, so 
students who wish to collect the tokens are not obliged to take in 
anv particular study. Please refer to your student handbook for more detailed 
information about the lab token scheme.
Q: Are there potential risks involved in participating in this study?
A: There are no anticipated risks of participating in this study, though some 
participants may find the medical diagrams upsetting. Due to the sensitive content, 
viewing these diagrams could potentially evoke negative memories or experiences. If 
you become distressed at any time, you will be able to withdraw your participation 
and end the study. If you become distressed, the researcher will provide immediate 
support and refer you to the Wellbeing Centre for counselling if necessary.
Q: What if I do not want to consent? Will there be consequences if I say no?
A: You do not have to consent and you will not be penalised or adversely affected by 
your refusal to participate or your subsequent withdrawal from the study after your 
initial consent.
Q: What will happen I decide to withdraw?
A: You will be able to exit the study at any time if you do not wish to continue. If 
you do not wish to continue, you are free to withdraw at any time and your data will 
not be used.
Q: How will the results be used and stored, and how will my information be 
protected?
A: The results of this study will be prepared for future publication in a peer reviewed 
journal. While the SONA system records participant names for timeslots, participant 
names, specific identifying details, and contact information for participants recruited 
through this system will not be provided in the actual study. You will be assigned an 
ID number which will be used on all documentation, and your signed consent form 
will be stored separately from this documentation. Only the researcher and his
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supervisor will have access to your data, which will be stored in a locked filing 
cabinet inside a locked room. All data will be anonymous and identified by 
participant number. Individual narrative responses may be used in the discussion 
section of the analysis, but any identifying participant details will be removed. Data 
will be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for 10 years 
in line with University of Surrey policy
Q: Will everything I say be kept confidential? Under which circumstances 
would confidentiality be broken?
A: Your information will be kept confidential, unless you disclose information that 
involves harm to yourself or to another person. Where ethical principles of 
confidentiality and safeguarding of children are in conflict, the British Psychological 
Society (BPS) have instructed researchers to ‘direct their prime responsibility 
towards the interests of children’, in compliance with the Children Act 1989 and the 
associated guidance ‘Working Together’ (Abuse of Children section on p. 10 of the 
BPS Generic Professional Practice Guidelines, located at
http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/generic professional practice g 
uidelines.pdf).
BPS also acknowledge that ‘balance of risk situations may prevail, where the needs 
of children and the risk they are exposed to may not be clear-cut’, and that ‘the 
balance needs to be assessed to guide decision making’ (p. 10). Based on these 
guidelines and this researcher’s careful evaluation of competing ethical principles 
related to this study, disclosures that involve acts of past or intended child abuse 
will not be protected by confidentiality.
Q: Who is conducting this research?
A: This research has been organised by Gavi Ansara, a PhD candidate in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Surrey, United Kingdom, and his 
supervisor Dr Peter Hegarty, who can be contacted with any questions or concerns 
by phone at (+44) 01483 68 6898 or by email at p.hegartv@surrev.ac.uk.
322
Appendix E -  Chapter 4 Experiment 1 Information Sheet 
Q: Has this research received ethical review?
A: Yes, this research has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee.
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Please place your initials or a tick in the [ ] after each bullet point to confirm your 
agreement.
• I, the undersigned, voluntarily agree to take part in the study on how people view 
medical diagrams of babies’ genitals. I understand that this study will involve 
viewing medical diagrams representing babies’ genitals. [ ]
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a 
full explanation by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely 
duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been advised about 
any discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being which may result. 
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and 
have understood the advice and information given as a result. [ ]
• I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during the study and to co­
operate fully with the investigators. I shall inform them immediately if I suffer any 
deterioration of any kind in my health or well-being, or experience any unexpected 
or unusual symptoms. [ ]
• I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, 
being used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data 
relating to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I also understand that disclosures 
of harm to me or another person and disclosures of past or intended child abuse 
will not be protected by confidentiality. [ ]
• I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
needing to justify my decision and without prejudice. [ ]
• I acknowledge that in consideration for completing the study I might receive lab 
tokens, subject to availability. I understand that, due to limited availability, I might 
not receive lab tokens. I recognise that I will not receive a lab token, if I withdraw 
before completion of the study. [ ]
• I understand that in the event of my suffering a significant and enduring injury 
(including illness or disease) as a direct result of my participation in the study, 
compensation will be paid to me by the University, subject to certain provisos and 
limitations. The amount of compensation will be appropriate to the nature, severity 
and persistence of the injury and will, in general terms, be consistent with the amount
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of damages commonly awarded for similar injury by an English court in cases where 
the liability has been admitted. [ ]
• I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my 
participation and agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
[]
Name of Participant (BLOCK CAPITALS). 
Signed..........................................................
Date............................. .........
Name of researcher/person taking consent 
(BLOCK CAPITALS).................................
Signed..........................................................
Date....................................................
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Participant #_
Please provide the following information about yourself as honestly as you can.
Age_________Please indicate your current educational level: □ Level 1 □ Level 2
Nationality/nationalities__________________________________________________
Language(s) you know fluently_____________________________ _______________
What term(s) would you use to describe your ethnicity? 
What term(s) would you use to describe your gender? _
What term(s) would you use to describe your sexuality? 
Wliat term(s) would you use to describe your biology? _
Before participating in this study, did you have any exposure (e.g., heard about, 
viewed, etc.) to:
Genital configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ QYes QNo 
The seven distinct genital configurations depicted in the diagrams QYes QNo 
The exact diagrams used in this study QYes []No
The practice of medically unnecessary infant genital surgeries QYes []No 
For each question to which you answered yes, please describe your prior exposure 
(you may write on the back of this page, if you need extra space):
Thank you for participating! ©
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Debrief -  How People Understand Medical Diagrams of Babies’ Bodies
Thank you for taking part in the study. You participated in one of three conditions 
investigating how labelling in medical communication can affect surgical decision­
making. People’s bodies can be described in many ways. For example, the images 
you viewed could have been described as female or male, disordered or not 
disordered, or as natural variations of people’s bodies. The separate images used in 
this study are from a diagram that contains all seven images. This diagram is widely 
used in the field of paediatric endocrinology. During this study, you were aware that 
the surgical decisions you made in this study were fictional. However, actual 
surgeries of this kind do occur.
If you would like to be notified of our research questions and findings at a future date, 
when this information is available, please email me at v.ansara@surrev.ac.uk. Emails 
of participants requesting notification will be stored separately from study data and 
will not be identified with your participant number or study information. Your data 
from this study will be kept completely anonymous and confidential.
If you experience distress following your participation, you may seek counselling or 
emotional support at the Centre for Wellbeing, which is located on the Ground Floor 
of Building 23 in University Court, between the Guildowns University Surgery and 
Duke of Kent Buildings. You can contact the Centre for Wellbeing on 01483 68 
9498 or by email at k.norman@surrev.ac.uk or centreforwellbeing@surrev.ac.uk.
If you have any other questions, wish to withdraw your data from the study, or would 
like further information on the subject, please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail 
at y.ansara@surrey.ac.uk. If you wish to make a complaint regarding your 
participation in this experiment, please eontact Dr Peter Hegarty at 
p.hegartv@surrev.ac.uk.
Thank you for your participation.
Y. Gavriel Ansara
PhD Candidate, Department of Psychology
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Welcome! To ensure your informed consent, you must read and consider the 
following information about this study.
Q: What is the purpose of this study?
A: The purpose of this study is to evaluate how people understand medical diagrams 
of babies’ genitals.
Q: How have I been selected?
A: You have been selected to participate in this study based on an invitation you 
received through online emails, web and blog posts, and/or campus-based University 
of Surrey recruitment.
Q: Who is welcome to participate?
A: All University of Surrey students are welcome to participate.
Q: What will my participation in this study involve?
A: If you consent to participate in this study, you will be asked to look at medical 
diagrams that depict representations of babies’ genitals and to respond to questions 
about these images.
Q: How long will this study take?
A: The study is expected to take 20-30 minutes of your time.
Q: What benefits will I get from participating?
A: A limited number of up to £5 per participant in cash payments may be available 
for completion of this study. You may also gain valuable insight into your view of 
babies’ bodies.
Q: Are there potential risks involved in participating in this study?
A: There are no anticipated risks of participating in this study, though some 
participants may find the medical diagrams upsetting. Due to the sensitive content, 
viewing these diagrams could potentially evoke negative memories or experiences. If 
you become distressed at any time, you will be able to withdraw your participation
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and end the study. If you become distressed, the researcher will provide immediate 
support and refer you to the Wellbeing Centre for counselling if necessary.
Q: What if I do not want to consent? Will there be consequences if I say no?
A: You do not have to consent and you will not be penalised or adversely affected by 
your refusal to participate or your subsequent withdrawal from the study after your 
initial consent.
Q: What will happen I decide to withdraw?
A: You will be able to exit the study at any time if you do not wish to continue. If 
you do not wish to continue, you are free to withdraw at any time and your data will 
not be used.
Q: How will the results be used and stored, and how will my information be 
protected?
A: The results of this study will be prepared for future publication in a peer reviewed 
journal. You will be assigned an ID number which will be used on all documentation, 
and your signed consent form will be stored separately from this documentation.
Only the researcher and his supervisor will have access to your data, which will be 
stored in a locked filing cabinet inside a locked room. All data will be anonymous 
and identified by participant number. Individual narrative responses may be used in 
the discussion section of the analysis, but any identifying participant details will be 
removed. Data will be stored in accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and 
kept for 10 years in line with University of Surrey policy.
Q: Will everything I say be kept confidential? Under which circumstances 
would confidentiality be broken?
A: Your information will be kept confidential, unless you disclose information that 
involves harm to yourself or to another person. Where ethical principles of 
confidentiality and safeguarding of children are in conflict, the British Psychological 
Society (BPS) have instructed researchers to ‘ direct their prime responsibility 
towards the interests of children’, in compliance with the Children Act 1989 and the 
associated guidance ‘Working Together’ (Abuse of Children section on p. 10 of the 
BPS Generic Professional Practice Guidelines, located at
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http://www.bps.org.uk/sites/default/files/documents/generic professional practice g 
uidelines.pdf).
BPS also acknowledge that ‘balance of risk situations may prevail, where the needs 
of children and the risk they are exposed to may not be clear-cuf, and that ‘the 
balance needs to be assessed to guide decision making’ (p. 10). Based on these 
guidelines and this researcher’s careful evaluation of competing ethical principles 
related to this study, disclosures that involve acts of past or intended child abuse 
will not be protected by confidentiality.
Q: Who is conducting this research?
A: This research has been organised by Gavi Ansara, a PhD candidate in the 
Department of Psychology at the University of Surrey, United Kingdom, and his 
supervisor Dr Peter Hegarty, who can be contacted with any questions or concerns 
by phone at (+44) 01483 68 6898 or by email at p.hegartv@surrev.ac.uk.
Q: Has this research received ethical review?
A: Yes, this research has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of 
Surrey Ethics Committee.
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Participant Consent Form 
Please place your initials or a tick in the [ ] after each bullet point to confirm your 
agreement.
• I, the undersigned, voluntarily agree to take part in the study on how people view 
medical diagrams of babies’ genitals. I understand that this study will involve 
viewing medical diagrams representing babies’ genitals. [ ]
• I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been given a 
full explanation by the investigators of the nature, purpose, location and likely 
duration of the study, and of what I will be expected to do. I have been advised about 
any discomfort and possible ill-effects on my health and well-being whieh may result.
I have been given the opportunity to ask questions on all aspects of the study and 
have understood the advice and information given as a result. [ ]
• I agree to comply with any instruction given to me during the study and to co­
operate fully with the investigators. I shall inform them immediately if I suffer any 
deterioration of any kind in my health or well-being, or experience any unexpected 
or unusual symptoms. [ ]
• I consent to my personal data, as outlined in the accompanying information sheet, 
being used for this study and other research. I understand that all personal data 
relating to volunteers is held and processed in the strictest confidence, and in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act (1998). I also understand that disclosures 
of harm to me or another person and disclosures of past or intended child abuse 
will not be protected by confidentiality. [ ]
• I understand that I am free to withdraw from the study at any time without 
needing to justify my decision and without prejudice. [ ]
• I acknowledge that in consideration for completing the study I might receive up 
to £5 in cash, subject to availability. I understand that, due to limited availability, I 
might not receive £5. I recognise that I will not receive £5, if I withdraw before 
completion of the study. [ ]
• I understand that in the event of my suffering a significant and enduring injury 
(including illness or disease) as a direct result of my participation in the study, 
compensation will be paid to me by the University, subject to certain provisos and 
limitations. The amount of compensation will be appropriate to the nature, severity 
and persistence of the injury and will, in general terms, be consistent with the amount
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of damages commonly awarded for similar injury by an English court in cases where 
the liability has been admitted. [ ]
• I confirm that I have read and understood the above and freely consent to 
participating in this study. I have been given adequate time to consider my 
participation and agree to comply with the instructions and restrictions of the study. 
[]
Name of Participant (BLOCK CAPITALS)
Signed..........................................................
Date.......................................
Name of researcher/person taking consent
(BLOCK CAPITALS)...................................
Signed..........................................................
Date....................................................
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Participant #_
Please provide the following information about yourself as honestly as you can.
Age________ Current degree course and uni: ______________________
Nationality/nationalities___________________________ __________________
Language(s) you know fluently (including English, if fluent)
What term(s) would you use to describe your ethnicity?___
What term(s) would you use to describe your gender?_____
What term(s) would you use to describe your sexuality? 
What term(s) would you use to describe your biology? _
Before participating in this study, did you have any exposure (e.g., heard about, 
viewed, etc.) to:
Genital configurations that are not strictly ‘female’ or ‘male’ QYes QNo
The seven distinct genital configurations depicted in the diagrams QYes QNo
The exact diagrams used in this study QYes QNo
The practice of surgically ‘normalising’ infants whose genitals do not appear strictly 
‘female’ or ‘male’ QYes QNo
For each question to which you answered yes, please describe your prior exposure 
(you may write on the back of this page, if you need extra space):
Thank you for participating! ©
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Debrief -  How People Understand Medical Diagrams of Babies’ Bodies
Thank you for taking part in the study. You participated in one of three conditions 
investigating how labelling and visual rhetoric in medical communication can affect 
surgical decision-making. People’s bodies can be described in many ways. For 
example, all of the images you viewed could have been described as natural 
variations of people’s bodies. In this study, each of the three conditions used 
pathologising communication in which you were asked to categorise babies’ bodies 
as disordered or not disordered.
The separate images used in this study are from a diagram that contains all seven 
images sorted in a particular order and labelled with textual descriptions. This 
diagram is widely used in the field of paediatric endocrinology. We explored the 
extent to which labelling and visual rhetoric are involved in eategorising bodies as 
disordered/not disordered and whether varying the presentation of pathologising 
communication (i.e., unsorted and unlabelled, sorted and unlabelled, and sorted and 
labelled) affected participants’ surgical decisions and confidence in their surgical 
judgements.
During this study, you were aware that the surgical decisions you made in this study 
were fictional. However, actual surgeries of this kind do occur. If you have 
experienced a surgery of this kind or are interested in learning more about how these 
surgeries can affect people, you may find the following resources helpful:
-René Cassin Intersex Rights Campaign
http://www.renecassin.org/campaigns/current-campaigns/240-intersex-rights.html 
-Organisation Intersex Internationale http ://www. intersexualite. or g/
If you would like to be notified of our research questions and findings at a future date, 
when this information is available, please email me at v.ansara@surrev.ac.uk. Emails 
of participants requesting notification will be stored separately from study data and 
will not be identified with your participant number or study information. Your data 
from this study will be kept completely anonymous and confidential.
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If you experience distress following your participation, Surrey University students 
may seek counselling or emotional support at the Centre for Wellbeing, which is 
located on the Ground Floor of Building 23 in University Court, between the 
Guildowns University Surgery and Duke of Kent Buildings. You can contact the 
Centre for Wellbeing on 01483 68 9498 or by email at k.norman@surrev.ac.uk or 
centreforwellbeing@surrev.ac.uk. If you are not a Surrey University student, you 
may contact the Samaritans 24/7 Helpline fi*om anywhere in the UK at 08457 90 
9090.
If you have any other questions, wish to withdraw your data from the study, or would 
like further information on the subject, please do not hesitate to contact me by e-mail 
at y.ansara@ surrey.ac.uk. If you wish to make a complaint regarding your 
participation in this experiment, please contact Dr Peter Hegarty at 
p.hegartv@surrev.ac.uk.
Thank you for your participation.
Y. Gavriel Ansara
PhD Candidate, Department of Psychology
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Sent: 24 July 2012 10:31
To: Ansara YGL Mr (PG/R - Psychology)
Subject: Experiences :-)
Dear Gavi,
Further to my participation in your research study a couple of weeks ago I wanted to 
elaborate on some of my experiences that lead me to leave such a large quantity of 
comments on the paperwork! !
As I indicated on the forms I have had prior experience of some sort in the area of 
your research in my capacity as a Research Assistant at a Behavioural 
Neuroendocrinology Research Unit based in XXXXXXXXXX. I was involved in the 
beginning of a longitudinal study looking at children and siblings with Congenital 
Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH). At this time I do not wish to go into details about the 
preliminary findings of the research as it is not my research to discuss however I 
would like to raise some points relating to the experiences I had a result of being 
involved in such research and some of my observations.
Firstly I would like to like to note that many of our research participants were 
recruited via CAH help groups or through referrals from hospitals in 
XXXXXXXXXX. This would mean that those involved were interested to find 
information out however I couldn’t help but feel that with some families it was seen 
as possible access to more information/support that they were seeking. Obviously 
this would indicate, as with any research, that we weren’t necessarily seeing a cross 
section representative of the research cohort. In addition families were paid and 
travel costs were covered which is an added incentive to participate.
My experiences were mixed, research was carried out in a double blind manner 
meaning I did not know in advance whether the child I was working with had CAH 
or it was a ‘normal,’ for want of a better word, sibling. We were working with a 
young age group, 3-11 (which soon became 4-11 year olds due to the complexity/
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duration of tasks we were asking children to do). Often the children who did have 
CAH that we saw were post-operative (possibly due to the links to hospital referrals). 
Some children I saw were post-operative but their parents raised them in a manner in 
which they were aware of the operation they had had, or in a way that didn’t lead 
them to fit into the stereotype of the gender they were assigned as a result of the 
operation. In other cases, cases which stick in my mind far more vividly, we had 
young children who were pre-operative. In one case we had a child whom the parents 
had chosen not to operate with the intention that when the child was old enough (I 
believe ten years old) they were going to let them decide on whether they wanted an 
operation themselves. However despite this decision to allow it to be the individuals 
choice rather than the parents, I felt that the parents still endorsed the female 
stereotype in the child, dressing her in pink, encouraging play with stereotypical 
female toys etc. This is despite having female siblings who weren’t encouraged and 
gender typecast in such a manner. From my perspective the family was perhaps 
struggling with wanting the decision to be their childs’ but also ‘fitting in’ thus 
hiding away any differences there may have been. In addition all of their children (4 
in total) were home schooled and almost hidden away, each of the four children only 
naming one friend they had, who was the same in each case, and turned out to be a 
relative. Seeing a non-post op child was unusual, unfortunately I do not remember 
case details fully to be able to confirm but generally I believe the decision to operate 
was often something that happened very fast for parents, meaning whether it was for 
a medical reason, or whether it was cosmetic, it was something they felt they needed 
to decide very early on either due to recommendation by medical staff or because 
they were so underexposed to disorders such as CAH that they felt ‘unseen’ societal 
pressures for the wellbeing of their child to be able to raise them as ‘a boy’ or ‘girl’ 
without any ambiguity or need for explanation further down the road. In this sense, 
and resulting from my experiences with those who did decide it should be the Childs’ 
choice, I believe that there could be more done to support families with children with 
CAH as I feel that perhaps the pressures (however real or perceived) and anxieties 
felt by parents are often neglected in place of supporting the individual with CAH 
themselves. Perhaps more support for both parents and children together would lead 
to wider-society having a greater understanding or knowledge of such disorders
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meaning that cases of hasty decisions to operate at birth and issue of the individuals 
consent to gender assignment would become fewer.
All of these points are based on my perception of the situation and observations I 
made during my time working on the research, which definitely shaped my responses 
to your research as I struggled with feeling I had to make a decision to operate or not 
when I feel that there is so much more you need to know relating to whether it would 
be for medical reasons or whether it is purely cosmetic and the drives and 
motivations behind that decision -  would a child who was post op still be encouraged 
to lead their own development in whatever direction it took them or would they be 
type cast to fit into the stereotype of the gender chosen. Would they even be told 
they’d had an operation? I felt it wasn’t a simple yes/no situation!
Due to the nature of the study being double blind as I mentioned previously, it meant 
that I did not know which child I worked with had CAH or not. I may have 
mentioned before that I like have my preconceptions challenged and I found one 
particular case refreshing as I couldn't help but try to work out, while running the 
battery of tests with the children, which one had CAH and which didn't. In this 
particular case I was completely convinced that I had correctly identified the child 
with CAH as she wasn't very stereotypically 'girly', whereas her younger sibling was 
incredibly girly, wearing pink, choosing stereotypical toys that we would expect girls 
to play with etc. However I later found out that it was the younger sibling who had 
CAH which completely went against the conclusions I had drawn. I found this all the 
more refreshing when I thought about the fact that as a child myself I never fitted 
into the stereotype of being a little girl - 1 loved rough and tumble play, preferred to 
dress up as cowboys over Princesses and yet I still relied on stereotypes to make the 
split decision when I was faced with these children I worked with. It just showed me 
that really on face value there really weren't any differences between children 
with/without CAH. Incidentally this is the same case as where the parents were 
letting the child decide for themselves yet still raising her as a girl - dressing her in 
pink and teaching her female values as they believed in their family there were strict 
female/ male roles (cooking, cleaning, etc) that I spoke of earlier.
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In all my time working on this project was a real breath of fresh air reminding me not 
to judge a book by a cover, or at least question my rationale after I've made any kind 
of judgement.
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Sent: 16 July 2012 02:36
To: Ansara YGL Mr (PG/R - Psychology); Hegarty PJ Dr (Psychology)
Subject: Personal Account
This is a personal account of my experiences of having an undescended testicle. I am 
happy for Gavi Ansara to quote from it, and use the material as he sees fit for his 
doctoral research.
I had a happy childhood, at least up until puberty. I attended, from the age of six to 
eleven, a very progressive state primary school in XXXXXXXXXX, England, 
catering for both boys and girls. I was taught about the importance of protecting the 
environment, for example, during a time when 'Green' was almost exclusively used 
to refer to a colour and not an ecological movement. In fact, our school was close to 
being a zoo.
We had a large number of birds, including a kestrel with one leg that had been 
rescued, which I remember feeding with dead mice. We also had an alligator, albeit 
quite a small one, and I remember having to evacuate a class room when it escaped 
one day. I also remember my mother's surprise when I brought home a parrot to stay 
with us for the summer. It was that sort of school. My parents sent me there, and let 
me remain, for two very sensible reasons, the children at this school were known to 
be veiy happy and well-adjusted, and there was a focus on literacy, numeracy and a 
love of learning. The headmaster, XXXXX, had a vision for education, and it was a 
political vision, much to the annoyance, I later found out, of the Local Education 
Authority. I was taught, for example, that academic selection to secondary schools 
was divisive and wrong, in clear contradiction to the LEA's policy at the time. This 
also applied to organised, competitive sports which were also discouraged. Co­
operation, not competition was what mattered. Mr XXXXX had a number of adopted 
children, of different ethnicities, and regarded bullying, due to difference, as being a 
very serious offence. We were told this often. I remember a school assembly, for 
example, when we were taught to admire the black American tennis player Arthur 
Ashe, who had shown dignity, we were told, in the face of racism. This was, it 
should be remembered, the 1970s, long before anti-racism, and anti-bullying policies
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became common in schools, especially so in an area that was otherwise socially 
conservative, and politically Conservative. As a small child I wrote a lot of poetry, 
read widely, and loved being read to, and become fascinated by school plays. The 
exception to these progressive attitudes were attitudes to sex and the body. I have no 
recollection of any sort of teaching about such matters. Nevertheless, my memories 
of this school are ones of happiness, and a feeling of security and being cared for. I 
expected by views to be taken into account, and my feelings to be regarded as being 
worthy of care. This all seemed perfectly normal to me. I had no experience of 
anything else.
My home life, during my early, years was similarly happy. We lived in a large house, 
with a large garden, and I had a number of friends close by. I was, however, quite a 
late child. My mother, keen to have a daughter, had given birth to two sons, then had 
a miscarriage, had then made a final attempt to bring a girl into the world when she 
was 41, only to end up with another son. My father had been 42 when I was bom. 
This meant that my parents had been teenagers in the 1940s, whereas most of my 
peers' parents had been teenagers in the 1960s. This marked a significant difference, 
not least to attitudes towards sex, and the body. I remember there being a far more 
relaxed attitude towards such things in my friends' houses, with one friend's mother 
sunbathing topless, and others happily discussing some 'sexy' scene in the latest film. 
The opposite was true in my house. In fact, my mother, despite managing to give 
birth to three children, had an extraordinary fear of nudity, finding being seen not 
fully clothed to be very upsetting. She also found seeing nudity on television 
similarly distressing.
So, overall, I would say, at the age of 11, when puberty was taking place, I was a 
quite happy and well-balanced child. I have no recollections of being particularly 
scared of anyone, and would automatically trust people. I was physically healthy too. 
However, my ignorance of my body and sexuality was substantial. This was, of 
course, before the internet. I do not even remember there being medical text books 
either at home or at school. I had no idea what changes should be taking place in my 
body. I knew, from about the age of eight, that I was attracted to girls, but my 
knowledge of sexuality was equally poor and distorted, coming from my peers.
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television (which was hardly explicit on these subjects at this time), and occasionally 
pornography. I was allowed to remain in total ignorance. However, I think around 
the age of eleven I began to realise that I might not be quite the same as other boys. I 
had heard people talk about 'balls' but I appeared to have just one. I remember, 
probably around the age of eleven, being in the boys changing rooms, and asking 
another boy if his testicles were like mine. I remember him being dismissive, and 
telling me not to worry about things. I do not think I was very worried at the time. I 
was more curious. As I say, I was a happy and secure child and did not worry about 
very much, beyond games, pets, football, children's television programmes, and the 
usual concerns of a small boy.
Matters, however, radically, changed, when I was twelve. Home life had become 
much more difficult. My father's business affairs had gone very badly and we had to 
move to a much smaller house, away from my friends. My brothers, much older than 
me, had left the family home, the older leaving the country for several years. My 
father drank very heavily, and my parents marriage was very unhappy. I would 
usually come home from school to my mother in tears. During the coming years, I 
felt a level of distress and isolation that it took me decades before I was able to talk 
about. Around this time I was also sent to a new school. Having passed the eleven 
plus I was sent to an all-boys grammar school. Founded [several centuries before], 
the school had been taken into state ownership by the 1945 Labour government, but 
still hung on to its public school history, with a very traditional syllabus, and only the 
most traditional sports allowed (it was made clear to us, for example, that the school 
did not have a soccer team as soccer was a working class sport). In the 1970s, the 
Labour government under James Callaghan, and with Shirely Wiliams as Education 
Secretary, had come close to abolishing the grammar schools. Grammar school 
children were told repeatedly how lucky they were to be allowed to have an 
academically elite, free education, and how fortunate they were now to have a new 
Conservative government that would protect these elite schools. The children were 
expected to be suitably grateful. However, I disliked it intensely from the beginning.
I disliked being called by my surname only. I hated the joylessness of the lessons, 
and the casual sarcasm and borderline sadism of some of the teachers. I disliked the 
compulsory rugby. However, matters got worse.
342
Appendix N -  Robert’s Story
Soon after starting at the new school, I remember changing in the assembly hall, 
which doubled as a gymnasium. I remember telling the boy next to me that I had 
only one testicle. He seemed uninterested, but went on to tell other boys what I had 
said. As I say, confiding in others felt natural to me. I never considered the dangers. 
More importantly, I felt at the time I had no one to talk to, and no source of 
information. I needed to know if I was different and, if so, how. However, my 
'confession' soon spread around the school. Over the next six years, until I left the 
school, chants of'testy' were common whenever I entered a room. This was usually 
followed by some degree of violence (what I think was called 'giving a rock' was 
common, for example, whereby knuckles were brought down quickly onto the top of 
the skull causing intense pain). While this manifestation of bullying may not have 
been uncommon, it being related to a genital defect, that I so poorly understood, 
made it especially difficult. I clearly was different, but how and why, and what I 
should do about it, remained areas of deep uncertainty. During this time, I withdrew 
from all activity that would involve any sort of emotional involvement on my behalf.
I stopped writing poetry, and sought only my own company. I also had a lisp, and 
found reading aloud difficult. I remember a particularly sadistic English teacher 
called XXXXXXXXX who made my life a misery for years. I developed a strange 
inability to actually hold a pen at times, losing the ability to control the muscles in 
my hand. I did not do well at school, often coming bottom in exams. The bullying 
was continuous and intense. Very little, if anything, was done by the school to stop it. 
Graham Greene, the English novelist and Catholic, wrote in one of the volumes of 
his autobiography, that he learnt something very important at school, the meaning of 
the word 'hell'. I have always felt I knew what he meant.
During the ages of 12 and 161 think I became aware that I had an undescended 
testicle, but my ignorance surrounding this remained. I did not know if this was 
serious, and if so, how. I did not know if I functioned 'normally' sexually as I had no 
idea what that meant. Indeed, I had little grasp on what was happening when I had a 
'wet dream'. I had little knowledge of even the mechanics of sex until well into my 
teenage years. I was mainly aware that I was different, and being bullied for being so. 
This difference had some practical implications. Saddles, for example, on bicycles or 
horses, would often cause me pain, my anatomy not being in the place expected by
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those who designed such items. I also think that, curiously, having unusual testicles 
gave me a heightened sense of self. I think, perhaps, I started to define my sense of 
self in terms of being different, isolated, and unhappy. This has stayed with me.
When I was 17 I told my mother I had an undescended testicle. She made an 
appointment with our GP, and I went to see him. He was quite kind and relaxed, and 
assured me that I had nothing to worry about, and could have an operation if I 
wanted, though the operation would be purely cosmetic. I am not sure I really fully 
understood what the operation would involve but I said I would like to have it done. I 
was duly admitted to a local hospital. I now have a scar, of about 10 centimetres, on 
the upper part of my left thigh. It seems to me that the undescended testicle was 
simply cut out, another incision made in my scrotum, and the testicle inserted. Given 
the scarring, and the fact that I have two testicle of substantially different size, I am 
not sure there really has been much of a cosmetic improvement. In fact, I was quite 
self-conscious about it for some time, especially in my 20s when I was sexually 
active. Having said that, it is not so much the operation that has stayed with me, but 
the years of doubt and confusion, and total lack of information. Clearly, a lot of the 
unhappiness I experienced in my teenage years was not directly related to my 
genitals. However, I think that the bullying and violence was made more intense 
because of it, as were the feelings of isolation, confusion and feeling different. I am 
quite sure that this all relates to the years of heavy drinking, gambling, problems with 
authority, and other patterns of self-destructive behaviour, that have been so very 
damaging to much of my life and well-being.
I have no idea if the operation I had was right or wrong. However, as a child I would 
have enormously benefitted from some level of information about how my body 
would change through puberty, and someone to turn to when I discovered that 
matters were not as I thought they should be. I remain amazed that intelligent people, 
charged with professional responsibilities towards children, presumably thought that 
providing such care and information was unimportant. Perhaps they assumed that 
such matters were handled in the home. However, as Tolstoy remarked in Anna 
Karenina: 'Happy families are all alike; every unhappy family is unhappy in its own 
way.' One cannot rely on the unhappy family. Instead, schools, and the state, have a 
duty of care. This seems obvious to me. Paradoxically, these experiences perhaps
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helped make me a better teacher (I hate the idea of letting down my students), and 
maybe even a more interesting researcher, as I tend to work in developing and under­
researched areas, on the edge, as it were, unwilling or unable to be part of any sort of 
mainstream.
"So we beat on, boats against the current, home back ceaselessly into the past."
The Great Gatsby. F Scott Fitzgerald.
345
Appendix O -  Chapter 5 Experiment 1 and 2 Recruitment Text
[Note that abridged versions were posted or reposted by others on social media such 
as Facebook and Twitter]
We are seeking adult participants for a new study about experiences with language 
that describes gender. You will be asked to describe an everyday event and then 
asked to respond to some questions about the event. You will then be asked some 
personal questions. This online study is anonymous. No identifying details will be 
requested and any individually identifying details you share in response to personal 
questions or open response text boxes will be anonymised prior to data analysis. 
Depending on how much you write, the study is expected to take 15-25 minutes to 
complete.
Please visit the study link if you would like to participate:
[LINK TO STUDY]
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the University of Surrey 
Ethics Committee.
Please contact me at v.ansara@surrev.ac.uk if you have any questions or concerns 
about this study.
Thanks!
Gavi Ansara
PhD Researcher & Academic Tutor 
School of Psychology 
Faculty of Arts & Human Sciences 
University of Surrey
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Experiences with language that describes gender
Study Information & Consent
Page exit logic: Participant C onsentiF: Question "Select one:" contains any {"No. I 
do not consent to participate in this study.") THEN: Redirect to: googjo.cpm
Page exit logic: New Page Logic A clionlF: Question "Select one:" contains any 
("Yes. I consent to participate in this study and I am 18 years of age or older.") 
THEN: Jump to pape 2 - MG N am ai\c
Welcome! This study explores people’s experiences with language that 
describes gender. In this study, you will be asked to share your 
experience about an everyday event. You will then be asked some 
personal questions. This online study is anonymous. No identifying 
details will be requested and any individually identifying details you 
share in response to personal questions or open response text boxes will 
be anonymised prior to data analysis.
This study has received a favourable ethical opinion from the 
University of Surrey Ethics Committee. Data will be stored in 
accordance with the Data Protection Act 1998 and kept for 10 years in 
line with University of Surrey policy. This research has been organised 
by Gavi Ansara, a PhD candidate in the School of Psychology at the 
University of Surrey, United Kingdom, under the supervision of Dr 
Peter Hegarty. Please contact us at y.ansara@surrey.ac.uk or 
p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk with any questions or concerns about this 
study.
You are free to leave the study at any time without explanation, but 
before closing your browser window, we ask that you select the ’Exit 
study without completing’ option that appears on each page of this
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study and submit this response to receive a debriefing and relevant 
links. Please note that the first time you submit the page with ’Exit 
study without completing’ selected, you will be prompted to complete 
all questions on the page. After you receive this prompt, you will be 
able to go to the debriefing page by re-selecting Exit study without 
completing’ and clicking submit a second time, without completing any 
other responses.
Please note that when optional questions are left blank, you will receive 
a prompt that your responses are incomplete. If you intended to leave 
the optional question blank, just click to continue the study a second 
time and you will be directed to the next page. Please note that you will 
only be able to go forward in this study, so please check that you have 
selected the answers you wish before submitting your responses for 
each page.
The study is expected to take 15-25 minutes to complete. There are no 
known risks associated with participating in this study. However, we 
ask that you complete this study in a private setting to make it easier 
for you to give honest responses. After completing the study or after 
exiting the study prior to completion, you will be directed to an exit 
screen containing a study debrief and relevant links.
Select one:*
O No, I do not consent to participate in this study.
Yes, I consent to participate in this study and I am 18 years of age or older.
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MG Narrative
Page exit logic: Exit Studs IF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" = ("Exit study 
without completing") THEN: Jump to page 1-" - i'-xi( Screen
Many people find that other people most often refer to them using 
terms that imply their gender. For example, terms like woman, man, 
Ms, Mrs, Mr, Ma’am, Sir, she, and he all communicate the speaker’s 
belief that a person is a woman or a man. However, sometimes people 
make mistakes and people are addressed or described by a term that 
doesn’t match their gender. Can you think of a time when you were 
addressed or described in this way? If so, then please write a few 
sentences about this experience in the box below.
If you cannot recall having had this experience, please write ’none’ or 
’N/A’ in the text box and PLEASE ANSWER ALL FURTHER 
QUESTIONS ON OTHER PAGES OF THIS STUDY IMAGINING 
HOW IT WOULD BE TO HAVE HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.
Many people find that other people most often refer to them using 
terms that imply their gender. For example, terms like woman, man, 
Ms, Mrs, Mr, Ma’am, Sir, she, and he all communicate the speaker’s 
belief that a person is a woman or a man. However, sometimes people 
make mistakes and address or describe people by a term that doesn’t 
match their gender. Can you think of a time when you addressed or 
described (a) person(s) in this way? If so, then please write a few 
sentences about this experience in the box below.
If you cannot recall having had this experience, please write ’none’ or 
’N/A’ in the text box and PLEASE ANSWER ALL FURTHER 
QUESTIONS ON OTHER PAGES OF THIS STUDY IMAGINING 
HOW IT WOULD BE TO HAVE HAD THIS EXPERIENCE.
Exit Study or Continue?*
Exit study without completing
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Continue study
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How You Felt
Page exil logic: Exit Study IF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" = ("Exit study 
without completing") THEN: Jump to page 13 - h.xit Screen
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term, how did you 
feel?
L  ' 1 Bad O 2  O 3  O 4  O 5  O e  O 7  Good
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term, how did you 
feel?
O  1 Sad O 2 O 3 O 4 O 5 O e  O 7 Happy
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term, how did you 
fee!?
G ' 1 Tense O  2 O  3 O  4 W  5 O  6 U  7 Relaxed
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term, how did you 
feel?
 ^ 1 Rejected O  2 O  3 O  4 O  5 O  6 W  7 Accepted
Additional comments about how you felt (optional):
Exit Study or Continue?*
O Exit study without completing
O  Continue study
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How You Think The Person(s) Felt
Page exit logic: Exit Study IF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page 13 - Exit Screen
When you used the wrong gender term, how do you think the person(s) for whom 
you used the wrong gender term felt?
0 1 Bad O 2  O 3 O 4  Ü 5  O e  O 7 Good
When you used the wrong gender term, how do you think the person(s) for whom 
you used the wrong gender term felt?
O  1 Sad O 2  O 3 Ü 4  Ü 5  Ü 6  Ü 7  Happy
When you used the wrong gender term, how do you think the person(s) for whom 
you used the wrong gender term felt?
G) 1 Tense (Z/2 W  3 G) 4 O  5 OJ 6 G) 7 Relaxed
When you used the wrong gender term, how do you think the person(s) for whom 
you used the wrong gender term felt?
O  1 Rqected C) 2 W 3 G) 4 ^^'5 O  6 LJ 7 Accepted
Additional comments about how you think the person(s) felt (optional):
Exit Study or Continue?*
O Exit study without completing
O Continue study
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Your Life Feelings
Page exit logic: Exit Study IF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page. .13 - Exit .Screen
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term.
How much did you feel you belonged in that setting?
1 Not at all U  2 O  3 L )  4 O  5 6 O  7 Very much
How true was the statement life  is meaningless’?
O  1 Not at all C )  2 3 O  4 W  5 O  6 G ) 7 Very much
How true was the statement 7 am in control of my life'?
Cy 1 Not at all O  2 1 ^ 3  O  4 O  5 O  6 O  7 Very much
To what extent did you think you were valued as a person?
Cj 1 Not at all G' 2 O  3 G' 4 U  5 G' 6 7 T/eryrniwdh
Exit Study or Continue?*
W  Exit study without completing
kJ  Continue study
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Their Life Feelings
Page exit logic: New Page Logic ActionlF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" 
contains any ("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page 13 - Exit
When you used the wrong gender term, to what extent do you think the 
person(s) for whom you used the wrong gender term felt...
That they belonged in that setting?
U  1 Not at all O  2 W  3 C j  4 O  5 O  6 U  7 Very much
That life is meaningless?
O  1 Not at all O  2 O  3 O  4 O  5 O  6 (Z) 7 T/eryrniwdh
That they were in control of their life?
Q  1 Not at all O 2  O 3  O 4  O 5  O ô  (Z) 7 T/ery rnwdi
That you valued them as a person?
G) 1 Not at all O  2 G  ^3 O  4 G) 5 O  6 (L)7 3A%ynuKh
Exit Study or Continue?*
O Exit study without completing
Continue study
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Your Relationship to Speaker
Page exit logic: Exit StudylF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page 13 - Exit Screen
When you were addressed or described by the wrong gender term.
To what extent did you feel that you were being ignored or excluded by the 
speaker(s)?
(Z]) 1 f4cü9Lt all (kZ) 2 (ZI) 3 (Z/^^1 (Z )  5 (ZZ) 6 (ZZ) 7 \feiyrirrudi
To what extent did you feel that you were being noticed or included by the 
speaker(s)?
CZ) 1 Not at a l l  U  2  CZ) 3 G )  4  ( Z )  5  G )  6  ( Z )  7  V e r y  m u c h
How much did you like the speaker(s)?
1 Not at all O 2 O 3 G) 4 W 5 GJ 6 G7 7 Very much
How much did the speaker(s) like you?
W  1 Not at all (Z )  2 G )  3 O  4 G ^  5 O  6 G )  7 Very much
Exit Study or Continue?*
O Exit study without completing
O Continue study
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Speaker's Relationship to Person(s)
Page exit logic; Exit StudylF: Question "Exit or Continue?" contains any ("Exit 
study without completing ") THEN: Jump to nage in - Exit Screen
When you used the wrong gender term, to what extent do you think the 
person(s) for whom you used the wrong gender term felt...
That you were ignoring or excluding them?
O  1 Not at all O  2 G ) 3 C ) 4 GJ" 5 O  6 O  7 Very much
That you were noticing or including them?
1 Not at all C'2 O s  0 4  O s  O ô  O  7 Very much
That they liked you?
G ' 1 Not at all G7 2 U  3 G/ 4 G) 5 G) 6 W  7 Very much
That you liked them?
1 Not at all k J  2 G7 3 KJ  4 G3 5 KJ  6 W  7 Very much
Exit or Continue?*
Exit study without completing
Continue study
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Personal Data
Page exit logic: Exit StudylF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing "1 THEN: Jump to page in - Exii Screen
Please provide the following information about yourself as honestly as 
you can.
Validation: Min = 18 Max = 1?()
Age:
Current occupation(s) or course(s):
N ationality/nationalities :
Language(s) you know fluently (including English, if fluent):
What term(s) would you use to describe your ethnicity/ethnicities?
Exit Study or Continue?*
Exit study without completing
Continue study
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Gender & Sexuality
Page exit logic: Exit StudylF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page in - i i \ ‘a Screen
What term(s) would you use to describe your gender?
Is this gender the same as the one you were assigned at birth? 
O  Yes
O No
Is this gender the same as the gender typically associated 
with your sex designation at birth?
O  Yes
oNo
Is this gender the same as the gender typically associated 
with the sex designation on your current identity documents 
(e.g., driver's license, passport, etc.}?
W  Yes
No
Based on your current self-described gender and your sex 
designation at birth, would other people classify you as 'trans' 
(e.g., transgender or transsexual)?
O Yes
o No
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Would you classify yourself as 'trans'? 
G ) Yes
O n o
Would you classify yourself as 'intersex'? 
O Yes
O No
If yes, please explain:
What term(s) would you use to describe your sexuality?
Exit Study or Continue?*
O Exit study without completing
O Continue study
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Prior Knowledge
Page exit logic: Exit StudylF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to page, i.3- I ndt Screen
Before participating in this study, did you have any exposure (e.g., 
heard about, viewed, etc.) to...
Descriptions of this study from previous participants? 
O Yes
No
If yes, please explain:
The idea that people sometimes use the wrong gender term 
when addressing or describing others?
G ) Yes
G ) No
If yes, please explain:
The idea that people's genders may be different from the gender 
typically associated with their birth-assigned sex?
O  Yes
No
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If yes, please explain:
Exit Study or Continue?*
W  Exit study without completing
Continue study
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Final Comments and Submit
Page exit logic; Exit StudylF; Question "Exit Study or Continue?" contains any 
("Exit study without completing ") THEN: Jump to ;xigc l.\-  E,\iî Screen
Page exit logic: Finish StudylF: Question "Exit Study or Continue?" = ("Continue 
study") THEN: Jump to page 15 -J'hantc ’H'ouî
Exit Study or Continue?*
Exit study without completing
Continue study
Please add any final comments about this study in the box below.
To complete the study, please click the button below.
362
Appendix P -  Chapter 5 Online Survey
Exit Screen
Page exit logic: New Page Logic ActionlF: Question "We are interested in why you 
did not complete this study, as this information will be used to inform future study 
design. We invite you to use the following optional response box to tell us why you 
did not complete this study (optional):" is answered THEN: Jump to page 11 - "pAii '
This study evaluated your experience of ’’misgendering," that is to say 
designating a person as a member of a gender category with which they 
do not identify. Some participants were asked to describe an 
experience in which they were misgendered. Other participants were 
asked to describe an experience in which they misgendered another 
person. Misgendering may occur to anyone, but is a particularly 
common experience of people whose gender self-designations differ 
from the gender they were assigned (i.e., those often labelled ’trans’ or 
’intersex’). We hope this study will provide useful information about 
how misgendering affects people who experience or engage in 
misgendering and that our results will inform future interventions to 
address misgendering.
Links to support resources:
Befrienders Worldwide- Links to worldwide resources in your local 
area that provide emotional support and suicide prevention for people 
in distress, http://www.befrienders.org/
Laura’s Playground- Moderated transgender chat room and suicide 
prevention resources.
http://www.lauras-plavground.com/chat.htm
We are interested in why you did not complete this study, as this 
information will be used to inform future study design. We invite you 
to use the following optional response box to tell us why you did not 
complete this study (optional):
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If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Principal 
Investigator Gavi Ansara, at y.ansara@surrey.ac.uk or his supervisor 
Dr Peter Hegarty, at p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk.
If you wish to obtain a summary of research findings following 
completion of the study writeup, you may email the Principal 
Investigator at gavriel.ansara@gmail.com. Please save this email 
address for your records.
"Exit" thank you page
Please close this window. Thank you.
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Thank You!
Thank you for participating! This study evaluated your experience of 
"misgendering," that is to say designating a person as a member of a 
gender category with which they do not identify. Some participants 
were asked to describe an experience in which they were misgendered. 
Other participants were asked to describe an experience in which they 
misgendered another person. Misgendering may occur to anyone, but 
is a particularly common experience of people whose gender self­
designations differ from the gender they were assigned (i.e., those often 
labelled ’trans’ or ’intersex’). We hope this study will provide useful 
information about how misgendering affects people who experience or 
engage in misgendering and that our results will inform future 
interventions to address misgendering.
Links to support resources:
Befrienders Worldwide- Links to worldwide resources in your local 
area that provide emotional support and suicide prevention for people 
in distress, http ://www.befrienders.org/
Laura’s Playground- Moderated transgender chat room and suicide 
prevention resources.
http://www.lauras-pIayground.com/chat.htm
If you have any questions or concerns, please contact Principal 
Investigator Gavi Ansara, at y.ansara@surrey.ac.uk or his supervisor 
Dr Peter Hegarty, at p.hegarty@surrey.ac.uk.
If you wish to obtain a summary of research findings following 
completion of the study writeup, you may email the Principal 
Investigator at gavriel.ansara@gmail.com. Please save this email 
address for your records.
Please close this window.
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Dear Examiners,
You have now reached the end of this thesis.
Thank you for the time and energy that you have invested in reading this thesis. 
I look forward to your insights and questions.
With respect and appreciation,
Gavi Ansara
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